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ABSTIUCT 
This dissertation focuses on the intcractions bctwccn local public sector organisations 
and institutions in the development of pcrrormancc measurement (PNI) targets and 
indicators. The research is grounded in the pcrfonnancc mcasurcmcnt and managcmcnt 
literature and adopts a joint new institutional and resource dependence pcrspcctivc. 
Empirically, the research, which is qualitative and thcory-building, consists of case 
studies undcrtakcn in local public scctor organisations in England. The itcrativc 
comparison of thcory and data has cnabled the investigation of a number of relevant 
thcmcs. 
In the last dccade, the British Govcmmcnt has placcd grcat cmpliasis on the consistcney 
of objectivcs, targcts and indicators from national to local lcvcls with the aim of 
cnhancing pcrformancc, transparcncy and accountability, and of driving bchaviour. 
flowcvcr, this rcscarch shows that the influcncc of scvcral organisations and the co- 
cxisicncc of various Phi initiativcs gcncrate confusion and ovcriaps locally. Nlorcovcr, 
in the cascs considcrcd the unmanagcablc numbcr of indicators and the lack of clarity 
rcgarding the drivcrs and purposcs of Phi havc lcd to confuscd mcssages and countcr- 
productivc approachcs to the mcasurcmcnt and managcmcnt of pcrformancc. 
From a theoretical vicw-point, the favourabic comments expressed by intcrvicwccs 
regarding the current I'M regime contrast with critics of New Public Management. 
Furthermore, legitimacy-sccking and efficiency-enhancing mtionaics have emerged as 
intertwined and loosely coupled. This is in opposition to what is maintained by early 
new institutional theorists. In line with resource dependence theory, Phl systems were 
found to be significant components of powcrsystcrns in organisations. 
Through the examination of the roles of PNI and the investigation of relevant conccpts 
such as 'goldcn thread' and performance culture, this research aims to make an impact 
on policy-making and to improve the ways in which targets and indicators are sct and 
used, hence having a positive cffcct on the scrviccs dclivcrcd. 
Keywords: Performance Measurement, Organisation Theory, Public Sector, 
Performance Nlanagcmcntý Measurement Theory. 
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7lie gods did not reival. from the beginning, all things to its. 
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Nor yet of all things of which I speak- 
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For all is but a wown iveb ofgticsses. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview 
This research focuses on the interactions between local. public sector organisations and 
institutions in developing performance measurement targets and indicators. In recent 
years scholars have investigated topics related to the measurement of performance in the 
public services. However, the relationships between the performance measurement 
(PM) systems being used at different levels of the public sector have rarely been studied 
in an empirical way. Furthermore, in the literature there is a gap between applied and 
theoretical perspectives, and in both types of approaches the philosophical bases of PM 
have not received sufficient attention. 
Govcnuncnts in several countries arc also demonstrating growing interest in this area, 
as are the press and media, and arc using performance targets and league tables in order 
to push through modernisation programmes, and demonstrate that value for taxpayers' 
money is being delivered. In this context, the British Government' has used the 
mctaphor of the 'golden thread' to cascade and align objectives, targets and 
performance indicators from central government to local organisations. flowcvcr, 
despite the substantial costs associated with it, there is little evidence of results being 
achieved through the adoption of PM systems at the local level. 
From a personal perspective, the researcher is committed to the improvement of public 
services' performance through a more cfficicnt and cffcctivc use of PM systems. 
Therefore, this research aims to make a contribution at theoretical, methodological and 
practical levels. To do so, both applied and theoretical approaches have been taken into 
consideration, as well as the ontological and epistemological bases of performance 
measurement. Moreover, through three distinct phases - exploratory case studies, pilot 
interviews and in-depth case studies - the relationships between local and national 
levels of government arc empirically studied. Thus, the appropriateness of the 'golden 
thread' mctaphor is critically assessed and the responses deployed by local 
organisations to institutional pressures examined. Finally, the drivers and purposes of 
PM in the public sector are investigated and recommendations are made for both its 
theory and practice. This introductory chapter provides an overview of the dissertation 
by presenting the theoretical background, empirical phases and findings of the research; 
the structure of the thesis is given in Figure 1.1. 
' Within the UK different performance measurement regimes have been implemented. Therdore, 
although this dissertation refers to the British Go-mmment, since the empirical analysis is based on the 
study of public sector organisations; in England, the research findings relate only to England and not to the 
whole of Great Britain. 
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1.2 Theoretical background 
Different bodies of literature were reviewed in order to ensure that the rcscarch is 
rigorous on both thc theoretical and methodological levels. First of all, contributions in 
the field of PM were considered together with the dcrinitions of 'pcrforinance 
measurement system' and the use of PNI models and frameworks in public and non- 
profit organisations. Subsequently, an in-depth review of the academic contributions to 
pcrfon-nancc measurement in the public sector was performed. This led to the 
identification of a number of research gaps. Furthermore, although a considerable 
number of studies have been carried out in this field, contributions seem mostly of two 
kinds: articles concerned mainly with practical aspects and papers that deal with mostly 
theoretical issues. Relatively littic research is both firmly grounded in theory and 
relevant to practice, and a gap appears between these two bodies of literature 
(Covaleski, Dirsmith and Samuel, 1996; Meredith and Samson, 2002). 
Af1cr considering the more 'applied' contributions, the use of several organisational 
theories in the field of PM was examined. As a result, a more in-depth and systematic 
literature review (Tranficid, Dcnycr and Smart, 2003) was undertaken on the uses and 
possible contributions of two theories - new institutional theory and resource 
dependence theory - in the subject of PNI in public sector organisations. In essence, 
new institutional theory is concerned with reproduction, imitation and acquisition of 
legitimacy, which are central concepts in the field of PNI in the public sector (cf. 
DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Geiger and Ittncr, 1996; Scott, 2001). Resource 
dependence theory looks at issues such as power, control and interdependencies 
between and within organisations, which arc equally important in this area (Oliver, 
1991; Pfcffcr and Salancik, 1978). 
Despite the differences existing among the perspectives considered, several research 
gaps emerged as interrelated. Following the review of the PM literature, the researcher 
decided to focus on the following issues: 
1. the characteristics and USCS of an organisation's PNI system 
2. the role of stakeholdcrs, especially in the design of PM systems 
3. the balance between internal and external (mandatory) indicators. 
Taking into consideration the research gaps that emerged in the systematic literature 
review, this research concentrates on the following two subjccts: 
1. the study of strategic responses to institutional pressures 
2. the interconnections bctwccn legitimacy and cfficicncy. 
3 
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The idcntirication and selection of the research gaps enabled the formulation of two 
overarching theoretical research questions: 
What are the relationships between local public sector organisations and 
institutions in the development ofperformance targets and indicators? 
* What are the strategic responses, conflicts, tensions and behaviours that arise? 
Before undertaking the fieldwork, a number of philosophical and methodological issues 
that could influence the course of the research were examined. 
1.3 Philosophical and methodological bases 
Although this research does not aim to investigate in depth the implications of the 
philosophy of science on PM, the researcher believes that solid ontological and 
epistemological bases would foster the development of PM as a field of research. 
Therefore, this thesis begins with a brief critique of the positivist paradigm that is 
prevalent in both management research in general and, in particular, in the field of 
performance measurement. Subsequently, the implications of adopting an objectivist 
ontological and subjectivist epistemological perspective are discussed, building on 
relevant contributions from philosophy of science and measurement theory in physics. 
Consistently with the ontological and epistemological positions adopted and the 
previous contributions in this area, this research is qualitative and theory-building. Case 
study was chosen as the research strategy and, in terms of data elicitation methods, 
different types of evidence were utilised: structured interviews, written texts and data 
obtained through observation. The triangulation of data greatly enhanced the validity of 
the research and mitigated the personal bias of the researcher. 
The research consists of three empirical phases. Two exploratory case studies were 
undertaken in a healthcare trust and a police force. Subsequently, unstructured 
interviews were carried out in nine local public sector organisations. Finally, two in- 
depth case studies were performed in a local authority and a fire service. In the 
cxploratory cases, publicly available documents were the main source of data, whereas 
in the in-depth case studies also 22 structured interviews were carried out. In terms of 
data analytic procedures, the data gathered was coded with the support of NVivo 
software. 
1.4 Exploratory case studies ' 
After defining the theoretical questions, the researcher set out to identify a suitable 
empirical context. The review of the PM literature shows that there is a relative lack of 
empirical research that describes in detail the systems and processes being used at 
different levels of government, particularly at the local level, to measure and manage 
performance (Talbot, 2005). In this context, the phrase 'golden thread' is used to 
express the consistency of objectives, targets and indicators throughout the different 
4 
levels from ccntral govcninicrit to scrvicc dclivcry (Audit Commission, 2002). In rcccnt 
years, the British Government has uscd the mctaphor of the 'goldcn thread' to cascade 
and align objcctivcs, targcts and indicators with the aim of criliancing pcrforniancc, 
transparcncy and accountability, and influcncing bchaviour. Given the dynamic context 
outlincd above and the relative lack of cnipirical studies in this arca, a preliminary 
rcscarch question was formulatcd: 
Does the metaphor ofthe 'goldcii thrcad'corrcctly rcprcScnt the wayperfonnance 
targets and indicators are developed in public sector organisations in E ngland? 
In onlcr to address this question, the PNI framework that is cffcctivcly in operation in 
part of the public sector in England was mapped. Operationally, two exploratory case 
studies were carried out in two different areas of the public sector - healthcare and the 
police. The analysis of the data shows that there is actually no coherent and clear set of 
priorities for the public services in England that align with a golden thread n-nning from 
central government to local delivery agencies. Indicators cascading through the public 
sector multiply at a significant rate and an explicit sense of priority amongst the 
multitude of indicators seems to be missing at the local level. Furthermore, the 
identification of tile role of the measurement system emerged as a primary concern. 
As for the research conducted on this latter issue, academics have been inclined to adopt 
different foci. A number of scholars have looked at the reasons for measuring 
performance from a general point of view, ranging from control to accountability to 
performance improvement (Smith, 1995a; Kopczynski and Lombardo, 1999). Others 
have concentrated on the intcmal/managcrial uses of PNI (13chn, 2003; Bovaird and 
Gregory, 1996; Pidd, 2005), whereas a third group has focused almost exclusively on 
central control (Power, 1997; Townley, 2002). Furthermore, articles written on this 
topic are seldom empirically grounded. Ilcrcforc, this research investigates the roles of 
PM in the public sector in more depth. 'I'lie following empirical research questions were 
formulated: 
Miat are the roles ofperformance measurement in localptiblic scclor organisations 
in England? 
IP7: at responses do local public sector organisations enact as a result of the 
institutionalpressures toward conformity that arc exerted on them? 
1.5 Pilot interviews and in-depth case studies 
In order to better scope the breadth and depth of the case studies, a series of 
unstructured interviews were carried out in nine organisations belonging to different 
areas of the public sector. These interviews led to the identification of a range of issues 
wider than the one achievable by looking at just one sub-sector. They also provided the 
rescarcherwith a better understanding of the possibility of considering different areas of 
the public sector and the consequent limitations of the final results of the research. The 
identification of a number of contextual and non-contextual aspects informed the choice 
of the subsequent in-depth case studies. Furthermore, the researcher had the opportunity 
5 
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to familiarise himself with the performance regimes existing in the public sector in 
England and the role of audit bodies. Finally, by means of such interviews, it was also 
possible to pilot the interview protocol and matrix subsequently used in the in-depth 
case studies. 
Building on the literature review and previous empirical stages, two significant cases, 
one holistic and one embedded, were carried out in two quite different organisations: a 
fairly simply structured and homogeneous fire authority (SFRA), and a complex multi- 
service local authority (LBBD). The first case was initially considered as a single unit of 
analysis and investigated separately. The second case was broken down into four units. - 
corporate level and three different services. These four units were then analysed both 
separately and jointly; finally, the two case studies were compared and contrasted. 
The primary finding is that, despite the differences of the organisations in size and 
scope, the issues raised were particularly consistent across cases. Moreover, somewhat 
unexpectedly, few respondents criticised the quite centralised PM regime, which 
pervades the public sector in England. Both national and local targets and indicators 
were considered generally appropri. ate and PM regarded as an indispensable element to 
promote change and improve service delivery. In both cases, respondents working at the 
corporate level focused on strategy, provision of 'joined up' services and ways in which 
a culture of performance management could be fostered locally, whereas nearer the 
frontline service delivery more emphasis was given to technical and more specific 
issues related to the performance targets and indicators. 
Finally, few discrepancies could be found when making comparisons among units of 
analysis in LBBD and between LBBD and SFRA. In the fire authority greater emphasis 
was given to leadership as an element to promote the use of performance measurement. 
This was mostly due to the recent introduction of PM in the fire service. Similarly, the 
acceptance of national indicators was regarded more favourably by services where PM 
had been in use for a shorter period. This could be because, in line with the argument 
put forward by resource dependence theorists, the introduction of PM influences the 
level of attention paid to services both nationally and locally, and the number of 
opportunities for them to attract funding. 
1.6 Discussion 
A number of themes could be identified by comparing the literature with the empirical 
results. First of all, although the organisations considered in this research greatly differ 
in terms of internal structure, links with the environment and services provided, the 
analysis of documents and interviews show that they face similar challenges in relation 
to PM. 
Secondly, although central government has put great emphasis on the consistency of 
objectives, targets and indicators from national to local levels, the practice of the 
'golden thread' in the public sector in England is not as consistent as could be expected. 
The cases considered show that this is mainly due to the influence of a number of other 
organisations and stakeholder groups, and the co-existence of conflicting PM initiatives. 
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Thirdly, the majority of intcrvicwccs cxprcsscd positivc cornnicnts as to the currcnt PM 
rcgimc, notwithstanding the substantial body of acadcmic litcrature and anccdotcs 
reportcd by the mcdia that dccply criticisc it. lndccd, local organisations have national 
indicators in placc bccausc thcy are statutorily rcquircd to, but thcy ofIcn considcr thcm 
appropriatc and uscful. Morcovcr, although issucs wcre raiscd rcgarding the audit 
proccss, rclationships with govcrnmcnt dcpartvncnts and auditors wcre dcscribcd as 
incrcasingly satisfactory and collaborativc. Ilicrcforc, this rcscarch contradicts somc of 
the argumcnts put forward by critics of Ncw Public Nianagcmcnt conccrning thc dcsign 
and usc of pcrformancc targcts and indicators, and rclationships bctwccn national and 
local organisations. 
Fourthly, instrumental work processes (e. g. the use of pcrronnancc indicators) and 
symbolic display of rational organisational practice (e. g. compliance with externally 
developed indicators) were found to be intertwined and difficult to discriminate. 
Tlicreforc, it could be argued that the concepts of Icgitimacy and cfficicncy arc loosely 
coupled, rather than in opposition as argucd by early new institutional theorists. From a 
resource dependence point of view, increases in the number of targets were welcomed at 
both local and national levels, since they implied more attention paid to areas or 
competence and, possibly, allocation of gmatcr resources. However, resistance and 
tensions also cmcrgcd in relation to the control of resources exerted through the PM 
system by departments on local organisations, and, within the latter, by corporate on 
service levels. 
From a more technical perspective, the main problems local public sector organisations 
in England seem to be facing are related to the oflen unmanageable number of 
performance indicators (Pis) in place. Government departments and audit bodies are 
surely responsible for the indicators local organisations arc required to report on. 
However, it is mostly the intervention of other organisations and PM frameworks along 
the 'golden thread', and the introduction of Pis by local organisations themselves, that 
make the number of indicators grow. Furtlicn-norc, conflicting demands and lack of a 
coherent strategy have a negative impact on the promotion of a 'joined up' delivery of 
services. In this sense, the introduction of Local Area Agreements and a more 
participative approach by the auditors were particularly valued. 
An important concept emerging from the data is 'performance culture'. Several 
interviewces, especially at corporate level, related it to people's capability to connect 
single indicators and analytical pieces of information to the organisation's widcr 
objectives. However, other respondents, close to the front-linc, rcfcn-cd more to the 
focus of staff on PM, ability to measure performance and, ultimately, contribution to 
achieving high scores in the assessments undertaken by the auditors. The adoption of 
the former approach to PM ('culture of performance management') could bring about a 
more integrated and cost-cffectivc use of the PM system. Whereas the lattcr ("culture of 
performance measurement') could generate malfunctions, such as fixation on targets 
and indicators, rather than achievement of underlying objectives. 
Finally, this research explicitly investigated the drivers and purposes of PM in the 
public sector. As several intcrviewces; rcmarked, sometimes ccntralisation, rather than 
service improvement seems to be the main reason for implcmenting a PM system. 
However, although central govcnunent's influcncc on how performance is measured 
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locally cannot be underestimated, only a limited number of indicators are introduced 
with the sole purpose of monitoring performance. Moreover, from a central government 
point of view PM is considered a fundamental means to ensure accountability. 
However, even though interviewecs agreed on the importance of PM and its role in 
fostering accountability, they claimed that public is actually interested in services 
delivered, instead of information related to targets and indicators. 
From a local point of view, comparisons of performance between and within 
organisations are very valued. A number of national Pls are used by central government 
to calculate league tables and allocate resources. However, comparative data is 
sometimes used by local organisations to identify good practices. Furthermore, elected 
members and top managers seem particularly sensitive to rankings and comparisons 
with other authorities. Finally, as to the fourth major role identified -'managerial use' - 
issues related to strategic direction, dccision-making, internal allocation of resources, 
and organisational learning consistently emerged from the analysis of documents and 
interviews. 
Although different categories could be defined, the two in-depth case studies show that 
boundaries between these categories could often be thin and difficult to define. More 
importantly, interviews demonstrated that it is virtually impossible to define a system of 
independent and hierarchically-related categories in which each indicator could be 
univocally 'labelled', since every indicator usually fulfils more than one role. Indeed, 
one of the major findings of this research is that, as all interviewees remarked, data 
relative to national indicators are collected and analysed not only to report to auditors 
and government departments, but also for internal purposes. However, it is the 
insufficient clarity on drivers and purposes of PM that could lead to confused messages 
and counter-productive approaches to PM and perfortnance management. 
1.7 Conclusions 
The researcher believes that by creating knowledge that is firmly grounded in theory 
and relevant to practice it is possible to improve our understanding of PM and 
performance management in the public sector. Therefore, the objective of this research 
is to advance the theory and practice of PM, to impact on policy-making and to improve 
the ways in which targets and performance indicators are set and used, hence having a 
positive effect on the services delivered. 
From a theoretical point of view, this research contributes to the field of PM and to the 
organisation theory literature. From a methodological perspective, the researcher found 
that the iterative comparison of theory and data was essential to investigating issues that 
are relevant to both theory and practice. Moreover, the use of case studies and the data 
triangulation of interviews and documents led to the identification of several 'rich' 
themes. Finally, this research also has important implications for policy makers and for 
the design and use of performance targets and indicators in the public sector. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITEIUTURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL BASES 
2.1 Overview 
The aim of this chapter is to describe ]low the review of the literature provides tile 
research with solid theoretical bases and leads to the formulation of the conceptual 
research questions. Diffcrcnt bodies of literature were reviewed in order to ensure that 
the research is rigorous on both the theoretical and methodological levels (cf. Table 
2.1). Since this research focuses on the measurement of performance in public sector 
organisations, the review of the literature started by considering the main academic 
contributions in the area of performance measurement. '11iis provided the researcher 
with a solid background in the field. In section 2.2 the main findings of this part of the 
literature review arc discussed. 
Secondly, a review of the dcfinitions of 'performance measurement system' was carried 
out and an extensive literature review was undertaken to understand the use of PM 
models and frameworks in public and non-profit organisations (cf. section 2.3). 
Thirdly, an in-depth review of the academic contributions to performance measurement 
in the public sector was performed. In order to better understand the main challenges in 
rclation to how performance is measured and managed in public sector organisations, 
books and articles in the area of New Public Management were considered (cf section 
2.4). 
This extensive review of the literature also showed that contributions in performance 
measurement (PNI) in the public sector are mostly of two kinds: articles concerned 
mainly with practical aspects, and papers that deal predominantly with theoretical 
issues. In order to explore the latter type of approach, the use of five organisational 
theories - new institutional theory, resource dependence theory, agency theory, 
resourcc-bascd view of the finn, and contingency theory - in the field of PM was 
reviewed (cf section 2.5). As a result, a more in-depth and systematic literature review 
(Tranficid, Dcnyer and Smart, 2003) was undertaken on the uses and possible 
contributions of two theories - new institutional theory and resource dependence theory 
- in the subject of PM in public sector organisations (cf. sections 2.6 and 2.7). 
Finally, research gaps identified in the 'applied' and 'theoretical' bodies of literature are 
examined and used to formulate two overarching theoretical questions that drive the 
research. Chapter 3 reports the review of material regarding philosophy of science, 
methodology and methods. In chapters 4 and 5 the empirical phases this research 
consists of are presented. 
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Area of the Section of literature 
main issues 
Work undertaken and results obtained the 
investigated dissertation 
Perfon-nance Review of contributions from a number of Section 2.2 
measurement management fields such as operations, management 
accounting and strategy. On the basis of this review 
and in collaboration with a number of colleagues, the 
researcher developed the call for papers for upcoming 
special issue of Long Range Planning on strategic 
performance measurement he is guest editor of. 
Definition of Literature review and analysis undertaken in Section 2.3 
performance collaboration with colleagues from Cranfield's Centre 
measurement for Business Performance. As a result an article has 
systems been published on the Journal of Operations and 
Production Management (cf. Franco et al., 2007) 
Perforinance Extensive review of the literature on the use of Section 2.3 
measurement performance measurement frameworks in public and 
frameworks non-profit organisations. As a result an article has been 
in public and published on Production, Planning and Control (cf. 
non-profit Micheli and Kenncrley, 2005) 
sectors 
Performance Extensive review of the literature in the area of New Section 2.4 
measurement Public Management. Previous versions have been 
in the public presented at academic conferences (cf Micheli and 
sector Neely, 2006) and published in a report to the National 
Audit Office on the use of performance information in 
the public sector (Neely, Micheli and Martinez, 2006). 
Use of Literature review, in collaboration with colleagues Section 2.5 
organisation from Cranfield's Centre for Business Performance, of 
theories in the use of five organisational theories (agency theory, 
performance contingency theory, resource based view of the firm, 
measurement new institutional theory and resource dependence 
theory) in the field of performance measurement. 
Presentation of a paper at the Performance 
Measurement Association conference (Micheli et al., 
2004) 
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2.2 Performance measurement 
Over the last thirty years the field of performance measurement has been the focus of 
considerable attention from academics and practitioners alike in both the private and 
public sector (cf Behn, 2003; Bovaird, 1996; Hood, 2006; Johnson and Kaplan, 1987; 
Kaplan and Norton, 2004; Neely, 1999; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2004). Research has 
shown that, through appropriate measurement and management of performance, 
organisations can greatly benefit in the following areas: 
" formulation, implementation and review of organisational strategy (e. g. Ahn, 2001; 
Butler, Letza and Neale, 1997; Euske, Lebas, and McNair, 1993; Veliyath, 1992) 
" communication to stakeholders of the results achieved, and strengthening of brand 
and reputation (Atkinson et al., 1997; McKevitt and Lawton, 1996; Smith, 1995) 
" motivation of employees at all levels, creation of a performance improvement 
culture, and fostering of organisational learning (Gittell, 2000; Malina and Selto, 
2002). 
Furthermore, research has shown that private companies have made substantial 
investments in performance measurement. Recent reports suggest that the average 
organisation with one billion dollar sales spends over 25,000 person days planning and 
measuring their organisational performance. Additionally, companies such as Volvo 
believe that up to 20% of management time is associated with planning and budgeting, 
while Ford report that they spend some 1.2 billion a year on their budgeting process 
(Neely et al., 2001). 
In the public sector, following the recent introduction of 'New Public Management' 
reforms in a number of OECD countries, considerable attention has been paid to 
performance measurement by governments, practitioners and the media. In the UK, 
government departments estimate that they spend more than E150m. per year solely to 
monitor progress on national targets (this figure does not include the costs of front line 
organisations providing data) (Neely, Micheli and Martinez, 2006). 
Empirical research conducted in this field has shown how performance measurement 
can be generally productive and help improve organisational performance (cf 
Cavalluzzo and Ittrier, 2004; Davis and Albright, 2004; Ittner, Larcker and Randall, 
2003). However, if done poorly, it can be very expensive, and not only ineffective but 
harmful and indeed destructive (Royal Statistical Society, 2005). Therefore, in order to 
realise value and to help organisations become more sustainable in the longer term, it is 
crucial to improve the ways they measure and manage their performance. 
2.3 Main definitions 
Before turning our attention to the PM literature specifically related to the public sector, 
it is important to consider and define relevant concepts in the field. Looking at research 
conducted in recent decades, it could be noted how PM has been the focus of 
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considerable attention from scholars coming fmm areas as diverse as management 
accounting and control, opcrations managcmcnt, public managcmcnt, human resources, 
organisational bcllaviour, stratcgy managcmcnt, inforrnation systcms and marketing. 
While multi-d iscipi i nary research is appealing, it can also create complications. Tile 
different approaches towards PNI have led to numcrous dcflnitions of performance 
measurement and pcrforrnancc mcasurcmcnt system (PNIS)2. From an operations 
perspective, performance mcasurcmclit can be dcfincd as "the process of quantifying the 
ciTiciency and cffcctivcncss of action" (Necly, Gregory and Platts, 199S, p. 81)3. Neely 
(1998) also found that a PNIS consists of ", thrcc intcr-rclatcd elements: 
1. individual measures that quantify the cfficicncy and cffcctivcncss of actions 
2. a set of measures that combine to assess the performance of an organisation as a 
whole 
3. a supporting infrastructure that enables data to be acquired, collated, sorted, 
analysed, interpreted and disseminated" (in Kcnncricy and Neely, 2003, p. 218). 
Always fmm an operations point of view, a PMS has been dcrined as the reporting 
process that gives fccdback to employees on the outcome of actions (Bititci, Carric and 
McDevitt, 1997). 
From a strategic control perspective, two different aspects of a pcrfon-nance 
measurement system have been identified. On one hand, a PNIS reflects the procedures 
used to cascade down those performance indicators used to implement the strategy 
within an organisation (Gates, 1999). On the other hand, a PMS is the system that not 
only allows an organisation to cascade down its indicators, but also provides it with the 
information necessary to challenge the content and validity of its strategy (Ittner, Larckcr 
and Randall, 2003). From a management accounting perspective, PMS have often been 
considered to be synonymous with management planning and budgeting (Otley, 1999). 
Given this plurality of connotations, a comprchcnsivc review of the performance 
measurement literature was undertaken. AtIcr considering over 300 documents 
(including journal articles, books, conference papers and working papers), only 
seventeen dcfinitions of performance measurement system could be found. 
2 The researcher was involved in a collaborative project on the review of the definitions of performance 
measurement systems. Part of the information reported in this section is included in an article the 
researcher is co-author of that has recently been published on the International Journal of Operations and 
Production Management (cC Franco et al., 2007). 
3 In section 31 the concept of measurement is discussed in more depth, taking into account contributions 
firom measurement theory. 
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As a result of the analysis, three main characteristics of PM systems emerged: 
* Features: the properties or elements which make up the system 
Roles: the purposesor functions that are performed by the system 
Processes: the series of actions that combine together to constitute the system. 
In terms of features, it could be argued that there are only two necessary features of a 
PMS: 'performance measures' (or 'performance indicators') and 'supporting 
infrastructure'. Although the need to include other dimensions of performance than just 
financial has long been discussed (Drucker, 1954; Goold & Quinn, 1990; Johnson & 
Kaplan, 1987), there is no consensus on the generic types or characteristics of indicators 
that should be included in any definition of a PM system (Kennerley & Bourne, 2003). 
Several definitions also talk about linking indicators to strategy or strategic objectives. 
However, there are measurement systems that only have operational goals, which may 
or may not be linked to strategy. Therefore 'goals' or 'strategic goals' may not be 
considered necessary features of a PMS. 
Looking at the roles of PMS, five major categories could be identified: measure 
performance; strategy management; communication; influence behaviour; and learning 
and improvement. In section 4.4 further reflections on the roles of performance 
measurement, particularly in relation to public sector organisations, are presented. 
In terms of processes, five categories emerged from the analysis of the definitions: 
selection and design of measures; collection and manipulation of data; information 
management; performance evaluation and rewards; system review. All these processes 
can take place at either organisational, team or individual levels. 
In conclusion, it is interesting to notice how, although a great number of academics and 
practitioners have demonstrated interest in the study of PM, the review of the 
definitions of performance measurement systems shows that there is little consensus 
over what is intended by 'performance measurement system'. This ambiguity not only 
influences the generalisability and comparability of studies, but it could also inhibit the 
very development of PM as a field of research. Further remarks in this sense are 
presented in chapter 4. 
In practice, performance measurement systems are being used more and more in both 
private companies and public sector organisations. The most successful framework in 
the last decade has certainly been the Balanced Scorecard (Kaplan and Norton, 1992; 
2004). Other frameworks are also being adopted by an increasing number of companies 
to help them design their PMS: these include the Performance Prism (Neely, Adams and 
Kennerley, 2002), the Performance Pyramid (Lynch and Cross, 1990), the Business 
Excellence Model, etc. 
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As rcgards to this, the rcscarclicr invcstigatcd the usc of PNI modcls and framcworks in 
public and non-profit organisations 4. To do so, a thorough rcvicw or cxisting 
performance mcasurcmcnt fmnicworks utiliscd within the public and non-profit scctors 
was carricd out in ordcr to asscss the applicability of cxisting approaclics and to idcntify 
the charactcristics ncccssary for an cffcctivc framcwork or modcl in this contcxt. 711is 
rcvicw highlightcd many of the coinplcxitics of mcasuring pcrforinancc in public and 
non-profit scctors and the difficulty of applying mcasurcincrit framcworks in thcsc 
contcxts. In particular. 
1. It is important to rccognisc that the development of a PNIS is always subject to 
political and social choices, especially in the public sector, and one of tile main 
goals a performance mcasurcmcnt system must be to reflect this (Van Pcurscm, 
Pratt and Lawrence, 1995). Furthermore, a PMS operates in an organisational 
context and, being a rational model, it has the power to altcr organisational 
dynamics but also the potential of being aItcrcd by organizational dynamics (Harris, 
1998). 
2. Any general PNIS should be modificd for different organisations and intcmnl 
capabilities should be developed in order to be able to better manage it during time. 
PNIS have important limitations as drivers of change and improvement, particularly 
to the extent that these systems are externally imposed (Sanderson, 2001). 
3. In the development of a PNIS there should be understanding of what this could 
encompass and what hard and soft data would be better to include, resisting the 
tcmptation to try to 'capture' all the soft data by incorporating them into the formal 
system (Goddard, Mannion and Smith, 1999). 
4. In trying to promote cflicicncy and cffcctivcncss in organisations through tile 
application of a PNIS, the very essence of the involved institutions should not be 
jeopardized (cf. Lawrcncc and Sharma, 2002). 
5. Different approaches in the dcvclopment of PNIS could be required depending on 
the characteristics and current state of an organisation. For instance, a flexible 
approach may be more appropriate to certain types of public sector executive 
agencies, especially those where objectives arc ambiguous and whcrc thcrc arc 
unclear cause-and-cffcct relationships. On the other hand, a system of setting 
mission statements, objectives and targets would be desirable, but togcthcr with 
sensitivity to context and awareness that the creation of a good system needs 
creativity and experiment and the possibility of renewal. 
in conclusion, this review of the literature cmphasiscs two major points related to the 
development of performance measurement systems in public and non-profit 
organisations. First of all, there is a need to better understand the analogies and 
differences between public, non-profit and private sectors. By identifying and 
emphasising these characteristics, it is possible to design a PMS which is appropriate 
for use in the appropriate context, thus avoiding the adoption of systems and tools 
4 For a mom extensiNt description of the use of petformance measurement frameworks in public and 
non-prorit sectors, please refer to hlicheli and Kennerley (2005). 
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originally conceived to suit other types of organisations. Secondly, especially in the 
phase of design of the PMS, it is crucial to identify the wants and needs of the 
organisation's key stakeholders (Kennerley and Neely, 2003). The adoption of a 
stakeholder-ccntric view of perfon-nance measurement, although important in any 
context, is particularly relevant for public and non-profit organisations. 
Another concept widely used in the literature is 'perfon-nance management'. The 
Improvement Development Agency suggests that performance management "involves 
you understanding and acting on performance issues at each level of your organisation, 
from individuals, teams and directorates, through to the organisation itself. As well as 
involving PM, systems and processes, performance management is about managing 
people and 'the way people within an organisation operate and work together'. Issues 
such as leadership, decision making, involving others, motivation, encouraging 
innovation, and risk taking are just as important to bring about improvement" (IDeA 
website - Glossary of performance terms). This definition also clarifies the relationship 
between the concepts of performance management and PM (effectively a subset of the 
former), which are often conflated in the literature. 
2.4 Performance measurement in the public sector 
The first part of this section provides a historical background of performance 
measurement in the public sector. In combination with the information presented in the 
empirical phases, it provides the research with important contextual details. 
Subsequently, the main themes emerged from the review of the PM in the public sector 
literature are discussed. 
2.4.1 Historical background 
Performance measurement in the public sector is not a recent phenomenon as it was 
already present in the 1960s. In 1965 the Planning, Programming and Budgeting system 
was introduced in the United States, whereas in 1966 the Fulton Committee was 
established to transfer managerial ideas into Whitehall. Subsequently, in the 1980s a 
system similar to the Planning, Programming and Budgeting - the Financial 
Management Initiative - was conceived in the UK by the Thatcher administration. The 
principle elaborated in the FMI was that "managers at all levels in government should 
have 'a clear view of their objectives; and assess, and wherever possible measure, 
outputs or performance in relation to these objectives"' (Carter, Klein and Day, 1992, p. 
5). 
Although PM in the publiq sector has its roots in the 1960s, it has gained substantial 
momentum through the acceptance by several countries of the so-called New Public 
Management (NPM) principles from the mid-1970s onwards (Hood, 1991; 1995). 
Nowadays, governments of several countries are demonstrating growing interest in the 
16 
CIIAIrTFR 2 MTRATURF REVIEW AND THEORMCALBASES 
incasurcment of pcrformancc in the public scctor, as arc the prcss and media, and arc 
using pcrfonnancc targcts and Icaguc tablcs in ordcr to push through modmisation 
programmes, and dcmonstratc that valuc for taxpaycrs" moncy is bcing dclivcrcd. 
In many advanced economics, such as thosc of the Anglo-Saxon countries, Scandinavia 
and the Nctlicrlands, public services have come under increasing pressure to improvc 
their efficiency and cffcctivcness, rcducc their demands on taxpayers, but at the same 
time to maintain the volume and quality or scrviccs supplied to the public. In the drive 
to achicvc this, public scrvicc organisations have been subjected to the introduction of 
various 'private sector' management tccliniqucs, frequently complemented by the 
adoption of some form of nco-markct system in which the purchascrs and providers of 
public services arc split and required to contract with each othcr (Brignall and h1odcll, 
2000). Effectively, the reforms that have been introduced place great emphasis on 
agency performance, customer focus, stakcholdcrs' interests and othcr mcthods of 
assessment (Kouzmin, Locfflcr, Klagcs, and Korac-Kakabadsc, 1999). 
Nevertheless, in spite of allegations of intcrnationalisation and adoption of a new global 
paradigm in public management, considerable variation has been found in the extent to 
which different OECD countries have adopted NPNI principles (Hood, 1995). 
Furthermore, although cost reduction and improvements in cfficiency and effectiveness 
have been among the main drivers in the NPNI doctrine, in the UK for example, 
"regulation grew markedly both in the two decades up to 1997 and in the plans and 
activities of the Blair government from 1997 and 1999" (Hood, James and Scott, 2000: 
283). While the British public sector dow-nsized considerably in staff (with a decrease of 
30%), there have been steady increases in regulation inside government and in a number 
of public sector organisations in terms of both direct spending (which more than 
doubled between 1976 and 1995) and staffing (which had a more than 90% increase) 
(Hood, James, Jones, Scott and Travers, 1998). 
In the UK, the Conservative Government introduced Compulsory Competitive 
Tendering (CCT) throughout the 1980s with the aim of bringing greater cfficiency to 
local government and health services through the use of competition. Although it could 
be argued that strong incentives were needed to stimulate reform, the impact of CCT 
was not as positive as originally envisaged and generated considerable resistance from 
local public sector organisations (for a review of the characteristics and impact of CCT, 
cf Bovaird (2006) and Boyne (1998)). 
Following the 1997 elections, the Best Value initiative was introduced by the New 
Labour Government in order to provide a framework for the planning, delivery and 
improvement of public services. Its main purpose was "to establish a culture of good 
management in local govcmmcnt for the delivery of cfficicnt, cffcctive and economic 
services that meet the users' needs" (IDcA wcbsite) (cf Boync, Gould-Williams, Law, 
Walker (2002) for a comprehensive discussion of the case of Best Value). Although 
local public sector organisations are still required to report against Best Value 
performance indicators, the "term 'best value' no longer features so prominently in the 
lexicon of local government improvement. It has faded with the emergence of the 
Comprehensive Perforrnancc Assessment (CPA). ( ... ) CPA was introduced by a Government white paper in December 2001. Inspections began in 2002 and were 
carried out by the Audit Commission, as a means of bringing together the widcr audit 
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and inspection framework for local government to produce an overall assessment of 
council performance and continuous improvement" (lDeA website) (cf also Chapters 4 
and 5). 
2.4.2 Review of the literature 
In order to explore the literature on performance measurement in the public sector, an 
extensive review was undertaken. As a result it was possible to identify five broad areas 
on which authors interested in New Public Management have focused and where 
relevant research gaps have been identified. These include: 
1. the characteristics and uses of performance measurement systems (Berman and 
Wang, 2000; Halachmi and Bouckaert, 1994) 
2. the role of stakeholders, especially in the phase of PMS design (McKevitt and 
Lawton, 1996; McKevitt, Millar and Keogan, 2000; Smith, 1995a) 
3. the existence of benchmarking within or outside a certain organisational field 
(Bowerman, 1995; Poister and Van Slyke, 2002) 
4. the balance between internal and external (mandatory) performance indicators 
(Hyndman and Eden, 2002; Streib and Poister, 1999) 
5. the satisfaction related to the PMS and the trade-off between costs and benefits 
(Boyne et al., 2002; Cavalluzzo and Ittner, 2004). 
The next sections present and discuss these five themes. 
The characteristics and itses ofperfornsance measurement sYsten's 
The first area of interest identified includes the examination of a number of issues. 
Scholars have concentrated on the relationship between PM, organisational mission and 
strategy (Behn, 2003; Berman, 2002), a theme that is also fundamental in the current 
private sector literature (e. g. Kaplan and Norton, 2004). In this sense, various papers 
have remarked the importance of the commitment of CEOs and managers to the 
development of a PMS. Hennessey (1998), for example, emphasises the role of 
leadership in the "reinvention of government" in his study of nine federal offices in the 
US. Bourgault and Tremblay (1994) examine the use of performance management and 
evaluation in the Canadian public sector since the 1970s. In this context the authors 
show how the successful implementation of PM initiatives depends on the involvement 
of managers and organisations as a whole. In particular, "organizations must provide all 
the organizational support required for successful performance management, while 
managers must be able to fulfil all the tasks involved in its management (setting 
objectives, supervising, developing management information, communicating 
successfully "face to face', making sufficiently objective evaluation judgments, and 
proposing corrective measures). They must also be prepared to devote to it the time and 
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energy required" (Bourgault and Tremblay, 1994, p. 546). In their analysis of the 
Australian public sector, Fullcr and Roffcy (1993) identify a nunibcr of key areas, 
which, it is argued, serve as necessary prerequisites to accountability arrangements 
within the public sector such as: an improved strategic approach to budgetary 
arrangements; infrastructure support for these arrangements in the form of greatly 
improved management information systems*, and systematic advances in relevant 
performance measurement. According to the authors, improvements in these areas arc 
principally the responsibility of CEOs and supporting executive management levels. 
Without such essential underpinning, they claim, "moves toward management and 
administrative devolution arc unlikely to succeed in improving the cfficicncy and 
effectiveness of public sector organisations" (Fullcr and Roffcy, 1993, p. 149). 
A number of scholars have also focused on the adequacy of the infrastructure in place. 
In their study of management stratcgics and capacity for successful information 
technology outsourcing by public sector organisations, Chcn and Perry (2003) look at 
the links between performance measurement and IT infrastructure. Similarly, Ilalachmi 
and Bouckacrt (1994) investigate the issue of relating the measurement of performance 
to organizational design and structure in the context of IT. Although it could be argued 
that physical infrastructure is crucial to support the development and use of a 
performance measurement system, "not only arc [performance indicators] the children 
of information technology, but they can also be the victims in the sense that capacity for 
handling and transferring vast quantities of data quickly may outstrip the capacity of the 
organisational system, and of the individuals within it, to handle them" (Carter ct al., 
1992, p. 181). Other authors have considered the competencies and training of people 
involved in the measurement of performance (cf. Birkctt, 1992). In their analysis of the 
adoption of PM in US counties, Berman and Wang (2000) focus on the capacities 
required for the successful implementation of pcrfon-nancc indicators. According to 
their analysis, the absence of capacities does not forestall the initial application of 
performance indicators, but threatens their widespread use. 
From the analysis of these articles, the following issues that require further research 
emerge: 
" the links bct-%vccn strategy formulation and execution and performance measurement 
" the involvement of CEOs and managers in the development of PMS 
" the role of information systems as support infrastructure for the development of 
PMS 
the skills and competencies required within an organisation for the successful 
design, use, implementation and review of a PNIS. 
The role of stakeholders, especially in thephase of AIIS design 
The second area of the literature consists of issues such as public governance and the 
involvement of the organisation or the people responsible for pcrfonnance measurement 
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in setting objectives and targets (Bovaird and Loeffler, 2003; Davies, 2002; Flinders, 
2002). In this context, De Lancer Julnes and Holzer (2001) point out a number of 
factors to be identificd and actions to be performed in order to get to a real utilisation of 
the pcrfon-nance indicators adopted. According to these authors, these are: assessment 
of the organisation's "readiness" to develop and implement performance indicators; the 
identification and involvement of the organisation's internal and external interest 
groups; the involvement of employee unions; the awareness and culture that the 
adoption of performance indicators can create; and the existence of a "performance 
measurement culture" (de Lancer Julnes and Holzer 2001). Other stakeholder-centred 
contributions have considered the role of the citizen/customer's preferences in 
developing the PMS. McKcvitt et al. (2000) found that the development of citizen- 
ccntrcd performance indicators rcqiiires that managers and professionals develop a 
capacity and competence in skills of communication, listening and sharing of 
information. These conclusions resonate with previous reflections on the importance of 
adopting a multi-stakeholder perspective, particularly in the phase of PMS design (cf. 
2.3). 
Other scholars have looked at the effects of public sector reforms on PMS and/or the 
modification of the indicators. In their study of UK public sector organisations, 
McKevitt and Lawton (1996) argue that that top-down implementation of PMS is likely 
to lead to middlc-manager disenchantment and, eventually, to end-user dissatisfaction. 
Moreover, according to these authors, insufficient consultation with staff, lack of 
information, and insufficient training are among the most crucial factors to affect the 
development of a measurement system. Hood et al. (1998) looked at the number of 
stakeholders and regulators that influence UK local public sector organisations. They 
found that in 1995 there were 134 regulatory bodies, which not only amounted to a 
considerable cost for taxpayers, but also determined duplication, overlap and 
unrationalised proliferation of separate units. Hood (2006) recently reiterated a similar 
message, arguing against 'targctworld' and provocatively comparing the UK 
performance regime to the one existing in the Soviet Union in the 1930s. 
Looking at the design of performance targets and indicators, a number of scholars have 
emphasised the difficulties encountered in designing targets and indicators (Di 
Francesco, 1999; Dobmeyer, Woodward and Olson, 2002) and in actually quantifying 
the services delivered (Heinrich, 2002). Propper and Wilson (2003) argue for a more 
rigorous implementation of performance measurement systems. According to them, 
piloting of performance measurement initiatives, better understanding of the link 
between process and outcome, and identification of independent information sources 
could contribute to achieving this goal. Several authors have pointed out the 
imperfection and limitations of performance indicators (cf Stewart and Walsh, 1994) 
and claimed that their role should be to inform the political debate and enhance 
accountability through the democratic institutions that allow that debate to take place 
(Royal Statistical Society, 2005; Smith, 1995a). 
In essence, a number of themes that require further analysis could be identified: 
the degree of involvement of a number of stakeholders in the various stages of 
development of a performance measurement system 
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* the role of rcgulators in promoting the dcvc1opmcnt of a PNIS 
the possible uses of pcrformancc infonnation in enhancing accountability at local 
and national levels. 
The existence ofbetichniarAing u*hin or outside a ccrtain organisationalfteld 
The third area identified in the New Public Nianagcmcnt literature cornpriscs 
contributions related to communication bctwccn and within organisations (Bowerman, 
1995) and the spread of "best practices' among public sector organisations within or 
outside an organisational field (sub-scctor). Ammons (199S; 1999), for example, argued 
that increased emphasis on relevant performance comparisons between local public 
sector organisations could capture media and citizen attention and, thus, prompt greater 
accountability. Kouzmin ct al. (1999), building on experiences developed in the private 
sector in relation to benchmarking, examined the possibility to have bcnchmarking in 
the public sector and critically presented a number of positive examples. Further 
rcflcctions on the use of benchmarking in the public sector arc presented in section 4.4. 
A number of scholars have also considered the possibility of performing cross-national 
comparisons between public sector organisations (cf. Kickcrt, 2003; KOmpcrs, van 
Raak, Hardy and Mur, 2002; Rubicnska and Bovaird, 1999). Christensen and Yoshimi 
(2001) look at performance reporting procedures in Australia and Japan at the same 
time that New Public Nianagcment changes have been observed. Although 
characteristics of NPNI could explain part of these changes, differences among countries 
dcpcndcd on a series of other factors not NPM-rclated (cfi Hood, 1995; Eshima, 
Katayama and Ohno, 2001). 
The two main areas cmcrgcd as rcquiring furthcr research in this context: 
e the dimensions and limits of bcnchmarking in the public sector 
the possibility of and difficulties related to comparative analyses of public scctor 
performance across countries. 
The balance between internal and ewcutal (tnandatorI9 performance indicators 
A number of articles have compared the design and use of performance indicators 
dcvcloped intcmally to mandated ones, and the conscquent degrccs of intemal support 
and level of agccment around the resulting PNIS (Usher, Locklin, Wildfire, and Harris, 
2001). According to Sanderson (2001), "'in the UK, the development of performance 
management in the context of the 'new public management' has been primarily 'top- 
down' with a dominant conccm for enhancing control and 'upwards account-ability' 
rather than promoting learning and improvement. The development of performance 
management and evaluation in local govemment in the UK has been conditioned by 
cxtemal pressures, especially reforms imposed by central govcmment, which have 
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encouraged an 'instrumcntal-managerial' focus on performance measurement" (p. 297). 
According to the author the existence of considerable external pressures induces a 
limited internal use of the measurement system. In their study of US govemmental 
agencies, Cavalluzzo and Ittner (2004) found that PMS implemented to satisfy external 
requirements are less likely to influence internal behaviour than are those implemented 
to satisfy the organisation's own needs. 
Scholars have also adopted a change management perspective, looking at the 
involvement of the organisation as a whole in the process of regulations and key 
performance indicators setting, and the change of indicators and targets over time (e. g. 
change of the whole measure, change of target, change of people involved, etc. ) (Van 
Pcurscm ct al., 1995). Others have studied the involvement and motivation of 
employees during the development of the PMS, and the frameworks and guidelines the 
organisation has to adopt/comply with (e. g. Best Value, Investors in People, 
Government Performance Results Act, etc. ) (Hoggett, 1996; Johnsen, 1999; Keenan, 
2000; Martin and Davis, 2001). 
In conclusion, although several pieces of research have been undertaken, there still is a 
need for future studies regarding the design of pcrforrnance targets and indicators, 
particularly considering the interplay between internal and external forces and rationales 
(cf Modell, 2002). 
The satisfaction related to the PMS and the trade-off between costs and benefits 
Both academics and practitioners have looked at the impact of the PMS on the 
organisation in terms of efficiency, effectiveness, transparency and accountability 
(Boyne et al., 2002). Reflecting the growing interest in the influence of performance 
measurement on organisations, scholars have concentrated on a number of issues, such 
as the quantification of costs associated with PM and of benefits in relation to costs 
(Halachmi, 2002; Hood et al., 1998). In this context, Cavalluzzo and Ittner (2004) found 
"little evidence that the perceived benefits from recent mandated performance 
measurement initiatives in the US government increase with greater measurement and 
accountability" (p. 243). 
Scholars have also focused on the use of the collected data (Jackson, 1993; Pollitt, 
2006; Propper and Wilson, 2003); the perceived usefulness of the PMS for the 
organisations and the employees (Hirschmann, 2002); and the unintended consequences 
and distortions brought about by PMS (Radin, 2005; Smith, 1995b). Even though 
studies have considered whether public sector organisations are really benefiting from 
the implementation of performance measurement systems (Kelly and Swindell, 2002), 
there is still mixed and often anecdotic evidence as regards to this (Streib and Poister, 
1999). Therefore, further research has been advocated to assess the costs and benefits of 
performance measurement systems in the public sector. 
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2.5 Applied and theoretical approaches 
Although a substantial nurnbcr of studies have been carried out on pcrformance 
measurement, tile challenge with much of tile work undertaken to date is that it tends to 
adopt too pragmatic a perspective to deal with the issues outlined above (Carruthers, 
1995; Modcll, 2003). An extensive review of tile literature in the field of PNI in tile 
public sector confirmed that contributions arc mostly of two kinds: articles concerned 
mainly with practical nspccts, and papers that deal with mostly theoretical issues. 
Relatively little research is both firinly grounded in theory and relevant to practice, and 
there seems to be a gap between these two bodies of literature. 
The majority of articles arc or a predominantly applied kind, in that thcy primarily 
address the practical aspects of PM systems, i. e. improving and refining pcrronnancc 
measurement techniques. These contributions of1cn lack a strong theoretical grounding 
and mostly build on other practical application papers. Contributions in this category arc 
often concerned with how PNIS arc dcvclopcd, implcmcntcd or managed, and the 
impact they have on people's behaviour and organisational results (Franco, Bourne and 
Nccly, 2003). 
The other body of literature, consisting of the so-called alternative approaches 
(Covaleski, Dirsmith and Samuel, 1996), deals principally with theoretical issues. 
Authors taking a more theoretical stance have grounded their work in organisationnI and 
sociological theories, and have considered PNI as a social practice rather than a 
technique. From these perspectives, various factors are considered as influencing the 
nature of PM systems, such as: cultural norms, social patterns of interaction and socictal 
presuppositions, political events, ideologies and subjective meanings (Covalcski ct al., 
1996; Dacin, 1997). Following Davis and Marquis (2005), this latter approach oflcn 
appears 'paradigm-drivcn', since empirical settings, if prcscn4 are primarily a context to 
test previously formulated hypotheses. 
In order to better understand the use that has been and could be made of organisation 
theories in the field of PNI, the researcher, in collaboration with colleagues from 
Cranficid's Centre for Business Performance, undertook an extensive literature review'5. 
As a result, it was possible to identify five organisational theories that have been 
extensively applied to undertake research on PM systems: agency theory, contingency 
theory, resource-based view of the firm, new institutional theory, and resource 
dependence theory; 6. 
5A 
previous version of the information reported here has been presented at the Performance 
Measurement Association conference (cE hlicheli, Franco, Marr and Boumc, 2004). 
6 Critical theory has also been used in a number of instances in the performance measurement literature 
and has enabled a number of scholars to look at a wide variety of issues from an alternative perspective 
(cf Broadbent, 2002; Guthrie and Parker, 1999; Lawrence and Sharma, 2002; Lehman, 2005; Power and 
Laughlin, 1996). Ilowcvcr. it could be argued that, given its emphasis on human emancipation and focus 
on the very nature of social science (Blailde, 1993). critical theory is more a philosophical perspective, 
which implies a certain view of the world, and not just a 'lens' through which we look at phenomena. 
23 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL BASES CHAPTER 2 
The purpose of this -literature review was to describe the main features of these five 
organisational theories and to clarify their use in the field of PM, in an attempt to 
provide bridges over the gap between the theoretical and applied literature. The 
researcher believes that, in order to further our understanding of performance 
measurement and management in the public sector, it is important to create knowledge 
that is firmly grounded in theory and relevant to practice. To do so, the complementarity 
of the 'applied' and 'theoretical' perspectives should be more widely acknowledged and 
the two approached reconciled (cf. chapter 7). 
In the following sections, the first three theories are described by outlining their 
development in general and their application in PM in particular. Subsequently, the 
systematic literature review of the uses of new institutional theory and resource 
dependence theory - the theories that are most relevant for the purposes of this research 
- in the field of PM in the public sector is presented. 
2.5.1 Agency theory 
Agency theory aims to describe the relationship between two parties: the principal(s) 
and the agent(s). The principal's role is to supply capital, bear risk, construct incentives, 
and delegate work to the firm's agents. The agent's role is to work for the principal, 
which involves effort as well as decision-making responsibilities. In a private sector 
context, the principal can be thought of as a 'representative shareholder', and the agent 
as the 'top executive team'. According to agency theorists, there are two main problems 
arising from the principal-agent relationship: moral hazard and adverse selection. A 
moral hazard problem arises due to the conflicting interests of both parties and to the 
fact that it is difficult or expensive for principals to verify agents' actions. The principal 
cannot directly observe whether the agents have behaved appropriately. An adverse 
selection problem arises because of the different levels of information the principal and 
the agents have regarding, for example, agents' skills or private interests. Taking into 
account that the principal and the agents have different attitudes towards risk, agents 
may choose to misrepresent their private information and pursue actions that might not 
be in the best interest of the principal (Gomez-Mejia, 1994). 
Both moral hazard and adverse selection problems are characterised by information 
asymmetry between agents and principals. If these problems are not resolved, they will 
lead to a loss in efficiency and a reduction in organisational value. This phenomenon is 
known as agency costs (Baiman, 1982). Most of the literature based on the agency 
model argues that in order to reduce the agency costs, principals have two choices: (1) 
purchase information about the agents' actions, investing in infort-nation/performance 
measurement systems (e. g. PM systems, accounting and budgeting system, management 
by objectives, board of directors); (2) design a compensation contract that makes agents 
contingent upon the performance measures included in the information system 
(Barkema and Gomez-Mejia, 1998; Lambert, Larcker and Weigelt, 1993). In theory, if 
the principals' information system accurately reports agents' actions, and if the 
compensation contract motivates agents to focus on achieving principals' goals, then 
adverse selection and moral hazard can be eliminated (Baiman, 1982). This means that 
principals' expected goals would more likely be achieved. 
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Most agcncy-bascd research has historically focuscd on managerial accounting 
information systcms, which provide principals and agents with measures of financial 
pcrfon-nance (e. g. costs, revenues, profits), Examples of the systcms or processes 
studied arc: monitoring systems, budgeting systems, variance investigation systems, 
cost allocation systems, and transfer pricing systems (Baiman, 1990). Only recently, 
agency researchers have begun to pay more attention to PNIS and the use of non- 
financial measures in information systems (e. g. Fcltharn and Xic, 1994; llcmmcr 1996; 
Sliwka, 2002). I'lic major areas of concern for agcncy-bascd pcrformancc measurement 
thcorists arc: the choice of the most appropriate pcrfoniiancc mcasurcrncnt system for a 
particular principal-agcnt relationship (e. g. Baiman, 1982,1990; Holmstrom, 1982), and 
the sclcction of the 'right' mcasurcs; of pcrformancc (e. g. Lambcrt ct al., 1987; Banker 
and Datar, 1989; Bushman, Indjqjikian and Smith, 1996; Dcmski, 1994; luncr ct al, 
1997; Jensen and Murphy, 1990). 
Given the characteristics outlined above, agency theory seems most appropriate to use 
in a study examining principal-agcnt relationships and related subsequent decisions in 
terms of performance indicators and/or compensation schemes. For instance, actual 
research looking at performance measurement frameworks, design of performance 
indicators, weights' choice, and target selection could bcncrit from the insights 
extracted from agency theorists (cf. OtIcy 1999; Ittncr and Larckcr, 1998). In addition, 
studies looking at the relationship between MIS and reward systems could also use 
agency models as theoretical frameworks (Ittncr ct al., 2003). For an insightful critique 
of agency theory, please rcfcr to Scal and Vinccnt-loncs (1997). 
2.5.2 Contingency theory 
Contingency theory is one of the overarching or general paradigms in the management 
field and, at the same time, it can be considered one of the simplest ones (Gomez-Mcjia 
and Balkin, 1992). The contingency theory of organisations is a subset of the 
contingency approach in science, which basically says that the effect of one variable (X) 
on another (Y) depends upon some third variable (AV) called 'moderator'. In the 
contingency theory of organisations the relationship studied is between one or more 
characteristics of an organisation (X) and pcrfon-nance (Y). A contingency is any 
variable that moderates this relationship (Donaldson, 2001). In the PM literature, 
contingency-based studies have mostly focused on the relationship between 
management control systems and organisational performance. The contingency factors 
that have been studied are: competitive strategy, culture, organisational size, 
organisational structure, uncertainty or risk, and industry (Clicnhall, 2003). As stated by 
Waweru, Hoque and Uliana (2004, p. 675), "the contingency theory of management 
accounting is based on the prcmisc that there is no universally appropriate accounting 
system applicable to all organisations in all circurnstances". 
Contingency management control research, which includes performance measurement 
systems (Flarnholtz, 1983), can be classified into four categories according to the level 
of complexity of its analysis (Fisher, 1995). At the first level, one contingent factor is 
correlated with one management control system. From this perspective, no attempt is 
made to evaluate whether the correlation between the contingent factor and the control 
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mechanism has any impact on an outcome variable (e. g. Simons, 1990). The second 
level of analysis investigates the joint effect of a contingent factor and a control 
mechanism on an outcome variable, which is usually organisational performance. This 
level is the most common in the control literature (e. g. Govindarajan and Gupta, 1985; 
Simons, 1987; Iloque and James, 2000). At the third level of analysis, the joint linkage 
between multiple control mechanisms, a contingent factor, and an outcome variable is 
examined (e. g. Merchant, 1981). The last level is similar to the third but looks at 
multiple contingency factors, rather than focusing on just one. It has been noted that 
most contingency management control research has been based on either the first or the 
second level of analysis. Fisher (1995) argues that more studies adopting the third and 
fourth types of approach are needed in order to advance understanding of management 
control systems. 
In terms of possible uses in the field of PM, contingency theory would be most suitable 
if a range of PM systems adopted by different organisations is examined. In this case, 
the focus would be on the best fit between PM and certain organisational or contextual 
characteristics. Research looking at the impact of contextual variables (e. g. culture, 
organizational structure or strategy) on the effectiveness of PM systems could also 
benefit from contingency theory premises (cf. Hoque and James, 2000). Furthermore, 
the study of the relationship between two or more performance measurement systems 
(e. g. the linkage between balanced scorecard and budgeting processes) and the impact 
of this relationship on overall performance is a topic that could be framed within a 
contingency theory framework. 
2.5.3 Resource-based view of the firm 
The resource-based view (or resource-based theory) originates from the strategic 
management literature and is centrally motivated by understanding performance 
differentials between organisations based on the different resources organisations 
possess (Conner, 1991). At the core of this theoretical approach is the notion that the 
heterogeneous resource architecture of firms is the source of economic rents and, 
therefore, driver of organisational performance and competitive advantage (Barney, 
1991). According to resource-based theory, a competitive advantage can be achieved by 
possessing unique, difficult-to-imitate, and hard to substitute skills, knowledge, 
resources or competencies (Barney, 1991, Teece, 1998; Wernerfelt, 1984). As Conner 
(1991) points out, this perspective has long been central to our understanding of 
organisational performance. Barnard (1938), Selznick (1957), Chandler (1962), and 
Rumelt (1974), for example, all connect performance with organisations' specific 
competencies in deploying and combining their human, physical, and reputational 
capital. However, Edith Penrose (1959) is oflen quoted as the first scholar to sketch a 
comprehensive view of resource or competence-based competition. This was later 
picked up by Wernerfelt (1984) and Rumelt (1984), who are seen as developers of the 
modem resource-based view of the firm (Foss, 1997). 
Central to today's understanding of the resource-based paradigm is that resources are 
bundled together, depending on and influencing each other (Lippman and Rumelt, 
1982). It is therefore difficult to identify how individual resources contribute to success 
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without taking into account the interdependencies with other resources (Lippman and 
Rumclt, 1982; Dicrickx and Cool, 1989; King and Zcithaml. 2001). Furthcnnorc, in 
order to create sustainable pcrfomiancc, finns havc to build the ability to create new 
fonns of conipctitivc advantage by appropriately adapting, integrating, and 
rcconfiguring organisational skills, resources, and competencies to inatch requirements 
of a changing environment (Tcccc ct al. 1997). At the same time, though, they have to 
take into account the path-dcpcndcnt 'evolution' of organisational resources and 
competencies, which is influenced by past decisions and actions (Nelson and Winter, 
1982). 
Spender and Grant (1996) argue that if a firm is a set of resources - including 
knowledge as a central resource - then we need to find ways to identify and measure 
such knowledge resources. King and Zcithaml (2003) build on this and prescnt a 
methodology of measuring knowlcdgc-asscts in firms. I'lic findings of Wiklund and 
Shcpcrd (2003) suggest that knowlcdgc-bascd resources (applicable to discovery and 
exploitation of opportunities) arc positively related to organisational performance and 
Henderson and Cock-bum (1994) discuss how firms can start measuring compctcncc in 
pharmaceutical research. Furthermore, much of the discussion about integrating 
intangible value drivers into PNI systems is grounded in the rcsourcc-bascd theory (cf 
Svciby, 1997, Marr, Gray and Neely, 2003). Marr and Schiuma (2001) have 
documented how Lycos and Great Universal Stores identificd their knowledgc-bascd 
resources to include into their PNI system. Another application is in acquisitions 
situations which require an understanding of the nature and sources of intangible assets 
of the two firms, how they complement one another, and how they can be leveraged to 
strengthen the acquirer's competitive position (Montgomery and Wcmcrfcld, 1988). 
In terms of avenues for further research, resourcc-based theory seems most appropriate 
to ground work on designing comprehensive strategic measurement systems, which 
include the organisational value drivers as well as outcome indicators. It would apply 
especially to the increasing work on measuring intangible assets and intellectual capital. 
Organisations often struggle with how to select and include the right value drivers in 
their PM systems and it seems that the rcsourcc-bascd perspective can be used to 
answer some of these questions by linking value drivers to competitive advantage. 
Furthermore, it might offer firms more insights into the design of causal maps reflecting 
the way different value drivers are linked with each other to create outcome value (cf. 
Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Roos and Roos, 1997); and therefore address some of the 
criticism relating causality in strategy maps (Norreklit, 2000). 
2.6 Theoretical bases of the research 
Although the previously described organisation theories are certainly relevant for the 
study of PM, new institutional theory and resource dcpcndencc theory were adoptcd 
with the aim of analysing and explaining the cmpirical phenomena considcrcd in this 
research. Section 2.7.1 substantiates the choice of these theories and tile dccision to 
undertake a systematic literature review (Tranfield ct al., 2003) with the aim of 
understanding the uses and possible contributions of new institutional and resource 
dependence theory in the area of PM in the public scctor. 
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In the next three sections the two organisation theories are first described separately and 
then compared. The main methodological aspects of the systematic literature review, i. e. 
the protocol used, and the overall results of the search, selection, and quality assessment 
stages are reported in section 2.7. Subsequently, a number of interrelated themes which 
have been identified through the systematic review process, and which have emerged 
from the articles and books considered are presented. Finally, suggestions on possible 
ways to bridge the gap between the 'theoretical' and 'applied' bodies of literature are 
made. 
2.6.1 New Institutional Theory 
A description of the main features and concepts of new institutional theory is not easy to 
provide. However, since in the literature the phrase '(new) institutional theory' is often 
used to connote different theoretical perspectives and traditions, a clear statement about 
what is meant by this phrase in this research is required. In order to do this, the author 
makes use of the analysis performed by Scott (2001). Describing the different 
contributions in 'neoinstitutional organisation theory', Scott identified three main types 
of approach: 
1. neoinstitutional theory in economics (transaction cost economics; evolutionary 
economics) 
2. neoinstitutional theory in political science (historical institutionalism; rational 
choice theory) 
3. neoinstitutional theory in sociology, with its theoretical roots in cognitive theory, 
phenomenology and cultural studies, and ethnomethodology. 
Substantial differences exist both between and within the different approaches. 
Nevertheless, the ambiguity in the terminology may lead to substantial confusion, i. e. 
'institutional theory' can be used to allude to each one of them, and the phrases 
'neoinstitutional theory', 'new institutional theory', 'new institutionalism', 'institutional 
theory', 'institutional sociology', and 'institutionalism' are used interchangeably in the 
literature to refer to the third approach - neoinstitutional theory in sociology. In this 
research, the approach to be considered is 'neoinstitutional theory in sociology' as 
described by Scott (2001). 
The first contributions concerning new institutional theory were published in the mid- 
1970s and, since then, they have generated much interest and attention among scholars. 
More recently, new institutional theory has been indicated as the leading perspective 
among organisational sociologists in the United States (Mizruchi and Fein, 1999). The 
first articles dealt mainly with the structure of organisations, the interactions between 
organisations belonging to the same field, and their ability to survive (cf. DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). 
In contrast to the traditional focus on efficiency and effectiveness, new institutionalists 
explained the behaviour of organisations through the concepts of ceremonial confon-nity 
28 
Cl IAPTE R2 1ATERATURE REVIEW AND THEORIMCALBASES 
and legitimacy, which are often at odds with practical activity. In this context, 
legitimacy can be dcrincd as "a generalized perception or assuniption that tile actions of 
an entity arc desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system 
of nonns, values, beliefs, and definitions" (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). According to early 
new institutional ists, tile achievement of legitimacy is the way in which organisations 
ensure their survival. In their view, a stable solution between the need to support the so- 
called 'institutional myths' and the requirements of practical activity consists of 
maintaining the organisation in a loosely coupled state. I'his involves "building gaps 
between ( ... ) 
formal structures and actual work activities" (hicycr and Rowan, 1977, p. 
341). As Covaicski and Dirsmith (1988, p. 563) stated, "an organisational survival 
requires it to conform to social norms of acccptabic behaviour as much as to achieve 
high levels of production cfficicncy". 
More recent contributions in new institutional theory have partly moved away from the 
idea of legitimacy as the dominant factor that drives the action of organisations and 
from passivity in the behaviour of managers that looks to industry norms, firm traditions 
and management fads to formulate strategies, without making truly autonomous 
decisions (Oliver, 1991). Contradicting Mcycr and Rowan's view concerning the 
relationship between formal structures and organisational ciTicicncy, some new 
institutional theorists have looked at the lack of coupling between goals and 
performance indicators in public sector organisations as a sign of system failure 
(Modell, 2003). Furthermore, studies in new institutional theory have been accused of 
being too theoretical and having "a hard time in providing practical recommendations" 
(Farashahi, Hafsi and Molz, 2005, p. 15). 
2.6.2 Resource dependence theory 
Pfeffer and Salancik established the bases of resource dependence theory in the late 
1970s and their work is still quoted by the majority of academics who rcfcr to this 
perspective. Resource dependence theory examines what "resources and activities are 
critical to the organisation and what individuals or groups do at present, or could 
potentially, to provide or affect those resources" (Pfcffcr and Salancik, 1978, p. 84). 
In this sense, organisational attempts to manage and avoid dependencies focus on two 
major components of intcr-organisational power. (1) the focal organisation's 
dependence on important critical resource exchanges; (2) the control that other 
organisations might possess over the exchange of that resource. Ilie concepts of power, 
critical resources and environment are fundamental in this theory. Here, the 
environment is considered "not only a given to be avoided, absorbed, or accepted. It is 
itself the dynamic outcome of the actions of many formal organisations seeking their 
own interest" (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, p. 190). Although both new institutional and 
resource dependence theories seem to be very relevant in the study of PM in public 
sector organisations, the latter perspective has not been used as widely as the former in 
this sense. 
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2.6.3 New institutional theory and resource dependence theory 
By comparing the two organisation theories, it is possible to understand how they 
significantly differ in some of their characteristics. First of all, new institutional theory 
is more concerned with reproduction and imitation, whereas resource dependence 
theory looks at the exercise of power, control and the negotiation of interdependencies 
to achieve organisational stability. Furthermore, the two theories "have attributed 
different degrees of resistance, activeness, and self-interest awareness to the behaviour 
of organisations responding to external constraints and demands" (Oliver, 1991, p. 149). 
Despite these differences, several authors have decided to use them conjointly, 
emphasising their common focus on stability and legitimacy, and their 
complementarity. The theoretical arguments related to the resource dependence 
perspective, in fact, can be viewed as particular forms of coercive isomorphic pressures 
(cf. DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Carpenter and Feroz (2001) supported this argument 
while focusing on management accounting in the public sector. "Resource dependence 
results in coercive isomorphic pressures for change, which can be a dominant factor in 
influencing a government's choice of accounting practices. Thus, the theoretical 
arguments related to the resource dependency perspective represent a particular form of 
coercive isomorphic pressures" (Carpenter and Feroz 2001, p. 573). 
Concerning the conjoint use of the two theories, Oliver (1991) was the first author to 
combine them and her article constitutes a watershed between older and more recent 
contributions in the field of new institutionalism. In this paper, a framework regarding 
strategic responses to institutional processes was formulated. In contrast with most 
institutional theorists, Oliver did not assume organisations' responses to be invariably 
passive, but also active and resistant to institutional pressures and expectations. The 
author identified and described different types of strategic responses (acquiescence, 
compromise, avoidance, defiance and manipulation) and then formulated various 
hypotheses, which have been used as bases of several studies conducted by other 
authors, but have only been partially tested (Modell, 2001). 
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2.7 A systematic reviciv of the literature 
2.7.1 Rationale for the systematic literature reviciv 
Following the cxtcnsivc review of flic uses of organisation theories in (lic ficid of PM, it 
was decided to pcrfonn a systematic litcraturc review of the uses and possible 
contributions of new institutional and resource dependence theory in the subject of PM 
in public sector organisations. 'I'lim arc several reasons why thcsc two theories wcrC 
chosen. 
First of all, the researcher wanted to explore more symbolic aspects of PNI in the public 
sector. One of the fundamental stances of new institutional theorists is that "no 
organisation is just a technical system and that many organisations arc not primarily 
technical systems. All social systems, licncc all organisations, exist in an institutional 
environment that defines and delimits social reality" (Scott, 1987, p. 507). Concepts like 
isomorphism, legitimacy and institutional pressure recur in the new institutionalist 
literature and they arc particularly powerful to explain issues regarding the 
measurement and management of performance in public sector organisations. As Geiger 
and Ittncr (1996, p. 550) argued, "the survival of government units depends primarily 
on the support of external constituents and only secondarily on actual performance, 
conforming to accepted social norrns and external requirements is required to maintain 
organisational legitimacy, thereby strengthening support and ensuring continued 
funding7- 
The role of institutions is very important, especially in the public services, where 
legitimacy and the consequent flow of resources determine the survival of 
organisations. Various authors argued that pressures to conform to accepted practices 
could be particularly powerful in government organisations (e. g. DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Moreover, one of the recurrent themes in the new 
institutional literature is the relationship between efficiency and legitimacy. Regarding 
this, scholars have pointed out how a 'logic of appropriateness, rather than economic 
efficiency, often applies in a public sector context (March and Men, 1989). 
Specifically regarding the use of new institutional theory, performance measurement 
has been considered as being implicated in the social construction of reality (Covalcski 
et al., 1996). Through, a new institutionalist approach, it is argued, it is possible to 
"direct greater attention to the dynamic interplay between more or less competing 
interests in the structuration of an organisational field and how tMs impinges on the 
development of PM" (Model], 2003, p. 335). 
The choice to consider resource dependence theory in this review is determined 
particularly by the analogies and differences between the two organisation theories 
identified by Oliver (1991). Authors adopting a resource dependence perspective have 
considered performance measurement systems mainly in terms of power relationships 
and political advocacy (e. g. Collier, 2001; Covaleski et al., 1996). Regarding the 
acquisition of resourcesý the public sector shows peculiar characteristics, such as the fact 
that political dccision-makers rarely experience the consequences of their actions 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Moreover, looking through the Icns of resource 
dependence theory it is possible to better understand the display of different types of 
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bchaviours in response to institutional pressures and directed towards the acquisition of 
greater legitimacy. 
2.7.2 Methodology 
A systematic way of reviewing the literature has been recently developed in opposition 
to traditional narrative reviews (Hart, 1998). The latter type, it is argued, frequently 
lacks thoroughness and in many cases the review is not undertaken as a genuine piece of 
investigatory science (Tranfield, Denyer and Smart, 2003). One of the main tenets of the 
systematic literature review (SLR) process, drawn from its application in the medical 
science, is that the assumptions and the steps followed by the authors will have to be 
made clear. The main attributes of the SLR, in fact, are: explicit protocols set upfront; 
possible replication by other researchers; quality assessment made with clear criteria; 
and minimisation of researcher's bias by explanation of the values, assumptions and 
steps followed during the review. The SLR process has been followed throughout the 
review of the use and possible contributions of new institutional and resource 
dependence theory in the subject of PM in public sector organisations. 
In this section the main issues concerning the systematic review are presented. First, the 
main features of the process and the protocol used are reported. The protocol enabled 
the researcher to carry out a review, which has been systematic and transparent. 
Subsequently, the overall results of the search, selection, and quality assessment stages 
are described. 
2.7.3 The protocol 
The aim of this systematic literature review was to understand the contribution of new 
institutional and resource dependence theory to the subject of performance measurement 
in public sector organisations. To achieve this goal, the protocol was structured in order 
to identify, review and assess all. the papers and books in which these two perspectives 
have been used in relation to the previously mentioned subject. The protocol was 
developed by the researcher, but several academics and practitioners were also involved 
in order to provide different perspectives on this subject and to suggest various sources 
of information that may have not come out in the initial scoping study, the keyword 
search and the cross-references analysis (Table 2.2). 
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Stage 1: Planning the review 
Phase 0- ldcntirication for the nccd for a rcvicw 
Pliasc I- Prcparation of a proposal for a rcvicw 
Phase 2- Dcvclopmcnt of a review protocol 
Stage 2: Conducting the rcvicw 
Phase 3- Identification of the rescarch 
Phase 4- Selection of studies 
Phase 5- Study quality asscssmcnt 
Phase 6- Data extraction and monitoring progress 
Phase 7- Data synthesis 
Stage 3- Rcporting and dissemination 
Phase 8- The report and recommendations 
Phase 9- Getting evidence into practice 
Table 2.2: Systematic review general stages and phases. Source: Tranficld ct al. (2003) 
2.7.4 Search strategy - Search ternis, databases and process 
The papers to be systematically reviewed come from four different sources: scoping 
study, keyword search, recommendations made by academics working in the ficld, and 
crosschcck of references of the papers included. Regarding protocol and kcy%vords, a 
first version was designed by the researcher, submitted to a selected group of scholars, 
amended, and finally practically used. 
Between the first and final sets of keywords, three major differences can be identified. 
First of all, in the early version, the researcher grouped the keywords into three sets - 
performance measurement, public sector, and organisation theories - rcflccting the 
focus of this systematic literature review. After consultations with academics, the search 
strings had to be modified, since great difficulty was found in identifying the keywords 
that could allow encompassing all types of organisations belonging to the public sector. 
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 report the final sets of keywords and rationale. It was therefore 
decided to express in the selection criteria whether a paper was going to be included or 
not on the basis of what kind of organisations the empirical data or theoretical 
reflections were referring to. 
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KEYWORDS RATIONALE 
Performance measure* Includes: performance measurement, performance measures, 
performance measurement system(s) (PMS) 
Performance management Expression sometimes used instead of performance measurement 
Performance evaluation Expression sometimes used instead of performance measurement 
Management control* Includes: management control, management controlling and 
management control system(s) (another way to indicate PMS) 
Management accounting Includes: management accounting (expression often used instead, 
of performance measurement) and management accounting 
system(s) (another way to indicate PMS) 
Accounting See management accounting 
Control system* See management control 
Table 2.3: Performance measurement - Keywords 
The final search string was: (Performance measure* OR Performance management OR 
Performance evaluation OR Management control* OR Accounting OR Control 
system*) AND (Institutional* OR Resource Depend* OR Organi* theor*). This search 
string was inserted in three databases, which were identified according to the 
preliminary literature review and consultations with librarians and academics - ABI 
ProQuest; EBSCO Business Source Premier; Science Direct. 
Other information sources to be included were mainly books, if their findings had not 
been already expressed in the journals included in the databases. It was believed that 
conference papers and unpublished papers were difficult to review in a systematic way, 
given the cross-disciplinary nature of the topic and the limited possibility to access 
them. As to this, suggestions by academics and practitioners were considered to be very 
helpful. Finally, the scoping study enabled the researcher to conclude that the journals 
included in the databases were the most relevant in relation to the subject of interest; 
therefore, specific journal searches were not strictly required. 
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KEYWORDS RATIONALE 
Institutional* This keyword allows overcoming the problcms caused by the plurality of 
words/cxprcssions used to designate -New Institutional Theory": 
I- "Institutional Theory", although thcrc arc other school of thought 
called -Institutional Theory" (c. g.: "(Old) Institutional Theory" 
"Institutional Theory" in cconomics; etc.: as to this, an cxplicit 
exclusion criterion has been set); 
2- "Theory" can be substituted by -perspective", "point of view" ctc. 
3- Some academies use "Institutionalism" or "Institutionalization", 
without explicitly using the words "New Institutional Thcory. 
Resource In the literaturc the word "dependence can bc spelled in three different ways: 
Depend* dependence, dependency, dcpcndancc. Furthermore, as previously said, 
authors use alternatively the words theory, perspective, point of view ctc. 
Resource Depend* cnablcs the researchers to include them all. 
Organi* Since both New Institutional and Resource Dependence Theory arc OT, a 
thcor* more general expression could be "organization theory", mostly because some 
authors do not explicitly mcntion specific theories in their titles and abstracts, 
but rcfcrjust to organization theories. Organi* thcor* includes: 
organisation/organization and theory/thcorics. 
Table 2A New institutional and resource dcpcndcncc theory - Keywords 
The second major difference between the first and final versions of the protocol derives 
from the first papers to be identified after carrying out the systematic search. The 
researcher, in fact, rcaliscd that the number of articles in which performance 
measurement in public sector organisations was studied from a new institutional and/or 
resource dependence point of view were not numerous. Furthermore, the great majority 
of authors quoted predominantly theoretical material that did not necessarily dealt with 
performance measurement, but that was crucial in order to understand the main 
concepts and constructs of the two theories. It was therefore decided to look also at the 
major theoretical articles and books found by scanning the references listed at the end of 
the selected studies. 
Finally, as previously mentioned, performance measurement is an emergent subject of 
interest, no general definition is accepted and just few are available. For this reason, the 
search string regarding performance measurement, as phrased in the initial protocol, 
was kept as broad as possible and allowed looking at papers that did not refcr exactly to 
PM, but also to related areas, such as budgeting and cost allocation. 
2.7.5 Selection and quality assessment critcria 
The inclusion and exclusion criteria were fonnulated following the same rationale used 
to phrase the kcy%vords. The papers to be included, in fact, had to deal with performance 
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measurement and the authors had to adopt a new institutional and/or resource 
dependence point of view (cf. Tables 2.5 and 2.6). 
CRITERIA RATIONALE 
No restrictions There is no particular reason for excluding papers on a time basis. 
regarding time frame However, the papers that to be found have been written thirty years 
ago at most, given the relatively recent use of the two OT 
No restrictions on a The stated purpose of the review is not focused on a particular 
geographical basis geography 
No methodological No particular methodology can be discarded a priori 
constraints I 
Table 2.5: Inclusion criteria 
CRITERIA RATIONALE 
Performance If the main contribution of an article/book comes from its analysis of 
measurement, empirical data or from theoretical reflections specifically on a certain 
program evaluation, subject, its primary focus has to be on PM or on a closely related field of 
performance interest. Material on program evaluation, performance appraisal and 
appraisal and financial accounting is excluded, since these subjects are too weakly 
accounting connected to PM. Their focus, in fact, is respectively on: the ex-post 
assessment of governmental programs, performance from a human 
resource point of view, and accounting just in a financial sense. 
Private and non- If the main contribution of an article/book comes from its analysis of 
profit organisations empirical data or from theoretical reflections on a certain sector or sub- 
sector, the material to be included has to discuss cases and/or make a 
theoretical contribution predominantly on public sector organisations, 
and not on issues regarding private or non-profit ones. 
Theoretical All the material to be included must have a new institutional and/or 
perspectives other resource dependent standpoint, or make a relevant contribution to issues 
than New related to those theories (e. g. definition of concepts widely used in the 
Institutional or literature identified through the scoping study, keyword search, cross 
Resource reference analysis and suggestions by academics). 
Dependence 
Theoretical basis Papers or books that do not have a sufficient theoretical basis are 
excluded 
Institutionalism The words "institutional", "institutionalism", "institutionalization" etc. 
have to be related to New Institutional theory and not just to institutions 
in general 
English language The databases and most of the other sources considered enable the 
authors to systematically review just material written in English 
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Sourccs The sourccs of inronnation sclcctcd could constrain, although to a limitcd 
"tclit, the body of litcraturc to bc takcn into account 
Table 2.6: Exclusion critcria 
In the systematic approach, each paper or book, aftcr passing the inclusion and 
exclusion criteria, has to be assessed on the basis of its quality. For this purpose. a Study 
Quality Assessment table was structured in order to further select which papers to 
include. Five aspects were considered: (1) theory robustness, (2) implications for 
practice, (3) data supporting methodology, (4) gcncralisability, (5) contribution that the 
article makes to the existing knowledge (Table 2.7). 
Furthermore, two thresholds were set in order to select articles on the basis of their 
content. For each of the five aspects to be considered in the quality assessment, a scale 
from 0 to 3 was devised and the possibility of inapplicability of any element was also 
taken into account. The first threshold regards the contribution made by the paper if it 
did not make an important contribution and it was not clear the advances it made (i. e. 
contribution rated as 0 or 1), the paper did not pass the quality assessment critcria and it 
was excluded. If, on the contrary, the contribution was very high (level 3, i. e. it further 
develops existing knowledge, expanding the way the conccpt/plicnomcnon was 
explained so far), the paper was selected. Therefore, fundamental theoretical papers and 
books were included in the rcvicw. I'lic second threshold concerns gcncralisability: 
articles in which the literature was reviewed, but not in an original way, and then no 
relevant empirical contribution was made, were excluded. 
37 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL BASES CHAPTER 2 
q Leve 
; 4, 1 111 
' - Not Element I )S 0- 1 enc LoW 1- 
ýJl ýpýlicable'- j 
Theory Poor awareness Basic Deep and broad 
robustness of existing understanding of knowledge of 
The article does 
literature and the issues around relevant literature This 
not provide 
debates. Under the topic that is and theory relevant element is 
enough or over 
being treated for addressing the not 
information to referenced phenomenon applicable 
assess this 
element 
Low validity Although data Good relations 
to the 
document for theory is support the theory-data 
given theory, the link is 
weak 
Implication for The article does Very difficult There is a Significant benefit This 
practice not provide to implement potential for may be drawn if the element is 
enough the concepts successfully principles are put not 
information to and ideas implement the into practice. applicable 
assess this presented. No proposed ideas, Relevant issues for to the 
element relevant for with minor practicing managers document 
practice adjustments 
Data supporting The article does Data Data is related to Data strongly This 
arguments, not provide inaccuracy and the arguments, supports arguments. element is 
Methodology enough not related to though there are Besides, the not 
information to theory. Flawed some gaps. research design is applicable 
assess this research Research design carefully "crafted": to the 
element design. may be improved sampling, data document 
gathering methods, 
and analysis 
Generalisability The article does Only the Organisations of Highlevelof This 
not provide population similar generalisability element is 
enough studied characteristics not 
information to applicable 
assess this to the 
element document 
Contribution The article does Does not make Although using Further develops This 
not provide an important other's ideas, existing knowledge, element is 
enough contribution. It builds upon the expanding the way not 
information to is not clear the existing theory the phenomenon applicable 
assess this advancesit was explained so far to the 
element makes. I document 
Table 2.7: Critical appraisal tool 
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2.7.6 Data extraction and synthesis 
The data extraction process conccrns the papcrs that havc inct the scicction and quality 
critcria. More spccifically, the categories of information to be extracted were: citation 
information (author and title of the article; title of the journal, volume, part, 
month/scason and pages); descriptive information (location, contcxt/industry),, 
mctliodological information (cmpirical/ilicorctical, mcthods of data collcction and 
analysis, study cliaractcristics/philosophical approaches); thematic information (key 
findings, notes on ideas, approaches and theories used). 
The synthesis phase of the SLR cnablcd the rescarclicr to bring togcthcr the findings 
obtained from diffcrcnt sources. Ilirough this process it was possible to classify and 
catcgorisc the data according to main charactcristics and key conccpts; to do so, the 
ProCitc database was uscd. 
2.7.7 Results 
The protocol was utilised to structure the literature review process. In the next 
paragraphs, information is firstly provided regarding the articles idcntiricd through the 
keyword search, and then in ten-ns of the number that passed the different stages of the 
selection. A significant number of articles were identified through the keyword search 
(Table 2.8). 
Search string \ Database ProQuest EBSCO Science Direct 
(Performance measure* OR Performance 
management OR Performance evaluation OR 
Management control* OR Accounting OR 972 694 441 
Control system*) AND (Institutional* OR 
Resource Depend* OR Organi* theor*) 
Table 2.8: Keyword search results 
However, excluding articles just on the basis of their titles and eliminating papers found 
in more than one database, the total number dropped to 292. All the corresponding 
abstracts were then examined and the number of papers to be thoroughly examined was 
94 (Table 2.9). Regarding databases, ProQuest was the first one to be looked at, EBSCO 
the second and Science Direct the third; therefore, if an article appeared in both 
ProQuest and EBSCO, it was considered as appearingjust in ProQuest. 
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Database \ Stage Keyword Search Analysis of the title Analysis of the abstract 
ProQucst 972 201 66 
EBSCO 694 59 24 
Science Direct 441 32 4 
Total 2107 (*) 292 94 
Table 2.9: Keyword search - Three stages 
(*) Including ovcrlaps bctwccn databascs 
During this process of preliminary selection, any overlap with the papers belonging to 
the scoping study was also considered. Subsequently, a similar procedure was followed 
regarding the material suggested by academics and found by scanning the references at 
the end of the papers to be submitted to the inclusion and exclusion criteria. The number 
of papers to be examined was 119; Table 2.10 presents the total number broken down 
according to sources. 
Source Scoping Panel Cross Keyword Total 
study (SS) recommendations references Search (KS) 
(PR) (CR) 
Number of 39 4 9 67 119 articles 
Table 2.10: Number of articles and books before the selection criteria 
The inclusion and exclusion criteria were then applied to the 117 articles and 2 books. 
Consequently, the ones that passed them were assessed on the basis of their quality. The 
final results are presented in Table 2.11. 
Before inclusion and After inclusion and After Quality 
exclusion criteria exclusion criteria Assessment 
Number of 119 48 42 
papers I I II 
Table 2.11: Results - Inclusion, exclusion and quality criteria 
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Ilic papcrs includcd arc of two main typcs: 
I- Articics/books that dcal with performance mcasurcmcnt or with rclatcd subjects or 
interest from a new institutional and/or resource dcpcndcncc standpoint. The level of 
gencralisability is higher than the one of the population studicd and there is a clear 
contribution from an cmpirical or thcorctical point of view. If the main contribution 
dcrivcs from the analysis of empirical data or from thcorctical rcflcctions on issues 
regarding a ccrtain sector or sub-scctor, the cases prcscntcd or the thcorctical 
rcflcctions have to concern prcdominantly public sector organisations. 
2- Vcry relcvant thcorctical articlcs/books that adopt. a ncw institutional and/or 
rcsource dcpcndcnt standpoint, or makc a substantial contribution to issucs rclatcd 
to thosc theorics. 
Approximately two thirds of the articles to be assessed did not pass the selection and 
quality criteria (Table 2.12). 
Element \ Level 0 1 2 3 N/A 
Theory robustness 12 30 
Implications for practice 5 21 1 15 
Methodology 1 21 6 14 
Gencralisability 21 13 
Contribution 19 23 
Table 2.12: Quality messmcnt of the articles rcvicNvcd 
2.7.8 Alain findings 
In order to understand how new institutional and resource dependence theories have 
been and could be used to explain phenomena related to the measurement of 
performance in the public sector, a systematic review process was followed. The main 
themes that emerged from the review of the articles and books selected can be grouped 
into nine interrelated sets: 
1. The need to link theory and practice. The review strongly confirmed what had been 
found previously and provided more evidence concerning the existence of two 
different approaches to the study of Phi in the public sector. The main criticism 
made of the 'applied' approach is that practical issues are considered, but theories 
are very often neglected and remarks rarely made on a general level. Conversely, the 
, theoretical' approach seldom deals with practical aspects and authors do not seem 
much concerned about the practical relevance of their research. 
41 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL BASES CHAPTER 2 
2. In the studies where performance measurement in public sector organisations has 
been examined using new institutional and/or resource dependence theories, PM 
systems have been considered mainly as: enablers of data acquisition, analysis and 
dissemination (Ansari and Euske, 1987); servers of both objective and symbolic 
functions (Boland and Pondy, 1983); and drivers of behaviour (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978). In the next section, more details are provided and suggestions are made on 
how to bridge the 'applied' and the 'theoretical' bodies of literature. 
3. Rcflections on the dissimilarities between public and private sectors have often been 
concerned with the possibility for organisations to respond strategically to 
institutional pressures. However, most of the papers considered support the 
conclusion that public sector organisations can behave strategically, almost as much 
as their business counterparts (Casile and Davis-Blake, 2002; DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983; Geiger and Ittner, 1996; Meyer and Rowan, 1977). The analysis of the 
environment and the roles of management (i. e. the possibility of managers to behave 
pro-actively), together with the framework developed by Oliver (1991) and the 
studies that have made use of it, can provide a very strong basis for the study of 
strategic responses to institutional pressures in a public sector context. 
4. The concepts of efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy, and their mutual relations 
have proved to be very relevant in explaining a wide variety of issues related to the 
subject of PM (Bowerman, 2002; Carruthers, 1995; Suchman, 1995). Particularly 
interesting insights have been achieved by looking at the temporal aspects 
associated with the adoption and development of performance measurement systems 
(Westphal, Gulati and Shortell, 1997). 
5. The concept of loose coupling has also been utilised in several studies, but the 
majority seem to have misinterpreted it (Orton and Weick 1990; Weick 1976). In 
the context of PM, loose coupling could be considered in relation to which 
performance measurement systems accommodate or oppose external and internal 
standards of expected performance (Collier, 2001). 
6. The phenomenon of institutionalisation, its connections with power and self-interest 
within and outside organisations, and the existence of conflicting rationalities were 
discussed by various authors (Ansari and Euske, 1987; Carpenter and Feroz, 1992). 
Self-interest and power are important factors that influence whether or not 
institutional pressures for change are successful, and PM systems are a significant 
component of the power system in an organisation. 
7. The concept of isomorphism has been widely used and seems particularly relevant 
in a public sector context (Townley, 2002). The distinction between competitive and 
institutional isomorphism reflects the dichotomy between efficiency and legitimacy 
as justifications or explanations for social action. Through this concept it is possible 
to structure a framework that takes into account coercive forces (consistent with 
resource dependence theory), mimetic processes (more related to the core of new 
institutionalism), and normative isomorphism, which can be seen as a network 
influence (Mizruchi and Fein, 1999). 
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8. Interesting rcflcctions have been made rcgnrding the research level of analysis: most 
of the authors who have adoptcd a new institutional pcrspcctivc have carricd out 
cases on an organisational field level (Dihlaggio and llowcll, 1983). Ncvcrthclcss, 
there has been some criticism and different levels of analysis have bccn advocated, 
particularly to take into account intm, -organisational processes and forces, and not 
just intcr-organisational ones (Abcmcthy and Chua, 1996; Collicr, 2001). 
9. Finally, interesting contributions have bccn made in relation to incthods and 
methodologies. In the papers reviewed, authors showed a strong prcfcrcncc for case 
studies, rather than surveys, and to qualitative, rather than quantitative analysis. 11iis 
is in contrast to the more practitioner-focuscd type of studies where quantitative 
approaches are more widcsprcad. 
2.7.9 Conclusions - Starting to bridge the gap 
In this review of the literature a gap bctwccn the theoretical and tile applicd litcrature in 
the field of PM has been idcntiricd. It is not argucd that cithcr of those streams is more 
or less important; what is argued for is convergence. It is bclicvcd that by crcating new 
knowledge that has a firm theoretical basis and at the same time is relevant to practice, 
it is possible to bridge these streams and further our understanding of this field. Without 
a theoretical Icris it is difficult, if not impossible, to interpret findings in tile applied 
literature. 
This systematic literature revic%v has specifically discussed the use that has been, and 
could be made of new institutional and resource dependence theory. Many 'applied' 
papers highlight, issues relating to purpose, characteristics and utilisation of an 
organisation's performance measurement system, such as the weakness of the 
relationship bet'wcen PM, organisational mission and strategy (Berman, 2002; Bchn, 
2003); the inadequacy of the inforination system and the competencies of the people 
involved in performance measurement (Berman and Wang, 2000; 11alaclu-ni and 
Bouckacrt, 1994, Birkctt, 1992); or the low level of commitment shown by managers 
during the development of a performance measurement system (Cavalluzzo and Ittncr, 
2004). Applying the two suggested organisation theories might enable researchers to 
gain improved insights into the issues outlined above. 
The existence of conflicting demands and pressures from institutions, for example, 
strongly influences the development of a PNIS, particularly in a public sector context. 
Political influence and, at the same time, the attempt to gain legitimacy to ensure a 
sufficient level of critical resources for the organisation, play a fundamental role 
(Greening and Gray, 1994). Once legitimacy is achieved, new institutionalists claim, the 
organisation will focus on its practical activities, neglecting the techniques and tools 
that do not contribute to it. Therefore, if certain performance indicators, or the whole 
PMS, are imposed on a public sector organisation, the commitment demonstrated by 
managers might be strong in the beginning of the PNIS development, but might 
progressively decline once the compliance with institutional requirements has cnsurcd 
the survival of the organisation (McKevitt ct aL, 2000). 
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New institutional and resource dependence theories also relate to the issues of 
stakeholder involvement, design and use of performance measurement systems, by 
using concepts like resource dependence, legitimacy and loose coupling. The 
insufficient involvement of relevant stakeholders in the development of PMS, and the 
compliance with regulations that are often at odds with organisational efficiency and 
effectiveness are strongly related to the need of financial resources and the power of the 
organisation relative to institutions and stakeholders. Various articles have emphasised 
the discrepancy between the collection of massive amounts of PM data and the use that 
is subsequently made of it (Carpenter and Feroz, 2001), which is a particularly relevant 
issue in public sector organisations (Propper and Wilson, 2003). Organisational 
theorists have often described this difference between external and internal behaviour 
with the concept of loose coupling/de-coupling and the contraposition between 
legitimacy and efficiency (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). 
The reflections presented here are an attempt to bridge the two bodies of literature. 
Future research is advocated to build on these organisation theories, in order to improve 
our understanding of the subject of PM in general, and particularly in relation to public 
sector organisations. 
2.7.10 Promising avenues for further research 
Through this literature review it was possible to highlight a number of areas and related 
research questions, which would be worth investigating. The general suggestion coming 
from this systematic review regards the wider use of organisation theory in the field of 
PM. Moreover, a substantial number of gaps and possibilities for further research into 
PM in the public sector emerged: 
1. The necessity to complement new institutional theory with resource dependence 
theory, or, at least, to incorporate into the first theory elements that take into 
consideration the possibility of strategic choice and aspects related to power and 
self-interest in both inter- and intra-organisational contexts (Abernethy and Chua, 
1996; Collier, 2001). 
2. When studying the institutionalisation of systems, practices and techniques, 
institutionalisation could be considered as an ongoing process rather than as an 
outcome (Covaleski, Dirsmith and Michelman, 1993). This would enable research to 
focus on "the complex recursive processes by which institutional forces both shape 
and are shaped by organisational actions" (Scott, 2001, p. 179). More attention 
should also be paid to the relationships between institutional and technical 
environments: in this context, more empirical studies of how isomorphic pressures 
interact with intra-organisational and technical factors are required (Modell, 2002). 
3. Empirical studies should investigate the subject of strategic responses to 
institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991). The conflict between the three institutional 
'pillars' (Scott, 2001) - normative, regulative and cognitive - should also be 
considered (Broadbent, Jacobs and Laughlin, 2001). In this case, it would be 
interesting to examine the relationship between instrumental work processes and 
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"thc symbolic display of rational organisational practicc in rcsponsc to institutional 
prcssurcs" (Dirsmith ct aL, 2000, p. 515). The conscqucnces of rcsistant stratcgics, 
in particular for organisational cfficicncy and cffcctivcncss, as wcll as the reasons 
for conformity or rcsistancc ought to bc invcstigatcd (Olivcr, 1991). Finally, it is 
important to undcrstand whcthcr the sanic factors that affcct catly rcsponscs; to ncw 
standards also affcct the pacc of adoption of thosc standards, and if diffcrcnt 
rationaIcs for adopting ncw practiecs; ]cad to lictcrogcticous adoption pattcrns 
(Casile and Davis-Blakc, 2002). 
4. The intcrconncction bctwccn Icgitimacy, cfficicncy and cffcctivcncss is an issue 
which has not been sufficicntly addrcsscd in an cmpirical scnsc (Carruthers, 1995). 
Most new institutional scholars have assumed that practices designed to secure 
cxtcrnal legitimacy arc only symbolic and always dccouplcd from intcrnal opcrating 
systcms, but have rarely substantiated this rcflcction with cmpirical cvidcncc 
(Abcrncthy and Chua, 1996). I'lic possibility of attaining Icgitimacy and the ways in 
which it could be done have also been studied in insufficicnt dcpth (Bowerman, 
2002). 
5. The concept of loose coupling should be conccivcd "not as a black box, but as a set 
of mechanisms, which warrant description and intcrprctation" (Collicr, 2001, p. 
483). Furthennorc, unpredictability should be trcatcd as a topic of intcrcst, rather 
than as nuisance (Wcick, 1976). 
6. in the study of the differences between public and private organisations, it would be 
interesting to understand if these two types of organisations differ in the way they 
respond to institutional pressures, and if it is possible to achieve normative 
consistency in such environments (Casilc and Davis-Blakc, 2002). Moreover, 
empirical studies could examine how the introduction of private firms into a public 
sector field increases the heterogeneity of responses to change associated with the 
development of PMS (Roy and Seguin, 2000). 
These six areas are crucially important if we look at performance measurement in the 
public sector. In the next section, the research gaps identified here and promising 
avenues for further study emerged in the New Public Management literature arc brought 
together in order to formulate the theoretical questions that drive this research. 
2.8 Research gaps 
The review of the literature enabled the idcntirication of a number of opportunities for 
further research. Despite the differences existing among the fields considered, several 
research gaps appear to be interrelated. The linkages between tile identiricd areas, the 
relevance of the topics, and the researcher's personal interests are the main reasons for 
determining the areas of particular focus for this research. Regarding the review of the 
PM and new public management literatures, this research focuses particularly on tile 
three following issues: 
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1. The characteristics and uses of the organisation's performance measurement system, 
principally in terrns of design of PMS and links between strategy formulation and 
execution, and performance measurement. 
2. The role of stakeholders, especially in the phase of PMS design. In this sense, 
particular attention is paid to the involvement of stakeholders in the various stages 
of development of a PMS and the possible uses of performance information in 
enhancing accountability at local and national levels. 
3. The balance between internal and external (mandatory) indicators as a consequence 
of the interplay between internal and external pressures and rationales. 
The first area of interest is particularly relevant in a public sector context, since, despite 
the increasing use of performance targets and indicators (Hood, 2006), empirical 
research is required to understand how these targets and indicators are designed and 
utilised (Strcib and Roch, 2005). 
The issue of stakeholder involvement is crucial for organisations that depend on, and 
have to report and engage with, a number of different parties. This is especially the case 
with the public services, where "not only public agencies, but also non-governmental 
stakeholders such as business and the media exercise an influence upon the way the 
rules of the game are formulated and how it is played out in the public domain" 
(Bovaird and Loeffler, 2003, p. 167). 
Finally, the balance between internally defined and externally set targets and indicators 
greatly influences the actual use that is made of performance information both within 
and between organisations (Bowerman, 1995; Modell, 2003). In this context, the links 
between centre (e. g. national and regional governments, audit bodies, etc. ) and 
periphery (i. e. organisations in charge of delivering services to end-users) become of 
primary importance (Talbot, 2005). 
Taking into consideration the research gaps that emerged in the systematic literature 
review, this research concentrates specifically on the two following subjects: 
1. the study of strategic responses to institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991) 
2. the interconnections between legitimacy and efficiency (Carruthers, 1995). 
These issues are relevant from both theoretical and empirical points of view. 
Institutional pressures, legitimacy and efficiency are fundamental concepts in new 
institutional and resource dependence theories, but have also been widely used in the 
New Public Management literature. In particular, various academics have emphasised 
the necessity of empirically examining the relationship between the symbolic display of 
rational practices and real organisational. processes in response to institutional pressures 
(Dirsmith et al. 2000). Furthermore, the link between legitimacy and efficiency is an 
important issue, which has rarely been studied in an empirical context. While authors 
have hypothesised that in organisations efficiency and legitimacy are at odds (Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977), in practice this seems not necessarily so (Abernethy and Chua, 
1996). 
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2.8 Conceptual research questions 
The identification and selection of the rcscarch gaps existing in the litcmturc cnablcd 
the fon-nulation of two overarching theoretical rcscarch questions. 71is rcscarch focuses 
on the interactions between local public sector organisations and institutions ill tile 
development of PM targets and indicators. 'llicreforc the following questions arc to be 
addressed: 
Mix are the relationships betivecis local public sector organisations and 
institutions in the developincia ofperformance targets and indicators? 
9 fflat are the strategic responses, conflicts. tensions and behaviours that arise? 
In order to firmly ground the research in the theory, concepts arc drawn from the 
different streams of literature considcrcd. In particular, the work of Oliver (1991) 
regarding the formulation of strategic responses to institutional prcssurcs, and the 
criticism it received, arc particularly valuable sources (e. g. Abernethy and Chua, 1996; 
Carpenter and Fcroz, 2001), as well as articles that discuss the concept of legitimacy 
and cfficicncy (e. g. Mcycr and Rowan, 1977; Suchman, 1995; Neely, 1998; Model], 
2003). In order to explore these issues from an empirical point of view, two exploratory 
case studies were carried out. Chapter 4 reports the process followed and results 
achieved. 
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PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
TWs chapter presents the philosophical and methodological bases of the research. It 
starts by discussing characteristics of the positivist paradigm, which is prevalent in both 
management research in general and, more specifically, in the field of PM. Critics of 
positivism claim that this paradigm suffers fmm transferring explanation modes which 
arc appropriate in the sciences of organic and inorganic matter to social science. 
Scholars have also remarked the lack in positivism of an underpinning theory of the 
object and its limits in addressing fundamental cpistcmological questions. 
Although this research does not aim at investigating in depth the implications of 
philosophy of science on PM, it is believed that solid ontological and epistemological 
bases would fostcr the development of PM as a field of research. Therefore, the 
researcher examines philosophical aspects considering in particular the implications of 
adopting an objectivist ontology and a subjectivist cpistcmology. To do so, relevant 
contributions from philosophy of science and physics are reviewed and presented in 
relation to the measurement of performance. 
Consistently with the ontological and epistemological positions adopted, this research is 
qualitative. From an empirical point of vic%v, this research consists of three phases. Wo 
exploratory case studies were undertaken in a healthcare trust and a police force (cf. 
chapter 4). Subsequently, unstructured intcrviews were carried out in nine local public 
sector organisations (cf section 5.2). Finally, two in-depth case studies were performed 
in a local authority and a fire service (cf. chapter 5). In the exploratory cases, publicly 
available documents were the main source of data, whereas in the in-depth case studies 
also 22 structured interviews were carried out. In terms of data analytic procedures, the 
data gathered was coded with the support of NVivo software. '17he mcthodological 
remarks reported in this chapter refcr prcdominantly to the in-depth case studies (cf 
Fig. 3.1 for an overview of the main philosophical and mcthodological dimensions of 
the research). 
Methodological aspects are considered in relation to criteria used to assess the quality of 
research. Following choices made on both philosophical and mcthodological grounds, 
dimensions such as replicability, rcliability and validity arc sccn as target points, but not 
as necessary conditions, as would be the case in positivist research. On the other hand, 
practical relevance and credibility are introduced as fundamental quality criteria. Given 
the philosophical position adopted, the discussion on methodology ends with remarks 
on self-reflexivity and mitigation of personal bias. Finally, section 3.4 introduces the 
three empirical phases this research consists of. 
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Realist ontology 
and subjectivist 
epistemology 
Qualitative 
methodology 
Research design - Two 
exploratory case studies, 
nine pilot interviews, two 
in-depth case studies 
Method - Structured and 
unstructured interviews 
and document analysis 
FigUre 3.1: Philosophical and methodological dimensions of the research 
The next sections examine and justify issues related to philosophy and methodology 
from a prevalently theoretical point of view. In chapter 5, the choice and characteristics 
of the in-depth case studies performed and the actual tools used for data collection and 
analysis are introduced. 
3.2 Philosophical approach 
3.2.1 The current (implicit) paradigm 
As discussed in the previous chapters, contributions to the field of PM are often related 
to the development of procedures and tools that could improve the efficiency and the 
effectiveness of organisations. Therefore a wide body of literature has developed around 
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topics such as the design and implcmcntation of PNI systems, and the links bctwccn 
performance targcts, indicators and compcnsation schemes. 
So-called 'alternative approaches', have considered PM and managcmcnt accounting 
more as social practices rather than techniques. In this context, scvcral authors have 
advocatcd deeper reflections in the PNI field in order to move away from a 'what gets 
measured gets done' standpoint (Chua and Dcgcling, 1993). Ilowcvcr, although a 
number of scholars have remarked that the "conccpt of objectivity in accounting is 
largely a myth" (Morgan, 1988. p. 477), PM, accounting and auditing arc still seen as 
objective cvaluations of reality by most acadcmics; and practitioners (Powcr, 1997). 
Interestingly, little has been written about the fundamental questions related to tile 
ontological and cpistcrnological bases of PNI. 1"his concern resonates with remarks 
made by eminent scholars about management as a social science (cf Ghoshal, 2005), 
who noted how few articles published in management journals include explicit 
statements regarding the philosophical position of the authors. '11lis research does not 
aim to discuss in depth how the philosophy of science could inform the disciplinc of 
management as a whoic. Therefore, only certain aspects which arc especially relevant 
for the purposes of this research arc reviewed in the following sections. Subsequently, 
reflections are made regarding the implications of adopting a particular philosophical 
perspective. 
First of all, when considering management literature in general, it could be argued that 
there seems to be little clarity regarding differences among sciences. Elstcr (1983), as 
presented in Ghoshal (2005), noted that different types of science require different 
modes of explanation and theorising. Elster catcgorised such modes as causal, 
functional, and intentional (Table 3.1). 
Science Explanation mode 
Inorganic matter (e. g. physics) Causal 
Organic matter (e. g. biology) Functional 
Social sciences (e. g. management) Intentional 
Table 3.1: The different modes of explanation of the diffcrcnt sciences (adapted from Elster, 
1983), as quoted in Ghoshal, 2005). 
For the sciences of inorganic matter, like physics, the causal mode is tile only acceptable 
mode of explanation, whereas in sciences of organic matter this is not the case. 
"Functional explanations, based on notions such as benefits, evolution, or progress have 
no role in physics"' (Ghoshal, 2005, p. 77), but arc adequate in the sciences of organic 
matter, such as biology. This claim is justified by the existence of the theory of natural 
selection, which provides an overarching causal thcory. 
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The appropriate explanation mode in the social sciences, Elster argues, is one of 
intentionality, since individual action is always guided by some intention. This makes 
social science fundamentally different from sciences of inorganic or organic matter. 
However, as Ghoshal (2005, p. 79) notes, "management theories at present are 
overwhelmingly causal or functional in their modes of explanation. ( ... ) [A]. 
precondition for making business studies a science as well as a consequence of the 
resulting belief in determinism has been the explicit denial of any role of moral or 
ethical considerations in the practice of management". Therefore, it is claimed that, 
although management is part of the social sciences, most management scholars use 
modes of explanation that are appropriate in other types of sciences, like physics or 
biology. 
Secondly, it has also been argued that fundamental differences in the processes of 
theorisation have not been sufficiently taken into account (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996). 
Management theories, unlike theories in sciences of inorganic or organic matter, have a 
consistent impact on the subject they relate to, i. e. the ways in which organisations 
function. In social science theories tend to be self-fulfilling, whereas in physical science 
they clearly do not (Gergen, 1973). Therefore, the more a theory is based on strong 
assumptions on human self-interest and opportunism, as is the case with agency theory, 
the more it will induce exactly those types of behaviours (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996). 
Another important difference between sciences is indicated by the concept of double 
hen-neneutics, for which the epistemic role of the human agent should be considered in 
social science studies. "Whereas natural scientists interpret data that are not 
preinterpreted by natural things, social scientists interpret data that are preinterpreted by 
soeial agents" (Numagami, 1998, p. 6). 
However, despite the existence of significantly different explanation modes, 
management academics have adopted the "'scientific' approach of trying to discover 
patterns and laws, and have replaced all notions of human intentionality with a firm 
belief in causal determinism for explaining all aspects of corporate performance" 
(Ghoshal, 2005, p. 77). In the Nobel Memorial Lecture delivered in 1974, Friedrich von 
Hayek similarly stated that economics, like other social sciences, is subject to so-called 
'physics envy', which leads authors to draw inappropriate conclusions and to forcefully 
adopt methodologies and methods drawn from physical science. Von Hayek referred to 
this issue as 'scientistic error'. 
Although these concerns are common to both management in general and PM 
specifically, this thesis does not intend to discuss the implications of philosophical 
perspectives on management in a broad sense. Rather, the following sections present 
how the adoption of a realist ontology and a subjectivist epistemology could further the 
development of the PM field. To do so, the researcher builds on recent debates and 
advances in the philosophy of science and, somewhat paradoxically, in physics. 
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3.2.2 Ontological nnd epistemological bascs7 
The researcher believes that, drawing oil rcflcctions made rcgarding the thcory of 111c 
object in philosophy and the cpistcmology of mcasurcmcnt in physics, it is possible to 
contribute to the development of performance mcasureincnt as a ficid of rcscarch. 
Ontology is the branch of philosophy that deals with the nature of being. It studies being 
or existence, and tile claims and assumptions which arc made about the nature of reality. 
Therefore, ontology has important implications for the conccptions of rcality. 
According to an objectivist view of ontology, social and natural reality exist 
independently of human knowledge and cognition. '11iis means that tile world exists 
without any human awareness of this existence as being necessary (Blaikic, 1993). A 
subjectivist view of ontology assumcs that what we take to be rcality is an output of 
human cognitive processes, i. e. there is no reality 'out there'. '11crcforc, as 
postmodcmists argue, reality is convcntional and rclativc (Johnson and Dubcricy, 
2000). 
Epistemology is the branch of philosophy that studies tile nature of knowledge. in 
particular its presuppositions and foundations, and its cxtcnt, scope and validity. It 
investigates the theories of the origins, nature, and limits of knowledge. Therefore, a 
fundamental epistemological question would be: how do we know what we know? 
An objectivist view of epistemology implies that it is possible to have a thcory-ncutral 
observational language, i. e. to access the external world objectively. Consequently, 
general laws are usually generated in 'closed systems, where other environmcntal 
influences can be controlled. A subjectivist view of cpistcmology denies tile possibility 
of such an epistemological foundation. From this perspective, tile central role of the 
human agent has to be stated, but with reference to the interactions with an independent 
external reality, which can constrain or facilitatc human action (Johnson and Dubcricy, 
2000). 
Following the definitions of ontology and epistemology, and having cmpliasiscd the 
differences between related objectivist and subjectivist views, it is possible to map the 
main philosophical approaches to research (Fig. 3.2). Although substantial differences 
exist between ontology and epistemology, the two concepts have often been conflated, 
reducing what reality is - an ontological question - to what we (arc able to) know about 
it - an epistemological one. As Ferraris (2003) argues, this error, known as 'tile 
transcendental fallacy', was a major fla%v in Kant's Copernican Revolution, as Kant's 
idea was that "we do not have to ask ourselves how things are in themselves, but how 
they should be so as to be known by u! e'(Fcrraris, 2005, p. 149). Ferraris also maintains 
that positivism, the most widely (and often implicitly) accepted paradigm in 
management, but also empiricism, postmodernism and pragmatism, among others, share 
this basic flaw and lack an underpinning theory of the object. 
7 The reflections presented in relation to ontology have greatly bencrited from the conversations the 
researcher had the pleasure to have with Prof Maurizio Ferraris, whose enlightening work - mostly 
ignored in management studies - is widely referenced in this dissertation. 
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objectivist 
EPISTEMOLOGY 
subjectivist 
ONTOLOGY 
objectivist I subjectivist 
lpositivismý 
I Critical Rationalism 
Realism 
I Critical Realism I 
I Pragmatism I 
Incoherence 
Conventionalism Hermeneutics 
Critical Theory Interpretivism 
Feminism 
Structuration Theory 
I Postmodernism 
Figure 3.2: Map of the main philosophical approaches to research (adapted from Johnson and 
Duberley, 2000) 
From an ontological point of view, it is argued that the "minimum requisite to constitute 
an ontology of social objects is the adoption of a realist perspective" (Ferraris, 2003, p. 
448). This implies that we have to adopt a clear objectivist view of ontology - what 
Ferraris calls a 'realist' ontological perspective. Building on the theory of the object (cf 
Meinong, 1904; Husserl, 1907), this means that when we study a certain phenomenon 
"the last word goes to the object, and not to the subject, because it is the experience that 
has to verify, and then falsify, and then verify again, continuously confronting itself 
with the object" (Ferraris, 2005, p. 141). Only by doing so could we avoid falling into 
the transcendental fallacy trap. 
From an epistemological point of view, it could be noted that while reality is indivisible 
(Bohm, 1980), the ways in which we know about it change over time: by using different 
'lenses' (or theories), we see different aspects of that reality. This is in contrast with 
positivism and Karl Popper's critical rationalism: "the trouble with the social sciences is 
that the logic of falsification, which is so very essential for the epistemology of 
positivism, is very hard to apply with any degree of rigor and ruthlessness in the domain 
of social theories. Typically, no theory - which are all, by definition, partial - explains a 
'phenomenon of organised complexity' fully, and many different and mutually 
inconsistent theories explain the same phenomenon, often to very similar extents" 
(Ghoshal, 2005, p. 86). 
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7lic rcscarchcr's philosophical position is in line with Ircalism' as intendcd by Fcrrafis 
(2005) - i. e. objcctivist in ontology and subjectivist in cpistcrnology. llicrcforc, while 
the author maintains that social and natural rcality exist indcpcndcntly to human 
knowledge, it is acknowledged that 'truth' is ncithcr absolute nor purcly convcntional 
and relative (Johnson and DubcrIcY, 2000). Conscqucntly, the rcscarchcr ninis at 
formulating a general theoretical framework, rccognising that his beliefs about tile 
world are subject to all kinds of historical and othcr kinds of dctcrminations (cf. section 
3.3.5). 
Furthermore, by denying tile possibility of creating and studying closed systems in 
social science the researcher advocates a type of management theory that "does not 
pretend to be scientific laws, but merely serves as temporary 'walking sticks' - in Fritz 
Rocthlisbcrgcr's (1977) terms - to aid sense making as we go along, to be used only 
until a better walking stick can be found"' (Ghoshal, 2005, p. 81). Since social science 
entails practical interventions in social life and value judgments by the investigators 
(Bbaskar, 1978), it cannot aim at formulating a 'theory of truth' (Mir and Watson, 
2001). Furthermore, "a theory is primarily a form of iraight, i. e. a way of looking at tile 
world, and not a form of Ibion-ledge of how the world is! " (Bolim, 1980, p. 4). As a 
result, in terms of theory construction, the author agrees with Wcick's (1989) 
'disciplined imagination', as opposed to Karl Popper's (1969) formaliscd falsification. 
Relating these epistemological claims to the field of PNI, it could be argucd that 
"because of their usually tentative nature, performance indicators should bc sccii as 
6screening devices' and not over-interpretcd" (Royal Statistical Socicty, 2005, p. 2). 
Since this calls into question the vcry concept (and possibility) of PNI, the following 
section discusses the epistemology of measurement. To do so, reccnt developments in 
measurement theory in physics are analysed and compared to the current situation of 
PM as a field of research. 
3.2.3 The epistemology of measurements 
Having established the importance of embracing a realist 'View of ontology in social 
science, the implications of adopting a subjectivist view of epistemology are examined. 
According to the positivist paradigm, research in management is based on a number of 
assumptions: 
"Variables other than the ones whose variation we would like to observe arc 
perfectly controlled for. 
* The empirical scales measure the constructs completely. 
8 This section and subsequent reflections on the epistemology of measurement ha%v been developed 
through an ongoing collaboration with ProE Luca Mari, whose work on measurement theory has proven 
very relevant for the purposes of this research. As in the case of Ferraris' research on ontology. no 
evidence could be found of studies in performance measurement and management that have been 
influenced by Mari's work, despite its significance. 
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" There is no cognitive disagreement among social agents about the definition of the 
situation. 
" Social agents have an ability to rcflect, that is, they can think about their own 
thinking and that of others" (Numagami, 1998, pp. 4-5). 
Interestingly, these assumptions are aligned with traditional principles in physical 
science, for which measurement is "a process of empirical, objective assignment of 
symbols to attributes of objects and events of the real world, in such a way as to 
represent them, or to describe them" (Finkelstein, 2003, p. 41). However, the researcher 
argues that, not only are these assumptions examples of 'physics envy' and 'scientistic; 
error', but also current debates in measurement theory are questioning the validity of 
those very principles in physical science. For the purposes of clarity, a brief overview of 
the history of measurement in the 'hard sciences' is provided. 
Measurement - Definitions and history 
The etymology of the word 'measure' provides us with an interesting insight into the 
concept and history of measurement science (for a more in-depth analysis, please see 
Mari (2003)). 'Measure' initially referred to a "comparison with an external standard, to 
point to a universal sort of inner ratio or proportion, perceived both through the sense 
and through the mind. ( ... ) [A]s time went on, this notion of measure gradually began to 
change, to lose its subtlety and to become relatively gross and mechanical" (Bohm, 
1980, p. 21). This shift from "inner ratio or proportion" to mere quantification of 
(properties oo objects also implied that measures ceased to be seen as forms of insight; 
rather, they started to appear to be absolute truths about reality as it is. Bohm argues that 
this change has had significant consequences on both the ontological and the 
epistemological bases of science. 
However, according to Mari (2003), developments in measurement theory have 
questioned this mechanistic view. In order to support this claim he defines three main 
historical phases% 
1. the metaphysical period 
2. the anti-metaphysical period 
3. the relativistic period. 
The first position was expressed by the founders of the physical sciences, such as 
Aristotle, Galileo and Kepler, for whom numbers are present in the world, and measures 
are inherent properties of the objects being measured. According to them, any 
phenomenon considered has the characteristic of being quantitative (Mari, 2005). 
Consequently, as Galileo stated, the task of scientists is to count what is countable, 
measure what is measurable, and what is not measurable, make it measurable. 
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According to the second perspective, "measures arc results of operations that preserve 
the relations observed among measured things" (Mari, 2003, p. 23). llis position 
separates itself considerably from the previous one. From an anti-nictaphysical point of 
view, a phenomenon is represented by a quantitative expression, rather than being 
inherently quantitative. In mathematical terms, this implies that measurement is a 
homomorphism (cf. Finkelstein, 2003). 
Finally, from a relativistic standpoint "measures arc results of operations recognized as 
adequate for their goal of obtaining information on measured things" (Mari. 2003, p. 
24). This stresses the importancc and unavoidability of interpretive models in acquiring 
knowledge about reality, and that a phenomenon is quantificd according to the model in 
Use. 
The move from the first to the second position is fundamental, as it implies a shift from 
ontology to epistemology. The results of measurement arc not part of reality, as 
"measurement acts like a bridge between reality (to which the object under 
measurement belongs) and the linguistic/symbolic realm (to which the measurement 
result belongs)" (Mari, 2007, p. 2). 11crcforc, measurement relates to the knowledge %vc 
have about the state of an object, and not about the object itself. Along the same lines, 
Bohm (1980, p. 23) remarked how "measure is an insight created by man. A reality that 
is beyond man and prior to him cannot depend on such insight". 
From an anti-metaphysical - or 'representational' - point of view, measurement has to 
be empirical, objective, and its results must only give information about the measured 
property (Cecconi, Franceschini and Galetto, 2006). In this context, objectivity means 
"the numbers assigned to a property by measurement must, within the limits of error, be 
independent of the observer" (Finkelstein, 2003, p. 41). Therefore, the information 
produced through measurement has to be non-ambiguous and intcr-subjectivc. 
'Empirical' implies that measurement "must be the result of observation and not, for 
example, of a thought experiment. Further, the concept of the property measured must 
be based on empirically determinable relations and not, say, on convention" 
(Finkelstein, 2003, p. 41). 
The move from the second to the third position is also radical as it entails a shift from 
error to -uncertainty, and from a truth-based view to a mcAcl-bascd view. Error here 
refers to the empirical inability in the measurement process of determining the true 
value of the property of an object. Rather, uncertainty is the "lack of complete certainty 
on the value that should be assigned to describe the object under measurement relatively 
to the measurand" (Mari, 2007, p. 18). This dcrinition acknowledges that measurement 
is a knowledge-based process, and not the empirical determination of the property of an 
ob ect. j 
The relativistic view 
While in measurement theory the "metaphysical position' is now considered obsolete, 
the anti-metaphysical and relativistic perspectives seem to coexist. This section bricfly 
examines the latter, as it is believed it could shed light on the measurement of 
57 
PT 11LOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE AND METHODOLOGY CHAPTER 3 
perfon-nance in organisations. First of all, from a relativistic perspective the concept of 
model becomes of primary importance. A model-based view also takes into account 
pragmatic components, which are not considered in the two other positions, and aims at 
attaining 'adequate' results, rather than 'true' results. "In the presence of ambiguity, a 
decision can be made only on the basis of a contextual criterion. ( ... )The interest of balancing the costs of such resources with the quality of the measurement results makes 
the pragmatic dimension a relevant component of measurement. ( ... ) Measurement 
results must be assigned (and not determined) according to the goals for which the 
measurement is performed, with the consequence that they are adequate if they meet 
such goals" (Mari, 2007, p. 27-28). 
Secondly, repeatability is another differentiating factor between this position and the 
other two. Following the definition of Cecconi et al. (2006), which encapsulates the 
representational perspective, in measurement subjects have to be independent, i. e. 
6experiments' may be repeated by different observers and each will get the same result. 
On the other hand, advocates of the relativistic perspective maintain that "repeatability 
is only a desimble, but by no means a necessary, feature of measurement" (Mari, 2007; 
P. Is). 
Third, inter-subjectivity and objectivity, fundamental features of the representational 
position (Finkelstein, 2003), are considered here to be target points. Therefore, 
measurement has to aim at achieving complete inter-subjectivity and objectivity, for 
instance by increasing the number of experimental situations. However, both 
experimental (e. g. noise in a general sense), and conceptual issues (e. g. measurand 
identification / definition) make it impossible to reach them. 
Finally, in opposition to the metaphysical and anti-metaphysical positions, according to 
the relativistic view (building on Mari, 2003 and 2007): 
- Measurement is not a determination, but an assignment; 
- Measurement results are informational, and not empirical, entities; 
- The measurability of a property conceptually depends on the current state of 
knowledge on the property (and therefore it is not an 'intrinsic characteristic' of the 
property); 
- The measurability of a property operatively depends on the availability of 
experimental conditions (and therefore it cannot be derived from formal 
requirements); 
In a measurement process there is an important qualitative trade-off between the 
specificity - previously referred to as 'precision' - of a value and the trust attributed 
to it - previously referred to as 'accuracy'. Both aspects depend on the available 
experimental knowledge of the measurand. This implies that objects could be 
measured with great accuracy, but precision can be misleading, as metrics can be 
precisely wrong. 
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3.2.4 Implications for performance incasurcinait 
The rcflcctions presented in tile previous scctions licip shcd light on a number of issues 
related to the theory and practice of Phi. First of all, in relation to so-callal 'physics 
envy', it is paradoxical to note how dcbates in physics could infonn managcnicrit theory 
and practice, but they seem not to have bccn sufficictitly taken into account. Spccirically 
regarding PM, the current epistemology sccins to be somchow in bct%vccn tile 
metaphysical and anti-mctaphysical positions cxprcsscd in mcasurcmcnt thcory. 
However, the main tenets of the relativistic perspective should inform current dcbatcs 
on PM and more clarity is rcquircd regarding the philosophical undcrilinnings of 
measurement in social science. 
Secondly, it is important to remark that mcasurcmcnt can rclatc to thrcc types of object: 
physical (which exists in space and time); ideal (which exists outside space and time); 
and social (which has a beginning in time and is socially constructed) (Mcinong, 1904; 
Fcrraris, 2005). Metrology, as part of physical science, has traditionally focused on 
physical objects, such as bodies and substances. PNI is most often concerned with social 
objects (from stakeholders' satisfaction to return on investments, from intellectual 
capital to brand management), which arc oflcn complex and difficult to dcrinc and 
measure. Therefore, it could be argued that in PM, even more than in physical science, 
complete objectivity and empiricity must be considered as targets and not as necessary 
conditions. Moreover, following the 'relativistic pcrspcctivc" in measurement theory, 
pragmatic aspects, such as costs, bcncfits, specificity and trust also become essential 
features of PM. 
Third, the transcendental fallacy plays an important role in contemporary theory and 
practice of PM. This concept implies that 'performance' is reduced to what is possible 
to measure of performance. In practice, a performance indicator is equalled to the actual 
activity being performed, e. g. number of complaints expressed by employees = 
employees' satisfaction; impact factor of publications = academic standing, ctc. This 
issue is particularly relevant and problematic, if we consider the great difficulties 
encountered in - and, frequently, the impossibility of carrying out - the measurement of 
very complex activities and processes performed by organisations. Unfortunately, as 
cmphasised by von Hayek (1989), in the social sciences what is treated as important is 
what happens to be accessible to measurement. This claim confirms that the ontological 
and the epistemological dimensions are often conflatcd, thus reducing reality to what it 
is easy to access of reality. 
Following these reflections, it is possible to conclude that, in the field of PM, the 
adoption of explicit realist ontology and subjectivist - or "relativistic' - epistemology 
implies a re-conccptualisation. The focus of measurement has to shift from what is 
measurable, which is a prevalently cpistcmological act, to the nature of the objects that 
we want to measure, i. e. the actual organisational processes and activities being 
performed. Moreover, indicators should not be considered as exact pictures of reality or 
as unveiling presumed truths. On the contrary, they ought to be used as ways to gathcr 
information about organisational performance that is as adequate as possible. Therefore, 
when we measure performance the last word has to go to the object being measured, and 
not to the subject; as subjects we have to continuously confront ourselves with the 
object and not vice versa (cf Ferraris, 2005). 
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This leads to another significant implication in relation to the issues of organisational 
learning and PMS review. As Bohm (1980, p. 23) argued, "the attempt to suppose that 
measures exist prior to man and independently of him leads ( ... ) to the 'objectification' 
of man's insight, so that it becomes rigidified and unable to change, eventually bringing 
about fragmentation and general confusion". This means that, if confusion exists 
between reality and its measurement, in such a way that measurement is seen as 
capturing the essence of objects, PMS will inevitably be static. On the contrary, only by, 
analysing the data gathered through the PM system and, in particular, reformulating the 
system itself, can organisations improve their performance and ensure that single and 
double loop learning take place (Argyris, 1977). Therefore, the review of the system has 
necessarily to happen through an in-depth comparison between what is measured of the 
activities performed, and which activities really take place. 
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3.3 Methodology 
Af1cr discussing the philosophical bases of this research, it is important to consider its 
main mcthodological aspects. Methodology is "the analysis or how research should and 
does proceed, i. e. how theories arc gcncratcd and tested, what kind or logic is used, how 
particular theoretical perspectives can be related to particular research problems" 
(Wikipcdia). In a broader sense, methodology could be dcrincd as "a way of thinking 
about and studying social reality" (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p. 3). 
'17his research is of a thcory-building nature and is qualitative. 'Qualitative' rcfcrs to a 
type of research that leads to findings which arc not achicvcd through statistical 
procedures or other means of quantification. Rather, it is "a nonmatlicmatical process of 
interpretation, carried out for the purpose of discovering concepts and relationships in 
raw data and then organising these into a theoretical explanatory scheme" (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998, p. 10-11). In other terms, "the real purpose of qualitative research is not 
counting opinions or people, but rather exploring the range of opinions, the difrcrcnt 
representations of an issue" (GaskcIl, 2000, p. 41). Ilicrcforc, in this research the 
findings arc arrived at by continuous comparison between theory and data. 
Operationally, following the work of Bauer, Gaskcll and Allum (2000), three 
methodological dimensions arc taken into account: 
1. research design: formulated "according to the strategic principles of research, such 
as the sample survey, participant observation, case studies, experiments and quasi- 
experiments" 
2. data elicitation methods, "such as interviewing, observation and the collection of 
documents" 
3. data analytic proccdures, "such as content analysis, rhetorical analysis, discoursc 
analysis and statistics" (p. 4). 
These aspects are first discussed in theoretical terms. In chapter 5 they arc prcscntcd as 
practical steps towards the completion of the research. 
3.3.1 Research design 
To answer the research questions presented above, case study was chosen as tile 
research design. Despite the advantages of the case study method (cf, Yin, 1994), its 
validity has been questioned, particularly by positivist scholars. In the positivist 
paradigm, science has to be nornothetic - i. e. it has to look for universal laws - and 
reliability, replicability and external validity are fundamental criteria to be met. 
Positivists argue that case studies do not enable rcscarclicrs to score sufficiently highly 
along these dimensions. 
However, the researcher, in line with the chosen philosophical position, does not see the 
ob ective of his research - or any management study - as the search of an invariant law, j 
but as a way to improve current theory and practice, and to encourage reflective 
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dialogue in society (Numagami, 1998) (cf, section 3.3.5). In relation to replicability, it is 
believed that social phenomena can be difficult to reproduce, "because it is nearly 
impossible to replicate the original conditions under which data were collected or to 
control all the variables that might possibly affect findings" (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, 
p. 266). Although aspects of reliability and external validity are surely to be considered, 
relevance and explanatory range take precedence (Baehr, 1990; Johnson and Duberley, 
2000) (cf. 4.3.4 for further details). 
Given the lack of empirical studies on the issues considered,. this research is of an 
exploratory character; therefore, following Yin (1994), the in-depth cases are primarily 
descriptive and partly explanatory. Although description is often regarded as being just 
observation and reporting, it is believed that any descriptive research inevitably 
involves selection and that, to be of value, it has to be relevant (Sen, 1980). 
This research is of a theory-building nature. A number of authors have depicted case 
study research as an indispensable building block for theorising (Kaplan, 1983; 
Carpenter and Feroz, 1992; Voss, Tsikriktsis and Frohlich, 2002; Yin, 1994). As 
remarked by Kaplan (1986), case studies "provide a firmer basis for our modeling 
theory-building, and hypothesis-formation activities, activities that today occur in the 
absence of data and observations" (p. 445). The review of the literature and the a priori 
specification of part of the constructs help shape the research (Eisenhardt, 1989), and 
enable the researcher to avoid the degeneration of the case studies into a 'story' 
(Hartley, 1994). Moreover, linking the emergent theory to existing literature improves 
the theoretical level of theory building obtained through case study research 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). 
3.3.2 Data elicitation methods 
While carrying out the in-depth case studies, different types of evidence were utilised 
(Yin, 198 1): data triangulation (Denzin, 1978) was achieved by carrying out interviews, 
analysing written texts, and collecting data through observations. While carrying out the 
cases, the theory and data were continuously compared, iterating toward a theory that 
fits the data (Eisenhardt, 1989). Triangulation was obtained through the use of different 
methods of data collection; this strengthened the validity of the research and enriched 
the researcher's understanding of the phenomena under investigation by allowing for 
new or deeper dimensions to emerge (Voss et al., 2002). Furthermore, the use of 
qualitative methods played a prominent role by eliciting data and suggesting 
conclusions which other methods could not enable to draw, and potentially generate 
what anthropologists call 'holistic work' or 'thick description' (Jick, 1979). 
The interviews undertaken have the following-main attributes: 
1. they are qualitative - they "provide a framework within which respondents can 
express their own understandings in their own terms" (Patton, 1990, p. 290) 
2. they are individual, since the research objective is to perform case studies with 
repeated interviews over time (Gaskell, 2000) 
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3. they arc of a standardiscd open-ended type, i. e. interviews consist of "a set of 
questions carefully worded and arranged with the intention of taking each 
respondent through the same sequence and asking cach respondent the same 
questions with essentially (he same words"' (Pation, 1990, p. 28 1 ). 
By controlling and standardising the interview, the researcher ninis to obtain systematic 
and thorough data for cach rcspondcnt, although it is acknowledged that this process 
reduces flexibility and spontaneity. Particular attention is given to the wording of each 
question and a limited number of probes arc used to pursuc issues that wcrc not 
anticipated while writing the questions. 
This type of interview is in line with a rcalist approach to data collection and analysis 
(King, 2004). I'lic researcher's concern was to obtain accurate information from the 
intcrvicwccs, untainted by relationship factors. While trying to be scif-rcflcxivc, 
acknowledging his personal biases and previous knowledge, the rcscarchcr tried to 
minimise the impact of intcr-pcrsonal processes on the course of the interviews. Finally, 
a sample of respondents representing important distinctions within the organisational 
population was included; this improved the validity of the analysis, since it increased 
the number of different viewpoints collected via interviews. 
3.3.3 Data analytic procedures 
The information gathered through documents and interviews was analysed consistently 
(utilising NVivo software for coding), and themes and findings were compared, 
following data triangulation. The data gathered was both qualitative and quantitative, 
and the analysis was performed through coding and analysis of the discourse, similar to 
what was done in the exploratory phase (cf section 4.3). The results obtained were then 
compared to the theory, and conclusions drawn using concepts and categories coming 
from the literature and emerging from the data. 
The process of analysis started from the description of the data gathered through the 
identification and reporting of relevant quotes, and then moved on to a more 
interpretative phase (Patton, 1990). Through content analysis it was possible to identify, 
code, and catcgorise the primary patterns in the data. 'Coding' refcrs to "the analytic 
processes through which data are fractured, conccptualiscd, and integrated to form 
theory" (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p. 3). In this research, codes are partly derived from 
theory, rcflccting the purposes of the research (Bauer, 2000), but also emerge from the 
data. Appendix B provides an overview of the nodes utilised in the in-depth case 
studies. Moreover, it reports examples of coding practice and quotes related to the main 
themes identified during the analysis. 
3.3.4 Quality critcria 
Having presented the philosophical underpinnings and the principal methodological 
dimensions, it is important to rcflcct on a number of methodological critcria. 17his 
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research aims at creating knowledge that is firmly grounded in theory and relevant to 
the practice of PM in the public sector. The adoption of an objectivist ontology and 
subjectivist epistemology certainly influences the selection of 'quality criteria' to be 
met. Here replicability, reliability, internal and external validity are considered as target 
points, but not as fundamental characteristics, as would be the case if the author adopted 
a positivist stance. On the other hand, practical relevance and credibility are introduced 
as criteria to be met to ensure the quality of this study. In the next sections, these 
dimensions are presented and discussed in relation to the research. 
Replicability and reliability 
From a positivist perspective, replicability and reliability are considered as key- 
parameters to evaluate research. Replicability refers to the rate of success obtained by 
performing successive studies or experiments, possibly by the same researchers. In 
physical science it corresponds to "the variation in measurements taken by a single 
person or instrument on the same item and under the same conditions" (Wikipedia). The 
use of a case study protocol, a consistent series of questions while conducting the in- 
depth case studies, and the Nvivo software to code the material enhanced the degree of 
replicability of this research. Moreover, carrying out the analysis of data following a 
systematic process of decomposition, composition and interpretation contributed 
towards this aim. However, the author maintains that it is not possible to completely 
reproduce the conditions under which data are gathered in a social science study. 
Therefore replicability is considered as a target which is desirable, but neither necessary 
nor possible to fully reach. 
Reliability refers to "the ability of a test or experiment to be accurately reproduced, or 
replicated, by someone else working independently" (Wikipedia). It could also be 
defined as agreement among interpreters. "Establishing reliability involves some 
doubling of effort: the same person may make a second interpretation after a time 
interval (to determine intrapersonal reliability, consistency, stability), or two or more 
people may interpret the same material simultaneously (interpersonal reliability, 
agreement, reproducibility)" (Bauer, 2000, p. 143). As in the case of replicability, 
maintaining a chain of evidence contributed to the reliability of this research. Moreover, 
the involvement of two practitioners in the review of the interview protocol in order to 
understand whether the questions were comprehensible, meaningful and thorough, and 
the critical reflection by the researcher (self-reflexivity) were important in this sense 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995). However, the researcher acknowledges the 
determining epistemic role of the human agent. Therefore, reliability is considered as an 
important, but never totally achievable, criterion. Rather than reliability in a strict sense, 
the author aims at achieving a 'quality control' as depicted by Miles and Hubermann 
(1994). 
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Validity 
Validity is a central concept in both physical and social science research. Authors oflcn 
rcfcr to three dimensions of validity: 
" Construct validity: "the extent to which we cstablish correct operational measures 
for the concepts being studied" (Voss ct al., 2002, p. 211). 
" Internal validity: "the extent to which we can establish a causal rclationship, 
whereby certain conditions arc shown to lead to other conditions, as distinguished 
from spurious relationships" (Yin, 1994, p. 35). 
" External validity: "knowing whether a study's finding can be gcncraliscd beyond the 
immediate case study" (Voss ct al., 2002, p. 211). 
Construct validity could be enhanced through tile use of multiple sources of evidence. 
This has been achieved in tile empirical stages of this research. Ilowcvcr, construct 
validity also relates to the possibility of checking whether a construct could be 
differentiated from another (also known as 'discriminant validity') and "if predictions 
made about relationships to other variables arc confinlict! " (Voss ct al., 2002, p. 212). 
Since prediction and statistical relationships between variables arc not central 
components of this research, construct validity is not considered a fundamental 
criterion. 
Scholars have remarked how some of the characteristics which have been considered in 
this research, such as the use of different respondents from a number of organisational 
levels and cross-case analysis, could enhance internal validity (Gummcsson, 2000; 
King, 2004). However, the researcher argues that in social science we study open 
systems, for which "no constant conjunction of events is constant. As a consequence, 
identification of a causal law with a constant conjunction of events is inadequate and 
ought to be rejected"' (Tsoukas, 1989, p. 552). In accordance with Tsoukas, it is 
maintained that, although the use of different respondents and cross-casc analysis arc 
certainly also important from a realist perspective, complete internal validity could not 
be achieved in management studies. 
In terms of external validity, Yin (1994, p. 10) argues, "case studies, like experiments, 
are generalisablc to theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes. In this 
sense, the case study, like the experiment, does not represent a 'sampic', and tile 
investigator's goal is to expand and generalize theories (analytic generalization) and not 
to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization)". When 'analytic generalization' is 
followed, "a previously developed theory is used as a template with which to compare 
the empirical results of the case study" (Yin, 1994, p. 31). Therefore, tile emergent 
theory has been constantly tied to the literature (cf. Eisenhardt, 1989). Other authors 
have remarked that it is possible to generalise even from one single case, provided that 
the researcher achieves "a fundamental understanding of the structure, process and 
driving forces, rather than a superficial establishment of correlation or causc-cffcct 
relationships" (Gurnmesson, 2000, p. 89). This remark leads to a further quality 
criterion that, according to the philosophical position adopted, is central for this 
research. 
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Credibility and practical relevance 
A number of scholars have noted how researchers using a qualitative methodology 
"hope that their work has direct or potential relevance for both non-academic and 
academic audiences" (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p. 6). Moreover, "qualitative methods 
can be used to explore substantive areas about which little is known or about which 
much is known to gain novel understandings" (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p. 11). These 
comments are aligned with the objective of this research to improve current theory and 
practice, and to encourage reflective dialogue in society on PM in the public sector. I 
Therefore, although aspects of reliability and validity are surely to be considered, 
relevance and utilisation of findings take precedence. As argued by Miles and 
Hubermann (1994, p. 280), "even if a study's findings are 'valid' and transferable, we 
still need to know what the study does for its participants, both researchers and 
researched - and for its consumers. We simply cannot avoid the question of 'pragmatic 
validity' (Kvale, 1989); it's an essential addition to more traditional views of 
goodness". 
Carrying out the empirical investigation in three phases - exploratory cases, pilot 
interviews, and in-depth cases - and having a constant comparison of theory and 
practice contributed to the practical relevance of this research. Furthermore, the 
presentation and discussion of provisional results and directions of the research in front 
of both academic and practitioner audiences provided important 'reality checks' (cf 
chapter 7 for further details on communication and dissemination). This also ensured 
substantial access to documents and people working in a number of organisations. 
Following the discussion on the importance and the limitations of the quality criteria, a 
summary of the actions undertaken throughout the research is reported in Table 3.2. 
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Quality of the rcscarch Actions undertakcii 
Rcplicability and o Use of case study protocol 
reliability 0 Pilot interviews 
0 Review of the interview protocol with practitioners 
0 Maintain a chain of evidence 
0 Use of the Nvivo softwarc: to perform the coding 
0 Data analysis carried out following a systematic 
process of decomposition, composition and 
interpretation 
Construct validity 0 Multiple sources of evidence - data triangulation 
0 Coding - maintain links between the research issue 
and tools 
0 Maintain a chain of evidence 
Internal validity 0 Use different respondents from a number of 
organisational levels 
0 Cross-case analysis 
External validity 0 Analytic gencralisation 
0 Tic the emergent theory to existing literature 
0 Investigation of the structure, process and driving 
forces related to PM in the organisations considered 
Credibility and practical 0 Exploratory cases 
relevance 0 Pilot interviews carried out in different organisations 
0 In-depth case studies 
0 Accurate gathering and analysis of data 
0 Links between theory and data 
0 Actively make the findings available to the scientific 
community and the public 
0 Personal commitment to the task of research 
Table 3.2: Quality Criteria 
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3.3.5 Self-reflexivity 
The idea of self-reflexivity (or 'epistemic reflexivity') involves a critical reflection by 
the researcher on a number of socio-historical aspects, personal presuppositions, values 
and interests related to the research (Johnson and Duberley, 2000)9. Indeed, as Paul 
Klee said (and painted), I believe that 'Ich bin mein stil' and that every person has - his/her own view of the world, which, in an academic context, influences his/her own 
research. However, it could be argued that subjective factors are often underplayed, or 
even totally neglected, by scholars in the attempt to demonstrate that the results of their 
studies are 'objective facts' (Porter, 1995). On the contrary, I believe that all data 
involve theoretical presuppositions, i. e. there is no 'uncontaminated' data (Hammersley 
and Atkinson, 1995). Therefore, during the course of the research I have repeatedly 
interrogated myself about the influence of my personal characteristics and preferences 
on the results of the research. 
First of all, my interest in this subject springs from my will to improve both the theory 
and practice of performance measurement and management, particularly in the public 
services. I believe that relevant research with firm theoretical bases could really bring 
about improvements in the efficiency, effectiveness, accountability and transparency of 
organisations. I decided to focus on the public sector because I would like to contribute 
to the performance of organisations that provide products and services which are 
necessary for the sustainability of local and wider communities, and that can make a 
considerable difference to the quality of life of citizens. 
Therefore, my ultimate goal is to acquire further knowledge in this field, to engage in a 
continuous dialogue with both academics and practitioners, and to have an impact on 
policy-making. These are the main reasons why in recent years I have been 
progressively involved in attending and organising events in which I had the 
opportunity to discuss these themes with informed'and challenging audiences, and to 
contribute to practically relevant research projects (cf section 7.4). 
My personal characteristics and background influenced the course of the research in a 
number of ways. First of all, having a manufacturing engineering background, as most 
of my colleagues at the Centre for Business Performance, meant that before starting the 
PhD I was already familiar with the performance management literature from the point 
of view of operations. This was an advantage, but also an issue, since I had little 
knowledge of the other major disciplines and perspectives that are relevant for the 
purposes of this study. To overcome this problem, I gradually developed connections 
with academics and practitioners working in the areas of management accounting, 
public management and organisational behaviour. 
This certainly was an interesting and fascinating journey. However, it was not easy, 
since my knowledge of a number of relevant issues was sometimes inadequate. 
Furthermore, I soon understood that 'science' is made by communities and each - 
community tends to set its own rules of 'scientific respectability' (Porter, 1995) and 
9 Since this section deals with self-reflexivity, it was deemed appropriate to use the first, rather than the 
third person. 
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adopt a spccific lcxicon. As a conscqucticc, my "problcrn-drivcn" approach (Davis and 
Marquis, 2005) was cithcr valucd or criticiscd, dcpcnding morc on the typc of audicncc, 
rathcr than on the actual contcnt of the rcscarch. 
Being in some way an 'outsider" was also an advantage as it gave me the opportunity to 
explore certain aspects in a different way. For example, my background in physical 
science was useful in considering broader issues regarding measurement in social 
science and to draw comparisons between the two types of scicncc. 11iis, in 
combination with my interest in the philosophy of science, has cnablcd me to lookat the 
foundations of measurement and to identify relevant issues for the development of 
performance measurement as a ficid of enquiry. 
From a more empirical point of view, knowledge of the practical and structural aspccts 
of the English public sector was rcquircd to undcrtakc this piccc of research. Ncitlicr 
being a British citizcn, nor having workcd in the public scctor before were obstacles I 
had to ovcrcome, especially in the first phases of the research. ncrcforc, I had to 
familiarise myself with the history, present issues and jargon of the public sector areas 
on which I had decided to concentrate on as much as I could. 
Most importantly, since tile first phase of the research consisted of a literature review, 
my initial impressions of PNI in the public sector were based predominantly on 
academic articles and books. From the beginning it turned out that these arc often very 
critical of the use of PM systems in the public services. A number of academics, in 
particular, considered performance measurement purely as a means of control, or even 
surveillance, over people and organisations. Ilicrcforc, tile research questions and 
interviews I carried out focused on the problems local organisations experience in 
relation to PM. Looking at practice, though, I rcaliscd how central control, although of 
primary importance, is not the only driver for PM in the public services. In this contcxt, 
the analysis of the data, especially in the in-depth case studies, led to interesting 
findings. It would therefore be intriguing to carry out another study on this same topic 
examining more directly the positive, rather than negative, aspects of PX1. 
Finally, while acknowledging my personal charactcristics, prcsuppositions and valucs, I 
tried to mitigate my influence particularly in the phases of data collection and analysis 
(cf previous section). In particular, in the exploratory case studies I analyscd the data 
and drew the conclusions jointly with my mentor, ProE Necly. Subsequently, in the in-depth 
case studies, a structured approach was adopted and triangulation was obtaincd bctwcen 
documents and interviews. Thus, the content and %-alidity of these empirical phases of the 
research could be enhanced. 
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3.4 Empirical phases of the research 
After discussing the adoption of a realist philosophical position and its implications on a 
methodological level, it is important to introduce the three empirical phases this 
research consists of (cf. also Fig. 1.1 and Table 5.1 for an overview). Following the 
review of the literature, two exploratory case studies were undertaken in a healthcare 
trust and a police force (cf. chapter 4). Through these cases it was possible to gain a 
better understanding of the consistency of the PM systems developed at different levels 
of the public sector. Moreover, several issues related to the cascading of targets and 
indicators emerged, especially in relation to the roles fulfilled by PM in the public 
sector. At the end of chapter 4, the review of the literature and the findings of this 
empirical phase are brought together to formulate the empirical research questions. 
Following the exploratory case studies, unstructured interviews were carried out in nine 
different local public sector organisations (cf. section 5.2). This empirical phase enabled 
the researcher to identify issues that could be relevant to local public sector 
organisations. Furthermore, these interviews informed the choice of the in-depth case 
studies to be undertaken. Finally, the interview protocol and the matrix (used in the in- 
depth case studies to capture information related to the development of performance 
indicators) were piloted. 
On the bases of the philosophical and methodological issues discussed previously, the 
literature reviewed and the results of exploratory cases and pilot interviews, two in- 
depth case studies were performed in a local authority and a fire service in order to 
address the research questions (cf. chapter 5). From a methodological point of view, 
publicly available documents were the main source of data in the exploratory cases, 
whereas in the in-depth case studies also 22 structured interviews were carried out. 
The choice of having three empirical phases and a constant comparison of theory and 
practice contributed to enhancing both the rigour and relevance of this research. As 
mentioned in the previous section, the presentation and discussion of provisional results 
in front of both academic and practitioner audiences were fundamental too. In 
particular, the researcher has been co-ordinating the Centre for Business Performance's 
Public Sector Performance Roundtable for some time. The roundtable gives groups of 
executives, directors and managers the opportunity to meet together to discuss and 
research current issues and trends in performance measurement and management that 
may influence the way they run their organisations. Through the roundtable they have 
the opportunity to share experiences and ideas, and to learn about current research 
programmes and findings in the academic world. The Public Sector Roundtable has 
grown quickly since its formation in 2003 and has members from local authorities, 
healthcare trusts, central government departments, fire and rescue services and police 
forces. For the purposes of this research the roundtable has represented a key 
opportunity not only to gain access to data, but also to discuss and validate findings and 
explore their implications with managers interested in the measurement of performance 
in the public services. 
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EXPLORATORY CASE STUDIES 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the first empirical phase of the research. From the review of tile 
literature, the consistency between objectives, targets and indicators at different levels 
of the public sector - the so-called 'golden thread' - emerged as an issue which has not 
been sufficiently studied from an empirical point of view. Therefore, two exploratory 
case studies were carried out in an English healthcare trust and police force to assess tile 
consistency of the PM systems developed within those sectors. The analysis of the data 
reported in this chapter shows that there are several issues related to the cascading of 
targets and indicators. Moreover, the identification of the roles fulfilled by PM in the 
public sector emerged as a primary issue that requires further research. Finally, the 
review of the literature and the findings of this first empirical phase are utilised to 
formulate the empirical research questions. Following the remarks made in chapter 3 in 
relation to philosophical and methodological issues, chapter 5 presents the pilot 
interviews and in-depth case studies performed to address the research questions. 
4.2 Empirical context: the English 'golden thread' 
After defining the theoretical research questions, the researcher re-examined the New 
public Management literature, with the aim of identifying a suitable empirical context. 
As a result, it is possible to argue that, despite the significant volume of research 
performed in the field of public sector PM, there is a relative paucity of empirical 
research that describes in detail the systems and processes being used at different levels 
of government, particularly locally, to measure and manage perfon-nance (Talbot, 2005). 
In this context, the phrase 'golden thread' is used to track the targets set by central 
government down to delivery at the local level, i. e. to have an overall coherence of the 
6chain' of government set targets. Therefore, 'golden threads' are present if objectives, 
targets and performance indicators are consistent throughout the different levels from 
central government to service delivery (Audit Commission, 2002). In recent years, the 
British Government has used the metaphor of the 'golden thread' to cascade and align 
objectives, targets and performance indicators throughout the hierarchical levels of the 
public sector from central government to local organisations with the aim of enhancing 
performance, transparency and accountability, and of influencing behaviour. 
The emphasis put by the British Government on the provision of public services has 
been considerable since the early 1990s. PM and performance management have been 
pushed through all public sector levels, and organisations are required to measure and 
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report their performance to improve public accountability and to become more efficient 
and cffCctive. As tile 2005 report issued by the Royal Statistical Society states: "A 
striking feature of UK public services in the 1990s was the rise of performance 
monitoring, which records, analyses and publishes data in order to give the public a 
better idea of how government policies change the public services and to improve their 
cffcctivcness" (p. 2). Along the same lines, Hood, James and Scott (2000, p. 301) 
remarked that "the UK's New Public Management era cannot be adequately understood 
without reference to this growth of public-sector regulation". 
Although the design and use of performance targets and indicators across the different 
levels of the public sector is a very relevant and contemporary issue, little empirical 
research has been carried out to address it. This aspect is common to most research 
carried out in the field of public management, for which strong empirical research is 
deemed essential, and better relationships with practitioners are needed (Streib and 
Roch, 2005). 
4.3 Exploratory case studies 
4.3.1 Research design and methodology 
Given the dynamic context outlined above and the relative lack of empirical research in 
the area, this stage of the research has a predominantly exploratory character' 0. To drive 
this first empirical part of the research, the foll9wing research question was formulated: 
Does the metaphor ofthe 'golden thread' correctly represent the wayperformance 
targets and indicators are developed in public sector organisations in England? 
In order to address this question, the researcher set out to map the PM framework that is 
effectively in operation in part of the public sector in England. Case study was chosen 
as the research strategy, since this study deals with a contemporary phenomenon within 
a real-life context and the context is deliberately part of the design (Carpenter and 
Feroz, 1992; Kaplan, 1983). Operationally, two exploratory case studies (Yin, 1994) 
were carried out in two different areas of the public sector: healthcare and police. They 
enabled the researcher to illustrate in one case the relations between the PMS developed 
by the Treasury, the Department of Health (DoH) and the Healthcare Commission 
(HC), and the indicators used by a Primary Care Trust (PCT), which is directly 
controlled by the National Health Service (NHS) and, to a large degree, by central 
government; in the other case, the linkages between the PM systems used by the 
Treasury, the Home Office and one of the country's police forces (which are formally 
delivery agencies with substantial independence from central government). 
10 The researcher and his mentor, Prof Neely, conducted the empirical work described in this section. 
Although Prof. Neely focused more on the police force case and the researcher on the healthcare one, the 
analysis of data and consequent conclusions were jointly drawn by the authors. This enriched the content 
and enhanced the validity of this empirical phase of the research. A previous version of the information 
reported here has been presented at the American Academy of Management (cf. Micheli and Neely, 
2006). 
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Police forces and healthcare trusts show substantial differences oil a number of levels, 
such as the services they deliver, the environment they work in, and the diversity and 
number of skills they have to mobilise to deliver those services (cf. Carter ct al., 1992). 
However, given the substantial influence played by central government on how 
performance is measured, there is a high degree of similarity in the ways in which 
performance targets and indicators are designed across levels in both services. 
Therefore, this exploratory phase of the research looks at the two cases separately in 
order to identify specific issues, but also compares them searching for common aspects 
related to PM and the concept of the 'golden thread'. 
The author started by familiarising himself with the PM framework in use, as perceived 
by the Treasury. The data collection methods used at this stage included document 
analysis and, to a lesser extent, participant observation and unstructured interviews with 
key informants. Subsequently, document analysis was used to investigate how the 
framework developed by the DoH relates to the one designed by the HC and how these 
two frameworks are deployed in a Primary Care Trust. Similarly, the researcher 
examined how the framework designed by the Treasury has been applied in the Home 
office and deployed through to a police force. 
In so doing, it was possible to establish whether the PM framework in use could be 
mapped using publicly available material that departments and delivery agencies use for 
reporting their performance both to the Treasury and to the electorate. Given the 
relevance of public accountability and disclosure of performance data to the public in 
the government's discourse, publicly available documents are used as a primary source 
of information. However, relying on documents also implies certain limitations, which 
were taken into account in the subsequent steps of this research. 
The analysis of these exploratory case studies is presented in the next sections and 
consists of two main phases. It starts by assessing the intemal consistency of the 
elements of the organisational PM systems, i. e. if the targets and indicators within an 
organisation are consistent. Second, the consistency of the PMS designed by the 
different organisations within the two sectors is examined, e. g. the degree of congruence 
between the targets and indicators set by the DoH, the HC and a Primary Care Trust. 
The information gathered through documents and interviews is analyzed consistently 
and the NVivo software is utilised for the coding. This analysis also involves an 
examination of the language used and the identification of possible differences in the 
emphasis put on certain aspects. In the conclusive sections more general reflections are 
made, and patterns emerging from the analysis of the data are tied to arguments found in 
the organisation theory literature. 
4.3.2 The English performance measurement framework: a Treasury perspective 
At the heart of the English PM framework is the Public Service Agreement (PSA) 
regime. PSAs were first introduced in 1998 and form a central plank in the contract 
between the Treasury and government departments. In England Spending Reviews are 
conducted every two years. During these, the Treasury and government departments 
negotiate over departmental priorities, deliverables and budget. The agreed priorities 
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and delivcmbics are encapsulated in the PSAs, which are published upon completion of 
the Spending Review process. To assess delivery, each PSA consists of a number of 
objectives, targets and an accompanying technical note, which explains how progress 
towards each target will be measured. The objectives within departments' PSAs are 
designed to encapsulate the full scope of the departments' responsibilities. However, 
PSA targets focus on departments' key priorities - e. g. areas where a national aspiration 
is considered appropriate in order to drive forward a step-change in performance, or 
where it is appropriate to set a national 'standard'. In the 2002 Spending Review, this 
process resulted in around 130 PSA targets being proposed for 20 different departments. 
This compares favourably with the 250 performance targets set in 1998 and the 160 
targets set as a result of the 2000 Spending Review. In the 2004 Spending Review this 
figure has reduced even further, with I 10 PSA targets being agreed. At the time the 
original data on the police and health service was collected, however, the 2002 targets 
were used, as the 2004 targets had not been agreed yet. 
Interestingly, during these case studies the researcher had the opportunity to work with 
Prof Neely, who is in the position of observing the discussions that take place during 
the Spending Review on a regular basis. This enabled him to notice that while 
departments recognise the need to rationalise the number of PSA objectives, targets and 
indicators, there is also political pressure in each department to increase the number of 
PSA objectives and targets they have as this increases the departments' perceived 
influence at governmental level. This observation is in line with notions of organisations 
wishing to increase their legitimacy and power as discussed by new institutional and 
resource dependence theorists. 
From a-Treasury perspective the PSA objectives, targets and accompanying technical 
notes are the major elements of the English public sector PM frameworý. Once agreed, 
the Treasury recognises that departments will seek to translate the PSA objectives, 
targets and technical notes into more detailed statements, but the Treasury plays 
no formal part in this cascade process. This part of the research focuses on two specific 
departments (the DoH and the Home Office), how these departments seek to translate 
the subset of their PSA objectives that relate respectively to Primary Care Trusts and the 
police force, and how, as a result, targets and indicators are designed locally. 
433 Healthcare 
Healthcare -A departmental perspective 
In the English healthcare system there are various bodies involved in the design and 
development of PM systems. Firstly, the Treasury, through the DoH, details the aims, 
objectives and targets of the whole -sector, according to the previously formulated 
Spending Review. Under the 2002 Spending Review, the DoH agreed an overarching 
aim, three PSA objectives, including one value for money target, 12 associated targets 
and 32 resulting indicators. 
Second, the HC - the independent inspection body for both the NHS and independent 
healthcare - sets specific targets and indicators for the different trusts (acute, 
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ambulance, mental health, and primary care). Third, before each primary care trust 
applies or adapts these indicators to its own particular situation, several other bodies 
intervene and influence the way performance targets and indicators arc structured. 
The analysis of published material enabled the identification of four diffcrcnt 
organisations or frameworks that played a major rolc in this sense: tile Priorities and 
Planning Framework; the Personal Social Services Performance Asscssmcnt 
Framework; Best Value; and the Strategic Health Authorities. Finally, thc last level of 
this hierarchical structure consists of individual primary carc trusts, which formulate 
their objectives, targets and indicators. In the sections that follow, the linkages between 
the PM systems developed by the DoH and the HC and how they rclatc a Primary Care 
Trust - the West Suffolk Primary Care Trust - arc examined. 
The documents are analyzed in a four-step process. First, the internal consistency of the 
DoH PM system is examined. Second, a similar procedure is followed for the 1IC's 
performance indicators for Primary Care Trusts. Third, the consistency bctwccn these 
systems is discussed. Finally, the two frameworks are compared with the indicators 
developed by the West Suffolk PCT. In the case of healthcare, the analysis also focuses 
on the language used in the documents, and on the identification of possible differences 
in emphasis placed on specific indicators. 
Department of Health 
Each indicator developed by the DoH is related to a specific target, and each target to an 
objective. The high level of consistency amongst the different elemcnts enhances the 
clarity of the system - i. e. targets are consistent with objectives and the indicators are 
good metrics for the targets to which they refer (Fig. 4.1). 
For example, the first PSA objective is to "improve service standards"; the targets 
related to this objective, cover five main areas: (1) inpatient and outpatient waiting lists; 
(2) accident and emergency wait; (3) access to professionals; (4) hospital appointments; 
and (5) accountability to the public. It is possible to see how the targets are connected to 
the overall objective (they all relate to the provision of service) and they express the 
willingness of the DoH to improve the service that has been delivered so far. Examining 
the value for money target, it is interesting to notice how three keywords of the New 
Public Management literature, such as value for money, efficiency and effectiveness are 
all used. 
A good degree of consistency also exists between targets and indicators. The first target 
for the first PSA objective, for example, is to "reduce the maximum wait for an 
outpatient appointment to 3 months and the maximum wait for inpatient treatment to 6 
months by the end of 2005, and achieve progressive further cuts with the aim of 
reducing the maximum inpatient and day case waiting time to 3 months by 2008". The 
two associated indicators are: (1) the number of people waiting longer than 13 weeks for 
a first outpatient appointment; (2) the number of people waiting longer than 6 months 
for inpatient treatment. The first indicator translates the first part of the target in an 
operational metric (waiting for an outpatient appointment), while the second one 
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strongly relates to the second part of the target (waiting for inpatient treatment). The last 
part is not translated into an indicator, probably because it refers to a longer-tenn 
objective. 
Department of Health 
0 
Value ft Improve outcomes Improve service 
Value for money 
, rvic Impr vc 
standards 
Hospital 
appointments Improvement in Children and 
value for money mental health Access to 
professionts 
Reduce cancer Inpatient - -heart disease Reduce 
ir Accident & Outpatient wait inequalities 
Emergency Support for Dtrug users Accountability 
older people to public Improving life 
chances for children 
Figure 4.1: Department of Health's objectives and targets 
Healthcare Commission 
The examination of the documents pertaining to the HC (PCT section) provides a very 
different picture. In this case the 'key targets' are by no means related to the 'Balanced 
Scorecard indicators'. Furthermore, it is not clear what it is meant by 'Balanced 
Scorecard' (BSQ, since the BSC originally developed by Kaplan and Norton (1992; 
1996) rcfers to a totally different framework to the one proposed by the HC. 
It is curious that the description of the 'key targets' also includes the description of the 
indicators that make them operational, and that the 'Balanced Scorecard' indicators are 
structured in the same way as the 'key targets'. There is therefore confusion as to what 
is considered a target and what an indicator. Furthermore, two questions emerge from 
the analysis: 
1. What is the relation between PCT key targets and BSC indicators? 
2. What is the relation between PCT key targets and BSC indicators, and the DoH 
targets and indicators? 
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To answer the first question, the researcher checked whether key targets and BSC 
indicators dealt with similar issues. The first coding showed little connection between 
the two, namely no code could be applied to both a key targct and a BSC indicator. To 
confirm or refute these initial findings an analysis of the discourse was undertaken, 
which led to some interesting conclusions: 
1. The relation between 'key targets' and 'BSC indicators' is almost non-existent: just 
a few key terms are used in both parts and there is no evidence of a relationship 
between them. This applies even to terms that arc usually widely utiliscd in 
documents regarding PM in healthcare, e. g. child, community, equity, teenager, 
accident and emergency, etc. 
2. A few terms are used in both 'key targets' and 'BSC indicators' sections, but they 
often refer to different issues (e. g. access, general practitioners, smoking, etc. ). 
3. In the two areas where there are similarities (inpatient/outpatient waiting and staff 
surveys), there are differences between the sources of data (information comes from 
different databases) and the timescales of the indicators. 
4. The main difference between 'key targets' and 'BSC indicators" appears to be in the 
use of technical terms. In the latter, some of the targets and indicators relate to 
specific expressions (CAMHS, CHD, Cervical screening etc. ), whereas in the 
former such terms as not utilised. 
Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the 'key targets' and the 'BSC indicators' 
developed by the HC do not show any evident relation between one another (cf Table I 
- Appendix A). This contradicts the general assumption in the PM literature that targets 
and indicators should be connected. Furthermore, the names 'key targets' and 'BSC 
indicators' are also inappropriate, since they both refer to targets and indicators at the 
same time, and the phrase 'Balanced Scorecard' is not properly used either. 
It appears that the HC could rename their 'key targets' as 'general targets and 
indicators', and the TSC indicators' as 'specific targets and indicators' without 
significant loss of form or function. Furthermore, in future revisions of the HC's PM 
system it would seem appropriate to show how these different sets of targets and 
indicators are connected, in terms of content, sources of data, type of indicators, and so 
on. 
Although it was not possible to use the same codes in both parts of the HC document, 
targets and indicators could still be grouped according to the issues that they refer to. In 
so doing, the main priorities of the HC could be identified and compared with the DoH 
documentation. Eight groups were defined (Fig. 4.2): there are some common areas of 
interest (mainly access and treatment), but also issues, which are included either in the 
'key targets' or in the TSC indicators' (e. g. financial, internal and patient surveys). 
Furthermore, even in areas of interest like 'access, where two targets and two BSC 
indicators mapped in each category, it is possible to see how targets and indicators 
differ. The key targets, in this case, refer to "the percentage of patients able to be 
offered a routine appointment to see a GP (or a PCP) within one working day". The first 
BSC indicator, on the contrary, is "constructed by aggregating responses from the 
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survey (lucstions which relate to access and waiting". The second concerns "single 
telephone access through NFIS Direct to GP out-of-hours care", which still refers to 
aCCCSS, but by measuring a very specific aspect, not included in the key targets. 
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Health care -A it alysis of th e differen t perspectives 
Having examined the internal structure of the PM systems developed by the DoH and 
the IIC separately, the consistency between the two is now evaluated. The DoH, in fact, 
sets the overarching aims, objectives, targets and indicators for all public healthcare 
organisations. The IIC independently sets targets and indicators specifically for the 
acute, ambulance, mental and primary care trusts. 
The analysis, through the grouping and comparison of concepts (i. e. the nodes of the 
coding structure), shows that several common issues exist, specifically: access to 
professionals; patient satisfaction; inpatient, outpatient and accident and emergency 
waiting timcs; and some aspects regarding certain categories of patients (e. g. children 
and older people) and specific treatments or technical targets (e. g. drug users, cancer 
patients and cardiac patients) (Table 4.1). 
Groups D011 targets and indicators 
1IC - Key targets (and relative 
indicators) and BSC indicators 
Access to a GP (Appointment with a 
Access Access to professionals , 
(Access to a GP); Access to a PCP (Appointment 
GP; Access to a PCP); Aith a PCP); PCT patient survey - 
access; single telephone access 
Value for money (Improvement in value 
Financial management (Relative 
for money; Cost efficiency indicator; 
unplannedfinancialsupport, - Other 
Financial 
Service effectiveness indicator; Service 
financial indicators; Surplus or 
effectiveness indicator) 
deficit; Unplannedfinancial support; 
Variancefrom financial plan) 
Delayed transfers of care; Health 
Internal equity audit; NHS dentistry; PCT 
commissioning; Suicide audit 
Hospital 
-appointments 
(Inpatients PCT patient survey - information; 
Patient admitted; outpatients 
booked); PCT patient survey - relations; PCT 
satisfaction 
Accountability to public (Patient patient survey - Facilities; PCT experience measures; Enhancing patient survey - Safe care accountability); 
Children and mental health (Vs Suicide; 
Crisis resolution; CAMHS services); 
Support for older peopl (Support for 
older people); Improving life chances 
forchildre (19 year old care leavers; Child and adolescent mental health 
Particular Children education; Children looked services (CAMHS); Child - 
groups of after; Young people aged 16; Young protection; Community equipment; 
patients people cautioned or convicted; Under Infant health; Sexual health; Teenage 
18 conception rate); Reduce inequalities pregnancy 
(Gap in life expectancy rates-males; 
Gap in life expectancy rates-females; 
Change in reference costs; Gap in infant 
mortality rates) 
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Imi2roving working live (Achieving 
standards First-wavc; Achieving 
standards Sccond-wavc); GP 
Staff qppraisal, ý Staff survey -safety, Staff 
sun, ey - 11RAt Staff survey 
attitudes; MoAforce datasets 
ethnicity 
Druz misuse (Dnig misusers 
accessing treatment); Four-wce 
Reduce cancer - heart disease (Reduce 
smoking quitters (Four-week 
Treatments death rates for cancer; Reduce death smoking quitters); 
Cervical 
and rates for heart disease); Drug users 
screening; CIID Register; Death 
technical (Drug misusers for treatment; Drug rates 
from cancer; Death rates from 
targets/ misusers successfully retained; Drug 
circulatory diseases; Diabetic 
indicators 
misusers completing treatment) 
rctinopathy screening; Drug misusc - 
shared care; Flu vaccinations; 
Immunisation. MMR; Antibacterial 
drugs; Mental health 
Outpatients waiting longer thatLthe 
standard 
(Number ofpatients waiting)l 
Inpatient-Outpatient waiting (Inpatient Patients waitinji lonp-er than the 
Waiting wait; Outpatient wait); A&E wait (A&E standard for elective admission 
short wait; A&E long wait) (Inpatients waiting)* Total time in 
A&E: 4 hours or less (Relative 
waiting times in ME); Six-month 
inpatients wait 
Table 4.1: Comparison between Department of Health and Healthcare Commission 
However, to better assess the degree of similarity between the targets and indicators 
described in the two documents, several tenns and phrases (48 in total, obtained through 
coding) were interrogated (cf. Table 2- Appendix A). These searches confirmed that 
there were various issues that were dealt with in both documents, but they also 
emphasised several differences: 
1. The D, oH targets and indicators and the HC 'key targets' show some similarities, 
while correspondence with the BSC indicators is limited. This is partly due to the 
level of detail that the documents divulge - i. e. the BSC indicators often involve 
technical terms, while the DoH document and the HC key targets do not. 
2. Although there are targets that belong to similar areas, the way performance 
indicators are designed is different in most of the cases, e. g. outpatient and inpatient 
waiting, suicide prevention, etc. 
3. The HC documents show a strong focus both on service delivery (patient 
satisfaction) and staff satisfaction, while the DoH ones just consider service delivery 
(the word 'staff is never used, while in the HC document it is used 37 times). 
Furthermore, while appraisals and surveys are core concepts in the HC document, 
they are not even mentioned by the DoH. 
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4. The formulation of the Dol-l document has been strongly influenced by the New 
Public Managcnicrit lexicon, In contrast to the HC document. Keywords, like 
accountability, effectiveness, efficiency and value for money, can be found in the 
Doi I text, but not in the HC text. 
S. Some words or phrases which could be expected to appear in such documents are 
totally absent M the DoH document, e. g. equity, human resource, ethnic, financial, 
iii1brinatiori, safety, staff, smoking, etc. 
6. Coinparing the two documents, it seems that while the objectives, targets and 
indicators developed by the DoH have the aim of infon-ning citizens, the HC mixed 
similar c1cincrits with inctrics that will be used to assess the way various trusts 
operate. This means that external indicators concerning service delivery, for 
instance, arc sometimes mixed with internal Pls regarding imposed mechanisms - 
e. g. audits correctly carried out, etc. This generates confusion about the goals and 
role of the PM system. 
The comparison of the DoH and the HC documents emphasises a substantial degree of 
incongruence and, certainly, an insufficient explicit linkage between the two. The DoH 
never mentions the HC, whereas the HC refers just seven times to the DoH and only 
twice to PSAs. In this respect, a more explicit connection might be expected as well as 
the explanation of the existence of certain targets and indicators. Finally, looking at the 
main elements of the two documents it is possible to notice how the DoH targets 
correspond just partially to the HC ones. More specifically, the analysis shows how just 
four of the PSA targets are totally covered (i. e. 1,3,5,6), six are partially covered (2,7, 
9,10,11,12) and two are not covered at all (4,8). 
Healthcare - The local Perspective 
Following the same procedure used also in the case of the police force, the researcher 
compared the documents produced by the DoH and the HC with those produced by the 
West Suffolk Primary Care Trust. This analysis investigated the differences between the 
targets and indicators used by the West Suffolk PCT and the ones set by the DoH and 
the HC. In fact, the degree of correspondence was very low. 
The comparison shows that just about one-fifth of the indicators used by the PCT are 
also present in the two other documents. A further 15% are used in one, but not the 
other, and in more than 40% of cases it was not possible to find any correspondence. A 
major reason for this is that, as with the case of the police, significant PCT funding 
comes from joint initiatives with local authorities and other delivery agencies, and each 
of these initiatives tends to have its own monitoring and evaluation framework, with 
associated Pis (Fig. 4.3). 
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Figure 4.3: Correspondences between Department o I' I Ica It h, II calthcarc Commission and West 
Sull'olk Primary Care Trust's indicators. 
4.3.4 Police force 
Policefirce -A departnientalperspective 
Under the 2002 Spending Review tile Home Office agreed ail overarching ami: seven 
PSA objectives, including one value for money target with tile Treasury. with tell 
associated targets and 37 resultant indicators. Once the PSA objectives, targets and 
technical notes have been agreed with tile Treasury, the individual govcmincrit 
departiricrits detcri-nine how they will break down these high-level objectives into 
spccIfic initiatives and actions. There is no mandated process for doing this and. hence, 
each department has discretion over how they translate tile PSA objectives and 
gful and appropriate. This section f associated targets into language that is nicanin ocuscs 
on the approach adopted by one major department -- tile Home Officc -- and explores 
how this department translates its PSA targets into an appropriate PM framework for tile 
English police force. Examining the 37 indicators the Home Office agrees with tile 
Treasury, it is possible to see how the first nine and tile 37t" apply specifically to tile 
police force. Therefore, these are the indicators considered here. 
In 2002, the Horne Office released the first National Policing Plan, covering the pcriod 
2003-2006. In 2003, this plan was updated to cover 2004-2007. The Introduction to the 
first plan explains the PM fi-arnework designed by the Horne Office as follows: 
"The Government and the public need to be able to judge whether forces arc 
delivering the quality of service that everyone expects. This requires a 
robust and transparent performance management system for assessing the 
effectiveness of forces and individual Basic Command Units (BCUs) in 
tackling crime and the fear of crime. The planning framework ( ... ) sets Out 
how local plans will be measured in terms of raising police performance. 
Central to this framework are the Horne Office Public Service Agreements, 
29 
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which arc linked to the national priorities set out above. The key PSAs for 
the police service (PSAs I and 2) require a reduction in crime and the fear of 
crime and an improvement in the performance of all forces. ( ... ) These 
national targets are supported by Best Value Performance Indicators 
(BVPls). Each police authority sets local targets against the BVPls and will 
report its performance annually" (Anon, 2002, p. 4). 
In essence, the Home Office's view in 2002 was that the PSAs would translate into 
BVPls and these could be used to track performance at the local level. In addition the 
2002 plan makes reference to the Policing Performance Assessment Framework (PPAF) 
which will "develop a set of national standards on performance to ensure a consistent, 
first class service" (Anon, 2002, p. 32). The PPAF consists of six domains - citizen focus; helping the public; reducing crime; investigating crime; promoting public safety; 
and resource usage (cf Fig. 4.4). At the time of data collection, the English police 
forces were assessed on the basis of an interim framework, consisting of 49 separate 
indicators, documented in the National Policing Plan 2003-2006. These 49 indicators 
cluster around three broad categories. Six of them are identified as relating to PSA 1: 
PSA 1: Reduce crime and the fear of crime; improve performance overall, including 
by reducing the gap between the highest crime in Crime and Disorder Reduction 
Partnerships areas and the best comparable areas; and reduce: 
o Vehicle crime by 30% from 1998-99 to 2004. 
o Domestic burglary by 25% from 1998-99 to 2005. 
o Robbery in the ten Street Crime Initiative areas by 14% from 1999-2000 to 
2005. 
o Maintain this level. 
Another 12 indicators are classified as relating to PSA 2: 
PSA 2: Improve the performance of all police forces, and significantly reduce the 
performance gap between the best and worst performing forces; and significantly 
increase the proportion of time spent on frontline duties. 
The remaining 31 indicators are derived from the Best Value Regime and mapped onto 
the six dimensions of the PPAF framework. 
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Citizen Focus 
This is an area which is affected by all areas of policing performance - i. c. whether the 
public are satisfied with the level of service they get from the police, be that as victims 
of crime or otherwise 
Both local and national priorities will be reflected within the framework 
I Reducing Investigating Promoting Providing 
Crinie Crinie Public Safety Assistance 
(Dornain 1) (Doniain 2) (Doniain 3) (Domain 4) 
This is a 
proactive area, 
examining 
where policing 
activity helps to 
prevent and 
reduce crime 
This is a reactive 
area, i. e. how 
policing helps to 
solve crimes and 
bring offenders 
tojustice 
In this area, the 
police act to 
decrease the 
fear of crime 
and to promote 
public safety 
I'llis is also a 
reactive area, 
concerned with 
how the police 
deal with the 
public when the 
public comes to 
them for 
assistance 
Resource Usage 
The outcomes in the above activity areas are dependent on the level of resources 
available and the way they are deployed. 
Figure 4.4: The Policing Performance Assessment Framework (PPAF) 
Policeforce -A local perspective 
For. the police, the local level is the county or regional level. For the purposes of this 
phase of the research Cambridgeshire was chosen as the focus. In Cambridgeshire, two 
further plans are developed - the Police Authority Strategic Plan and the Local Delivery 
Plan. The first of these plans covers the time period 2003-2005, while the second 
covers 12 months. It should be noted that in the introduction to the latter document the 
Chief Constable states: 
"The Police Authority has to maintain an effective and efficient police 
service for the county under the requirements of the Police Act 1996. Under 
this same Act we also have to produce a Local Policing Plan. For 2003/04, 
this continues to be part of an overall Local Performance Plan which 
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includes the key delivery requirements from the National Policing Plan, a 
Local Priority Plan, the Efficiency Plan, the Best Value Performance Plan, 
Community Safety Strategies and our Finance and Resourcing Plan" 
(author's emphasis). 
In the section devoted to perfonnance indicators the plan states: 
"Cambridgeshire Police Authority has a responsibility to monitor and report 
on the Constabulary's performance in service delivery in a number of 
different areas. This responsibility comes from a number of sources, 
including: 
* The National Policing Plan, outlined in the Local Policing Plan; 
* The National Crime Reduction Strategy; 
The suite of Best Value perfortnance indicators, which support the Best 
Value Pcrfonnance Plan; and 
e The Constabulary's Service Charter. " 
Therefore, while in theory the targets and indicators should cascade neatly from PSAs 
to PPAF to Local Delivery Plans, in practice the Local Delivery Plans have also to take 
account of: (i) National Policing Plans, (ii) Local Policing Plans, (iii) Best Value Key 
Performance Indicators, (iv) Constabulary Service Charters, (v) Efficiency Plans, (vi) 
Community Safety Strategies and (vii) Financing and Resourcing Plans (cf Fig. 4.5). 
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Figure 4.5: The cascading of indicators in the police force 
This multitude of influences results in the 78 performance indicators used to track 
performance at the local level. Importantly, while at Treasury and Home Office levels 
the PSA and associated indicators are most widely discussed, at the local level the Best 
Value regime appears to become more influential. This is probably because while 
central government see the Best Value Regime as outdated, the regime was enshrined in 
the statute books through the Local Government Act 1999 and hence is still fairly 
important at the local level. Furthermore, it is important to notice how in some police 
BCUs, up to 50% of funding comes from 'projects and special initiatives' rather than 
'base budgets' (e. g. through Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships, special Home 
office schemes, etc. ) - and each of these separate short-term funding streams tends to 
have its own monitoring and evaluation frameworks, generating separate performance 
indicators (Pls). 
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Policeforce -Analysis of the different perspectives 
As a result of analysing the previously mentioned documents some interesting and 
important issues emerge. The first point to note is the rate of growth of indicators 
through the system. Through the PSA process the Treasury and the Home Office agree 
seven PSAs and 37 separate indicators, of which three PSAs and ten indicators are 
relevant to the police. In the Home Office's interim framework these three PSAs and ten 
indicators are converted into 49 separate indicators. At the local level the 49 PIs 
identified in the Home Office's interim framework are converted into 78 separate 
indicators. Therefore, effectively the cascade process manages to convert the three 
PSAs into 78 separate PIs, giving an average of 26 indicators per PSA. If every 
department followed the same process, then the 130 PSA targets defined in 2002 would 
translate into approximately 3380 indicators at the local level. Therefore, it is important 
to question why this happens and whether the resources required to track this number of 
indicators are justified. In the case of the police it appears that the answer to this 
question is that the local level performance indicators are derived from the Best Value 
review framework introduced by the Labour Government when it first came to power. 
Indeed it could be argued that there is a disconnection between the Treasury's PSA 
Regime and the Best Value Regime. 
Secondly, the documents show that there seem not to have been sufficient reflections 
upon the relationships between the indicators. Moreover, little explicit sense of priority 
among the variety of targets and indicators has been established both at the local and 
departmental levels. Strategy maps (Eccles and Pybum, 1992; Kaplan and Norton, 
2004; Neely, Adams and Kennerley, 2002) could be used to overcome these problems, 
as they are designed to help people identify which are the critical indicators and to 
understand - or at least endeavour to articulate - the relationships between the different 
indicators. Potentially this approach might prove valuable to those in the public sector 
designing measurement systems as they seek to rationalise the number of indicators 
they use. 
The third point involves a more detailed analysis of the relationships between the PIs. 
For each of the 78 indicators the researcher explored whether it could be mapped 
directly back onto: (i) the original PSAs; (ii) the ten PSA indicators; and (iii) the 49 
interim indicators identified in the Home Office's interim framework. This analysis 
demonstrated that two-thirds of the local level indicators can be linked back directly to 
the ten PSA indicators via the 49 interim indicators. However, if the two PSA indicators 
-7 and 8- are removed, then this figure drops to just one-third of the local indicators. 
PSA indicators 7 and 8 refer to "performance in the six domains of the Policing 
Performance Assessment Framework", which in itself is a very broad ranging 
fmmework. The breadth of these two PSAs is illustrated by the fact that about 75% of 
the local level indicators can be mapped onto them. This in itself calls into question 
their validity. 
It is interesting to carry this analysis further: of the ten PSA indicators, there are 160 
mappings - i. e. 160 separate occasions that local level indicators map onto specific PSA 
indicators. Of these 160 mappings, four PSA indicators - 1,3,7 and 8- account for 
more than 90% of them. This suggests that the indicators used at the local level are 
heavily skewed towards two broad categories of PSA indicators - those that relate to the 
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overall level of crime and those that relate to the PPAF framework. It also calls into 
question why the remaining six PSA indicators have bccn included at thc same lcvcl in 
the framework, or at least questions whether much progress will be made against them. 
The same analysis can be applied to the interim indicators. In this case there are 138 
mappings, split across 42 indicators. For seven interim indicators there is no 
corresponding local level indicator, whereas ten interim indicators account for more 
than half of all mappings, suggesting a strong bias of attention towards certain specific 
areas (i. e. violent crime, public satisfaction and fear of crime). The 7 interim indicators 
onto which none of the local level indicators map are: 
Number 5- Disrupt more organised criminal enterprises by 2005-06 compared with 
2003-04. 
Number 6- Level of the economic cost of crime (under development). 
Number 16 - Level of recruitment as measured by the published Police Personnel 
Statistics. 
Number 24 - Fairness and equality - user satisfaction. 
Number 25 - Fairness and equality - sanction detection rates. 
Number 47 - Percentage of officers and staff with Personal Development Reviews 
completed in the previous 12 months. 
Number 48 - Percentage of crime scene investigations, which lead to detections. 
The highest numbers of mappings occur in relation to interim indicators: 
" Number II- Progress on detections and convictions as measured by BVPI 136a and 
b. 18 and 19 [13 mappings]. 
" Number 35 - Percentage detected of violent crimes per 1,000 population [10 
mappings]. 
" Number 15 - Level of public satisfaction with the police as measured by the British 
Crime Survey [8 mappings]. 
Number 19 - User satisfaction: quality of service surveys [8 mappings]. 
Number I- Level of violent crime (including alcohol related violent crime) as 
reported by British Crime Survey 2006 to be lower than that reported in 2002 [6 
mappings]. 
0 Number 27 - Violent crimes per 1,000 population [6 mappings]. 
4, Number 31 - Level of serious violent crime (including gun crime) [6 mappings]. 
" Number 12 - Level of fear of crime as measured by BCS [5 mappings]. 
" Number 21 - Using the British Crime Survey, the fear of crime [5 mappings]. 
" Number 30 - Level of crime (BCS data) per 1,000 population [5 mappings]. 
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4.3.5 Findings 
The analyses reported in the previous sections have focused on issues that emerged 
from the examination of each case separately. Comparing the results obtained, it is 
possible to notice how a number of areas of concern are actually common. First of all, 
in both the police and health service cases the level of consistency in terms of 
indicators, and consequently targets and priorities, is relatively low across the hierarchy 
that constitutes the public sector. This negatively addresses the empirical research 
question set at the beginning - despite the emphasis put on PM by central government 
and regulatory bodies, the practice and theory of the 'golden. thread' in the English 
public sector are not as consistent as one may think. 
Secondly, looking at the linkages between perforinance targets and indicators at 
different levels in both sectors, the analysis shows a substantial growth of indicators 
through the system and a high degree of confusion at the local level regarding priorities. 
Third, in none of the cases is it possible to see evidence of adequate reflections made on 
the relationships between performance indicators, and rarely is it feasible to identify 
connections between targets and indicators. 
Concepts drawn from new institutional and resource dependence theory seem 
particularly powerful in explaining what happens both at government department level 
and locally. At both levels the concepts of legitimacy and efficiency take precedence, as 
the aim of departments is to survive and increase their influence, while at the local level, 
there is a constant battle for resources, which can be acquired either pro-actively or by 
accommodating external institutional pressures. 
From a resource dependence point of view, performance indicators are introduced 
mainly to fulfil the requirements of major funding organisations. As this varies across 
organisations (e. g. BCUs in the police, PCTs in health), there should be similar 
variation in the types and numbers of indicators found at local level. Where resources 
are secure, less attention will be paid to both the collection and interpretation of PIs 
related to that funding organisation. On the other hand, where resources are short-term 
and insecure, disproportionate effort may have to be devoted to collecting and 
responding to Pls from such organisations. This explains what happens in the public 
Spending Review process, where departments aim at maximising their PSA targets as a 
way of demonstrating their importance and legitimacy in delivering the government's 
agenda, in the "competition for shares of the public purse" (Carter et al., 1992, p. 30). 
Resource dependence theory also allows one to better understand the bias of attention 
towards certain areas highlighted in the police force and, similarly, what happens in the 
case of one- and three-year matched funding schemes for specific initiatives in PCTs 
from Single Regeneration Budgets, European Union programmes, etc. 
Drawing more on the new institutionalist literature, the three types of institutional 
isomorphism - coercive, mimetic and non-native - (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) help 
explaining a wide variety of behaviours, especially at the local level. The concept of 
coercive isomorphism is central to understand the ways in which local police forces and 
PCTs respond to certain aspects of the PM regime (e. g. system design and reporting 
procedures are likely to become more similar over time, in line with the prescriptions 
from higher level agencies). Mimetic isomorphism is present mostly in non-intersecting 
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sets of agencies, which make up distinct 'communities of practice' (e. g. the adoption of 
Balanced Scorecard approaches within the same family of health organisations). The 
very use of the 'Balanced Scorecard' expression in the IIC documents could be the 
result of such a type of isomorphic pressure and willingness to acquire legitimacy. 
Finally, normative isomorphism helps to explain certain bchaviours, in line with advice 
from professional groups, but much of this is isomorphic in terms of resistance to 
certain central directives, rather than compliance with them. Over time, PMS become 
part of the institutional framework, but at a different rate in different public programme 
areas - and therefore generate their own set of gatekeepers and monitors - with 
associated overhead costs. 
Following this analysis, it is clear how the conflicting interests and different rationales 
existing at different levels of the public sector generate confusion locally. Organisations 
like the Cambridgeshire Police Force and the West Suffolk Primary Care Trust need 
access to resources if they arc to deliver the service. They are forced to adopt 
measurement targets and indicators that can be used in the political negotiation process. 
And yet this is where the system breaks down. For it is not always clear at the local 
level who holds the power, and hence access to finance, at the central level. Locally, 
organisations are forced to respond to the requests of the PSA framework imposed by 
the Treasury, but also to frameworks imposed by others - e. g. the Best Value and the 
Comprehensive Performance Assessment regimes. It is these competing demands that 
cause much of the confusion at the front line about the true priorities. The documents 
analysed clearly show this lack of prioritisation, especially at the local level, and little 
integration of the single targets and indicators within an overarching framework. 
4.3.6 Discussion and conclusions 
One of the most significant implications of this stage of the research is that there is not a 
very coherent and clear set of priorities for the public services in England that align with 
a golden thread running from central government to local delivery agencies. 
Furthermore, indicators cascading through the public sector appear to be multiplying at 
a significant rate. At the level of the Treasury relatively few targets and indicators are 
agreed. At central government department level - the Home Office and the DoH - 
significantly more indicators are introduced, while locally the number of indicators 
mushrooms once again. In some ways this is unsurprising. In any organisation there is 
always more that can be measured at the front line than in the equivalent of the Home 
office. What is of concern, however, is the lack of any explicit sense of priority 
amongst the multitude of indicators at the local level or indeed amongst those at the 
central government departmental level. 
From a theoretical perspective it seems clear that part of the problem is the interaction 
between the conflicting priorities expressed by the organisations involved through their 
PM systems. Recognising the different stances and hence responses of different actors 
at different levels in the system is essential if we are to make some progress in 
reconciling and rationalising the PM regimes that exist. Moreover, following previous 
research (e. g. Hood et al., 1998; Power, 1997), further reflections upon the costs 
involved in the measurement of performance throughout the public sector in England 
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would certainly be appropriate. An empirical analysis of this issue would also contribute 
to tile debate between new institutionalist academics on the contraposition between 
efficiency and legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Modell, 2001). 
Finally, a number of questions emerged from this study. The first concerns the 
possibility of adopting certain tools or practices to improve the overall process of design 
and use of performance targets and indicators. In the case of strategy maps, private 
sector companies have made much progress in their application, and it is believed that 
public sector organisations could benefit from them too, as this is a general tool, which 
is neither context nor sector specific. 
Second, while investigating measurement in the public sector, the identification of the 
role of the measurement system becomes a primary concern. It could be argued that the 
Public Service Agreements process is designed to control local delivery, to improve 
accountability, to compare organisations' performance, and to influence behaviour and 
action in order to improve public services. Each of these roles has important 
implications for the design of the PMS and its implementation. It is clear that the 
current PMS in both police and health suffer from trying to fulfil too many of these 
roles at the same time. This is not only inefficient, but it also leads in many cases to 
confused messages and counter-productive approaches to performance measurement 
and management. 
4.3.7 Main implications for this research 
This empirical study enabled the researcher to gain relevant insights and carry out an 
analysis of several issues related to PM in the public sector. However, this phase of the 
research also had limitations. In particular, other sources of information have to be 
considered in order to have a deeper understanding of the phenomena considered. 
Since the UK Government has often emphasised the importance of public accountability 
and the disclosure of performance data to the public, it was decided to use publicly 
available documents as a primary source of information. However, it is acknowledged 
that a more direct contact with people working in this field would be required (e. g. 
interviews). Furthcn-nore, following the conclusions drawn from the two cases 
considered, the researcher decided to investigate in more depth the roles of PM in the 
public sector. 
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4.4 The roles of performance measurement in the public sector 
Following the literature reviews and the conclusions of the exploratory study, particular 
attention was paid to the identification of the roles fulfilled by PM in the public sector. 
Although it has been acknowledged that performance indicators "have a variety of uses 
depending on their purpose and location in each organisation" (Carter ct al., 1992; p. 
42), little research, especially empirical, has been performed to understand what these 
roles are and what are the factors that influence them. 
A number of academics have seen PM, like auditing, as a normative check orientated 
towards compliance (Power, 1997; Townley, 2002). As Butterfield, Edwards and 
Woodall (2004, p. 398) argue "these formalised control systems have more to do with 
sustaining a myth of control and external legitimation than with any real improvements 
in operational efficiency", in line with early new institutionalist theorists. Smith (I 995b, 
p. 278) also focused on control, but distinguished two roles: political control - 
"external, of the sort that legitimate stakeholders - such as voters, service users, elected 
representatives and taxpayers - might want to exercise"; and managerial control - 
"internal, as sought by managers within the organisation". In the first case the driver for 
measuring performance is external, while in the second it is internal. 
Other studies have emphasised roles of PM in the public sector besides control. The 
Royal Statistical Society (2005) pointed out that public accountability and comparisons 
of performance to identify well-performing or under-performing organisations arc 
primary reasons for measuring performance. Regarding the use of data to compare 
performance within and between organisations, three different types of benchmarking in 
the public sector have been defined (cf. Bowerman, Francis, Ball and Fry, 2002): 
" voluntary (as is the case in most private sector companies) 
" compulsory (externally driven) 
ip defensive (to prove to an external agency that the organisation is doing well). 
While the first is internally driven and aims at improving performance, the second and 
third are more orientated towards legitimation, accountability and central control. 
Another study (Pidd, 2005) acknowledged the previously mentioned roles and pointed 
out the importance that PM has internally in organisations, as it enables them to 'see 
what works' and identify competences. Bovaird and Gregory (1996) recognised four 
managerial roles for PM: giving strategic direction; resource allocation; exercising 
control; encouraging learning. More recently, Nicholson-Crotty, Theobald and 
Nicholson-Crotty (2006) reviewed other studies that focus on the drivers and purposes 
of PM in the public sector. Kopczynski and Lombardo (1999) argued that PM helps 
organisations to recognise good performance, identify performance targets, perform 
jurisdictional performance comparisons, enhance accountability, and build coalition and 
trust. To this list Hatry (1999) added internal and external budgeting activities, problem 
identification, evaluation, strategic planning, and improvement. Finally, Behn (2003) 
focused on the 'internal use' of PM and defined the following aspects: evaluate, control 
subordinates, make budgetary decisions and requests, motivate employees, promote the 
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organisation to stakeholders and political principals, celebrate accomplishments, learn 
about programme efficacy, and improve performance. 
Interestingly, the public sector literature tends to place particular emphasis on the 
external drivers and purposes for measuring performance in organisations; whereas the 
private sector literature focuses almost exclusively on internal drivers and purposes, e. g. 
improving product/service delivered; formulating, developing and challenging strategy; 
communication; alignment of behaviours; individual and organisational learning, 
process improvement and continuous improvement, etc. 
Building on the insights drawn from the literature, it is possible to define four main 
roles of PM in the public sector, which could be used to further examine the results 
obtained in the exploratory cases: 
1. Central control: in both police and healthcare cases central control emerged as a 
very important driver for measuring performance. In this light, the PSA process and 
the Best Value regime could be considered mainly as mechanisms to enable central 
government to control local delivery. 
2. Public accountability: national accountability is Government's first argument 
regarding the performance measurement and 'audit explosions' (Power, 1997), but 
there is little empiriýal evidence to sustain this argument (Pollitt, 2006). Since 
targets for local organisations are mostly developed mostly centrally and 
performance data is reported principally to departments and regulatory bodies, local 
accountability seems to be promoted only to a limited extent through PM. 
3. Comparison of performance: generally speaking, there is greater potential for 
benchmarking in the public sector than in the private sector, because of the 
availability of a wide choice of comparators, and the little competition in the sector. 
However, compulsory and defensive, rather than voluntary, benchmarking have 
emerged as the most prominent forms in the public sector in England (Bowerman et 
al., 2002). These forms do noi promote performance improvement, but rather 
acquisition of legitimacy, central control and, supposedly, public accountability. In 
the cases considered there was little evidence of voluntary benchmarking, while a 
number of indicators were used for league table purposes; 
4. Managerial use (internal): in both cases this did not emerge as a strong driver, 
although it is usually the main such driver for internally developed Pls. Therefore, it 
could be argued that the way the Treasury and government departments operate 
actually reduces the power of managers to design and use local targets and 
indicators. 
The initial review of the literature, the empirical findings of the two exploratory case 
studies, and further reflections on the roles of PM in the public sector enabled the 
formulation of the empirical research questions, which are discussed in the next section. 
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4.5 Empirical rcscarch qucstions 
This research focuses on the interactions between local public sector organisations and 
institutions in the development of PM systems. As emerged in the literature, the 
majority of studies of PM in the public sector lack a strong theoretical grounding, 
despite the potential contribution of theory to explaining and understanding a wide 
variety of issues. Furthermore, few empirical studies have bccn carried out on the 
measurement and management of performance at different levels of the public sector, 
especially from a local perspective, and the different roles fulfilled by PM have not been 
sufficiently investigated. Therefore, this research aims to provide deeper insights by 
studying this topic in the context of local public sector organisations in England. The 
following empirical research questions are addressed by this study: 
What are the roles ofperformance measurement in localpublic sector organisations 
in England? 
Which responses do local public sector organisations enact as a result of the 
institutional pressures toward conformity that are exerted on them ? 
The next presents in detail the pilot interviews and in-depth case studies that address the 
empirical research questions. In chapter 6 the findings of the different empirical phases 
are brought together with the insights drawn from the literature. 
1 
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CHAPTER 5 
PILOT INTERVIEWS AND IN-DEPTIl CASE STUDIES 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the main empirical findings of the research. Building on the 
literature review and the exploratory case studies, the conceptual and empirical 
questions were formulated (cf. chapters 2 and 4). On the basis of the rcflcctions made 
on the philosophical and methodological underpinnings of the research, case study was 
chosen as research strategy (cf. chapter 3). 
In order to identify issues that could be relevant to local public sector organisations, the 
researcher decided to carry out unstructured interviews in nine organisations. These 
interviews also enabled the definition of the characteristics of the in-depth case studies 
to be undertaken. Moreover, the interview protocol and the matrix (used to capture 
information related to the development of performance indicators) were piloted. 
Following these pilot interviews, two significant cases, one holistic and one embedded, 
were carried out in two quite different organisations: a fairly simply structured and 
homogeneouý fire authority (SFRA), and a complex multi-service local authority 
(LBBD). The interview protocol and matrix were used in 22 interviews (six at SFRA 
and 16 at LBBD). The interviews were then transcribed and analysed with NVivo 
software; data triangulation was achieved through the examination of a number of 
documents (cf. Table 5.1). The first case was initially considered as one unit of analysis 
and investigated separately. The second case was disaggregated into four units of 
analysis - corporate level and three services. These units were then analysed separately 
and conjointly. Finally, the two case studies were compared and contrasted. 
In the next sections the findings of the pilot interviews are followed by the rationale for 
cases, data collection tools and data analysis techniques used in the in-depth case 
studies. Subsequently the two organisations are described in detail and the themes 
emerged during the analysis presented. Appendix B provides an overview of the nodes 
utilised and reports examples of coding practice and quotes related to the main themes 
identified during the analysis. In chapter 6 the theoretical insights gained through the 
review of the literature are compared to the issues identified in the empirical phases of 
the research. 
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Empirical phases Organisations considered Main data sources 
Exploratory case Treasury, Department of Health, Publicly available 
studies (cf. chapter 4) Healthcare Commission, West documents 
Suffolk Primary Care Trust, 
Home Office and 
Cambridgeshire Constabulary 
Pilot interviews Nine local public sector Nine unstructured 
organisations operating in inter*ws of 
different areas - local approximately I hour with 
government, healthcare, police performance managers 
force, fire service, environment, 
culture 
In-depth case studies Stoke-on-Trent and Staffordshire - Six structured interviews 
Fire and Rescue Authority of the approximate duration 
of I V2hours. Interview 
protocol and matrix 
utilised. 
- Relevant PM documents. 
London Borough of Barking and - 16 structured interviews 
Dagenham of the approximate duration 
of I hour. Interview 
protocol and matrix 
utilised. 
Relevant PM documents. 
Table 5.1: Empirical phases of the research 
5.2 Pilot interviews 
Following the reviews of the literature and the formulation of the research questions, the 
researcher set out to identify the major issues being faced by local public sector 
organisations and to define the appropriate research strategy and empirical context. Pilot 
interviews were carried out with performance managers of nine different organisations. 
Given the exploratory nature of this phase of the research, choosing a representative 
sample was not the primary driver and opportunistic sampling was utilised, primarily to 
deal with the issue of gaining access to relevant organisations. Therefore most of the 
organisations selected belonged to the Centre for Business Performance's Public Sector 
Performance Roundtable (cf. section 3.4). The roundtable also played a crucial role in 
validating the results of this pilot phase, since the researcher had the opportunity to 
deliver several presentations and informally discuss these issues in a number of 
instances with roundtable members. 
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The organisations chosen belong to several public sector domains: 
9 local government (two county councils and a borough council) 
* healthcare (a strategic health authority and an ambulance trust) 
o an cnvironmcntal organisation 
*a police force 
9a fire authority 
oa museum. 
Through this variety of sectors it was possible to examine a range of issues wider than 
the one achievable by looking at just one area. This also provided the researcher with a 
better understanding of the possibility of considering different areas of the public sector 
and the consequent limitations of the final results of the research. Furthermore, the 
identification of a number of contextual and non-contcxtual aspects informed the choice 
of the subsequent in-depth case studies. Finally, the researcher had the opportunity to 
familiarise himself with the performance regimes existing in the public sector in 
England (e. g. Best Value, Comprehensive Performancc Assessment, etc. ) and the role 
of audit bodies, such as the Audit Commission and the National Audit Office (cf. also 
sections 5.3). 
The pilot interviews were "informal conversation interviews", which relied "entirely on 
the spontaneous generation of questions in the natural flow of an interaction" (Patton, 
1990, p. 280). They proved extremely useful in opening up this research "to the range of 
possible meanings, properties, dimensions, and relationships inherent in any bit of data" 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p. 88). During these interviews, the researcher prompted the 
discussion on PM-related issues and asked questions following the interviewees' 
answers. In so doing, it was possible to explore different topics across the interviews 
and to identify some contingent or common factors, some of which could be related to 
the previously reviewed literature. 
The themes emerged are discussed in the next sections, starting from the analogies 
between organisations. First of all, though, it should be remarked that one of the main 
findings of this empirical phase is that, although the organisations considered greatly 
differ in terms of size, services provided and geographical areas covered, substantial 
commonality of issues was found. 
5.2.1 Common themes 
Design of targets and indicators 
One of the primary findings of this empirical stage regards the variability in the targets 
and indicators used in the public services. The highly political nature of designing them 
and the frequent changes in general policy (also, but not only, as a result of changes in 
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national or local political leadership) make it very hard to establish cause-and-effect 
relationships. According to the performance manager of a county council, frequent 
changes in the type and number of performance indicators is "an obstacle for the 
calculation and interpretation of trends". 
Furthermore, in all organisations considered it was possible to see how several 
organisations influenced the design of the indicators. Or even, as a respondent put it: 
"indicators are imposed upon us". In the case of museums, for instance, the Department 
for culture, media and sport sets targets and indicators in relations to funding 
agreements. However, the interviewee claimed, "funding agreements are not very much 
affected by performance" and rarely are sanctions defined in terms of funding. This 
calls into question the use that is made of performance data both within and outside 
organisations. 
In terms of development of targets and indicators, insufficient involvement of local 
organisations was lamented and differences existing between organisations were said to 
be not considered enough by government departments. Moreover, as in the case of 
museums, the Gershon Review, the National Audit Office and the Heritage Lottery 
Fund, among others, as well as all the partners involved in specific projects play 
important roles in the measurement and management of performance. According to the 
performance manager interviewed, this plurality of key stakeholders can generate lack 
of clarity and confusion at the local level. 
Measurement ofperformance 
Various respondents remarked the difficulty of quantifying inputs, outputs, outcomes, 
productivity and quality in the public sector. Several scholars have also remarked the 
difficulty of capturing the quality and outcome of public services (cf. Smith, 1995a). In 
certain instances, such as the reporting of attemptedand substantive crimes by police 
forces, there is lack of clarity even over how to record inputs and outputs. Similar 
reflections could be made as regards to the assessment of costs and benefits of 
performance measurement in local organisations. Although this certainly is an important 
topic (cf. section 2.4.2), since it is very much dependent on a number of assumptions 
and caveats, it would require a specific and in-depth study which goes beyond the scope 
of this research. I 
Despite the inherent issues with the quantification of performance in the public sector, 
several interviewees remarked the importance of "passing from input to output and 
outcome indicators" (performance manager of a county council). In the case of the 
environmental organisation considered, for example, the scorecard adopted was 
criticised as being "too operational and better measures are needed, especially as to 
outcomes". 
Moreover, several interviewees emphasised the importance of benchmarking and 
sharing of information between organisations (not necessarily operating in their same 
sub-sector) as ways to improve performance. However, according to a number of 
interviewees, central government seems to be more interested in the publication of 
I 
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league tables than in fostering performance improvement through the comparison of 
pcrformancc betwcen organisations (cf. also section 4.4). 
As regards to this, the researcher, in collaboration with colleagues from the Centre for 
Business Performance, analysed a number of public sector reports, such as tile Gershon 
Review, the Atkinson Report and Public service productivity report on health, and 
literature on the design and use of league tables. From the analysis emerged that league 
tables are oflen statistically flawed, and that the ways in which the results of public 
sector reports are communicated and used tend to be too simplistic and to drive wrong 
behaviours (cf Micheli, Mason, Kennerley and Wilcox, 2005) (cf. also chapter 6). 
Another issue to be raised regards the measurement of performance when services are 
jointly delivered by different local organisations. For example, as remarked by the 
performance manager of the strategic health authority, although social services play a 
key role in healthcare, national targets and indicators for social services and healthcare 
trusts are quite different. Similarly, although police forces and local authorities need to 
co-operate to prevent and tackle crime, indicators and information required by 
government departments and auditors are different and this, as emphasised by the 
performance manager of a local authority, can cause tensions between organisations. 
Performance culture 
Most of the interviewces showed great interest - and, at the same time, concern - 
regarding the development of a performance culture within the organisation. The 
imposition of performance targets and indicators from other organisations (often 
identified with the expression 'performance monitoring% and a culture of blame seem 
to be the main barriers to the achievement of a culture of perfortnance within 
organisations. In all organisations considered the performance indicators against which 
data are currently collected appeared as neither sufficiently related to strategy nor 
organised according to priorities. Furthermore, in certain instances the complexity of the 
system in place was seen as an obstacle to performance management and the creation of 
a performance culture. 
Several performance managers underlined the importance of changing the culture of the 
people working within their organisations. According to the performance manager of a 
borough council, "a culture of performance is not about ticking boxes, but about really 
managing performance". This could be achieved by linking BVPls to the internal 
performance indicators and having greater consistency in the measurement of 
performance. Always referring to performance culture, another respondent emphasised 
the link between the measurement of performance and the use of data to support 
decision-making processes (cf. Neely, Micheli and Martinez, 2006). Moreover, 
somewhat curiously, respondents emphasised the necessity to both acknowledge weak 
perfon-nance and celebrate success when targets are met, which, currently, are not 
sufficiently taking place. 
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Data collection 
For the development of this research, the pilot interviews also led to an interesting 
finding on a methodological level. Although there are many documents available on the 
Internet, it is hard to gather all the relevant information on objectives, targets and 
indicators of a public sector organisation. The pilot interviews showed how integrated 
PMS are rarely present at the local level and this is reflected in a considerable 
dispersion of data, even where performance managers and performance teams are 
present (Adams and Micheli, 2005). Particularly in complex organisations, many 
indicators are owned by different individuals and reported to other people and 
organisations, sometimes without being checked by a central department within the 
agency. Furthermore, the indicators published are very often the statutory ones, whereas 
this research is also interested on what is done differently by local organisations and 
why. Therefore, although the analysis of publicly available documents is certainly 
important, by itself it would not be sufficient for the purposes of this research (cf. 
section 7.1.2). 
5.2.2 Differences beihveen cases 
Despite the substantial differences between the types of organisations considered most 
themes emerged as common. This is mainly due to the role of government departments 
and audit bodies, and the ways in which targets and indicators are developed, which are 
consistent across different public sector areas. 
The principal difference that could be identified from the analysis of the interviews 
regards the complexity of an organisation's PMS. In several organisations, such as local 
government and healthcare organisations, the number of performance indicators 
appeared as incredibly high. Since in most cases each performance indicator is linked 
with several sub-indicators, the measurement system could be very complicated. 
Moreover, in bigger organisations the PMS consists of different levels, which are rarely 
grouped in a single scorecard. In County Councils, for example, there is often a 
corporate scorecard plus about 30 frameworks or lists of indicators for each of the 
separate services, which are then sub-divided into various other levels. In one local 
authority the total number of indicators was estimated by the performance manager as 
greater than 1,000. Another local authority reported that only in relation to Local 
Service Partnerships, there were approximately 350-400 indicators. At the other end of 
the spectrum, the museum considered had only 26 performance indicators in total and 
the police force and the fire authority less than 50. 
Therefore, from the analysis presented in this section, it could be argued that the pilot 
interviews enabled the researcher to identify a number of relevant themes and to better 
focus the breadth and depth of the research. In particular, issues regarding the design, 
implementation and use of targets and indicators, and the reporting of information to 
institutions appeared as quite consistent across cases. On the other hand, the difference 
in complexity of the PMS emerged as a fundamental issue to be considered in the 
sampling of the in-depth case studies. In the following sections the rationale for the 
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cases and the processes for data gathering and analysis are described. Subsequently the 
case studies are discussed in detail. 
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5.3 In-depth case studies 
5.3.1 Rationale 
In chapter 3 the choice of case study as a research strategy was justified from a 
theoretical point of view. In an empirical sense, the researcher decided to look for 
significant cases, i. e. local public sector organisations, where interesting practices 
related to PM had been developed (cf Kaplan, 1986). Following Eisenhardt (1989), 
since case study research relies on theoretical sampling, cases are chosen for theoretical, 
not statistical, reasons. 
The findings of the pilot interviews and the framework developed by Carter et al. (1992) 
are also used to better scope this search. In particular, these authors introduced two 
relevant dimensions - heterogeneity and complexity - onto which they mapped several 
types of organisations: 
* heterogeneity refers to the number of different products or services provided 
complexity is defined as the extent to which an organisation has to mobilise a 
number of different skills in order to deliver its services or produce its goods. 
Building on Carter et al. (1992) and, more broadly, on the literature reviews and the 
pilot interviews, it could be argued that in the public sector the concepts of 
heterogeneity and complexity usually go hand-in-hand. Organisations like healthcare 
trusts and local authorities are multi-service and require the mobilisation of a number of 
skills with a substantial level of interdependence between the different actors. On the 
other hand, organisations like police forces and fire authorities rate fairly low in 
heterogeneity and complexity, as the number of activities performed and the skills 
required are limited. I- 
Therefore, it was decided to carry out two case studies. The first was conducted in an 
organisation with a fairly simple PM system: the Stoke-on-Trent and Staffordshire Fire 
and Rescue Authority (SFRA). The second case was undertaken in a local authority: the 
London Borough of Barking and Dagenham (LBBD). This organisation uses a complex 
PM system, which has to reflect the wide range of services provided, from social 
services to housing, from leisure to revenues and benefits. Specific rationale for each 
case is provided while discussing the cases in depth. 
Following Yin's (1994) categorisation, the first is a holistic case study, i. e. it consists of 
a single unit of analysis. The second is an embedded case, as multiple units of analysis 
were considered: the corporate level and three services. In line with the philosophical 
perspective outlined in the chapter 3, cases are first considered separately and then 
compared (Miles and Hubermann, 1994) (Fig. 5.1). Before examining the cases and 
describing in detail their characteristics, the procedures followed to gather and analyse 
the data are presented. 
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Stoke-on-Trent and London Borough 
Staffordshire Fire of Barking and 
and Rescue Dagcnham 
Authority 
One holistic Four embedded 
case study 
II 
units of analysis 
Corporate Revenues Safeguarding Leisure, 
level and and Rights Arts and 
Benefits service Olympics 
service service 
Data Data Data Data 
collection collection collection collection 
and and and and 
analysis analysis analysis analysis 
Data Within case 
collection comparisons 
and 
analysis 
Cross-case 
comparisons 
Figure S. 1: In-depth case studies - Collection and analysis of the data 
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5.3.2 Data collection tools 
Data was collected mainly through structured interviews and documents, and partly 
through participant observation. A pre-defined protocol and a limited number of probes 
were used to perform the interviews. In order to understand whether the questions were 
comprehensible, meaningful and thorough, the interview protocol was piloted with the 
Head of Planning and Perforrnance and a Principal Service Analyst at SFRA. 
The final protocol was obtained through the analysis of the literature and the insights 
gained through the exploratory study and pilot interviews (cf. Appendix 131). The first 
questions regard the objectives of the organisation and what the* respondent considers as 
success for the organisation. Subsequent questions are derived from new institutional 
and resource dependence theory, as they investigate what is currently measured in the 
organisation and if PM contributes to the achievement of the previously stated 
objectives. Particular attention is paid to the relationships between the organisation 
considered and the organisations that influence the way performance targets and 
indicators are developed. These questions are linked to the following main themes: 
" drivers and roles of PM (cf. section 4.4) 
" design, characteristics and uses of the organisation's PM system (cf. section 2.4.2) 
" existence of conflicting demands and their implications on the development of PM 
systems (Modell, 2001) 
" the relationship between instrumental work processes and the symbolic display of 
rational organisational practice in response to institutional pressures, e. g. 
discrepancies between reasons for collecting data and actual use of the information 
gathered (cf. Dirsmith et al., 2000) 
" examination of strategic responses to institutional pressures and the identification of 
the factors, which influence the nature of these responses (cf. Oliver, 1991) 
" effects of alignment and non-alignment to externally imposed performance targets 
and indicators on organisational efficiency, effectiveness and legitimacy. Possible 
intertwining of legitimacy-seeking and efficiency-enhancing rationales (Suchman, 
1995; Abernethy and Chua, 1996). 
Furthermore, building on the TM Record Sheet' developed by Neely, Richards, Mills, 
Platts, and Bourne (2003), a matrix was also designed to capture and structure the 
infon-nation related to the development of the indicators, and to identify possible 
discrepancies between how an indicator is mandated and the way it is defined and used 
by the local organisation. This matrix was filled in with the support of documents and 
by interviewing one person working on PM in each unit of analysis considered, i. e. a 
Performance Analyst at SFRA; one Analyst at corporate level and three at department 
level at LBBD. The interview protocol and matrix are reported in Appendices 131 and 
B2. 
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5.3.3 Data analysis 
The two cases are first analysed separately - in the case of LBBD it is also possible to 
make comparisons between services - and then conjointly. In particular, cross- 
comparisons are performed at the organisational level, between similar levels (e. g. 
senior management, middle management, ctc. ), and also between cacti LBBD service 
and SFRA, given their comparability in size and their focus on one function. To 
increase the external validity of this research and to achieve further triangulation of 
evidence, presentations were made at various stages at the Cmnficld Public Sector 
Performance Roundtable in front of very diverse groups of public sector managers (cf. 
also section 7.4). 
In the discussion and analysis of the themes quotes are often used in order to report as 
much as possible the interviewees' opinions on the issues investigated in this research 
(cf. Eisenhardt and Gracbner, 2007). To put particularly emphasis on the material 
gathered,. the quotes included in sections 5.3.4 and 5.3.5 arc reported in italics. Finally, 
the codes used during the analysis have been derived from the literature, but also 
emerged from the data (cf. Appendix B). The themes presented at the end of each 
section reflect and bring together these codes (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). 
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5.3.4 First case study - Stoke-on-Trent and Staffordshire Fire and Rescue 
Authority 
5.3.4.1 Rationale 
The English fire service is an interesting context for this research, as in recent years it 
has started moving from an autonomous and corporate culture to a more managerial one 
with increasing pressures to cut budgets and improve efficiency and service quality 
(Redman and Snape, 2004). A number of initiatives have been undertaken with regard 
to PM, the most relevant ones being Best Value and the Comprehensive Performance 
Assessment (CPA). Best Value was introduced shortly after the 1997 elections in order 
to foster continuous improvement in the public services. CPA started in 2002 aiming to 
analyse "performance and indicate where the organisation has strengths and 
weaknesses" (SFRA website). The Audit Commission carries out both Best Value and 
CPA reviews in the fire service. 
One of the main differences between the CPA and Best Value is that the former has 
been piloted in various organisations in order to improve the process and ensure better 
results. In the fire service four authorities were selected for the CPA Pilot Test, which 
took place in late 2004, and SFRA is one of them. In the CPA 2005 review, SFRA was 
rated 'good' (the levels being excellent, good, fair, weak and poor), thanks to the good 
performance achieved through the "strongest possible grade for political and 
professional leadershipý' (SFRA website). It should be remarked that "CPA is an 
assessment, at the corporate level, of how well the Authority is being run. It does not 
give an opinion about how well thefire service responds to emergency incidents" (Audit 
Commission website). 
The factors discussed in the previous section, the changes taking place in the English 
fire service, and the particular characteristics and processes the organisation went 
through, make the case of SFRA relevant for this research. 
5.3.4.2 Background information 
The Stoke-on-Trent and Staffordshire Fire Authority covers an area of 270,000 hectares 
with a population of 1.06 million in 432,920 domestic dwellings. As the CPA Report 
released in 2005 states, "Staffordshire is a county of diverse contrasts with sparsely 
populated moorlands and rural areas where agriculture is the predominant industry, and 
concentrations of dense urban populations. ( ... ) Traditional employment areas of coal, 
steel, ceramics, textiles and brewing have declined dramatically in recent years, giving 
rise to a changing risk profile, and transitions in unemployment rates. ( ... ) Overall, 
unemployment is lower than the national average. Although affluent in parts, the fire 
authority area has concentrations of deprivation and social exclusion in the urban areas, 
( ... ), [but] there are also issues of 
deprivation in rural areas related to accessibility of 
jobs and services". 
In terms of budget, for 2004-2005 the Authority had E35 million, within which capital 
budget accounted for fl. 25 million. However, from 2004-2005, "with the introduction 
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of precepting, the fire authority has had to balance its aspirations and challenges to 
deliver improvemcnts in community and staff safcty against the Govcmmcnt's 
requirement to contain council tax rises within acceptable single figures" (CPA Report 
2005). 
Regarding structure, SFRA is "a combined fire authority comprising 19 elected 
members from Staffordshire County Council and six elected members from the City of 
Stoke-on-Trent Council" (CPA Report 2005). Community safety and statutory fire 
safety services are co-ordinated at nine area command locations and 30 fire stations 
operate on three different crewing systems. Six whole-timc stations are crewcd 24 hours 
a day; five day crewed stations arc partially crewed; and the remaining 19 stations arc 
crewcd by retained staff. 
In terms of staffing and level of operations, SFRA has "466 whoic-timc fire-fightcrs, 
415 retained fire-figbters, 30 control room staff and 160 support staff. The senior 
management of the Authority comprises 23 staff at policy group and policy advisory 
group level representing 2.2 per cent of the workforce. ( ... ) In the fiscal year 2003/04, 
the fire authority dealt with 16,599 incidents of which 2,956 were primary fires, 5,487 
secondary fires, and 2,072 were special service calls (of which 757 were road traffic 
accidents). The rest were false alarms or other calls" (CPA Review 2005). 
5.3.4.3 Performance measurement - Background information 
The CPA 2005 review stated that SFRA. was improving strongly and was demonstrating 
a good performance. This report also discussed a number of points regarding 
performance measurement and management which are relevant for the purposes of this 
research (building on the CPA Report and Audit Commission website): 
Leadership: the Audit Commission largely emphasised the effective organisational 
and political leadership of both the Authority and fire service and their beneficial 
impact on organisational performance. 
Partnerships: the investments made by the organisation in developing better 
partnership working have contributed to the wider social inclusion, neighbourhood 
renewal and crime reduction agendas, positioning SFRA well within the partnership 
arena and ensuring that the direction of travel is good for reducing preventable 
accidents. 
Performance measurement and management: the performance management 
arrangements have been set in a well-structured framework and there is now an 
effective use of risk management. The service delivers positively on the Authority's 
priorities and there is good involvement of members in the service work. Effective 
methods for extracting learning from day-to-day activities are in place but there is a 
less structured approach in applying the learning across command areas. The service 
is continually moving forward; it may need to find the time and space to pause, 
reflect on what has been achieved and draw out lessons. 
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Resource allocation and use: SFRA has succeeded in achieving ambitious targets 
with existing resources. Furthermore, the use of partnership working is helping to 
extend the capacity of the service as well as making a significant impact in target 
areas. A good mix of targeted preventative work is provided, based on real 
intelligence, with a willingness to refocus and shift resources in order to achieve 
improvement. 
Governance and working environment: there is an open and fri ' endly atmosphere 
in 
the service and good working relationships between members and senior officers. 
The approach to governance arrangements is well-structured, clearly defined and 
member-led, but is still relatively new, and has yet to become embedded. 
Role within the local community: SFRA has an understanding of the communities it 
serves and the wider social agenda. Moreover, it displays strong community 
leadership and has played a key role in working with partners to address its aim of 
community protection. 
Future plans and objectives: for the future, the Authority has a range of clear and 
robust future plans that target national, regional and local priorities and are 
consistent with its long-term vision and core aims to 'make people safe'. 
Therefore, although the organisation, as all fire authorities in England, is going through 
a period of substantial change, it has achieved notable results and has considerably 
moved forward in its adoption of PM related practices. However, the use of 
performance targets and indicators is still recent and the organisation needs to fully 
embed PM in the way it operates. The next section presents the documents reviewed 
and people interviewed; subsequently, the results of the data analysis are discussed in 
order to shed light on a number of issues related to PM and management. 
53.4.4 Data collection 
After gaining access to the organisation, the researcher started the process of data 
collection. Firstly, all relevant documents were gathered; these include: the Annual 
report; CPA Pilot test report (October 2004); CPA Self-assessment report (January 
2005); Best Value performance plan 2005-2006; Integrated risk management plan 
(IRMP) 2005/06; Medium term strategic plan 2004/05-2006/07; Strategic plan 2005/06 
onwards; Performance targets 2005/2006 to 2009/2010. Furthermore other relevant 
information could be downloaded from the SFRA website. These documents enabled 
the researcher to gain a good understanding of the current situation and to identify the 
key people to interview. 
In the case of SFRA, the respondents are all involved in PM and were selected in order 
to represent different levels within the organisational population. In so doing, it was 
possible to consider a number of different viewpoints. Interviews, of the approximate 
duration of I V2hours, were carried out with: 
9 Chief Fire Officer/Chief Executive (CFO) 
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Deputy Chief Fire Officer and Deputy Chief Director of Organisational Performance 
and Planning (Deputy CFO) 
9 Perfonnance and Quality Manager 
9 Head of Planning and Performance 
o Principal Service Analyst. 
A second interview was carried out with the Principal Service Analyst in order to 
populate the matrix, by going through all the current targets and indicators. 
5.3.4.5 Data analysis 
The information gathered through documents and interviews was coded using the 
NVivo software. Codes were partly derived from the literature, but also emerged from 
the data. As a result, a number of themes were identified in relation to the research 
questions, consistent with the findings obtained in the previous phases of the research. 
Throughout the analysis of the cases, several quotes from both documents and 
interviews are reported. Appendix B4 includes all the main quotes (in some instances 
the same data was coded utilising more than one code). Appendices B5 and B6 provide 
an overview of the nodes utilised in the analysis. 
In general, responses from the interviewees were quite consistent; the differences 
encountered depend mostly on the hierarchical level to which intervicwces belonged. 
The CFO and Deputy CFO made remarks particularly on policy and strategy, whereas 
the other intervicwees focused more on operational details and actual delivery of 
service. In this sense, the choice of carrying out interviews at different organisational 
levels proved valuable as different issues emerged. Furthermore, through interviews it 
was possible to investigate topics, such as performance culture and 'joined up' 
government, for which no questions were initially designed, but that were 
spontaneously mentioned by the respondents. The following sections describe the main 
themes identified through the analysis of documents gathered and interviewscarried out 
at SFRA. 
Flows ofperformance information 
The main flows of performance information within SFRA and between the organisation 
and the environment are linear and fairly simple (Fig. 5.2). Intemally, each area 
command provides data to the centre, i. e. the Planning and Performance team. In turn, 
this team reports the information to the board and externally. 
As in all empirical cases considered in this research, external reporting is fundamental 
for SFRA. The frequency of external reporting often dictates the measurement of 
performance at the local level. As the Performance and Quality Manager stated 
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"obviously, we have to commend to that nationalframework ofgovernment. We have to 
send an annual return to the ODPM [Ojfice ofthe Deputy Prime Minister] about our 
own performance. So quarterly we have to look at our performance. " 
Environment 
Planning and 
Perfonnance 
Team 
Area Area Area 
Command I Command 2 Command 3 
Figure 5.2: Main flows of perfonnance information in SFRA 
CEO and 
Board 
Area 
Command 9 
External reporting is often directed to central govenunent, but also to the local authority 
and, on request, to the wider public. Flows of information within SFRA are also 
important. The Audit Commission has identified that 
"communication ofperformance is not systematic atpresent, although this has been 
identified and is being addressed" (CPA Pilot Test Report - October 2004). 
Although the organisation is not as complex as a local authority or a healthcare trust, the 
infon-nation that is passed to the CFO and Senior Management is more aggregated than 
that used at area command level. The CFO is interested in the overall picture, policy and 
reporting, whereas area commanders are more concerned with operational performance. 
Therefore, national Best Value Performance Indicators (BVPI) are often broken into 
sub-BVP1s, which enable area commanders to 'drill down' and obtain a more detailed 
picture. Furthermore, area commanders have performance reports 
"that are published on a monthly basis and that's to assist them in their management 
ultimatelyfor best value performance indicators. So it'sjust supporting evidence, 
supporting data " (Principal Service Analyst). 
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histilittionalpressitres 
From the analysis it clearly emerged that institutions play a fundamental role in the 
development of performance targets and indicators in SFRA. The majority of tile 
perfortriance indicators (PIs) currently used in the organisation have bccil developed 
externally. Although the organisation rated very highly in the last CPA review in terms 
of performance management, it is interesting to note that it has not been very proactive 
in the design of Pis, which could better reflect its spccific characteristics. 
However, in contrast to most academic literature on PM in the public sector, all 
interviewees stated that both Best Value and CPA have helped SFRA to improve their 
performance and to foster a culture of performance within the organisation. As the 11cad 
of Planning and Performance stated 
"it is vital to have pressure comingfroin CPA and other institutions. Ifyou areforced to 
modernise and measure, you can achieve improvenicnts in the service. " 
Moreover, few complaints were expressed regarding current national indicators. From 
the interviews it emerged that the majority of Best Value Performance Indicators are 
seen as appropriate and only few of them should be amended. However, three principal 
remarks were made as regards to centrally set performance targets and indicators. 
Firstly, BVPIs are sometimes seen as past-focused and not oriented towards future 
improvement. Secondly, and partially related to the previous point, often 
fyou don't achieve targets, this is seen as afailure, rather than which directions "i 
should befollowcd " (Chief Fire Officer). 
Finally, particularly in the case of new indicators, rationale for their introduction, use of 
collected data and guidelines for setting targets are sometimes not clear. 
When describing relationships between SFRA and institutions, interviewees emphasised 
the difference between the approach traditionally adopted by Her Majesty's Inspectorate 
(HMI) and ODPM, and the recent CPA review. The Comprehensive Performance 
Assessment has not only been more participatory, but has also looked at 'joined up' 
services, management culture and other aspects previously neglected by auditors. As the 
Deputy CFO argued 
"I think in the past it was very much directed and it was one way: ODPAI, thefire 
services Inspectorate or whoever determines what the BVPIs would be basically told us 
what was going to happen. Certainly over the last two or three years they have been far 
more keen to engage with individual authorities on a consultation basis. " 
At senior management level the Audit Commission and ODPM are almost considered 
as partners to collaborate with: 
"the approach of the Audit Commission in terms of CPA was to look into taking a more 
holistic view ofthe performance ofthe organisation, identify the relative relevance of 
each indicator and then beingprepared to listen to our explanation as to why we let 
performance in some areas ofthe organisation drop. So I certainly think that our 
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experience with CPA is very much about a collaborative partnership approach to 
achieving improvement rather than the almost oppressive inspectorate regimefinding 
fault" (Deputy CFO). 
However, at middle management level the perception appears to be more hierarchical: 
"I don't have any strong views about the relationship, other than we know that 
[ODPM] are our masters, ifyou want. Wejust try and achieve what they set us 
(Performance and Quality Manager). 
Target setting and Yoined up'government 
There are several overlaps between the activities performed by SFRA and other 
authorities, particularly local government and police. To promote so-called 'joined up' 
government, interviewees agreed that there is a need to create a performance 
environment which enables SFRA to work together with other local public sector 
organisations. However, as remarked particularly by the CFO, often it is the 
Government's task to develop 'joined up' local strategies: 
"it is difficult to have Yolned up'services when there's a lack ofstrategy at government 
level. " 
Interviewees focused on three aspects which could foster the integrated provision of 
services locally. First of all, in order to achieve improvement, relationships with central 
government should be formative, and the review of local organisations' perfon-nance 
should look at 'joined up' services and management culture. Although these aspects are 
improving, concern was still shown. Specifically, although the number of national 
targets has been reduced, if the organisation fails to meet them, this is interpreted as a 
failure, rather than as a means to identify which directions to follow. 
Secondly, the CFO and Deputy CFO emphasised aspects related to strategy, target 
setting and provision of integrated services locally. The current way of setting targets 
and indicators seems too centralised and fragmented; as the CFO argued 
go a cohesive strategy is differentfrom a set of targets ". 
Therefore, although Government intervention could help single organisations to become 
more performance focused, it could be an obstacle towards the achievement of higher 
quality of service for the community. 
"Targets oftenfoster centralization and not quality ofservice improvements" (Chief 
Fire Officer). 
Finally, there appears to be a disconnection between policy makers and deliverers. As 
the CFO rcmarked, strategy and policy development have often been insufficiently 
linked to service delivery. For example, while the fire service has received great 
attention in recent years, growing issues like fire deaths and arson have not reached the 
political agenda. According to the CFO, central government is currently relying more 
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on central targets than on actual performance to dclivcr local services. Therefore, 
government policy seems more driven by results against national targcts, rather than by 
actual understanding of local delivery and pcrfonnancc. 
Organisational ohjectives 
The perception of what the main objectives and priorities for the organisation are is 
quite consistent across all interviews. This may not be surprising; however, it is 
interesting to notice how the CFO and Deputy CFO, in particular, argued that in central 
government the fire service is associated with fire deaths, which is "one level below the 
main one". According to them, the key objectives for the organisation should be broader 
ones, such as "sustainable Staffordshire, regeneration of the ctivironment, rural 
economy, etc. " (CFO). Comments regarding organisational objectives reinforce the 
criticism aimed at moved to government departments of not seeing the 'bigger picture'. 
Secondly, while describing the objectives of the organisation, intcrvicwccs oflcn 
referred to the local community, emphasising the positive contribution that the 
organisation could bring to citizenship. As the Deputy CFO noted: 
"in the longer term we would want to see more prosperous communities; we want to see 
more engaged communities and them making a contribution to the local economy, less 
strain on the police resources, less strain on the health service resources, less 
disruption to education and all that sort ofthing as a longer term goal" (cf previous 
section). 
Finally, PM is seen as a key element for achieving the organisation's objectives. As the 
Performance and Quality Manager stated: 
"I consider performance management to be so important that it is the only way, to a 
degree, that we can support our objectives. You need some sort ofineasurement ofhow 
you are doing. " 
Therefore PM is considered as a way to demonstrate performance and that value for 
money is being delivered. At operational level, objectives are detailed within each area 
command and are based on the BVPIs. The use of national indicators enables the 
organisation to compare performance with other fire authorities: 
"the objective ofthefire service is to provide a good service. And we want to be the best 
service in the country" (Performance and Quality Manager). 
Leadership andperformance managentent 
Although the influence exerted by central government is certainly substantial, the 
committed leadership demonstrated by the Chief Fire Officer has also been necessary to 
promote the introduction of PM at SFRA. As the Principal Service Analyst expressed it: 
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dd performance management is getting ingrained in thefire authority. ( .. ) The CFO is dragging the people at all levels through this process ofchange. " 
The Performance and Quality Manager took this point even further, stating that without 
performance indicators there would be no way to evaluate the success of the 
organisation. 
The CPA Report published in 2005 confirmed this process of change within SFRA: 
"The culture ofmanaging performance as o osed to monitoringperformance is Tp 
demonstrable. Performance management is now a routine part ofthe Authority's 
governance, executive and senior management arrangements. The results of CPA 
activity have confirmed the structure and approach ofthe planning andperformance 
management process. " 
However, although PM and management is now more prominent in the way the 
organisation manages corporate governance and service management, because of this 
top-down approach, PM is still to be embedded from the middle management level 
down. As the Deputy CFO put it: 
"The main problem internally is that not all ofour managersfully understand the 
concept ofperformance management and I think there's a perception that performance 
management is a punitive arrangement. " 
The CPA Review expressed a similar judgement, encouraging the organisation to 
develop and implement its own PMS 
"to include wider general management and individual performance in order to ensure 
[PM] becomesfully embedded". 
Performance culture 
Performance culture was not an area questions focused on, but all interviewees added 
comments related to it (cf Appendix B4 for the most significant quotes). Both-during 
the interviews and in official documents performance culture was defined as the shift 
from PM towards performance management taking place at SFRA: 
"there is a cultural change throughout the organisation towards improvedperformance 
management " (CPA Pilot test report - October 2004). 
According to the Head of Planning and Performance, 
"a performance management culture has grown in this organisation in the lastfour 
years, to thepoint now where the only thing that could make it really better to me isjust 
to upgrade the mechanisms, have some more sophisticated statistics in place". 
This finding is interesting especially as PM has only recently been introduced in the fire 
service. 
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In this sense, it is important to notice, as in the exploratory case performed in a Primary 
Care Trust, how the New Public Management lexicon is fairly widespread in official 
documents. 'Modernisation' is a word that is often utilised, e. g.: 
"Staffordshire `lRMP' [i. e. Integrated Risk Management Plan] has recogniscd the 
significant move towards modernisation since the completion ofan e-wensive Best Pahle 
Review of Community Protection carried out in 2000 " (sentence underlined in the 
Executive Summary of the IRMP). 
Moreover, particular relevance is given to results of the auditing process: 
"Further, the ODPM Verification A uditfound solid evidence to corroborate the 
Service's modernisation progress " (IRMP). 
Finally, words like 'efficiency' and 'productivity' are often utilised. This reflects tile 
process of transition from an autonomous culture to a more managerial one. As the CFO 
stated, 
"'Productivity'is a word used now, but nolft ve years ago! 
However, although PM is being progressively accepted at SFRA, there is room for 
improvement and work has to be done in order to embed PM within the organisation. 
Sometimes there still is 
"a perception that performance management is a punitive arrangement (J. rather than 
being seen as a management tool, as a means to ensure that resources are being used in 
the most appropriate way" (Deputy CFO). 
According to all interviewees, a culture of performance has to pervade the organisation 
at all levels. To do so, the reasons and benefits of measuring and managing perfon-nance 
have to be understood by everyone within SFRA- At present, this has been achieved at 
senior and middle management levels, but, as confinned by the CPA Review in 2005, 
PM has still to be embedded below middle management and new political members 
have to be more involved as well. According to the Head of Planning and Performance, 
since members play such an important role in the development of organisational 
strategy, they need to be more educated as regards PM and get more involved in the 
operational design and development of targets and indicators. 
Performance indicators 
The Pls being used at SFRA are predominantly the national BVPls. Regarding their 
design and use, most respondents showed dissatisfaction with the current regime only to 
a limited extent. The more participative nature of the CPA, in comparison to Best 
Value, and the direct involvement of SFRA in the process has proven valuable. As the 
CFO stated: 
"CPA is increasingly driving improvements much more than Best Value. CPA is about 
performance environment and notjust Ms. (. ) A more holistic approach is needed ". 
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The intcrvicwccs depicted CPA as a test that is externally driven, but which, if 
appropriately linked to the specific aspects of the organisation, can encourage people to 
deliver better results: 
"Certainly our experience with the comprehensive performance assessment was that the 
reviewers were keen to engage with us and listen to us and share their views with us 
and were prepared to be challenged" (Deputy CFO). 
Therefore, it seems that processes of cultural change are happening within both SFRA 
and organisations at the national level: 
"In the past ODPM and HMI have provided slow and bad guidelines, but relationships 
will improve through the CPA and ODPM shouldfoster an improvement cycle" (Head 
of Planning and Perfonnance). 
An in-depth interview was carried out with the Principal Service Analyst regarding 
appropriateness and satisfaction with both local and national indicators. In general, 
national PIs were described as relevant and complaints were mostly expressed as 
regards to the guidelines provided by the auditors. The Analyst felt that, in order to have 
meaningful measurement, more information should be provided, especially because the 
authority is regularly benchmarked on all national indicators; thus it is important to have 
a consistent process across the country. Another concern was expressed regarding issues 
on which either the organisation has limited influence, or which are not clearly linked to 
opportunities for improvement. Pls related to expenditure or head counts, for example, 
were described as ambiguous, as "it is not clear what they are there to achieve" 
(Principal Service Analyst). 
In terms of development of local indicators, the organisation does not seem to be 
sufficiently pro-active. As the CPA Report stated, "the culture of managing 
performance as opposed to monitoring performance is demonstrable. " Local indicators 
are developed either if there is something missing in the national indicators, or, as sub- 
BVPIs, to better capture the performance of the organisation at area command level. 
There are only five local indicators not developed as sub-BVPIs, whereas there are 38 
national indicators. Through sub-BVPIs managers are able to have a less aggregated 
picture than the one obtained by reporting on BVPls. However, the process of data 
gathering is not straightforward, since area commanders 
"don't want to be responsible. Different information is received depending on who 
provided it " (Head of Planning and Performance). 
In terms of internal use of perfon-nance information, the CFO and the Board only review 
the most important BVP1s with a certain frequency. These PIs are included in a periodic 
report that the CFO takes to every fire authority to compare organisations' performance. 
Similar to performance indicators, targets are often accepted as appropriate and 
developed following existing national ones. Changes are only introduced when 
'stretching' government targets and achieving performance above the national threshold 
leads to additional funding: "there are targets but what we have done is actually 
increase the target to be eligible for this additional funding" (Principal Service 
Analyst). 
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Finally, since both targets and Pls used at SFRA arc mostly national, changes in the 
local PMS depend mostly on the national political agenda and not on the results 
achieved locally. As a result, two issues emerged: firstly, as remarked by the CFO, there 
may be a disconnection between national targets and indicators and actual performance. 
Second, the analysis of interviews and documents cmphasiscs that when new initiatives 
are implemented, the old ones are not necessarily dismantled, therefore confusion, 
duplication of effort and higher costs are incurred locally. As also clearly emerged from 
the exploratory case in a police force, local organisations experience difliculties, as they 
have to cope with 
"debrisfr0m previous initiatives. [Now SFRA is subject to] new Local Level 
Agreements, but also old Local Public Service Agreements, Community Strategy 
Agreements, etc. " (CFO). 
In order to overcome these problems, it would be necessary to "have a ihread that goes 
through all the plans" (Principal Service Analyst), including internal ones. 
Reasonsfor ineasuringperformance 
A number of purposes and drivers for measuring performance were mentioned during 
the interviews. After coding the data, it is possible to define the following main areas: 
Central control: referring to the government's approach to PM, the CFO noted that 
"centralisation seems to be the main driver, rather than improvement". However, as 
the Head of Planning and Performance maintained, for the organisation 
"it is vital to have pressure coming from CPA and other institutions. If you are 
forced to modernise and measure you can achieve improvements in the service ". 
Therefore, although external influence is seen as dominant, it is considered as a 
necessary element to bring about change and improve performance. 
Accountability: the intervicwccs referred to the concept of accountability, 
differentiating between three principal types: local community, central government, 
and the organisation (internal accountability). The first was considered as most 
important, particularly by CFO and Deputy-CFO. According to them, the 
organisation is and has to be accountable mainly to the citizenship. On the other 
hand, other interviewees depicted ODPM and Audit Commission as the 
organisation's 'principals'. Finally, internal accountability was considered very 
relevant, but not easy to achieve. Often area commanders are said to oppose the 
implementation of performance indicators at their level, as they see PIs as either not 
valuable, or as potentially leading to a decrease in their power and discretion. 
Benchmarking was described as one of the main reasons for measuring 
performance. As is the case with most public sector organisations in England, SFRA 
is constantly compared against other authorities. In particular, based on 
119 
CASE STLTDTES CHAPTER 5 
demographic and geographical characteristics, fire authorities are grouped into 
clusters and their performance against BVPIs is contrasted. 
"Some of [the PIsJ arc nationally driven. The death and injury are nationally 
driven, and the arson are also nationally driven. "at we've tried to do is to 
benchmark what we have actually achieved in a progressive manner to get to the 
end target of2010 is to benchmarkfor arson. " (Perfonnance and Quality Manager) 
Although comparisons at organisational level are fraught with difficulties, SFRA 
certainly values the availability of this type of information. According to the 
Principal Service Analyst, not only is benchmarking useful, but it is also going to be 
increasingly used in the fire service to foster performance improvement and 
organisational learning. 
Resource allocation: performance data is considered fundamental to identify areas 
that require improvement and to develop capabilities at individual, team and area 
command levels. 
"The main driver Lfor measuring performance] must be to ensure that our resources 
are in the right place and that we're putting our money where it's needed" (Deputy 
CFO). 
In this sense, performance reports are used to assist senior management and to 
provide supporting evidence when decisions are made. 
Communication and reputation: by measuring performance, the organisation could 
be held accountable to a number of stakeholder groups, but it also could, in the case 
of good performance, improve its reputation both in the local community and in the 
'fire service circles'. However, while talking about communication, the Deputy 
CFO showed concern regarding the role of the media: 
"I think one ofthe things that is difficult to influence, although we do our best, is the 
media reaction to [performance reports]. Because, notwithstanding the professional 
judgements that are made ofus by the likes ofthe Audit Commission inspectorate 
and others, as a public authority, we will be tried through the media and, ifthere is 
anything in the reports that indicates negativity, then the media tend to pick up on 
that. " 
Acquisition of resources: SFRA has to report regularly on national targets and 
indicators, but it can also choose to stretch targets in order to obtain financial 
rewards. This happened in a number of instances, for example in the case of home 
fire safety checks. 
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5.3.5 Second case study - London Borough of Barking and Dagenham Council 
5.3.5.1 Rationale 
The first case study regarded an organisation which, following Carter ct al. (1992), 
could be defined as homogeneous and not very complex, and which had a fairly simple 
PM system in place. Given these characteristics and previous rcflcctions on PM in tile 
public sector in England, the researcher decided to carry out another case study on the 
basis of theoretical replication (Yin, 1994). 
In order to complement the findings of the initial empirical phases and the case of 
SFRA, and to reach significant and more general conclusions, the PM system of a local 
authority was examined: the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham Council 
(LBBD). There are three primary reasons for this choice: 
I. In contrast with more 'linear' models of fire authorities and police forces, local 
authorities are very complex multi-functional organisations. They play a 
fundamental role in the delivery of approximately 140 services at the local level, 
from education to health, from social services to housing, etc. 
2. While the fire service has recently gone through substantial changes, of which PM 
has been a prominent component, considerable experience has been accumulated in 
local authorities as regards to PM in the last decades. 
3. LBBD is among the most innovative local authorities in the country in terms of PM. 
In recent years it has developed a Balanced Scorecard to equip itself with a 
systematic and integrated PM system and now the system is embedded in the 
organisation. Furthermore, in contrast with other examples of literal implementation 
of the Balanced Scorecard in local govenunent, LBBD has modified it to suit its 
specific characteristics. This is in contrast with SFRA where, although PM is surely 
on the agenda, a similar degree of pro-activity could not be found (cf section 
5.3.5.5.1). 
Therefore, the study of LBBD enabled the researcher to look at a local public sector 
organisation, which has achieved a good level of success in relation to PM. Moreover, 
the maturity of the PM system makes the collection of data more cffective, as this is 
often a very difficult process, especially in organisations of this size, because of the 
great fragmentation and dispersion of data (cf Adams and Micheli, 2005). 
5.3.5.2 Background information 
The Borough of Barking and Dagenham is situated in East London and has a population 
of approximately 165,000 living in 62,000 households. The borough has had a 
traditionally low migration rate; therefore its population is less diverse than that of the 
majority of London boroughs. However, the black and minority ethnic population has 
almost doubled in recent years, growing from 6.8% in 1991, to 12% in 2002. From a 
socio-economic point of view, the Borough faces significant disadvantages: "it is the 
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42nd most deprived in England and 14 of its 17 wards are in the bottom 20% nationally. 
Residents have the lowest average income level in the capital. ( ... ) The area is also disadvantaged by high levels of teenage under-1 8 conception rates, heart disease, cancer 
and long-term illness" (Local Level Agreement 2006). 
The Council has 51 councillors and "has a tradition of being labour-led and of having 
very large labour majorities. ( ... ) In 2001/02 the net revenue budget was just over; El 83 
million and the capital budget E75 million. Revenue balances at the end of 2000/01 
were JC29 million. ( ... ) The council employs 5,800 (excluding teaching staff) full-time 
equivalent staff' (CPA 2002). In terms of structure, the organisation consists of five 
corporate Directorates (resources, Customer Services, regeneration, adult and 
community services, Children's Services) and a chief executive's department providing 
support functions. In turn, every Directorate comprises a number of services (26 in 
total). 
With the aim of serving the community better, LBBD carried out a survey of local 
residents that highlighted the main concerns of people living in the Borough. This 
resulted in the identification of seven 'community priorities', which set the direction the 
organisation wants to follow to improve its performance. These priorities were crucial 
for the development of the first corporate Balanced Scorecard'in 2000 and for its 
subsequent reviews (cf. section 5.3.5.5.1 for greater details). 
Despite the substantial difficulties it has to face in a number of areas, LBBD has a 
positive record in the Comprehensive Performance Assessments. In local government 
the assessment of services and of the overall performance of councils is undertaken by 
the Audit Commission in conjunction with a number of other independent bodies, such 
as the Benefit Fraud Inspectorate, the Commission for Social Care Inspection, etc. 
Since the introduction of CPA for local authorities in 2002, LBBD has consistently been 
rated as 'fair' (the categories being: excellent, good, fair, weak and poor). In 2006 it was 
judged a 'good' Council by the Audit Commission, which also acknowledged that the 
organisation is "improving well". In particular, the inspectors 
"highlighted that the overallpositive change was achieved during a major 
reorganisation ofthe Council in 2006 which allowed more capacityfor services to 
improve. All ofthe Council's core services, which are benefits, children andyoung 
people, environment, housing and social care ofadults, have scored a 3- out of4-star 
rating except culture, which scored 2" (LBBD website) 11. 
11 The score is based on a scale of I to 4, with I being 'does not meet minimum requirements' and 4 
being 'delivers well above minimum requirements'. 
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5.3.5.3 Performance measurement - Background information 
The latest CPA Report emphasises the good performance of LBBD, especially 
considering the challenging and complex environment within which tile organisation 
operates. Moreover, the CPA Report remarks how 
66only through sustainedfocus and the effective building ofcapacity the Council 
has delivered improvements in areas such as community safety and the environment. It 
has worked well with partners and local people to set an ambition and priorities that 
are stretching and challenging as ivell as addressing local needs. The Community 
Strategy agreed in 2004 together with the Local Area Agreement (LAA)forin the 
cornerstone ofthe Council's ambition. " 
Building on the analysis of the CPA Report and other documents present on the Audit 
Commission website, it is possible to identify a number of issues relevant for this 
research: 
Strategy and planning: LBBD's priorities are clear, they reflect national priorities 
and address the most pressing concerns for local people, namely crime, housing, 
improving skills and job prospects. However, action planning and target setting are 
inconsistent and there is a lack of coherence to knowledge management and policy 
development. 
Community leadership: the Council's approach to equality and diversity supports its 
ambitions for community cohesion. Furthermore, the complex nature of the 
community is understood and work is underway to engage and communicate with 
the community in a more coherent way. LBBD has demonstrated cffective 
community leadership through the Chief Executive, officers and in its partnership 
working. However, community leadership by councillors at a sub-rcgional, regional 
and national level could be further developed given the recent turnover and rise in 
the number of new councillors. 
Leadership and workforce: the Council's managerial leadership is one of focused 
drive and determination to improve the borough for local people. The Chief 
Executive is an effective leader with a clear focus on improving services for all. 
officer and councillor relationships work well and the Council has the capacity it 
needs to deliver its ambition. This has been facilitated by a recent restructure and a 
committed and motivated workforce. 
Performance management: financial management is strong and there is a good focus 
on value for money. This is integrated with a well established approach to 
performance management and the Council has been successful in instilling the right 
culture and values so that it is at the heart of decision making. This has resulted in 
tangible improvements in key priority areas with just less than three-quarters of key 
indicators improving, which is above the national average. Perforrnance 
management in partnership continues to develop in a planned and effective way. 
This has led to improvements in areas such as community safety. 
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Although important acliicvcmcnts were identified, a number of areas that require 
iniproverncnt cnicrged from recent audits: 
Performance management: PM and capacity have helped to deliver improvement in 
services. However, LBBD needs to focus on delivering wider community outcomes 
in respect of local priorities such as skills, access to employment and housing. The 
Council needs to sharpen its approach to prioritisation as it seeks to deliver its 
ambitious agenda for revitalisation of the borough. Councillors need to be more 
engaged in setting and reviewing priorities and the Council requires a more 
consistent approach to action planning with outcome-focused targets. 
The role of councillors: initial work has been undertaken to encourage councillors to 
adopt more 'modem' approaches and councillors recognise the need to change. 
However, further capacity building is required to enable councillors to play a full 
role in delivering the Council's ambition for the community. 
Strategy development: The Council needs to take a more strategic and co-ordinated 
approach to the development of its policy framework. 
Communication: the organisation needs to strengthen its approach to 
communication. In particular, improving the way in which it communicates its 
successes and plans for the future. This would give local people, community groups, 
the private sector and other stakeholders greater opportunity to influence key 
decisions. 
Partnerships: There is scope to further improve how the Council works with others 
to achieve its ambitions. Local Area Agreements are useful catalysts and 
opportunities could be exploited through joint service provision, workforce 
planning, joint problem solving, joined-up consultation, and enhancing knowledge 
sharing and performance management. This would improve the Council's capacity 
and maintain the momentum for delivering across all shared priorities. 
The information presented above provides a useful background to the LBBD case and 
relevant contextual details to understand the issues the organisation as a whole is 
currently facing in terms of performance measurement and management. The themes 
identified by looking at the CPA report and Audit Commission website are 
complemented in sections 5.3.5-5.1 - 5.3.5.5.4, where the four units of analysis 
considered in this research are discussed in more depth. Before describing those, the 
data collection procedures and the rationale for examining those specific units of 
analysis are presented. 
5.3.5.4 Data collection 
The interviews were carried out at LBBD in summer 2006. Since in the previous 
months the organisation had undergone a process of re-organisation, a preliminary 
meeting was held with the fon-ner corporate perfon-nance manager. This enabled the 
0 
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researclicr to understand dic nia . lor characteristics oftlic organisation in rclation 
to I'M 
and to start to idciltify who to intcrvicxv at corporatc, (1cpartillelit and SCI*N'Icc Icvc1s. 
Tile SFRA case is holistic, whereas 1.13131) is ctlcctl\, Ciy 111 C111I)C(l(IC(I olic. as thew arc 
multipic units of analysis (Yin, 1994). Looking. just It tile COI'1)01', ItC ICVCI WOUld 110t 11C 
suft-icient to capture tile complexity and current practices of' tile organisation. TlIcI-cl, ()I, c 
a multIpIc-casc logic is adopted in terms of' both replication and CXmi'slon (ct,. 
Fisenhardt, 1991). 
The preliminary interview with the 161-111cr corporatc pci-101-111alicc Manager slicd light Oil 
how performance is measurcd and reported both within and outside tile organisation 
(Fig. 5.3). At central level, tile corporatc Balanced Scorccard has been developed with 
the aim of gathering data coming fi-om departments and services, and providing 
information to the Board and the environment (mostly local community, mid business 
partners). The corporate scorccard has bccri built on tile seven 'community priorities, 
and consists of both national and local performance targets and indicators (cf also 
sect ion 5.3.5.5.1 ). 
Eilvirotinicnt 
Corporate 
Scorecard 
Department III Department 211 Department 3 
(TO and 
Board 
Department 411 Department 5 
service ... Service ... Service ... 
Service Service 
III III 
II 
n2 
I100 
Figure 5.3: Main flows of performance information in LBBD [Thc red arrows are used to 
indicate differences between LBBD and SFRA] 
The links between the corporate Balanced Scorecard and the service scorccards (26 in 
total) are extremely important. In order to ensure sufficient consistency between thern, 
the design of targets and indicators is carried out following a standard process. This is 
accurately documented and cornniunicatcd through the organisation's Service Scorecard 
Pack. Therefore, although the number and nature of PIs varies greatly across services, 
every scorecard has to be linked and contribute to the corporate objectives and 
'community priorities' (cE section 5.3.5.5.1 for more details). 
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The number of scorecards and the connections between them make LBBD a much more 
complex case than SFRA. Furthermore, not only services in LBBD must communicate 
with the ccntre of the organisation, but they also have to report to government 
departments and auditors. This is in opposition to what happens in the fire service where 
area commands communicate almost exclusively to the Planning and Performance team 
within the organisation. Operationally, the Audit Commission reviews services, 
performance on a quarterly basis. However, when targets are not met or when the 
authority's performance in some areas is in the bottom quartile, the frequency of 
monitoring becomes weekly. 
Given the structure of the organisation and the flows of information outlined, the 
researcher decided to consider the corporate PM system as well as the PMS of three. 
different services: Revenues and Benefits (within the Department of Customer 
Services); Children's Safeguarding and Rights (within the Department of Children's 
Services); and Leisure, Arts and Olympics (within the Department of Regeneration). 
These three services were chosen on the basis of theoretical sampling. All three services 
chosen are 'core' for LBBD, as their performance determines the final CPA score of the 
Council. However, they show a number of differences; in particular, they differ in the 
experience acquired with PM, the number and type of performance indicators, and have 
scored differently in the last Comprehensive Performance Assessments. 
Revenues and Benefits is a service where PM has been present for a number of years. 
The service scorecard consists of an almost equal number of national and local 
indicators. In terms of performance, it has received consistent positive evaluations by 
the auditors (3* in the last assessments). 
Children's Safeguarding and Rights is also a highly measured area, but mostly because 
of locally developed PIs (208 between indicators and sub-indicators, as opposed to 16 
national indicators). In terms of performance, the auditors identified improvement in 
performance and awarded a 3* status to the service in the last assessment (previously it 
was rated as 2*). 
Leisure, Arts and Olympics is a service in which there has traditionally been very little 
PM and indicators have been developed only recently. According to the last CPA, this 
service is among the lowest performing within the organisation and was rated as 2*. 
Taking into account both the corporate and service levels enabled the author to 
investigate the existence of institutional pressures and tensions not only between LBBD 
and its environment, but also within the organisation. As in the case of SFRA, all of the 
interviewees are involved in PM and were selected with the aim of representing diverse 
levels within the organisational population. In so doing, it was possible to consider a 
number of different viewpoints. Interviews, with an approximate duration of between I 
and 1! /2hours, were carried out with: 
19 Assistant Chief Executive for performance and delivery 
41 Political member responsible for performance management 
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9 Corporate Director of Resources 
" Corporate Performance Manager 
" Corporate Scorccard Project Manager 
" Policy and Partnership Division Officer (person responsible for Local Service 
Partnerships) 
" Policy and Review Officer at corporate strategy department (person responsible for 
corporate performance indicators) 
" Head of Leisure, Arts and Olympics 
o Corporate Director of Customer Services 
e Head of Revenues and Benefits 
9 Group Manager of rents and benefits 
* Assistant Manager for housing benefits and council tax benefit claims 
Performance Monitoring and Service Development Manager for the revenues and 
benefits department 
* Corporate Director of Children's Services 
* Divisional Director of Safeguarding and Rights 
o Performance Analyst for Safeguarding and Rights. 
The difference in the number of interviews carried out in each unit of analysis depends 
on the breadth of activities undertaken, the experience developed in relation to PM 
within the service or department, and the possibility of interviewing people who are 
informed about PM. 
Similarly to SFRA, for all the units of analysis considered, both the intmicw protocol 
and the matrix designed to structure the information on the design of targets and 
indicators were used. Before and during the interviews all relevant documents were 
gathered, including: Strategic Corporate Priorities for Action 2005-2010; CPA 2002 
report; Service Scorecard Pack 2006-2009; Corporate Strategy Map; Revised 
Organisation Structure 2006; Community Strategy-, Local Area Agreement for Barking 
and Dagenham (and guidance); Children and Young People's Plan; Performance 
Assessment Framework Monitoring Tool (for Children's Services safeguarding and 
rights); Performance Dataset Monitoring Tool (for Children's Services safeguarding and 
rights); Revenues and Benefits - Performance pack. Furthermore relevant information 
could be downloaded from the LBBD and Audit Commission websites. 
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In the next sections, the results obtained at corporate level and in the three services are 
first presented separately and then compared. Throughout the analysis of the cases, a 
substantial number of quotes from both documents and interviews are reported (cf. 
Eisenhardt and Gracbrier, 2007). Appendix B7 includes all the main quotes (in some 
instances the same data was coded utilising more than one code). Appendices B8 and 
B9 provide an overview of the nodes utilised in the analysis. In section 5.3.6 the 
findings of the LBBD and SFRA cases are contrasted. Finally, in chapter 6 the results of 
the empirical phases are brought together and discussed in relation to the literature. 
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5.3.5.5 Data analysis 
53.5.5.1 Corporate level 
The first unit of analysis to be considered is the corporate. At this level most of the 
internal decisions regarding PM arc taken. In order to have an initial understanding of 
the ways in which performance is measured and managed at the corporate level several 
documents present on the LBBD wcbsitc were reviewed. Particular attention was paid 
to the development and use of the Balanced Scorccard and the Community Priorities, 
and the links between the measurement system and other plans and processes. These arc 
presented in detail in the next section. Subsequently, the main themes emerged from the 
analysis of documents and interviews are presented. 
Background informationl2 
In November 2000 the Council agreed to develop a Balanced Scorecard, which was 
cffectively introduced in 2002, as corporate PMS to change how the organisation was 
managed. As the former Chief Executive stated: 
"the Council as a whole needs a single cohesive approach to maximise the benefits and 
outcomesfrom the modernising agenda and to continue the process ofmodernising the 
management ofthe Council and improving seniccs to the Borough's residents ". 
The Balanced Scorecard was adopted in order to translate strategy into operational 
objectives that drive both behaviour and performance. Moreover, it was, and still is, 
used to focus the actions of the Council towards the delivery of its longer term vision 
for the borough, within the context of the 7 Community Priorities. These priorities arc a 
set of externally facing and inward looking strategic objectives, which are the main 
goals for the Council. They are balanced to ensure the Council focuses on a range of 
areas that are important, to move performance forward and improve front line services. 
The Priorities, which are based on the results of a survey of local residents that 
highlighted the main concerns of people living in the Borough, are: 
a raising general pride in the Borough 
promoting equal opportunities and celebrating diversity 
developing rights and responsibilities with the local community 
improving health, housing and social care 
making Barking and Dagenham cleaner, greener and safer 
providing better education and learning for all 
12 nis section builds on material identified on the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham website. 
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9 regenerating the local economy. 
In operational terms, the Balanced Scorccard was designed over a 12-wcck programme 
of work involving senior management on a sounding board facilitated by external 
consultants. The purpose of this was to formulate the key strategic goals for the 
corporate Balanced Scorecard. Furthermore, through the adoption of the Scorecard the 
organisation aimed to: 
* translate strategy into actions that are recognisable to everyone 
link-up and align the authority around delivering the strategy 
enable everyone to make a contribution to LBBD's strategies and targets 
mobilise change towards the Modernising Local Government agenda 
deliver outcomes that make a real difference to people's lives, e. g. an increase in the 
average income ranking of Barking and Dagenham citizens. 
Therefore, the organisation decided to structure its Balanced Scorecard across five main 
elements that could move the Council towards where it wanted to be, reflecting its range 
of objectives and priorities: 
I- 'Community First'- Reflecting the organisation's wider leadership role in 
performance management 
2- 'Customer First' - Customer focus 
3- 'Funding the Future- Integrating financial planning with service planning 
4- 'Performance Counts' - Business processes to ensure the efficient delivery of 
quality services 
5- 'People Matter' - Organisational development (people and culture). 
It is important to note that the innovative approach adopted by LBBD in the 
development of its Balanced Scorecard has received a considerable amount of 
recognition both nationally and internationally. 
In order to have a comprehensive performance measurement system, the corporate 
scorecard was cascaded into a number of service scorecards. As a result, each head of 
service was, and still is, required to produce a scorecard, ensuring that all the individual 
service actions of the organisation's services are in line with delivering against the 
corporate scorecard. This must contain the key priorities necessary within their area to 
deliver both corporate objectives and individual service priorities. In order to ensure 
consistency, a 'Service Scorecard Pack' has been developed. This comprises: 
A strategy statement for each service area, setting out the medium to long term 
vision for that service, incorporating other strategy requirements prepared to meet 
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the Government's requirements e. g. Education dcvclopincilt plan, Libraries plan, 
Housing strategy ctc. 
*A strategy map which sets out the service objectives. 
A service scorecard setting out the indicators which will be used to measure 
progress against the objectives, identifying which corporate scorccard strategic 
objective each service objective is driving forward. Moreover, the relevant key Best 
Value Performance Indicators and all Comprehensive Performance Assessment and 
Local Public Service Agreement targets have to be included in each service 
scorecard. 
An Implementation Plan setting out the specific actions that need to be taken within 
the service to achieve the service objectives and targets to drive these forward. 
These plans also state how the service will be responding to any relevant 
Comprehensive Performance Assessment improvements and Best Value review 
improvements. 
Other performance indicators that will be used to monitor performance for those 
services (including relevant statutory performance indicators and local management 
indicators). 
The LBBD website remarks in several instances how the integration of all of the targets 
and indicators from the Comprehensive Performance Assessment and the Local Public 
Service Agreement into the scorecard structure has simplified the management of the 
Council and ensured clearer focus for the services. Another important aspect related to 
the measurement and management of performance at LBBD regards the links between 
the scorecards and other plans and processes. In particular, the organisation's priority 
actions directly link to the longer ten-n actions developed in the Community Strategy. 
Subsequently, these actions are taken from the annual Service Scorecards that underpin 
the Community Priorities, which form the basis of the work for the Partnership that 
agrees the Plan. For the organisation it is crucial that there is a strong and clear link 
between financial planning and the service planning process. To do so, the 3-year 
medium term financial strategy sets out what the priority areas for funding are over a 3- 
year period and the annual budget process ensures that individual savings and growth 
decisions made at service level are in line with this. The other plans required by 
government departments are also linked into the individual service scorecard packs. 
In conclusion, it is possible to state that the development of the scorccard has had a 
clear impact over the functioning of the organisation, and the relationships of 
accountability within LBBD and between LBBD and its key stakeholders. First of all, 
the development of the scorecard was aimed at simplifying what each manager needs to 
do to improve the services delivered. Secondly, it was intended to make the 
mo dernisation process more understandable to councillors, the public and staff and to 
enable people to understand their roles and responsibilities. Therefore, each bead of 
service now has an annual assessment with members on how they have delivered 
against their service scorecard and their future priorities for improvement. Employees 
below this level have annual appraisals, where the objectives and targets are considered 
as part of the process. Finally, progress against the corporate scorecard strategic 
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objectives and specific targets are monitored quarterly by the Executive of the Council 
and in some cases monthly by the Corporate Management Team. 
Data collection and analysis 
In order to gain further understanding of how the corporate balanced scorccard is 
designed and used, and how it is related to the service scorecards, a number of other 
documents were reviewed (cf section 5.3.5.4) and eight people were interviewed: the 
Assistant Chief Executive for performance and delivery; an elected member responsible 
for pcrfon-nance management; the Corporate Director of Resources; the Corporate 
Performance Manager; the Corporate Scorecard, Project Manager; the Policy and 
Partnership Division Officer (person responsible for Local Service Partnerships and 
Local Area Agreements); the Policy and Review Officer at the corporate strategy 
department (person responsible for corporate performance indicators); and the former 
Corporate Performance Manager. 
In the next sections several themes are examined. These include the different uses of 
performance information within the organisation, but also the links between LBBD and 
the environment, which mainly consists of government departments, audit bodies and 
local communities. At corporate level, respondents paid particular attention to strategy, 
the provision of 'joined up' services and the creation of a performance culture at the 
local level. In terms of the roles of PM a number of opinions were expressed, reflecting 
both the dependence on external resources and the willingness to improve performance 
and be considered as an efficient organisation and an employer of choice. 
Uses ofperfornsance information 
As underlined in the previous sections, the corporate balanced scorecard is an important 
tool, which provides an overview of the performance of the organisation as a whole. All 
corporate Directors meet on a regular basis to discuss the performance of particular 
services as well as the overall agenda for the council. To do so, they use the corporate 
balanced scorecard and 
"the chiefexecutive personally takes a selection ofindicators and grills the Directors 
on exactly what's happening and what action we're taking" (Corporate Director of 
Resources). 
Elected members receive information on a regular basis regarding several national 
indicators and, depending on local political priorities, they can influence the monitoring 
of performance. However, as many interviewees noted, elected members seem to use 
this information only to a limited extent in their communications with the citizens. 
Therefore, a challenge for the organisation is to make performance information more 
politically relevant. According to the Corporate Director of Resources, this mostly 
depends on how much elected members agree on Pls, but also on their capability and 
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interest in acting on them, as "they tend to have slightly poorfocus to understand the 
principles". 
If we consider the links between corporate and service levels, tile organisation seems 
quite hierarchical in the ways in which performance is measured and managed. First of 
all, a scrutiny management board is set up to monitor the areas in which services are 
underperforming and to assess the actions undertaken in order to improve performance. 
Secondly, the service scorecard pack is utilised to ensure consistency. Therefore, every 
service has to build its own indicators and report to the centre of the organisation on tile 
basis of the corporate balanced scorccard and strategy map. Furthermore, a detailed 
checklist is provided; this covers, for example, the links between tile service scorccard 
and corporate priorities for action, the statutory indicators, value for money, 
opportunities for efficiency gains, etc. Although 
"it's up to head ofservice to make ajudgeinctit about what goes in [the service 
scorecard], it doesnt mean to say they don't deliver them, because anything statutory 
has to be delivered" (former Corporate Performance Manager). 
The use of scorecards and the consistency between them enables senior management to 
understand how the main agenda for the council is being delivered. As the fon-ncr 
Corporate manager argued 
"when you delve down into the scorecards, services then are responsiblefor making 
those deliveries and boards can call in the services and say: how are you doing on the 
delivery ofthis? Nat are your problems? Miat are the blockages? Have lve been 
overambitious? Is there a resources issue or is it the ivrongpriority? " 
Performance indicators 
During the interviews a number of issues were raised regarding the cost and quality of 
the performance indicators being used at LBBD. First of all, as argued by the corporate 
performance manager, the cost of measuring performance is a major issue. According to 
him, it is very time consuming to collect and process the data and substantial resources 
are required at all levels. The elected member reinforced the idea that the costs 
associated with auditing, inspection and reporting are considerable for the organisation. 
Moreover, according to the former corporate performance manager, often "statutory 
indicators are fine but they don't give us the key aspects of the ser-, ice". A way to 
overcome this issue is to have "more consultation and involvement with practitioners". 
Secondly, since performance is measured by services and then reported to the corporate 
level, timeliness and reliability of data are crucial if the organisation wants to have an 
accurate and updated picture of its current performance. The Policy and Partnership 
Division Officer, who is also responsible for Local Service Partnerships, expressed 
particular concerns in this sense. 
Finally, a number of interviewees noted that the authority needs to improve the way it 
measures 'softer' aspects of performance, e. g. how people 'feel' about the services the 
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authority provides. Furthermore, during time some indicators might become redundant, 
but they are not necessarily eliminated. However, according to the corporate 
performance manager, the situation is improving in this sense. 
Strategy andperformance culture 
LBBD has a clearly formulated strategy, whose aim is "to give all those partners 
involved, especially local communities, a clear sense of purpose" ('Building 
communities, transforming lives' document). The documents analysed show in detail 
how organisational strategy is linked to general objectives and performance targets. 
During the interviews, all respondents at central level, when asked about the objectives 
of the organisation, referred to the seven 'community priorities', which had been 
defined in consultation with the public. According to the interviewees, the 'community 
priorities' reflect LBBD's main aim, which is to contribute to the quality of life of 
citizens, through the promotion of the economic, environment and social wellbeing of 
the area. 
However, great emphasis was also given to the role at both strategic and operational 
levels of external assessments and audits, notably the Comprehensive Performance 
Assessment. Most respondents stated that to provide better services performance 
indicators should be understood, accepted and used within the organisation. 
Undoubtedly, given the substantial experience gained in recent decades, 
"the culture within local government is now about performance - you know where you 
fit in that league table, what's'YOur CPA rating" (Policy and Review Officer). 
However, in order to achieve a sustainable culture of performance, it is important not to 
focus on "the currentframework; it is the process, it is people having discussions about 
these things" (Corporate Director of Resources). According to the interviewees, this is 
particularly difficult to achieve as we move closer to the actual delivery of services. 
There, as the policy and review officer noted, people 
"don't need to understand how we put the balanced scorecard together or what the 
strategy ofthe service is, but they need to understand how theyfit into it". 
Communication 
The respondents considered communication between the organisation and the public as 
very important. LBBD should not only provide richer and more timely information to 
the citizenship, but also try to align the perceived quality of local services with the 
actual one. For example, although the elected member interviewed has always 
supported the development of the balanced scorecard at LBBD, he showed concern 
regarding the discrepancy between what performance indicators say and what the local 
community feels about the performance of the organisation: 
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I'sometimes the public can perceive that things get worse, but they're actually getting 
better; and sometimes that adds situations where the public have been satisfied with this 
service and we said., it's actually very poor ". 
The Corporate Director of Customer Services reinforced this concept: 
"I think incidentally that the public don't give a toss about perforniance indicators. I 
think theyjudge us by three things really. how clean the streets are and what it's like to 
live round here, whether they think that the council is listening to them and consulting 
them; and what happens when they ring tip and ivant a service. Their real life 
experience is what theyiudge us on. (. ) I think there is a real danger that you get a 
disconnect between CPA assessment and what people think oflocal services ". 
However, this disconnection could also be generated by the very fact that the electorate 
judges the performance of the council only along those three areas. As in the case of 
most other services, "the electorate often doesn't raise questions until the problem is 
actually there" (Assistant Chief Executive). 
Finally, communication should be handled with particular care, especially when the 
media are involved, as they could either distort the figures or focus only on the negative 
aspects. As the corporate Director of resources stated: 
"there's a bit ofan issue about whether we say things in public or not, and ofcourse it's 
healthy that we do. On the other hand, ifive really want members to explore a 
challenge, do they want to do that with the press there? " 
Partnerships and Yoined upgovernment 
Partnerships are very important for the organisation, as services are delivered in 
cooperation with a number of private, public and no-profit organisations. To promote 
partnerships and coordination of public services locally, since 2001 LBBD has had a 
local strategic partnership (the Barking and Dagenham Partnership) that also enabled 
the authority to attract additional funding from central government. More recently, 
Local Area Agreements have been introduced in the whole country. Local Area 
Agreements are 
"a new contract between central and local government to deliver the priorities to local 
people. (. ) [LAAs] will achieve greater efficienciesfor local authorities and their 
partners giving them thefreedom to work in a Yoined upway to ineet the challenges 
that localitiesface " (Local Area Agreement guidance 2005, p. 4). 
In essence, LAAs aim at improving central/local relations, service delivery, efficiency, 
partnership working, and enabling local authorities to provide better leadership. The 
emphasis placed on partnerships at both national and local levels has not only 
contributed to the introduction of LAAs, but, according to the policy and partnership 
division officer, it has also become increasingly part of CPA. 
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Given the involvement of a number of services, LAAs not only presuppose the 
coordination of activities locally, but also at government department level. 
"The difficulty [with LAAJ came when it was then widened to the overall various 
government departments. Now, that was an issue as muchfor the inter-relationship 
between government departments, rather thanfor the relationship between local and 
central" (Policy and Partnership Division Officer). 
However, as the Director of corporate resources argued, LLAs are a good opportunity to 
reconcile broad national objectives and local knowledge of the service. 
In terms of PM, there are a number of challenges related to the measurement of 
partnerships' performance. First of all, since different stakeholders are involved, it is 
important to ensure consistency in the approach; therefore continuous changes in the 
measurement system should be avoided. Secondly, difficulties are said to exist in the 
phase of data gathering. As the policy and review officer noticed, there can be delays in 
collecting data of up to 14 months, as in the cases of environment and road safety. 
However, all respondents welcomed the introduction of LAAs, as they 
"allowed all the key agencies to agree on measures and targetsfor the community, 
because they know that the resource has been brought together to deliver it". 
Institutionalpressitres 
The relationships with government departments and auditors emerged as primary in 
relation to the measurement of performance and the functioning of the organisation in 
general. Although positive remarks were made about the overall relationship between 
LBBD and institutions, points of concern were raised especially with regard to the 
auditing process. First of all, dissatisfaction was expressed in relation to the guidance 
received from the Audit Commission on a number of performance targets and PIs. 
"I think sometimes we have a bit ofa struggle with the Audit Commission about what a 
CPA indicator is trying to achieve" (Corporate Director of Customer Services). 
According to the interviewees, clearer directions would limit the occurrence of different 
interpretations and ensure consistency of measurement. As the Policy and Review 
Officer stated: 
" We have issues with the timing in which stuffcomes out. Yhere are problems with data 
qualityfrom what the Audit Commission requires There's insufficient guidance on 
what to do. " 
Secondly, the competence of the personnel conducting the inspections was also 
questioned, especially regarding the consistency of feedback received by the auditors. 
Furthermore, the amount of work needed to prepare and carry out the inspections was 
considered too high. This point was repeatedly expressed by the elected member: 
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"in relation to the, 4udit Commission and in relation to auditors and thejob that they 
do, 171 say without hesitation: the A udit Commission is too bigfor its boots, we are 
over-audited. PricewaterhouseCoopers getpaidfront this council f820,000 a ycarý 
that's approximately 2% ofthe council tax! " 
Third, the corporate scorecard project manager also argued that there has to be sufficient 
alignment between national and local priorities, but the council must have the power to 
influence the way in which the national agenda is delivered. As regards to this, the 
Corporate Perforrnance Manager noted that the organisation has actually increased its 
influence on the design of national Pls, as a consequence of a more open relationship 
with government departments and auditors. Particular satisfaction was expressed 
regarding the relationship with the Government Office for London. 
"In terms ofpartnership working over the lastfouryears, it's been very good, it's been 
excellent. There's a regular ongoing dialogue ivith them (. ), there's a very real 
understanding ofthe problems locally and the difficulties betiveen local government 
organisations and central government organisations. It's the cultures and the sjýyle that 
they operate and I think there's an understanding ofthat, there is a commitment to try 
and improve that relationship and that's been working very it-ell " (Policy and 
Partnership Division Officer). 
Last, but not least, respondents expressed concern regarding changes in the performance 
regime. In particular, the Corporate Scorccard Project Manager focused on the 
frequency with which central government introduces new initiatives: 
"they've come up with lots and lots ofinitiatives and there's ajoke about it every 
week-what's the new initialivefor this iveck? " 
She also contrasted the tendency of implementing new frameworks and regulations to a 
certain resistance to provide funding to local authorities to support the implementation 
of these initiatives. 
Similar comments were made by the Policy and Partnership Division Officer, who 
remarked that continuity in performance targets and indicators would be helpful for both 
local and central government. Fewer changes in PM would imply fewer costs and 
enable meaningful comparisons between authorities. As the elected member noted, with 
"more consistency, less change in this [the PAlframework], you can actually genuinely 
compare year-on-year orpossibly a tivo- or thrce-year period going back " 
Finally, changes in the PM regime and in the emphasis on specific aspects of 
perfon-nance also depend on which parties are in power at both central and local levels. 
As the former Corporate Performance Manager noted 
"ifyou're conservative, you may not think ofBest Value as being your primary driver, 
because conservative is CCT[Compulsory Competitive Tendering], you lazow, they 
all have their own slant on this ". 
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Reasonsfor measuringperforntance 
From the analysis of documents and interviews carried out at corporate level a number 
of different reasons for measuring performance emerged: 
Accountability: According to several respondents, one of the primary reasons for 
measuring performance is to demonstrate to the public that the Council is using 
resources properly, i. e. that the organisation is efficient and provides value for 
money. As the elected member expressed it: 
" Me have to demonstrate to the public out there that we are using their resources 
well; we do after all set a council tax and we say as councillors we're going to dip 
our hands in your wallets and take your moneyfrom you. " 
Comparing performance: Comparisons with other authorities, particularly within 
Greater London were considered very relevant by all interviewees. As the elected 
member affirmed: 
"I think very strongly comparisons with neighbouring authorities and national 
London trends.. I think that's important to compare ourselves with outside, to look 
at what goes on in other authorities. " 
The corporate performance manager, who also noted that members are particularly 
sensitive and likely to take more action on the basis of benchmarking with other 
authorities, echoed these remarks: 
"It's valuable to have national comparisons and visits to understand good 
practices. On the basis ofbenchmarking members tend to take more action. 
Central control: At corporate level, respondents agreed on the necessity to have both 
national and local perfonnance indicators. 
"I think because ofthe nature ofthe business, government will always have things 
that locally we need to implement and it's how we apply that locally" (Policy and 
Review Officer). 
However, central government has recently started to devolve responsibilities to local 
organisations, particularly through the Local Area Agreements. This has been 
welcomed by authorities, but as the Policy and Partnership Division Officer stated, 
"there are issues in terms ofloss ofjobs and staffing at central government level if. 
the devolution takes place. There are lots ofcontrol issues and it's a question of 
trust PP. 
Finally, inspections and audits are not only fundamental for resources and the 
reputation of the local authority, but, according to the elected member they also are 
good indications of success: 
"I'm actually quite afan ofinspection because it tells us as electing members... it's 
an outside reality check". 
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Individual perfon-nance and reputation: lntcrviewccs oflcn spoke about employees' 
performance and reputation of the organisation as two interrelated concepts. First of 
all, appropriate Pls can give people a clearer indication of their performance: 
"do you want to know ifyou're doing a goodjob? ( .. ) 0K. once youve got the right 
measure, you should be clamberingfor data on that nicasure " (Corporate Director 
of Resources). 
In addition, as the Policy and Review Officer noted, at an organisational level CPA 
score§ not only influence the degree of autonomy and funds available to tile 
Council, but are also fundamental in attracting a good work force and rctaining 
current employees. Good performance assessments are messages to possible future 
employees and the community that the "council is run it-ell, that people can haiv 
confidence in its management, its structures". Finally, shortly before the last CPA in 
which LBBD was actually judged a three-star authority, the elected member argued: 
"should we show improvement to movcfrom a two to a three [star authority] (. ), 
the benefit would be enormous in terms ofreputation ofthe Council and the 
borough, and should make everybodyftel good ". 
Performance monitoring and improvement: PM also enables the organisation "to 
decide whether we're making progress towards our objectNes, it gives its a basisfor 
then taking any action ifive're not"' (Corporate Director of Resources). In the Policy 
and Review Officer's words, PM is 
is a way ofshowing success andprogress. Ifyouve set yoursey'a goal or an 
objective or a target at the beginning ofa service planning cycle, the indicators are 
there primarily to tell you ifyouve delivered on it ornot ". 
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53.5.4.2 Revenues and Bencrits 
'T'he first service to bc analyscd is Revenues and Benefits, which is part of the 
Dcpartnicnt of Customer Services. The Revenues and Benefits service covers the 
maintcnancc and collcction of rent from over 20,000 council tenants and also deals with 
housing and council tax bcncfits for all those eligible. It is responsible for the 
administration as well as the billing and collection of the majority of LBBD's income. 
7lic performance assessment of this service is carried out by the Benefit Fraud 
lnspcctorate (BFI). The role of the BFI is to inspect benefits administration and counter- 
rmud activity within the Department for Work and Pensions' agencies and local 
authorities. The findings from their inspections are reported to the Secretary of State. In 
2004 an inspection - the most detailed to date - was undertaken by the BFI. Its 
conclusions were quite critical and encouraged a significant change in the service. 
Indeed, in both 2005 and 2006 Revenues and Benefits was awarded a 3* status by BFI; 
these assessments were based principally on "achievement against the 2005 housing 
bcncfits/counciI tax bcncrits performance standards" (Audit Commission websitc). 
Before cxamining the themes emerged from the documents and interviews, a more 
dctailcd background and contextual details arc provided through the analysis of the BFI 
assessment undcrtakcn in 2004. 
Background information" 
Before the inspection carried out by the BFI in May 2004, the London Borough of 
Barking and Dagenham had undertaken a self-assessment, which was completed in 
September 2003. This scif-asscssment showed that the organisation's performance was 
below standard in all functional areas. Moreover, in the BFI assessment, performance 
for strategic management and counter-fraud was found to be significantly weaker than 
had been identified by LBBD. 
However, it should be remarked that the BFI inspection took place at a time when the 
Revenues and Benefits service was embarking on a major programme of change that 
included improving performance management across the service and reviewing its IT 
system. Furlhcrinorc, in the two years prior to this inspection the service reviewed its 
senior management structure and, with the appointment of a new manager, it started to 
look outwards and learn from best practice. There were also signs of a move from a 
focus on the process to more recognition of the needs of customers. 
Following the Comprehensive Performance Assessment of the Benefits service in 2002, 
senior officers and Members provided additional support to the service through 
increased financial resource in 2003/04 and by obtaining an understanding of the issues 
faccd by the service. Officers in the service produced an Improvement Plan for 
Revenues which included improvement plans for the Revenues and Benefits service. 
13 This section builds on relevant material idcntif icd on the Bencfits Fraud lnspcctorate Report of May 2004 and the 
London Borough of Barking and Dagenham and Audit Commission wcbsites. 
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Focusing on issues rclatcd to PNI, Best Value 11crforniancc Indicators wcrc the only 
indicators that the service would make available to members and scnior officcrs. Ilic 
BFI asscssmcnt, as part of the Comprchcnsivc, llcrronnancc Asscssmcnt process, 
revealed that the Revenues and Bcncrits scrvicc, rocuscd on these indiators rather than 
addressing widcr aspects of pcrfonnancc. Othcr conccrns raiscd by the BFI in rclation to 
strategic management and PM rcgardcd: 
the gaps between corporate policies and procedures in rclation to performance 
monitoring 
0 the lack of stratcgy in rclation to staff induction, training and timlopnicnt 
the IT system, which oflcn hindered rather than supported the dcvclopinctit of the 
service. 
Thcrcforc a scrics of rccommcndations wcre madc in rclation to: 
* the review of the service's organisational structure 
o the link between the work of the scrvicc to corporate priorities 
e cffectivc training and dcvclopmcnt of staff and IT infmstructurc 
e the improvcmcnt of opcrational planning. 
Therefore, it could be concluded that the BFI inspection carried out in 20W provided a 
fairly negative picture of the performance of tile Revenues and Benefits service. Ilircc 
main issues were raised: staff's fixation on statutory indicators (cf. Smith, 1995b); tile 
inadequacy of the IT system in place and necessity to improve stafrs capabilities; and 
the importance, but at the same time difficulty, to go through a process of transition led 
by the new management. Therefore, a series of initiatives were undertaken in order to 
address the issues raised in this report. 
With the aim to capture these recent developments and better understand the functioning 
of the service, particularly from a PM point of vicw, a series of interviews were 
undertaken w-ith: the Corporate Director of Customer Services; the Head of Revenues 
and Benefits; the Group Manager of rents and bcncfits; the Performance Monitoring and 
Service Development Manager for the Revenues and Benefits department; and tile 
Assistant Manager for housing benefits and council tax bencrit claims. 
The analysis of the data shows that, despite the issues raised about the auditing process 
and the control exerted by institutions and the corporate lcvcI on how the service 
operates, a number of positive comments were made regarding the current PNI regime. 
Moreover, since this service has a high number of indicators in place, it was also 
possible to examine specific and technical aspects of PNI. From a methodological point 
of view, it is important to note the considerable alignment bctNvccn the documents 
analysed (cf section 5.3.5.4) and what stated by the intcrvicwces. 
141 
Performance indicators 
Currently six I'M frameworks are utiliscd within the Revenues and Benefits service: 
Best Value; Performance measures; Management information system; Cash collection; 
Balanced Scorccard; and Customer care. The first three groups of PIs are reported on a 
monthly basis; the latter three, every quarter. If we discount the substantial overlaps 
existing between these frameworks, the total number of indicators used is 86 (28 
national and 58 local). 
11crfortnance information is reported to a number of key stakeholders, such as: the 
corporate management team, the chief executive, elected members, the Benefits and 
Fraud Inspcctomtc, the Department for Work and Pensions and the Department for 
Communities and Local Government. The Best Value Performance Indicators, arguably 
the most important Pls, arc reported directly to the Department of Work and Pensions 
and to senior management; BVPIs are also used to compare councils on a regular basis. 
Most of the other indicators are only reported internally. 
In comparison to other services within LBBD, Revenues and Benefits is a highly 
measured department. llowcvcr, as the Performance Manager stated, having so many 
Pis 
4# means that sve're now a lotfitrtherfonvard than other departments in measuring 
things and using them to develop the service. Whether we're drowning in them and that 
is taking awayfrom what we want to do, then that's an argument as well". 
The Performance Manager also raised several times the issue that having so many 
indicators makes it difficult to establish priorities and provide focus within the service. 
However, according to the Corporate Director, in the past that was absolutely the case, 
whereas things have recently improved. From a historical perspective, the introduction 
of a great number of national indicators has had significant implications for this service. 
It is interesting to report what the Assistant Performance Manager stated in relation to 
this: 
"Benefits was always a bit of a Cinderella department. Because the effect in CPA nolv 
andbccause ofthefact that it is a difficult area, theprofile ofBenefits has been raiseda 
lot higher. I'm not sayingjust here, but in most local authorities I think it's true to say it 
it-as theforgouct; department. Now, because it's a keyfactor in performance in the 
CPA, managers and even members areforced to take more notice ofit, it makes it 
easier to get resources and obviously there's more pressure put on ifa department is 
failing. I think a lot ofthat is purely down to the CPA and the B VPI It's raised the 
awareness. " 
This argument is clearly related to role played by PM in the acquisition of resources, 
which is described in the next sections and presented more extensively in chapter 6. 
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Data quality 
Intcrvicwccs expressed conccni regarding the quality of data and tile resources required 
to gathcr and analyse them. Given tile number of performance indicators, the 
performance manager suggested that she would be interested to measure how much tile 
service is benefiting from the measurement and reporting processes. Furtlicnnore, as tile 
Corporate Director argued 
"too inany indicators mcans no real priority and I think It also drives you to a position 
it-here what gets nicasurcdjust gets measured ". 
Another issue to be raised regarded the ways in which data arc presented. According to 
the performance manager, statistics arc open to interpretation and it is unfair to be 
assessed almost solely on those. Furthermore, often scores do not provide sufficicrit 
information and it would be necessary to put them into context - something that rarely 
happens during assessments and evaluations. The assistant manager also questioned tile 
reliability of league tables, since 
"although the league tables are quite use/41, they arc quite distorted because yOu can't 
comparc lik ivith like. " 
Therefore, when published, results should be explained as much as possible or PIs 
should be changed if they do not reflect the actual performance of the organisation. As 
an example, both the group manager and tile pcrfonnancc manager mentioned the 
indicator related to 'new claims'. In this case, until 2005 new claims had to be 
processed within 36 days. Subsequently the target was reduced to 29 days, although 
customers still have 28 days to respond to any queries from the Council. 1"his implies 
that the organisation often can do little to meet the target, as it might havc only One day 
to process the new claim. "I'licreforc, this spcciflc indicator was deemed inappropriate. 
Finally, the Head of Smice showed concern regarding the accuracy of the data. Since 
the performance manager and assistant manager arc involved in the actual process of 
measurement, they could comment on tile technical aspects of data gathering and 
analysis. According to them, the software in use can make an incredible difference in 
-cleaning and manipulating the data". Moreover, errors in recording data are fairly 
common and auditors may not realise that certain figures are the result of mistypcs. 
"71ze worst time ofycar is January. Vic number oftimes you'll go through and 
someone ivill put 05 instead ofO6.. (j I think the worst one Ifound it-as 34,000 days to 
process a claim. So youve got to do that work- and clean it dolt'n. because all [the 
auditors] are going to be getting is a load ofrubbish. [In the auditing process] itjust 
amazed me how detached, how no one saw, no one ci-cit considered that someone might 
actually misjýype in a date and I thought that it-as a bit naTve. I think their heart it-as its 
the right place, they thought they were helping its out. but I don't think they actually 
thought ofthe practicalities ofit " (Assistant hianagcr). 
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III-Vitutional pressures 
All rcspondcnts were positive regarding the relationships with both central government 
and auditors. Both (he Audit Commission and the Department of Work and Pensions 
were, described as engaging with local authorities and, on average, quite helpful. Mutual 
trust and participation emerged as determining factors in this type of relationship. 
Furthcnnorc, the introduction of CPA means that local organisations need to have a 
more holistic perspective on their activities. As the Corporate Director argued, LBBD 
should not be looking at individual Pls, as it did in the past, but rather at the overall self- 
assessment. 11crcfore CPA seems to have an important role in promoting the so-called 
shift from PM to performance management in the public services. 
However, dissatisfaction with the current PM regime was manifested in a few areas. 
Criticism of the Audit Commission was expressed particularly regarding guidelines on 
how to calculate indicators and their purposes. The Group Manager raised the issue of 
consistency in measurement, particularly as to how data is gathered across different 
authorities and how auditing is performed: 
"it is not 110% clear on a lot ofthe indicators howyou calculate them. Ican sit here in 
this authority and calculate this indicator and then I can go and get a set ofauditors 
who come in and audit me and they can say. - "right, I agree with your calculation ". And 
I can have a set ofpcople in another authority who get audited by a different set of 
auditors and have done a calculation completely differently and there's no continuity 
Sometimes timeliness and frequency of changes in the performance regime were 
questioned too: 
"I do have to say as it-ell that the CPA basket changes almost without notice and 
sometimes quite illogically. (.. ) For example the CPA critical Nsfor this year have not 
been confirmed and it's already July. We really needed to know what they were last 
December, but the [Audit] Commission are stillfaffing around" (Corporate Director). 
Interestingly, divergent views were found on the possibility of influencing the design of 
national Pls. 11c Head of Revenues and Benefits was quite satisfied with the process of 
consultation in place between his service and its auditors: 
dowhat local government does do, and they do very well, is consult on P2s. 7hey consult 
on performance indicators about whether they're meaningful and useful, and therefore 
we have a chance to influence them (J. So what we do have is quite a robust 
frameworkfor revenues ". 
On the other hand, Group Manager, Performance Manager and Assistant Performance 
Manager did not seem so positive: 
#* every time they change [the local PIs], they consult via the local government 
association and the association ofLondon government and they askfor our comments. 
Comments are put in every time by the practitioners, sometimes they are listened to, but 
I'd say the majority generally don't change anything " (Group Manager). 
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Another issue is the importance given to a small sub-sct of Ills. Although it could be 
argucd that, without conccntrating on a restricted nuinbcr of Ills, thcrc would be no 
priorities; the pcrformancc managcr complaincd about having complex services 
asscsscd almost exclusively on 3 or 4 BVPls. 1"his rckction is c1cirly linked to n 
resource dcpcndcncc argument. In this scnsc, the Corporate Director ocknow1cdgcd the 
considerable dcpcndcnce of the organisation on the allocation of resources that rollows 
the Comprclicnsivc Pcrforrnancc Asscssmcnt: 
"we have beenfocusing mostly on the [PIsj that are CPA critical, because the council 
wants to movefroinfair to good and then to cxcellctit. So. there 's been a lot ofemphasis 
on CPA critical and LPSA [Local Public Scri-imelgrecinent] critical. because ofthc 
reward grants andjust the status that goes with achieving stretch targets as opposed to 
not achieving. (.. ) 77ic difference bcm-ecit bottom and top quartile Performance off 
council tax collection could bcfive or six million Pounds a ycar and that makes an 
anful lot ofdiflercncc to the sen-ices sve can provide. " 
Performance culture - Links between scorecards 
Whilst. refcrring to the concept of performance culture, the Head of Revenues and 
Benefits pointed out that people at all levels within the scrvicc should understand "how 
they impact upon the bigpiclur6". In order to achieve this aim, it is necessary to -have a 
very clear thread' between individual actions and service aims and results. In these 
terms, PM could fulfil an important function, particularly if thcrc are sufficient links 
between scorecards. 
" Illiatever objective they [the employces/ have as it-ell. they can link it to the divisional 
objective. u-c then link to the corporate objcclivc- So they have a %-cry c1car approach 
that helps to see the similarities bctit-ccit their individual target plaits " (11cad of 
scrvicc). 
However, two issues could be raised in relation to this. First of all, relationships 
between scorccards at different organisational levels arc certainly not easy to establish 
and manage. The Corporate Director rcmarked that the approach has changed and 
improved since the appointment of a new CEO in 2005: 
"a year ago the centre on performance it-as monitoring ourfailures, ifyou like, and 
marking our homework, today we're uvrking together, I think there's no question about 
that ". 
This could be reinforced by noting that all intcrvicwces within the service agreed that 
targets and indicators are linked and that, despite their number, it is clear how they fccd 
into the service scorecard and how they relate to the national indicators. Second, and 
most critical, people nearer the front end seem to focus on performance indicators with 
the aim of achieving higher scores in the CPA, rather than considering them as a means 
to improve services. 
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Reasonsfor ni casuring perform an ce 
During thc interviews a number of reasons for measuring performance in the revenues 
and bcncrits service emerged. Seven categories could be identified through the analysis 
of the data. - 
Accountability: According to the Head of Revenues and Benefits, the service should 
match the expectations and requirements of two main stakeholders: central 
government and customers (i. e. the public). Targets and indicators are fundamental 
in this sense, as they promote a sense of ownership and accountability at both 
individual and organisational levels. In relation to the concept of local 
accountability, the pcrfon-nance manager stated that citizens are actually not 
intcrcstcd whether the organisation uses national or local indicators, or how it scores 
in the assessments. This is line with the previously reported statement from the 
Corporate Director of resources. Furthermore, not only are citizens interested in the 
level of service and not on the performance indicators, but also 
"the custonscr doesnt understand [the B VPIs]; they're complex quite often. (. )I 
really wouldn't expect the customer to understand all this and how it's calculatcd" 
(Group Manager). 
Comparing performance. - The Head of service expressed enthusiastic remarks 
regarding the opportunity for local authorities to compare performance using 
national indicators. Through BVPls, it is possible to identify other organisations that 
are 
"better than [LBBDJ in the same area ofbusiness with the same kind ofclientele, 
same variance like deprivation or whatever it might be. Then I'm going tofind out 
what it is that they do and how can we learnfrom that, so we can learn and share 
best practice; and I think it also helps us challenge, it helps us to raise our 
aspirations, it helps us to improve standards ". 
Moreover, in areas which are important, but not sufficiently covered by the national 
indicators, 
"I'm having to rely on bcnchmarking clubs where you are part ofafamily group, 
which is not bad. Ifive had aB VP1, that would have been great. 
Tbercfore, not only are comparisons with other organisations greatly valued, but 
they are also considered more effective if made through national Pls. However, the 
performance manager agreed that national indicators are needed to compare 
authorities, but she noted that they should always "be taken as what they are, just a 
broad briislistroke". Furthermore, the Group Manager, Performance Manager and 
Assistant Performance Manager noted that comparisons are only meaningful when 
calculations are consistent across authorities. According to them, this is seldom the 
case, also because of the paucity of clear guidelines provided to undertake the 
measurement. 
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Dccision-making: In order to cffectivcly use pcrforniancc inforniation to make 
decisions, it is necessary to set priorities and consider only a restricted 1111111ba or 
dimensions of pcrronnancc: 
" When pu havefour hundred indicators it's tough to do that; wheis you 've got a 
core baskct ofa do. -cn or tuvity, you can do it. We only reallyfocus oil the top 
nventy in the department at any one timefor "al inanagement action " (Corpomte 
Dircctor of Customcr Scrviccs). 
Central control: Arguably, a number of indicators have been introduced by central 
government with the sole purpose of monitoring perfortnance. Ili= BVPls, ofIcn 
classified as 'head counts' or 'level of cxpenditure', arc the ones that, according to 
the respondents, causc most frustration within the service. To exemplify, the Group 
Manager noted: 
doone ofthe PIs Ive got to do is the number offraud inirstigators cinployedivr 
thousand case loads. Now, I could havefy? yfraud investigators but not do ally 
investigations. or I could have two who actually do real big investigations and gcI 
results. Why am Icounting and reporting nationally the nuinbcr offraild 
investigators Ive got? " 
Individual performance and reputation: According to the Group Manager, the 
current PM regime provides the service with 'good cvidcncc' of the capability and 
performance of its employees. Furthermore, employees could bc held morc 
accountable through the existing PNIS: 
44 people are morefocused, because they Ajims, that iftlicirperfortnance is low 
they'll be spoken to about it, and iftheir accuracy is low. they'll be spoken to about 
it ". 71te disclosure ofinforination oil the perforinance ofthe semice plays all 
important role also oil the rccndtmcnt ofa skillcd ivorkforce: g7f)-ou're a high 
performing authority, you're going to be someone who's going to be in the papers. 
yolt're going to be gettingpeoplefrorn other authorities, you're raising)-our profile, 
you'repultingyoursey'in a beticrposition " (Group Nlanagcr). 
* Performance monitoring and improvcment: Sevcral intcrvicwccs cmphasiscd flic 
"need to drill down and ask hard questions about pufonnance and circumstances 
and challenge what the managers and the people doing thejob want to sa y 
(Corpomte Dircctor). 
In these terms, PIs are ways to gain a more 'objective' understanding of current 
perfonnance and to provide direction for improvement. As the Assistant Manager 
stated, PM in revenues and benefits "has been ofgrcat help, it's been a goodfocin 
on what we actually de. 
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5.3.5.4.3 Snfcgunrding and Rights 
Background information" 
Ilic second service to be considered is Safeguarding and Rights, which is part of the 
Department of Children's Services. This service has responsibility for: providing an 
individualiscd service to children in tile greatest need; safeguarding and protecting 
vulnerable children; building on the ongoing improvements in Children's Services; 
managing the disabled children's team and link with partnerships across the health and 
voluntary sectors*, and leading the development of a preventative strategy and a 
workforce development strategy. 
The performance assessment of this service is conjointly undertaken by "the 
Commission for Social Care Inspection [CSCI) and Ofsted (Office for Standards in 
Education, Children's Services and Skills], following a review of the Council's overall 
performance and key indicators" (Audit Commission website). This assessment 
involves the submission by the service of a data set and self-assessment, showing how it 
has contributed to improving outcomes for children and young people in the local area. 
Ailcr the submission, a meeting is held with the inspectors from Ofsted and the 
Commission for Social Care Inspection to discuss the findings in July of each year. In 
the autumn the auditors send a letter, which summarises the strengths and weaknesses 
of the service, before the final score is published. 
The latest sclf-asscssmcnt undertaken by the service shows that the health of children in 
the Borough compares unfavourably with similar areas and the level of teenage 
pregnancies is high. Levels of obesity are also high and immunisation rates are low. In 
order to tackle these issues, recent increased investment in primary care and the 
identification of the Authority and the Primary Care Trust as a Spearhead Authority 
have been made. On the other band, the national Children's Services indicators show 
strengths. For instance, child protection conferences and reviews of looked aftcr 
children are conducted cfficiently; all children on the child protection register and 
children looked after have an allocated social worker. However, a recent inspection 
report indicates that practice and quality standards are not at the level they should be to 
safeguard all children adequately. The quality of initial and core assessments requires 
improvement. 
In an area of deprivation, the educational standards achieved by most of the Borouglfs 
schools have risen at a rapid rate in recent years; overall, standards compare well %vith 
those in similar authorities. The lowest attaining third of children (including looked 
after children at secondary level) remain in danger of social and educational exclusion 
and arc an ongoing priority for the Council. Attainment at higher levels is too low. 
School attendance is in better than the average for similar authorities, although below 
the national average. Levels of exclusions in secondary schools are too high. Too many 
young people arc not currently in education, employment or training, although 
innovative curricular provision is beginning to make a difference. Levels of youth 
14 This swion builds on relevant material identified on the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham and Audit 
Commission wcbsitcs. 
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offcnding arc rclativcly high at agc 16+ but a rcccnt inspcction indicatcs; that the work 
of the Youth Offcnding Tcam is cffcctivc, particularly in prcvcnting rc-offcnding. I ligh 
proportions of young pcopic Icaving care cntcr cniploynicrit or continuc: thcir cducation. 
Finally, health incqualitics pose a key challenge for the Council and its patincrs. While 
investment has been made in this area, outcomes rcmain mixcd. In Children's scrviccs 
there is good partnership working but outcomcs for children and young people are 
adequate with challenges in areas such as meeting the nccds of children with disabilities 
and post- 16 courses. 
Tbcrcforc, as the key contcxtual features prcscntcd in scction 5.3.5.2 also cinphasisc, it 
is clear that the organisation, and its individual scrviccs, have to face substantial 
difficulties in a numbcr of areas. llowcvcr, it is intcrcsting to note that in 2006 the 
scrvicc of Safeguarding and Rights was awanlcd a 3* status, which comparcs 
favourably to the 2* status obtaincd in 2005. 
In order to better understand how targets and indicators are dcsigncd and uscd in this 
service, other documents were considcrcd and three people were intcrvicwcd: tile 
Corporate Director of Children's Scrvices; the Divisional Dircctor of Sarcguarding and 
Rights; and the Pcrfortnance Analyst of Safeguarding and Rights. 
The analysis of the data, which is reported in the next sections, led to a number of 
interesting findings. First of all, this service utiliscs a large number of performance 
indicators, which are mostly designed intcrnally. Although the intcrvicwccs; were oflcn 
positive about the current performance regime, front-linc staff were said to be less so. 
The unwillingness of social workers to report on all the dimensions of performance 
included in the service scorceard poses problems in relation to the timeliness and 
accuracy of the data. Therefore, in Safeguarding and Rights the main issues with PNI 
seem to be caused by the internally contested decision to adopt a wide range of Pis, 
rather than by external pressures to report to auditors and government dcpartmcnts. 
performance indicators 
Safeguarding and Rights, similarly to Revenues and Bcncrits, has been subject to 
measurement for some time. A considerably high number of indicators arc utilised 
within the service. The 18 national indicators (BVPIs) are grouped under the 
Performance assessment framework, whereas local indicators are divided into several 
sets: Referral and assessment (43 PIs); Case allocation (42); Child protection (31); 
Looked after children (62); Adoption / Asylum (18); Agency staff (13). In sum, the total 
number of local performance indicators used in Safeguarding and Rights is 208. 
T'he Performance assessment framework (PAF) monitoring tool document is used to 
keep track of the national indicators. 71c Performance datasct monitoring tool 
document is essentially the database for the local performance indicators. It is produced 
on a monthly basis by the Performance and information team and is prcscntcd to tile 
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Social services departmental management team and to the monthly Operational 
management team performance meeting. 
Therefore, performance information is collected at individual, team and service levels, 
and then communicated not only to auditors, but also intemally to the head of service, 
head of performance and all team managers, who use it to discuss the relevant indicators 
with their team. From the analysis of documents and interviews, it was possible to 
obscrvc substantial reliance on data within the service. As mentioned at the beginning 
orthc Pcrronnancc datasct monitoring tool, 
"data quality has shown evidence ofnotable improvement over recent months, however 
there are still areas ofiveakness that will need to be addressed". 
During the interview, the Director of the service utilised mainly quantitative 
information to demonstrate progress and improvement in the service provided. 
According to the Pcrfon-nance Analyst, the PM system used within the service is 
"quite cxIcnsive, it's more axtensive than the last authority I worked in and it's more 
extensive than that ofcomparators, but it works. " 
As regards national indicators, the Performance Analyst seemed quite satisfied, as he 
found them very helpful. The review of all BVPIs led to the conclusion that almost all 
of them arc appropriate, as they help the organisation to identify problems and 
encourage people to improve. The interviewees also emphasised the importance of 
having local indicators, which could reflect aspects specific to LBBD. However, they all 
agreed that local indicators should be linked to national ones, as their main purpose is to 
dctail and support the national PIs. 
"In order to succeed in any ofthose [national] PIs, you've got to have a number of 
other local Performance indicators that we don't have to report nationally but are 
important in terms ofour success " (Divisional Director) 
Therefore, much of the development of local PIs themselves is carried out by explicitly 
considering how they could relate to the BVPIs. As the Divisional Director stated: 
"the local indicators are the ones that are the back bone to the national ones, because, 
ifit wasn'tfor achieving some ofthe local indicators, we wouldn't be able to do as well 
as we do on the national ones. So I think they are exceptionally important. " 
Finally, it is interesting to note that, whilst referring to education and social care in 
general, the Corporate Director argued, 
"the majorperfomance indicators that have led to real improvement have been 
international, particularly around school improvement. (. ) Without theperformance 
indicators, without the internationalpressure, the pressurefrom those indicators to go 
and look- ive would never have noticed there was another way ofdoing it and therefore 
the performance indicators had a direct impact on practice, and international practice 
for that matter. " 
ISO 
Data quality 
In this particular service, both the Corporate Dircclor anti the 11crronnancc Analyst 
crnphasiscd the shortage of skillcd workers. 11c first principally rcfcrrcd to Analysts, 
whose role should be to idcntify and point out issues to managm and Dircctors and not 
to have just "a number cninching calwity'. According to the corpora Ic Dircctor, rarcly 
is it possible to have both "the anal -sis and the intellect". In turn, the Pcrrorniancc 
Analyst rcfcrred to the national shortage of social workcrs, which arc difficult to 
manage, as they arc more cxpcnsivc and, if 
st-ant them to give good sen-ice /and. therefore, you] traits them up, they're going 
to go somewhere else ". 
Having a high turnover of social workers and a lack of trained paromiancc Analysts 
can be quite relevant issues from a PM perspective, since these can lead to 
-the dliplication ofhow the perfonnance indicators are reconled. hosv they are Collated 
and thefrequenc34 the amount oftime it takes to get that orgaidsed" (Dircctor of the 
scrvicc). 
A second issue related to data quality is the heavy reliance on quantitative infonnation. 
Although PM is widely accepted as a key driver for improvcnicnt, the Corporate 
Director stated that what mattcrs 
"is notjust performance as quantified infigurcs, it's pcrforniatice qualitatively. (.. ) 
Ifle've built tip quantitative performance measures ofcourse delcrtnined and driven 
largely by the government's performance regime. but also a qualitatil-C obscmational 
batik ofciidcnce aroundpcr/ormancc. Vic two taken together amfindamental ". 
Although it is acknowledged that 
"before drauft conclusions about pcrforniance. [Plsj m ust be considered Wth other 
sources ofinformation about performance, including contexual data. and inspection 
reports " (PAF), 
both PAF and the Performance dataset monitoring tools contain vcry dctailcd 
spreadsheets, but neither narratives nor qualitative information. 
Performance culture 
The interviewees; agreed that it is important to have a MIS in place and were quite 
positive about the ways in which performance is mcasurcd in the service. In the 
Divisional Director's words: 
of although I undcrstand that it's time consurning. frustrating and a lot ofitvrk I think 
[pis] scn-c a very goodpurposc. Moving myscu^into a position ofbcing a member of 
thepublic, I would like to know what local government actually does. so I hawnt got a 
problem itith thatframeivork fl. c. th e balanced scorecard] ". 
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The 11crforniancc Analyst added that in Safeguarding and Rights there is a strong 
pcrfoniiance culture: 
"all the managers buy into [PAIJ, a lot ofthe work goes right into it and it does help its 
track our performance. is-here we're doing good and where we need to do better ". 
However, given the number of Pis and the resources invested to measure and report 
performance, the Corporate Director expressed concern about whether the organisation 
is actually maximising the potential of PM through appropriate analysis and consequent 
action. Talking about national Pis lie argued: 
$'not only are ive subjected to targets and indicators at government level, ive're also 
subjected to Inspection criteria and an inspection regime by Ofsted and by CSCI with 
perinissionfor social care inspection. So, my word, performance indicators are all over 
theplace, ive are absolutely infected, infused, whatever wordyou like, by them. " 
Interestingly, though, the corporate Director seemed particularly satisfied with the ways 
in which performance is measured and managed at LBBD. Moreover, the large majority 
of indicators being used within the service are designed locally and not nationally. 
In relation to service scorccards, the Corporate Director stated: 
"there's a tension there really about the amount ofwork that goes into the balanced 
scorccard and whaher it's productive and cost effective andprovides valuefor money 
Thus, he expressed interest regarding the analysis of the amount of time and cffort 
devoted to measure performance, as opposed to the resulting benefits, and the 
exploration of opportunities to simplify the current system. 
Furthermore, the Corporate Director felt that measurement had become too 
bureaucratic, there were overlaps among the different frameworks in place and that this 
generates duplication of reporting. This, in turn, means that social workers are often not 
compliant and not sufficiently diligent in recording. According to the performance 
Analyst, front line staff have often opposed the measurement of performance: 
"social workers have a cultural thing about recording things... Things like: '7 didn't 
become a social worker to use the computer " ". 
However, the Divisional Director stated that the main tension in relation to PNI 
"has to do with me getting annoyed with people not recording their work 7"hey are 
selling themselves short. It's like saving money and then you get your bank statement 
and it doesn't show - it's not showing in the account ofhow much you saved overall 
Institutionalpressures 
I'lic Corporate Director remarked that, although there arc some issues, he is 
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I#vcry satisfied with the broad regime ofperformance targets and Indicators. Me), 
represent an important substitute in the educational uVrId or the social smices world 
forprofit as a bottom line nicasure. I kiosv there's always stuffabout the audit society 
and all the rest ofit, and the producer always comes out and vqs blah. blah and the 
unions ... so that 's that ". 
Interestingly, the Corporate Director also argucd that in the definition or pc6brinalicc 
targets and indicators there was 
-not any [participation] at all in any iva),. none. Vicy are iniposed in our increasingly 
ccntraliscd socidy by the goi-crninctit ". However. although this lack- ofivrticipation 
caused "a hcll ofa lot oftrouble Icit orfiftecti )-cars ago. ( .. )I don't biou, (f there are 
arty tensions. (.. ) In education ivcvc been fineasuring Perfonnancel for so long no )v 
since 1988 in this country arid so intensively, that I think it-c'm all got so used to it, that 
it's riot a source oftcnsion and conflict, except arnongst certain proi-iders like those 
schools in needy suburbs st-ho dont like things being rci-caled about thcin ". 
Therefore, it could be argued that, considering the Corporate Dircctor's gcncrally 
positive remarks on the PM regime, participation and involvctncnt might not be so 
relevant for him. This contradicts the view of most other intcrvicwccs in the 
organisations considered. hiorcovcr, if thcrc arc tensions, the Corporate Dircctor argues 
that they arc not generated principally because of the ways in which PCrforinaricc is 
measured; rather, people might oppose Phi, bccausc it exposes their poor pcrformancc. 
Another interesting aspect to cmcrgc during the interviews is the scrvicc"s dependence 
on central rcsourccs. In relation to this, the Divisional Dircctor stated the following: 
-#71cre's a target called the local public sen-ice agrccinent target arid, for instancc, it's 
a stretched target. 1*71 say that 70% ofour looked aficr kids isill leave care itith one 
A-C GCSE [General Certificate ofSccondary Education]. Ifivc stretch oursch-es arid 
say in addition to that another 14 itill leave itithfivcI-C GCSE'S, then the got-cril"Iclit 
it-ill sqy. ý OK, if)-ou exceed that. we'll give )-ou L500.000. So there is a reward c1cinclit 
1%, hich is quite iniportant arid ofcourscfor sonic ofthc service areas, the council itscY' 
tnight say wc is-ant to invest inorc nioney into this particular area. " 
Reasonsfor nteasuringperforntance 
From the analysis of the data, it emerged that, according to the intcrvicwccs. there arc 
two main reasons for measuring performance at service level: 
Comparing performance: All respondents cmphasiscd the opportunity through 
national indicators to compare pcrfonnance with other councils. In this sense, the 
Performance Assessment Framework indicators 
adprovide a statistical oven-iciv of Childrens Senices, Safeguarding & Right's 
perfonnance allowing coniparisons benwen counciLs owr tinie " (PAF monitoring 
tool documcnt). 
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Although the Divisional Director pays attention to the performance of other local 
authorities, lie also argued that comparisons arc 
41notalways accurate though, not in thesense ofn timbers and stats; Idon't think 
[they provide] an accurate picture ". 
Furthermore, performance data could be utilised to make comparisons only to a 
limited extent, also because of necessary reliance on other local services. For 
cxnmplc, since the analysis of the data carried out by the Metropolitan Police is not 
separated from borough to borough, it is very difficult for LBBD to compare the 
looked af1cr kids in Barking and Dagenham with every kid in Barking and 
Dagenham on a number of parameters. Finally, in certain areas of the public sector 
"nationalgoodpractice isn't enough; international goodpractice is much wider 
and ofcnicial importance " (Corporate Director). 
In order to achieve comparability of results, though, it is necessary to have 
consistency in the ways indicators are set and performance calculated, which is not 
easy to achieve on an international scale. 
Performance monitoring and improvement: The Divisional Director stressed the role 
of PM in identifying areas that require improvement and take action with the aim of 
enhancing the cfficicncy and cffectivcness of the service. Through Pls it is possible 
to 
demonitor 
thepcrfomancc ofofficcrs (. ); it's a tool to make sure thatpcopIc 
deliver what they say that they deliver in their day-to-day work". 
Thcrcforc, 
#da lot ofthe work goes right into [PAf] and it does help us track ourpcrformance, 
where we're doing good and where we need to do better" (Perfonnance Analyst). 
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5.3.5.4.4 Leisure, Arts and Olympics 
Background information's 
The last service examined in LBBD is Leisure, Arts and Olympics, which is part ofthe 
Dcpartmcnt of Rcgcncration. Rcgcncmtion is incrcasingly a key priority for (he 
Govcmmcnt, councils and the communitics they rcprcscnt. I'lic importance of cconoillic 
viability, cnvironmcntal sustainability and social cohesion is rccogniscd across the 
country. As the Corporate Scorccard Pmjcct Nlanagcr stated: 
saregmeration is mitral to its now in many respcas and everything kind ofhangs off 
that almost now. " 
I'lic main areas of responsibility of the Leisure, Arts and Olympics Division arc: cvcnts, 
play, tourism and Olympics; parks and countryside; parks and lcisurc dcvclopinclit; 
cemeteries; arts programme and development; and security investigations. 1lic Leisure, 
Arts and Olympics service is led by the Head of Service who is supportcd by 5 group 
managers. 
The Audit Commission carries out the performance assessment of this service. In 2005, 
Leisure, Arts and Olympics was awarded a 3* status, %vhc= in the latest CPA it was 
downgraded to 2*. In particular, LBBD was said to provide 'fair' cultural services, 
which have promising prospects for improvement. 
This service was assessed as 'fair', because the quality of users experience was said to 
be variable. Some facilities are in need of refurbishment or remodelling and satisfaction 
levels for the services are low, when compared to other London boroughs. Analysis of 
the detailed needs of users and the local community is underdeveloped as consultation 
tends to be used to identify spccific responses to discrete services or where large scale 
investment is planned but not generally to inform the development of day to day 
services. The Council strugzjcs to evidence spcciric outcomes from the many of their 
cultural services and this makes it difficult to evaluate value for money. For example, 
some services, like sports development, have national accreditation and providc good 
quality at reasonable cost, whereas other directly managed services attract above 
average costs and low satisfaction lcvcls, e. g. leisure services, so do not providc value 
for money. 
The Council is using cultural services as a key vehicle for promoting community 
cohesion and investments over the last few years have significantly improved the 
Council's cultural facilities. Access to cultural services is generally good and facilities 
are geographically well spread across the Borough. The range of diverse events and 
activities has increased for black and minority ethnic communities, younger people, 
older people and people with disabilities. Increased opportunities for learning has had a 
sustained focus, with increases in library usage and schools programmes provided 
across the services. The Council is tackling the fear of crime with the use of dedicated 
parks police and community wardens. 
15 This scction builds on relevant material idcntificd on the London Borough of Batking and Dagenham and Audit 
Commission wcbsitcs. 
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Ilrospccts for improvement arc promising because the Council has a clear commitment 
to cnsurc that cultural services arc a key vehicle for creating learning opportunities, 
improving civic pride and making Barking and Dagenham a place where people will 
want to live. This is supported by a large capital investment programme, which has 
already dclivcrcd some significant improvements. The expansion of facilities is also 
linkcd to the longer term need to meet the needs of a changing and growing population. 
Performance management arrangements have improved, with strategies linked to local 
and national priorities. 
However, service planning and management arrangements of cultural services are not 
fully joined up. Services arc provided within two divisions and good practices are not 
always sharcd. An example of this is in consultation and the detailed analysis of users 
and non-users across the services. Some service sections do this well, leading to better 
planning but other sections do less well leading to lost opportunities to engage users and 
non-uscrs. Finally, mechanisms to analyse the impact of services and investment are 
weak, particularly where linked to the shared outcomes. 
Given the remarks reported above, the Audit Commission expressed a number of 
recommendations. In particular, the Leisure, Arts and Olympics service needs to have: 
" more tailorcd and focused services, leading to better and measurable outcomes for 
local people 
" an increase in the number of users with a better balance across the community 
" wider access to cultural services, venues and facilities for community activities, 
linked to shared priorities, and to further increase usage 
" greater clarity for users and staff regarding the services standards expected 
" an improved capacity of the Council to provide good quality value for money 
services. 
As in the case of other services, the researcher planned to carry out several interviews, 
in ordcr to capture different perspectives on performance measurement and 
management. However, during the period of data collection the service of Leisure, Arts 
and Olympics underwent substantial changes, which led to the replacement of the 
Corporate Director as well as a number of people involved in PM. Furthermore, the 
implcmcntation of a national PM system in the service was quite recent; thus, little 
cxpcTicnce had been developed in the measurement of performance as regarded to that. 
Despite the difficulties encountered in gathering data, it was nevertheless decided to 
include this service in the analysis. A particularly detailed interview with the head of 
service and the analysis of a number of documents enabled the researcher to gain a 
sufficient understanding of the PM system in place. Secondly, as the analysis of the 
material included on the Audit Commission and LBBD websites demonstrates, it was 
important to investigate a service which is now quite important in terms of CPA, but 
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that has a shortcr history of PNI than Rcvcnucs and Bcncrits and Saftuarding and 
Rights. 11is lcd to intcrcsting conclusions on the roics and importancc of IM at thc 
local lcvcl. In particular, PM was considcred as a primary way to prornotc 
accountability and, morc importantly, attract attcntion and rcsourccs at local and 
national lcvcls. 
Performance indicators 
11crc arc 18 national indicators for Leisure, Arts and 01)vpics and these arc quite 
influential in the ways in which the service functions. 11c licad of scrvicc was salisficd 
with how national targets and indicators arc sct. Ilowcvcr, cspccially bccause or the 
rcccnt introduction of Pls, in "the cultural block- they still nec(I to Iv refinell". 
This is also due to the particular difficulty of measuring aspects rclatcd to art and sport 
programmes: 
"sonic of[our perforniancel is non tangible and sonic ofit is extrenicly difflicult to 
capture. For cxaniple: how do you capture an expcricticc oftourisin or art and drania 
progrants? Miat added value did that give to the community? (.. ) Ilow do ive calculate 
thatfccl goodfactor? " 
In order to quantify performance, members of the service workcd with the community 
and the community groups to understand local wants and needs. According to the 
intcrvicwcc, this process "resulted in a plan that citi. -citsfccl ou-ners oj". Co-opcration 
and sense of ownership were described as fundamental for both PNI and the overall 
success of the service. 
Data quality andpartnerships 
The intervicwce was particularly concerned with the quality of the data. Particularly 
when partnerships arc involved, it is important to have clear and consistent 
measurement of performance and accurate collection and analysis of data by all partners 
involved. Moreover, changes in national targets and indicators have a substantial 
influence on local organisations. Even more so in the case of partnerships, as existing 
indicators used (also) for partnerships might become outdated or inconsistent with the 
new framework. As the interviewcc rcmarked, this is more cvidcnt if funds arc 
involved. 
Illstitutionalpressures 
The head of service was very positive regarding the introduction of national 
performance indicators in his service. According to him, with the introduction of 
national indicators more attention is paid to Leisure, Arts and Olympics. Second, 
national Pls are a means to infonn central government on local circumstances and 
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influcncc national policies. Regarding tile links bctwccn local and national levels, he 
argued that tcnsions will always be there, but they could be reduced by working in a 
more colliborativc manncr. Finally, whilst rcfcrring to the links between corporate and 
scrvicc scorccards within LBBD, the respondent pointed out the necessity of having "a 
common theme that nins through the balanced scorccard ofall the heads ofscrvice". 
Reasoissfor ineasuringperformance 
Ilic licad of service concentrated on two main reasons for measuring performance at 
service level: 
Accountability: The intcrvicwce remarked that, as a public service, it is necessary to 
havc "a good robust evidence trail" and to be able to demonstrate perfonnancc. 
Furthcrmorc, it is important to have "performance indicators that arc consistent, but 
also add value". This could be achieved by proving 
liquite categorically that that million pounds that's invested in your service has 
actually delivered those outcomes and outputs and life quality ". 
According to him, Pis are the only way to provide evidence to support claims about 
past and current performance. 
Acquisition of resources: Central government has often used national PIs to allocate 
"a substantial antount offunding opportunities" locally. Similarly, at the local level 
PIs, both national and local, are considered tools to "prioritise how the money gets 
spent" within the organisation. As the head of service stated, in order to increase 
spend within the borough, it is necessary to base requests on the evidence of 
performance data. 
158 
5.3.5.5 London Borough of Barking and Dagenham - Comparative analysis 
11is section compares the results obtained in the four units of analysis within the 
LBBD. Before undertaking this analysis, it is important to rcmatk that a thcorctical 
sampling logic was adopted to identify both the services and the people to interview. 
Examining the PNI system in use at the corporate level was rundamcntal, as thc 
organisation is substantially hierarchical in the way it measures and reports 
performance. Secondly, thrcc services wcrc considered in orilcr to gain a deeper 
understanding of how the corporatc and scrvicc lcvcls interact and to invcstigatc thc 
perceptions of pcopic working closer to service delivery of the current PNI systems. 
From a PM point of vicw, the Rcvcnucs and Bcncrits scrvicc has had national targcts 
and indicators in placc for several years and has dcvclopcd considcrablc cxpcricncc in 
the design and usc of PIs. Safeguarding and Rights ha3 fcwcr national Pls, but it has 
dcsigncd a high number of local indicators to support national Pls and to monitor 
pcrformancc. Finally, in Lcisurc, Arts and Olympics a national PM fmmcwork has 
recently been implemented. 
Within these four units of analysis, respondents wcrc selected with the aim of capturing 
different perspectives. Therefore, intervicwccs ranged from corporate directors of 
departments to performance analysts. Howcvcr, it should bc noted that, given the 
specific focus of the interviews on PNI, respondents arc all involved in the measurement 
of performance and have sufficient knowlcdgc of the targets and indicators being used 
at their level. 
This choice has important implications on tile findings or this research (cf. chapter 7 ror 
limitations and opportunities for further research), but also on the number of people that 
could be interviewed. Furthermore, LBBD was going through a process of substantial 
re-organisation while the data was being gathered. 711crcforc, new people were 
appointed in roles, which arc key for PNI; interviewing them was sometimes not 
possible, as their knowledge of the organisation was not sufflicient. In order to minimisc 
these issues, the researcher also interviewed the former Corporate Performance 
Manager and the Corporate Director of Resources, since they had been involved in the 
design of the organisation's PNIS from the very beginning. Morcovcr, a number of 
documents were analysed with the aim of increasing the internal validity and construct 
validity of the research. 
Considering the analysis reported in the previous sections, there is substantial similarity 
between the responses obtained in the four units of analysis (cf. Table 5.2). Moreover, 
considerable alignment could be found between the documents considered and the data 
gathered through interviews. For example, both documents and respondents very 
frequently referred to the Seven Community Priorities as the organisation's main 
objectives. 
As regards specifically to the interviews, both the themes that emerged and the 
responses obtained are quite consistent. Although this is surely due to the utilisation of a 
consistent interview protocol, many intervicwccs focused also on concepts and areas, 
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such as pcrrormancc culture, data quality, analysts' capabilities and relationships 
between corporate and service levels, which were not explicitly covered by the 
questions. I lowcvcr, during the interviews a number of interesting differences emerged 
and it is worth examining them. In the following sections the main themes arc reviewed 
tind discussed. Subsequently, the results arc compared to the findings obtained in the 
Stokc-on-Trcnt and Staffordshire Fire and Rescue Service case study. 
Themes Services 
Pcrromiancc indicators Corporate; Revenues and Benefits; Safeguarding 
and Rights; Leisure, Arts and Olympics 
Data quality Revenues and Benefits; Safeguarding and 
Rights; Leisure, Arts and Olympics 
Links bctwccn corporate and Corporate; Revenues and Benefits 
service levels 
Institutional pressures - Resource Corporate; Revenues and Benefits; Safeguarding 
dependence, audits and inspections and Rights; Leisure, Arts and Olympics 
Performance culture Corporate; Safeguarding and Rights; Revenues 
and Benefits (links between scorecards) 
Partnerships and 'joined up' Corporate; Leisure, Arts and Olympics 
government 
Strategy Corporate 
Communication and use of Corporate 
performance information 
Table 5.2: Major thcrnes emerged in the LBBD case study 
Performance indicators 
A substantial part of this research focuses on the design and uses of performance 
indicators. This section compares the interviewees' perceptions of the relevance of PNI, 
the introduction of local indicators and the costs associated with PM. 
As previously rcmarked, the number and type of Pis can greatly vary across the 
organisation. Because of the nature of the services and regulation they are subject to, 
both Revenues and Benefits and Safeguarding and Rights have more national and local 
Pis than Leisure, Arts and Olympics. Despite this, the analysis of the data shows that 
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there is substantial agreement on the relevance of Phl and acceptance or the ways in 
which national indicators arc designed. 
Interestingly, few respondents questioned the current, quite ccntraliscd I'M rcginic. In 
the case of education, for example, Pls are deemed to have 
"enortnou. sly helped towards [the service's1success. Vicy are central and until 
national perfortnance indicators in education. for crantple. it-ere published, nobody 
kiew the objecth, c position ofthe children down here rclaffiv to national outputs and 
national outconics " (Corporate Director of Children's Scr%iccs). 
111c majority of intcrvicwccs considered national indicators as oflcn appropriate and 
necessary to improve local services. As the c1cctcd member stated: 
"there's a whole nuniber ofgood things in pcrfortnance indicators that I think are %-cry 
important. (. ) [7hrough PAIJ we can prove to oursch-cs it-licil things are getting better 
and what is gating isvrsc or whether ive're sta)*ig the sanic " 
(further rcflcctions on national indicators arc presented in the section on links bctwccn 
national and local). 
As already shown, the corporate scorccard and all service scorccards consist of a rnix of 
national and local indicators. If responses concerning national indicators were often 
positive, opinions regarding the usefulness of local indicators rangcd from very positive 
to negative. On the one hand, people working within services saw local Pls as the best, 
and oflen only, way to capture local needs. On the other, as the former corporate 
performance manager argued, local indicators can be -dangerous" as "they're not 
audited, they're unusable generally, they're not licIpfur". Thcrcforc, the main 
disadvantage of local indicators seems to be their non-comparability with other 
authorities. Interestingly, one of the main concerns expressed about PNI at service level 
regards the ways in wWch comparisons across organisations arc made and how spccific 
and unique local contexts arc. 
Divergence of opinions also exists in relation to the reasons for introducing local 
indicators. Some respondents argued that local indicators are introduced mainly to 
better reflect local characteristics and, therefore, for the organisation to be more 
responsive to the needs of local communities. However, the performance managers and 
analysts interviewed cmphasised the consistency between local and national indicators, 
so much so that in many instances local indicators seemed to be there with the sole 
purpose of facilitating the process of reporting against national BVPls. 
Another major issue related to PM is the cost of collecting, analysing and reporting data 
both within and outside the organisation. Considerable costs arc also associated with 
auditing and inspections carried out by the Audit Commission and other national bodies. 
A number of interviewees, particularly in the most Phi-drivcn services, demonstrated 
concern regarding the balance between costs and bcnefits associated with PM, but no 
evidence could be found on how much the organisation spends in terms of financial 
resources and employees' time. 
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Data quality 
From the analysis of the interviews, three primary issues emerged in relation to the 
quality of performance data. At corporate level, the Policy and partnership division 
officer cmphasiscd the need for having consistent and timely communication of data 
from services to the ccntre. The I-Icad of Leisure, Arts and Olympics echoed this 
concern, particularly in relation to partnerships; when a number of organisations are 
involved, he argued, it is difficult to ensure timeliness and consistency in data collection 
and analysis. 
Secondly, various respondents pointed out that coherence in measurement could also 
depend on the guidelines provided by central government and auditors. Although the 
relationships with institutions were depicted as good and improving, negative remarks 
were expressed about the dctail and timeliness of national guidelines. 
Finally, a number of intervicwccs at service level emphasised the need for trained 
performance analysts who could systematically gather and analyse data and effectively 
communicate it to managers. This links to the development of capabilities required from 
performance analysts, their ability to design robust local indicators and to use and report 
both qualitative and quantitative information. As regards the latter point, it should be 
noticed that the majority of documents considered are very schematic and include little 
descriptivc information. In essence, at corporate level concern was expressed especially 
about timeliness of reporting; whereas within services attention was paid mostly to the 
development of people and infrastructure, and to the appropriateness of guidelines on 
how to measure pcrfon-nancc. 
Links between corporate and service levels 
During the interviews the importance of having links between corporate and service 
scorccards was often acknowledged. Indeed, LBBD has a hierarchical system that 
ensures consistency of process and tight internal guidelines on how to develop service 
scorccards. One of the documents analysed - Strategic corporate priorities for action 
06/07 - summariscs the organisation's priorities in 19 points and is effectively an 
adapted version of a strategy map. Service scorecards are developed on the basis of this 
document and following the guidelines provided in the Service Scorecard Pack, which 
also brings togcthcr all the PIs currently used in each service. 
Furthermore, the Service scorecard pack cascades and specifies for each service the 
objectives set by central government, such as the efficiency targets set in the Gershon 
review. However, this file is so detailed and prescriptive that it resembles an auditing 
document. This led some respondents within services to express a certain degree of 
dissatisfaction with the centralised approach adopted in LBBD. However, greater 
involvement and collaboration in the definition of local targets and indicators, and a 
collegiate approach in making decisions were greatly valued. As the Corporate Director 
of Customer Services expressed it: 
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asi think the relatiotiship between ta and the cciare ofthe organisation has moved oil 
and improved enonnotaly over the last year or so. I think [the clirmit Cl-. 'Oj has 
changed the regime, we've got different people. we've got a much more collaborative 
approach, a much more collegiate approach. I would havesaid that a yCar ago the 
centre oil perfonnance it-as monitoring otirfaihires ifyou like and marking our 
homework- and today we're working together. I think there's no question abvist that. 
Institittionalpressures 
During the intcrvicws, thrcc issucs rccurred in rclation to the connections bctwccn local 
scrviccs and national institutions: the possibility of influcricing the ticsign of national 
Pis; the auditing proccss; and the implications of pcrformancc against national targcts 
on availability of rcsourccs at the local lcvcl. '17hc opinions cxprcsscd about the 
rclationships with auditors and govcmmcnt dcpartmcnts wcre always positivc, ranging 
from satisfactory to vcry good. Most intcrvicwccs agrccd that participation anti 
coop, cration arc important factors in the rclationships with ccntral govcniincnt and audit 
bodics. Thcy also cmphasiscd that the Comprchcnsivc Pcrformancc Asscssmcnt had 
provcn collaborativc and aimcd at improving pcrformancc, rather than at sanctioning 
poor past pcrfonnancc, as was oflcn the casc with Bcst Valuc. 
However, the perceptions of the relationships with institutions divcrgcd and 
participation in the design of national targcts and indicators ci-ncrgcd as a much dcbatcd 
issue. At corporate level govcmmcnt bodies arc considcrcd almost as partncrs the 
organisation works with in ordcr to improve its pcrfonnancc. "I"he design of targcts and 
indicators is oflcn depicted as a collaborative process in which local organisations have 
their say. On the other hand, acceptance and perccivcd influcncc over the I'M rcgimc 
and auditing processes changed dramatically moving from corporate to service levcls. In 
Safcguarding and Rights, although positive commcnts were made rcgarding the 
appropriateness of national BVPls, participation was dcrined as almost non-existcnt. 
The Corporate Director and Head of Scrvicc of Rcvcnucs and Bcncrits wcrc quite 
positive regarding the level of cngagemcnt with govcnuncnt dcpartmcnts and auditors. 
in contrast with the critical opinions cxprcsscd by group managcr and pcrformancc 
manager. 
These differences were reflected in what respondents said regarding the objectives and 
success of the organisation. At corporate lcvcl, service improvement and the seven 
6community priorities' are considered fundamental. Whereas at service level CPA 
scores are often seen as the objectives of the organisation. In this sense, achieving a 
, four* status" in CPA and becoming a 'grccn authority' in partnership work (for 
partnerships a traffic light system is used) is crucial. As the Head of Revenues and 
Benefits rcmarked, "being successful is that we're top quartile in those Indicators 
[BVPIs] ", or, as the performance manager in the same scrvicc put it, success is "getting 
thefour at the CPA at the end ofthe), ear ". 
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I'lic partial disconnection between those who feel involved in the design of indicators 
and the ones nearer the front line is visible also when considering certain Pis. 
Performance managers and analysts at service level complained about those national 
indicators that are merely related to input, e. g. number of people employed, costs per 
head, etc. Although from a central government perspective these Pis could be useful for 
monitoring purposes, people involved in the actual collection and analysis of the data 
struggle to make sense of them. This issue relates to both the creation of a performance 
culture at the local level and the roles of PM (see chapter 6). 
From the intcrvicws carried out at all levels two main concerns emerged with regards to 
the rclationships with auditors. First of all, the guidelines on how to calculate some 
national indicators were deemed either unclear or not timely by the people directly 
involved in the mcasurcment. Secondly, the preparation and competence of auditors and 
the consistency of the auditing process were questioned at both corporate and service 
levels. 
Finally, a very important element from a resource dependence perspective is the 
examination of the implications of PM on availability of resources locally. The 
theoretical sampling logic adopted enabled the researcher to compare services where 
PM has been in place for some time with a service in which national indicators have 
only been recently introduced. Having financial rewards associated with the 
achievement of high levels of perfon-nance emerged as a strongly motivating factor for 
all services considered. However, the Head of Leisure, Arts and Olympics favoured the 
introduction of new national Pis, especially because of the funding opportunities 
attached. The Assistant Performance Manager in Revenues and Benefits expressed a 
similar opinion while referring to the moment at which national indicators were 
introduced in his service. On the other hand, the Corporate Directors of Children's 
Services and Customer Services (two intensely measured departments), although they 
did not contest the overall PM regime, felt overwhelmed by indicators. 
Performance culture 
A number of intervicwecs utilised the expression 'performance culture', even though 
the original questions did not refer to it. According to the Corporate Director of 
Resources, to foster a culture of performance within an organisation it is necessary that 
people understand bow their work can contribute to the delivery of services and how 
this contribution could be assessed and communicated through the use of performance 
indicators. However, although it was apparent that most people at LBBD had bought 
into PM, in practice three different types of reactions could be identified. 
Respondents at corporate and department levels often connected the use of indicators to 
the strategy and main objectives of the organisation. For them performance indicators 
arc a way to make national and local policies and organisational strategy operational. 
The interviewccs at service level considered PM as almost synonymous to CPA rating 
and positions in the league tables. According to them, PM is useful to improve services, 
but they see their influence on the system as very limited. Finally, although no 
interviews were carried out with front-line staff (e. g. social workers for the 
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Safeguarding and Rights service), several rcspondcnts cornmcntcd on the difficulty of 
gathering data at the service level and, conscqucnily, at corporate levels. The cxistclicc 
of too many indicators and too much burcaucrncy wcrc itictitificd as the two major 
factors that discourage front-linc workcrs from collecting nnd rcporting data. From their 
point of view, PM seems to be more of a necessary evil than a uscrul tool. 
However, the Policy and Review Officcr argucd that opposition to PNI is mostly due to 
people's resistance to mcchanisnis of accountability: 
81you'll hear lots offnistrated comments, because the whole thing aroundivrformance 
is that it's cWdcncc-bascd now. it cart be proven, the source cart be identifiled. It's not 
just: here's thcjtgurc, that's it, lik-c it it-as 3vars ago. It's all audited. has to be 
evidenced arid there's a real drivc and industry in itselfitow. - so there arefnistrations, 
but senior managers rccognisc that it has to be done. so they do it ". 
Partnerships and Yoined up'government 
Effective and efficient partnerships arc fundamental for the delivery of services. As 
clearly emerged from the interview with the Policy and partnership division officcr, 
who is responsible for Local Service Partnerships and Local Arca Agreements, central 
government is promoting partnerships by transferring considerable financial resources 
to local public sector organisations. As the Corporate Performance Managcr argued: 
"what certainly the LAA has done, and we'll see ifit works or not, is put lot's oftnoncy 
in one pot and now everybody is working logctherfron: their different vicispoint to 
deliver a common oulcome ". 
Therefore LAAs are having a positive impact on the collaborations bctwccn local 
services and arc contributing to the achicvcmcnt of so-called 'joined up' government. 
Although several respondents welcomed the introduction of LAA, its consistency with 
the way in which national targets and indicators arc set was questioned. To ensure the 
success of local partnerships, the Head of Leisure, Arts and Olympics claimed that 
central government needs to make sure that radical changes are not introduced in the 
system. Modifications of targets or resources allocated would 
"increase the complexity ... differences right across the piece, it-licit you've got PCTs, 
the voltintary sector. the police, fire brigade (. ) Weve got a local area agreement that 
is it-orking, which is a good practice; for example they've cut right across Ofstcd. but 
then fforl a lot ofthefour targets, a lot ofthe things that ivcd actually ivork-cd oil, the 
fiinding is no longer there, so we have to re-look at how ive're going to delivcr off 
them ". 
Therefore, a more 'joined up' central government seems to be a prcrcquisitc for a more 
, joined up' approach to local government. 
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Strategy 
The analysis of documents showed that the organisation has a clearly formulated 
strategy, which is derived from the seven 'community priorities' identified through 
consultation with the public. The organisation's success map and scorecards are used to 
make the strategy operational at both corporate and service levels. During the 
interviews, a number of respondents mentioned the 'community priorities' and service 
scorccards, but only two explicitly referred to organisational strategy. Although this 
result may seem surprising, this is consistent with findings from the previous empirical 
phases of this research (see chapter 6 for discussion). 
Communication 
Communication to stakeholders was considered very important, especially by 
intcrvicwccs at corporate level. Relevant and timcly information should influence 
citizens' perceptions of the Council's performance. However, as many respondents 
noted, the public is not interested in performance targets and indicators, either because 
they do not understand the figures, or, more simply, because they are solely concerned 
with the services they regularly use. Furthermore, the media often simplify or even 
distort the information, focusing on negative aspects of performance. Therefore, it is 
very important for the organisation to be in a position to communicate directly to the 
citizenship and to utilise messages that arc both informative and comprehensible. 
A controversial issue that was raised relates to the inclusion of contextual factors in how 
performance figures are presented. In the case of Revenues and Bencfits, for example, 
respondents emphasiscd the need to take socio-economic and demographic aspects into 
account to provide a picture of the service's performance untainted by aspects like 
economic deprivation. On the other hand, the Corporate Director of Children's Services 
argued that in education both central and local government should think in absolute 
terms, since 
"it doesn't matter where our schools are in the league tables, especially when [the 
pupils] will be lookingfor ajob ". 
Moreover, according to him, in organisations like LBBD the exclusion of contextual 
factors could also foster a performance improvement logic: 
"Ipersonally have always been very wary ofcontextualisation, ofusing social and 
economic variables to give a context ofperformance, because you can easily start 
excusing objectitely low outcomes by way of- "well, not bad in the environment that 
you've got " ". 
UsCS ofperformance information 
The analysis of documents and interviews showed how performance information is 
disseminated within the organisation and how it could influence decisions. Having an 
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intcgratcd PMS and links between scorccards licips avoid coliccling pcrrormancc data is 
collected ror the sake of it. However, respondcnts at corporate level cxprcsscd conccn) 
regarding the use that clcctcd members make of the data. According to the intcrvicwccs, 
although the organisation is investing conspicuous resources in PNI and pc6onnancc 
management, local politicians rely little on the cvidcncc available. 'I'lic widcr issue or 
use of performance information by diffcrcnt stakeholder categories cmcr8cd as 
problematic in a number of instances and scvcral rcspondcnts classified it as n priority 
the organisation should concentrate on. 
Reasonsfor m easuring perform at: cc 
Building on the literature, the intcrvicwcd protocol cxplicitly cavcrcd the purposes and 
drivers of PM at the local level. A numbcr of factors cmcrgcd from the intcrvicws 
carried out at LBBD (cf. Table 5.3). 
Reasons Serviccs 
Accountability Corporate; Revenues and Bcncrits; 
Leisure, Arts and Olympics 
Acquisition of resources Leisure, Arts and Olympics 
Comparing performance Corporate*, Revenues and Bcncrits; 
Safeguarding and Rights. 
Central control Corporate; Revenues and Benefits 
Decision-making Revenues and Bcncrits 
Individual performance and reputation Corporate; Revenues and Benefits 
performance monitoring and improvement Corporate; Revenues and Benefits; 
I 
Safeguarding and Rights 
Table 5.3: Principal reasons for measuring performance at LBBD 
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Accountability 
Although most respondents mentioned accountability as a primary reason for measuring 
pcrfon-nancc, there were discrepancies in its (implicit) definitions. At corporate level, 
intcrvicwccs cmphasiscd the importance of being accountable to the local population 
and considered the communication of performance information to citizens as a way to 
enhance it. From this point of view, the organisation has to demonstrate to taxpayers 
that it operates in an efficient way and provides value for money. At service level, 
respondents saw themselves accountable to the citizenship, but also to government 
departments and auditors. 
Statutory indicators and regular inspections make the communication flows between the 
local organisation and institutions quite structured. On the other hand, although the role 
of citizcns/customcrs was acknowledged as primary, several respondents demonstrated 
dissatisfaction on how LBBD currently interacts with them. Moreover, scepticism was 
demonstrated regarding the disclosure of information to the public, because of the 
associated costs and the difficulty for citizens to understand the figures published. The 
elected member emphasised that people are not very interested in performance data, do 
not think in terms of time series, but only consider present and personal circumstances, 
and do not have an overview of the portfolio of services the local authority provides. 
This and other similar remarks question central government's position of considering 
the provision of information to the public as inherently valuable. 
Allocation of resources 
The analysis of data showed that great emphasis is placed at all levels within LBBD on 
elements of the national PM regime, such as Best Value and the CPA. Moreover, as 
several respondents pointed out, if the organisation meets 'stretched' national targets, it 
is entitled to receive additional funding. It is interesting to notice that the Head of 
Leisure, Arts and Olympics was the person who most frequently mentioned the link 
between PM and resource allocation. In his case, the introduction of national targets and 
Pis meant that the service would receive more funding and attention both nationally and 
locally. 
Comparing perfonnance 
The opportunity to compare performance with other organisations was considered very 
valuable. However, lack of precise guidelines on national indicators and incoherence in 
the auditing process made some respondents raise issues regarding the accuracy and 
consistency of data and the real possibility of making meaningful comparisons. It 
should be noted, though, that there was even more criticism of local indicators as they 
were not external ly audited and could not be used to benchmark services' performance. 
Thcreforc, it is possible to argue not only that comparisons with other organisations are 
greatly valucd, but that they are also considered more effective if made through national 
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Pis. Moreover, although local politicians seem not to rely much on performance data, 
they arc said to act on the basis of cornparativc information. In this sense, it is 
interesting to note that different types of comparisons nrc considcrcd useful dcpcnding 
on the topics and services considered. In a numbcr of cascs rcspondclits valucd 
comparisons with local authorities in the London arca; othcrs with local authorities it) 
the whole country; finally, as in the case of education, intcrnational comparisons were 
described as fundamental in driving change and improving pcrforniancc. 
Dccision-makin 
The intcmal consistency and links bctwccn the different levels of LBBD's I'M system 
promote the use of performance information as a support to dccision-making processes. 
However, as some intervicwccs remarked, the excessive nurnbcr of targets and 
indicators and the frequent changes they arc subject to oflcn limit their potcntial to do 
so. Although intcn-clated, these two issues seem to originate from two differcrit causes. 
Modifications in national PIs are mostly due to changes in national policy and only 
partially open to influence by local organisations. On the other side, tile number of 
national indicators is fairly limited in the services considered, whereas local Pls account 
for the greatest part of indicators being utiliscd locally. Therefore, BVPIs arc modificd 
perhaps too frequently and on the basis of critcria local organisations could influence 
only to a limited extent. However, the number of indicators being uscd at the local level 
seems to depend more on the organisation than on national policy. 
Central control 
Several Pls are introduced by government departments and regulatory bodies with the 
aim of assessing the impact of national policies and ensuring hierarchical control. The 
majority of interviewccs favourably judged the Government's intervention in the ways 
the organisation measures and manages performance. Moreover, audit scores were scen 
as good indications of success and recent changes in the PNI regime, such as the 
introduction of LLAs, were welcome as stcps towards dcvolvcmcnt of powers from 
national to local. 
However, respondents involved in the actual measurement of performance demonstrated 
dissatisfaction as regards indicators that ccntre on 'head counts' or 'level of 
expenditure'. These Pls were contested, as their purpose is to enable central government 
to control local delivery, with no direct benefit for local scrviccs from the rcsourccs 
invested to gather, analyse and report data. 
Individual perfonnance and reputation 
At Barking and Dagenham PM is also used to assess the performance of individual 
employees, to understand their capabilities and training needs, and to motivate them. To 
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achieve these aims, links between corporate, service, team and individual performance 
were deemed very important. 71irough sufficient and coherent connections between 
these levels, I'M could enhance people's accountability within the organisation. In some 
intcrvicwces' opinion, this was a major reason for some employees' resistance to PM. 
Morcovcr, as many respondents crnphasiscd, the disclosure of performance information 
strongly affccts the reputation of the organisation. Therefore, from the point of view of 
building capabilities within the organisation, rankings and CPA scores have important 
implications on the external perceptions of the organisation as an employer and, thus, 
the possibility for it to attract talented and motivated people. 
PuLormance monitonnigand improvemcnt 
All intcrviewecs agreed that the use of appropriate targets and indicators is a primary 
way to foster service improvement. A number of respondents argued that PM is 
essential to understand if cffectivc progress has been made towards organisational 
objectives and ensure focus on service delivery. Moreover, evidence on current 
pcrformance could enable the organisation to identify areas that require improvement 
and action, and provide direction for improvement. 
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5.3.6 Cross-case comparison 
Building on the review of the literature and the preliminary cinpirical phase, two case 
studies were carried out in a fire authority - the Stokc-on-Trctit and StalTordshirc Fire 
and Rescue Authority - and in a local authority, the LBBD. I'lic first organisation is 
fairly small and utilises a simple PNI system, consisting mostly of national pcrronnancc 
targets and indicators. The second is a multi-scrvicc organisation, whose lcgal 
requirements and greater experience in PNI has rcsultcd in a n1ulti-lcvcI PNI systclil with 
more complex information flows. 
Despite these differences, it is interesting to notice that a large nurnbcr of similarities 
cmcrgcd from the analysis of the data. Nlorcovcr, by carrying out intcrvicws at diffcrctit 
organisational levels in both cases and in cmbcddcd units at LBBD, it is possible to 
state that issues raised by respondents at SFRA arc very similar to the ones cxprcsscd by 
people working at service level at LBBD. Furthermore, in both cases thcrc was 
substantial alignment between the documcnts reviewed and the responses given by the 
intervicwccs. From a methodological point of view, this greatly cnhanccd the validity of 
the research. 
However, there arc also differences bctwccn cases, mostly because of discrcpancies 
between organisational structures, number of functions fulfilled and experience acquircd 
in the measurement of performance. 11iis finding is in line with what was asscrtcd at the 
beginning of this empirical phase (cf. section 5.3). In the next scctions, both similarities 
and differences are discussed in relation to the main thematic areas explored. In chapter 
6 these findings are linked to the litcrature and the previous empirical phase. 
Performance targets and indicators 
Despite differences in size and scope, the two organisations are remarkably similar in 
the ways in which they measurc and manage performance. Intcrvicwccs expressed 
consistently positive views regarding the usefulness of both Best Value and CPA in 
improving services and fostering a culture of performance within the organisation. 
Furthermore, CPA was considered as more systemic and holistic than previous schemes 
and, essentially, a substantial improvement in central government's approach to PNI. 
However, in relation to the design of specific Pis, insufficient details and lack of clarity 
and timeliness emerged as major concerns with the guidelines provided by the auditors. 
Furthermore, interviewees, at both LBBD and SFRA manifested tile need for their 
organisations to better recognise and capture the linkages bctwccn inputs, outputs and 
outcomes. Comments of this kind were linked to the strategic intent at local level to 
enhance the quality of life of citizens and contribute to the well being of the population. 
Similar perspectives were also expressed regarding tile introduction and use of local Pls. 
In both organisations local indicators are of1cn developed to detail and support the 
national ones and, to a certain extent, to better reflect local characteristics and issues. 
Therefore, greater importance was given to national Pis, because they arc audited and 
could be used to compare performance. 
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Although a number of common points emerged across cases, differences in structure 
and flows of performance information, most notably the existence of corporate and 
service levels at LBBD, are important factors that affect the ways in which performance 
is mcasurcd and managed. In LBBD, for instance, tensions were said to exist between 
service and corporate levels. On tile contrary, at SFRA substantial alignment could be 
observed between area commands and central departments. 
Sccondly, a great number of local indicators are being used at LBBD, whereas SFRA 
has not been very pro-activc in the design of local PIs. Both organisations clearly 
understand the value of integrating national and local indicators in order to have a 
coherent set of indicators. flowcvcr, at LBBD the use of documents like the Service 
Scorccard Pack and the organisation's Strategy Map arc important steps towards this 
goal, whereas at SFRA there was no evidence of the development of such tools. 
77he difference in number of local Pls and quality of PM systems is best explained by 
considering the different degrees of experience gained as regards to PM. At LBBD most 
people within the organisation arc familiar with the processes of design, implementation 
and use of Pls, whereas at SFRA, national Pls have been in place only for a few years. 
77hrough the analysis of documents it appears that the relatively recent use of keywords 
belonging to the New Public Management lexicon (e. g. efficiency, productivity, value 
for money) is a symbol of the change that is taking place within the fire service. In local 
government this discourse is more ingrained and widely present, as local authorities 
have used PM for a number of years. 
Inslitittionalpressures 
One of the most evident, and perhaps striking, findings that has consistently emerged 
during the interviews is the positive feeling respondents demonstrated in relation to the 
auditing process, which is increasingly perceived as open and participative. In both 
cases, relationships with auditors were depicted differently according to the job 
positions of the interviewees. At senior level, auditors were perceived as partners in the 
development of the measurement system. Senior managers described these relationships 
as collaborative and stated that the local organisation could feed information into the 
design of national targets and indicators. Further down the hierarchy, respondents 
considered their relationships with auditors and representatives of central government as 
less open and quite hierarchical. As a consequence, they described their perceived 
influence on the national PM regime as almost non-existent. Therefore, they regarded 
auditors almost uniquely as inspectors that should be clear in terms of guidelines and 
sufficiently experienced to assess the performance of the organisation. With regard to 
these issues, concerns were expressed, again quite consistently, at both SFRA and 
LBBD. However, in the fire authority most respondents stated that the non-achievement 
of targets is oflcn seen as a failure. In the local authority, probably because of longer- 
lasting and more established relationships with auditors, this was more rarely the case. 
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Strategy and organisational objectives 
Similarly to the case of relationships with auditors and ccntrul govcninicrit, diffcrclit 
opinions were expressed regarding strategy and organisational objcctivcs dcpcndinJ; on 
the job position of the intcrvicwccs. Remarks on stratcgy and 'joincd up* govcniniclit 
were made almost exclusively by people at senior lcvcl. 'Joincd up' govcninictit, was 
considered as still undcrdcvclopcd and difficult to achieve, but also vcry important and 
increasingly pervasive locally. Positive remarks were made in rclation to Ilic 
introduction of LLAs at LBBD and SFRA. 
However, in both cases greater synergies at central govcrnmcnt were advocated in order 
to achieve a really 'joined up' delivery of services and cffectivc partnerships at tile local 
level. The CFO and deputy CFO at SFRA were particularly conccmcd about the lack of 
strategic thinking in central govcmmcnt. According to thcm, pcrformancc: targets arc 
often used as a substitute for strategy and this has detrimental effects oil tile local 
provision of public services. This leads to 4targct fixation' for which tile achievement of 
targets is considered as more important than the actual delivery of services. 11iis critique 
made to central government is also linked to dissatisfaction with the current 
dcvolvcmcnt of authority and effective possibility of having 'joincd up' services. 
Moreover, respondents cmpliasiscd that local organisations nccd to focus on ways to 
improve the quality of life of local communities, rather than to reach target levels and 
comply with auditing critcria. Finally, for respondents working nearer the front end 
success and organisational objectives correspondcd prevalently to CPA scores and 
inclusion in top quartiles in tile national rankings. Therefore, they considered PM as a 
way to enhance performance against BVPls, rather than as a means to improve services. 
Leadership andperformance culture 
The expression 'performance culture' was of1cn used during the interviews at both 
organisations. Great attention was paid to ways in which targets and indicators could be 
used to drive service improvement. In particular, the issue of embedding a performance 
culture below middle management emerged similarly at both SFRA and LBBD. 
Different emphasis was put on leadership as a key factor for fostering a culture of 
performance within the organisation. At LBBD only one person referred to the new 
chief executive, whereas at SFRA the CFO's interest in Phi was considered as one of 
the main driving forces for the promotion of a performance culture. flowevcr, it should 
be noted that LBBD had already accumulated considerable experience in Phi and its 
previous CEO, who strongly supported the introduction of the Balanced Scorccard, also 
regarded Phi as a priority. The fire service has rcccntly been reformed and does not 
have extensive experience in Phi. Therefore, in both cases leadership has been a 
fundamental component for the introduction of Phi within the organisation. 
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Reasonsfor measuringperformance 
A number of points of view were expressed about the drivers and purposes for 
mcasuring performance at the local level. The main similarities and differences between 
cases are outlincd in relation to the themes identified (cf. sections 5.3.5 and 5.3.6 for 
greater details on each case and section 6.9 for a more thcory-informed analysis): 
Acquisition nnd n1location of resources 
Information on past performance plays an important role on how resources are allocated 
from central government to local public sector organisations, and, within organisations, 
from corporate to service levels. Given the importance of this issue, resource 
dependence constantly emerged in both cases, with CPA reviews and 'stretched targets, 
as primary examples. Achieving higher scores in the Comprehensive Performance 
Assessment implies not only that the organisation is entitled to receive additional 
funding, but also that it is less stringently examined by the Audit Commission and other 
auditors. Effectively, this means that the local organisation can use resources in a more 
liberal way. 'Stretched targets' refcrs to the possibility to apply for additional funding if 
in certain pre-defined areas the organisation achieves levels of performance above the 
national threshold. 
Central control 
Several Pls are set by central government to monitor performance and are used at the 
local level principally because it is mandatory to report on them. Although the influence 
of government departments and auditors is seen as dominant, the majority of 
intcrvicwccs agreed that the role played by institutions is necessary to promote change 
and improve services. Furthermore, it is interesting to notice that a great number of 
local indicators arc introduced to support the national BVPIs, ensuring that what is 
reported to the auditors is sufficiently accurate. Finally, even though national PIs were 
rarely contested, several intcrviewees advocated the introduction of PIs more related to 
outputs and service quality, as opposed to indicators that measure expenditure with no 
relation to the impact on the service delivered. 
Accountability and-reputation 
Since every public sector organisation is linked and often depends on a great number of 
stakeholders, the concept of accountability was mentioned during the course of most 
interviews, but with different connotations. Accountability could be used in relation to 
institutions and citizens, but also, from an internal perspective, to the links between 
corporate and service levels in the case of LBBD, and central departments and area 
commands at SFRA. However, the importance of using performance information to 
demonstrate performance to main stakeholders was never questioned during the 
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intcrvicws. Morcovcr, the analysis of docurncnts also confirnicd the pcrccivcd link 
bctwccn PM and local accountability, sincc CPA scorcs and Ircrids rclativc to BVI'ls arc 
oflcn includcd in a numbcr of both printcd and Intcnict documents. 11lis is ill contrast 
with the opinion cxpresscd by a numbcr of rcspondcnts that infonnatioll oil pcrfonliancc 
indicators and Icaguc tablcs is not vcry rclcvant for citizcns. llowcvcr, thcrc was 
agrccmcnt rcgarding the influcncc of pcrfoniiancc rcports oil the organisation's ability 
to bc pcrccivcd cxtcmally as an cmploycr of choicc. 
Benchmarkin 
Comparisons with othcr organisations wcrc much valucd in both cascs. League tabics 
and usc of quartilcs in ranking and rcporting pcrformancc on a national scalc, although 
somctimcs disputcd, wcrc rcgardcd as fundamcntal ways to promotc changc locally. In 
particular, local politicians wcre said to bc vcry rcactivc and drivcn by bcnchmarking 
data. Furthcrmorc, comparisons of pcrformancc could Icad to the idcntification and 
adaptation of good practiccs to local contcxts. 
5.4 Conclusions 
This chapter has presented the themes cmcrgcd from the analysis of the nine pilot 
interviews and the two in-depth case studies. 111c primary finding was that, despite the 
differences in size and scope of the organisations, the issues raised were particularly 
consistent across cases. First of all, somewhat uncxpectcdly, few respondents criticised 
the quite centraliscd PM regime, which pervades the public sector in England. 
Furthermore, both national and local targets and indicators were considered as generally 
appropriate and helpful. In both organisations PNI was rcgardcd as an indispensable 
clement to promote change and improve performance at the local level. In the in-dcptli 
case studies discrepancies in the responses could be idcntiricd by carrying out 
interviews at different levels within the organisations. Respondents working at 
corporate level focused on strategy, provision of "joined up' scrviccs and ways in which 
a culture of performance management could be fostered locally. Within services, more 
emphasis was given to specific issues related to the performance targcts and indicators. 
Although this is not surprising, it has substantial implications on pcopic's perceptions of 
the drivers and purposes of PM and, considering the links between national and local 
dimensions, on the perceived influence on the design of national Pls. 
Only a few discrepancies could be identified when performing comparisons between 
units of analysis in LBBD and between LBBD and SFRA. For example, in the fire 
authority greater emphasis was given to leadership as an element to promote the use of 
PM. This is mostly due to the relatively more recent introduction of PNI in the fire 
service. The acceptance of national indicators was regarded more favourably by the 
service of Leisure, Arts and Olympics at LBBD and by SFRA than the two other 
services considered. This is because, in line with the resource dependence argument, the 
introduction of PM influences the level of attention paid to services nationally and the 
opportunities for them to attract funding. As the previous sections show, the different 
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dcgrccs of experience acquired in PM, the types of organisational structures and number 
of functions fulrillcd by the services considered contribute to the explanation of the 
differences which emerged as a result of the analysis. 
176 
CHAPTER 6 
DISCUSSION 
This chapter brings together the thcorctical insights gained through the review or the 
literature with the themes which cmergcd rrom the analysis of the data. Since (his 
research is qualitative, it was possible not only to investigate the issues idcntificd ill tile 
literature, but also a number of topics that were not originally included in the research 
questions. The interviews undertaken in the two final case studies, in particular, shed 
light on scvcral aspects of PNI. 
In the following sections general remarks arc first made oil the empirical findings of tile 
research. Subsequently, the consistency of objectives, targets and indicators along the 
public sector hierarchy (i. e. the 'golden thread) is evaluated and the strategic responses 
enacted by local organisations to institutional pressures arc discussed. Concepts drawn 
from new institutional and resource dependence theories - i. e. the interconnection 
between legitimacy and efficiency, and the link- bct%vccn PM and resource dependence - 
arc also presented. This is followed by the examination of issues related to the design 
and use of performance targets and indicators. While these themes arc mostly 'theory- 
driven', issues of 'joined up' government and performance culture could be idclitificd 
through the analysis of the data. The chapter ends with tile discussion of tile main roles 
fulfilled by PM in local public sector organisations. Chapter 7 presents the main 
conclusions of the research, the implications for academics, practitioners and policy 
makers, and areas for further investigation. 
6.1 General remarks 
One of the most significant findings of this research is that great commonality of issues 
was found across the organisations considered. Although local public sector 
organisations can greatly differ in terms of internal structure, links with the cnvironmcnt 
and services provided, the analysis of documents and interviews show that they face 
similar challenges in relation to PNI. I'licreforc, although this is certainly challenging 
from an empirical point of view, it is believed that comparing problems and experiences 
across the public sector could lead to very interesting insights on how performance is 
and could be measured and managed. 
From a PM perspective, as the literature suggests (cE Carter ct al., 1992), differences 
between organisations could be explained by considering the number of services 
provided and the skills required to deliver them. However, experience gained in 
measuring performance also contributes to explain tile differences both between 
organisations and within services belonging to a single organisation. 
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A third major remark regards the pervasiveness of PM in the organisations studied. 
Since PM initiatives have been introduced in public services in England from the late 
1960s, the experience acquired in certain areas, such as local government and 
healthcare, is impressive. Indeed, the review of PM documents and the interviews 
conducted in a number of organisations revealed that PM is becoming a fundamental 
component in the ways in which organisations function. The analysis of the discourse 
confirmcd the importance of PM and tile influence of the New Public Management 
doctrine. Finally, it should be underlined that the interview protocol was developed on 
the basis of the literature, which is often very critical of the current performance regime. 
Nevertheless, even though questions focused on the problems organisations experience 
in their relationships with institutions, the responses obtained were by and large positive 
and few issues were raised by the respondents (cf. section 6.3). 
6.2 The'golden thread' 
The review of the literature shows that, although perfon-nance targets and indicators arc 
increasingly uscd in the public sector (flood, 2006), empirical studies are needed to gain 
a deeper understanding of their design and use (Streib and Roch, 2005). In this context, 
the mctaphor of the 'golden thread' is utilised by the Treasury and the Audit 
Commission to refcr to the consistency between national and local performance targets 
and indicators (Audit Commission, 2002). Therefore, the first question to be addressed 
in this research was: 
Does the metaphor ofthe 'golden thread'correctly represent the wayperformance 
targets and indicators are developed in public sector organisations in England? 
The researcher decided to undertake two exploratory case studies - in a Primary Care 
Trust and in a Police Force - to investigate the relationships between the PM systems 
being developed at national and local levels. The main result of this empirical phase is 
that the consistency in terms of targets and indicators is relatively low across the 
hierarchy in those two sectors. Subsequent interviews in a number of organisations and 
especially the in-depth case studies performed in a fire service and in a local authority 
reinforced this finding and provided greater clarity on why this is the case. Indeed, 
although the PM systems being used in government departments are often clearly 
structured, the systems in place at the local level arc not simply more detailed versions 
of the national. Rather, they are the result of diverse and sometimes competing 
influences exerted by a number of organisations besides government departments, such 
as auditing and professional bodies, inspectorates and regional institutions. Therefore, 
the local picture rcflects the objectives and targets expressed by national government 
only to a certain extent, as public sector organisations depend on a number of other 
external stakeholders, which can influence the design of local performance targets and 
indicators (Ilyndman and Eden, 2002). In this sense, the empirical analysis shows that 
in all the organisations considered PM was strongly linked to concepts of legitimacy, 
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powcr and rcsource dcpciidcncc, as indicatcd by ncw institutional thcory and rcsourcc 
dcpcndcncc theory (cf. Olivcr, 1991; Townicy, Coopcr and Oakcs, 2003). 
Moreover, as was clearly the casc in the firc and policc services, %vilcl, central 
govcmmcnt introduces new measurcincrit initiatives, old frameworks arc not necessarily 
removed. This also contributes to inconsistencies along the public scctor hicrarchy. 
Discrcpancics between mcasurcmcnt systems also cxist bcCausc or local organisations' 
dccisions to dcvclop local indicators that could bcttcr capturc local charactcri sties. 
flowcvcr, the in-depth analysis of the PNIS used in a local authority and a firc scrvicc 
showed that local indicators are rarely developed without taking the national ones into 
account. 
Therefore, it is possible to conclude that although central govcrnmcnt puts great 
emphasis on PM and consistency of objectives from national to local levels, the practice 
of the 'golden thread' in the public sector in England is not as consistent as might be 
expected. I'lic cases considered show that this is mainly due to the influcncc played by a 
number of other organisations and stakcholdcr groups, and the co-cxistcncc of more anti 
less recent PM initiatives. 
63 Organisational responses to institutional pressures 
A number of scholars have called for empirical studies to investigate the subject of 
strategic responses to institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991; Dirsmith ct al., 2000). In thc 
context of this research, central government departments and auditing bodies exert 
considerable pressure on local public sector organisations in terms of the design and use 
of performance targets and indicators. As a consequence, local organisations arc 
required to report on a number of national Pls. I-lowcvcr, public sector organisations can 
behave strategically (Mcycr and Rowan, 1977), by. for example, challenging the 
national PM regime, and developing and using more appropriatc local indicators. 
Therefore, the second research question investigates both the types of strategies adopted 
as a response to institutional pressures and pro-activity in the design of Pls: 
JPVch responses do local public sector organisations enact as a result of the 
institutional pressures toward conformity that are exerted on them? 
The triangulation of documents and interviews shows that local organisations are mostly 
acquiescent in relation to the ways in which national targets and indicators arc designed 
and their performance audita Indeed, local public sector organisations rely quite 
substantially on national indicators. However, there arc several masons for this. First of 
all, in such a centralised system, local organisations are statutorily required to report on 
national indicators and are strongly dependent on central government's resources. 
Therefore, they cannot pursue a clear opposition strategy. 
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Interestingly, even though if some national PIs are considered not useful or 
insufficiently clear, none of the intcrvicwccs really ever challenged the power 
rclationship bctwccn central and local government. However, this is not so much 
because of some kind of resignation towards the current PM regime. Rather, it is largely 
because of the appropriateness of national indicators and the acknowledgement that the 
promotion of PM in local public sector organisations requires the intervention of central 
government. Thus, the majority of intcrviewees expressed positive comments, 
notwithstanding the substantial body of academic literature and anecdotes reported by 
the media that critique the ways in which performance targets and indicators are set in 
the public sector in England. In other terms, this research contradicts some of the 
arguments put forward by critics of New Public Management and new institutional 
theorists (e. g. de Bruijn, 2001; Noordegraaf and Abma, 2003; Talbot, 2000; Townley, 
2002). 
Third, both civil servants and elected members greatly valued comparisons of 
performance between organisations on the basis of national indicators. Even though 
national league tables arc considered imperfect and sometimes overtly criticised, they 
are often treated as 'true representations' of actual performance and as having 
substantial effects on organisations' reputation. Therefore, all local organisations 
considered focus heavily on succeeding on meeting national targets and 'aim at top 
quartilcs'. 
Finally, the quality of relationships with external organisations is often described as 
satisfactory and improving. This is due to the perceived greater influence on the design 
of national indicators and the more participative and collaborative approach 
demonstrated by the auditors. According to a number of respondents, improved 
relationships with institutions also favours the adoption and use of national targets and 
indicators at the local level. As Martin (2002) argued, "current initiatives are though 
distinguished from previous reforms by the pursuit of a more consensual approach and a 
much greater emphasis on the need for 'joined up' working between local and central 
government" (p. 304). 
Regarding collaboration between local and national levels, interesting results could be 
obtained by interviewing people working at different levels within the local 
organisations (cf King, 2004). In particular, in the cases of LBBD and SFRA 
differences in perceptions were consistently found between corporate and service levels, 
and between management and staff working nearer the front-line. This could be 
explained by differences in their relationships with the representatives of govenunent 
departments and auditing bodies. CEOs and corporate directors have a fairly 
collaborative relationship with auditors and policy makers, whereas, moving down the 
hierarchy, people see auditors more as their 'masters' (Performance and Quality 
Manager at SFRA). Another explanation is related to the type of communication that 
takes place both within and between organisations. Discussions between top managers 
and auditors focus more on strategic issues related to the comprehensive performance of 
the local organisation. On the other hand, people involved in the collection and analysis 
of the data would mainly consider problems with the calculation of Pls. In case of a 
specific concern, their feedback would have to 'travel' a long way before reaching the 
organisation in charge of setting that Pl. This could explain why people at lower 
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hicrarchical lcvcls dcscribc the fccdback and influcncc ovcr mlional indicators and 
auditing proccsscs as problcmatic. 
Besides the differences in the perception over the influence oil national indicators, a 
major concern was expressed about the role played by central government in promoting 
change and service improvement through PNI. In all cases and at all levels considered, 
respondents remarked that national targets and indicators arc modified with too high a 
frequency. This causes frustration at the local level, since modifications in national Ills 
could only be influenced to a limited extent and because, when they happen with too 
high a frequency, it is impossible to calculate trends. As Martin (2002) put it, the danger 
of introducing so many changes in the system "is that many practitioners arc finding 
themselves swamped by initiatives and some authorities are buckling under the sliccr 
weight of reforms as resources that might otherwise have been devoted to the provision 
of better services and more effective community governance are having to be diverted 
into the apparently nevcr-cnding task of responding to the latest new initiatives from the 
ccntrc" (p. 305). Moreover, since local PIs arc oflcn designed to detail the national 
indicators, the introduction of new policies has both direct (e. g. through introduction or 
CPA, modification of BVPIs, ctc. ) and indirect cfTects (the local indicators have to be 
modified too) on the local PM systems. 
6.4 The interconnection between legitimacy and efficiency 
In the study of the relationships between local organisations and institutions, particular 
attention was paid to the link between legitimacy and efficiency. 71iis issue is very 
relevant for both the theory and practice of PNI. Although a number of scholars have 
referred to these concepts, especially in the organisation theory literature, the 
interconnections between legitimacy and cflicicncy have not been sufficiently studied in 
an empirical sense (Carruthers, 1995). Early new institutional ists have oflcn considered 
legitimacy and efficiency as dccouplcd and as two opposite ends of a spectrum. 
However, more recent studies have challenged this assumption (Abernethy and Chua, 
1996; Modell, 2001). 
In the context of this research, the link between cfficicncy and legitimacy corresponds 
to the examination of the relationship between instrumental work processes (i. e. the use 
of Pis) and the symbolic display of rational organisational practice (i. e. compliance to 
externally developed indicators). New institutional theorists argue that, once the 
organisation is legitimated in the eyes of its external stakeholders, it will focus on its 
operational activities, neglecting the procedures and tools that do not contribute to it. 
Some scholars (cf McKevitt et al., 2000; Carpenter and Fcroz, 2001) argue that public 
sector organisations simply report on national P Is, but no real internal use is made of the 
information gathered. If the concepts of legitimacy and cfficicncy arc at odds, then the 
data local organisations collect to satisfy external demands and report to institutions will 
not be used for internal purposes (Propper and Wilson, 2003; Cavalluzzo and Ittner, 
2004). 
Interestingly, in this research legitimacy and cfficiency emerged as connected and rarely 
in opposition. Indeed, several intcrvicwccs cmphasised that data collected to report on 
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the national indicators is oflcn uscd internally to allocate resources and make decisions. 
As prcviously rcmarkcd, this is not only because these indicators are statutory, but also 
bccause they are considcrcd appropriate. As Covalcski and Dirsmith (1988) notcd, 
organisations nccd to both confonn to social norms of acceptable behaviour and to 
improve their cfficicncY and cffectivcness. This research certainly supports this 
argumcnt, but these aspects very often appeared as interrelated and difficult to 
discriminate. 
Moreover, during the interviews communication also emerged as a very relevant issue. 
In this context it could be argued that the link between legitimacy and cfficiency is 
somewhat parallel to the one between perceived performance and operational 
performance. Ilowcvcr, although intervicwces often mentioned communication and 
reputation as key factors to ensure organisational performance, little action seems to be 
taken in those directions, e. g. information campaigns, direct communication to key 
stakeholders, initiatives to increase citizens' participation, etc. 
Tlicrcforc, from the comparison between theory and practice of PM, it is possible to 
conclude that analyses of organisational. performance should consider both symbolic 
and rational aspects. Moreover, attention should be paid to the conditions for which 
lcgitimacy-sccking and cfficicncy-cnhancing rationales and communication strategies 
interact and have 'non-lincar' effects on performance, for example through vicious or 
virtuous circles (cf. section 7.3). 
6.5 Resource dependence 
The interconnection between legitimacy and efficiency has been the focus of several 
studies undertaken by new institutionalist theorists. The second organisation theory to 
be uscd in this research is resource dependence theory, which focuses more on the 
concepts of power, critical resources and links between the organisation and its 
environment (Collier, 2001). In this research such concepts were particularly powerful 
to study the relationships between local organisations and institutions, and to examine 
the links between an organisation's departments. 
For local organisations it is a requirement to report on national indicators. Depending on 
the levels of performance they attain they are given greater operational freedom; 
therefore there is a substantial incentive for them to improve their performance along 
these dimensions (Geiger and Ittner, 1996). Greater effects on motivation are obtained 
when targets and indicators are linked to some form of financial reward. This could be 
observed in the case of 'stretched targets', but also in the introduction of Local Area 
Agreements (LAAs) in local government. 
The link between PM and resources was also very visible when, in the exploratory case 
studies, government departments were included in the analysis. In that case, 
departments welcomed increases in the number of national targets, since they implied 
more attention being paid to their areas of competence and, possibly, allocation of 
greater resources. A similar reflection could be made in relation to the analysis carried 
out in the Leisure service at LBBD. There, the Head of service was particularly positive 
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regarding the recent introduction of national indicators, bccausc the service would gain 
more importance at both national and local lcvcls. 
Tensions could be identified when studying the relationships bctwccn corporatc lcvcl 
and smices at LBBD, and between the central dcpartment anti arca commands at 
SFRA- On the one hand, services complained about the excessive influctice cxcrtcd by 
the corporate level. On the other, they complied with the decisions taken thcrc anti, 
although not always exactly as required, communicated the data they wcre rcilucstcd to 
report. Moreover, indicators developed within services, n1though somctimcs in grcat 
numbers, were always considered as less important than the national Pis. 
These findings support the argument put forwani in several studies in inanagcIncrit. 
accounting (cf. Abernethy and Chua, 1996; Collier, 2001) that it is very important to 
investigate not only phenomena in intcr-organisational contexts, but also the dymamics 
taking place within organisations. Interestingly, this minark rcsonatcs; with the work that 
established resource dependence as an organisation theory, since Ilfcffcr and Salancik 
(1978) focused specifically on the interactions between organisational units and 
departments. 
Thcreforc, it is possiblc to state that both within and bctwccn organisations, bccausc of 
the essential link between PM and rcsourcc dependence, similar phenomena tak-c placc. 
As in the case of the interconnection bctwccn legitimacy and cfficicncy, the concepts of 
power and resources should always be taken into account whcn examining the design 
and use of targets and indicators, which is also, but not solcly, a technical issue. 
6.6 The use of performance indicators 
The comparison between the themes identiricd in the literature and the issues emerged 
from the empirical phases led to the identification of a number of technical issues 
related to PM (cf. also chapters 4 and 5). In this sense, the main problem public sector 
organisations seem to be facing is related to the often unmanageable number of Pls in 
place. This certainly was a major concern in the police force, healthcare trust and local 
authority considered and also in most of the organisations where pilot interviews were 
conducted. 
A number of scholars (cf. De Bruijn, 2002; Talbot, 2000) have criticiscd the role played 
by central government in the process of setting targets and indicators. According to 
them, because of too many externally mandated Pls, "the public service in the United 
Kingdom is awash with performance data7' (Talbot, 2000, p. 63). Ilowcvcr, while this 
research confirms the tendency of public sector organisations to ovcr-measurc 
performance, complaints about the excessive number of indicators being used at the 
local level should not be directed only to central goverrinicrit. 
Indeed, government departments and audit bodies arc responsible for the indicators 
local organisations arc required to report on. But it is mostly the intervention of other 
organisations; and PM frameworks along the 'golden thread', and the introduction of Pls 
by local organisations themselves that make the number of indicators grow. For 
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example, the service of Safeguarding and Rights at LBBD has 18 national Best Value 
Pcrforniancc Indicators and 208 locally designed Pis; whereas the Revenue and Benefits 
service uses 28 national and 58 local indicators. Therefore, the empirical analysis shows 
that (lie system is more complicated than the traditional 'command and control' model 
suggests, and, although central government plays a crucial role, it is not fully 
rcsponsiblc for the number of Pis being utilised locally. 
It is interesting to further examine why local indicators are introduced. In the in-depth 
case studies two principal reasons for introducing local Pis emerged. Several 
intcrviewccs argued that local indicators were used to better capture local characteristics 
and the wants and needs of the community. However, particularly when the researcher 
went through all of the indicators with the analysts, local Pis seemed to be there mostly 
as "the back bonc to the national indicators" (Divisional director of Safeguarding and 
Rights at LBBD). In the local authority more detailed versions of the BVPIs were often 
introduced to ensure an accurate process of data collection at service level. In the fire 
authority it was more a case of holding area commands more accountable. In both cases, 
local indicators either focused on activities that would feed into the areas that auditors 
dccm critical, or were simply more 'specific' versions of national Pis, e. g. they required 
more frequent measurement and, when aggregated, would result in the figure the 
auditors requested. 
In synthesis, national indicators, although not prevalent in number, play a fundamental 
role in shaping local PM systems and are surely considered as more important than the 
locally designed ones. This is particularly relevant if we consider the complaint that a 
number of respondents reiterated, namely the high frequency of changes made to the 
national framework. As previously noted, when national indicators are modified, this 
affects local organisations not only directly, but also indirectly, since the local 
indicators have to be changed too. 
Furthermore, the introduction of so many Pis causes several problems locally. First of 
all, even in organisations that have successfully implemented complex PM systems like 
LBBD, there appears to be an under-utilisation of the information gathered. Although 
certain indicators arc surely obsolete, inappropriate or introduced mainly by government 
to control service' delivery, it is the large number of local indicators coupled with 
insufficient clarity on the purposes of measurement and the insufficient link between 
PM and strategy that determine this phenomenon. Interestingly, although several 
intcrviewees showed interest in the assessment of the costs and benefits of PM, no data 
could be found in relation to this; neither does the literature seem to help to a great 
extent (cf Hood ct al., 1998). 
Another issue to be identified through the analysis of data regards the relationships 
between Pis, and the connections between targets and indicators. At LBBD, the 
introduction of strategy maps (Kaplan and Norton, 2004) was particularly helpful in 
structuring the PM system and providing greater clarity for its use. In the other 
organisations considered this was not the case. In their study of UK government 
agencies, Hyndman and Eden (2002) argued, "it is surprising that so many of the 
perfon-nancc measures used in the annual reports could not be related to targets. [ ... ] If 
aspects of performance are being measured (and being valued) that are unrelated to 
targets, unrelated to objectives, and unrelated to the mission of the agency, there is the 
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danger of giving them an importance that cncoumgcs the production or, ror example, 
more of them or an improved quality rclatcd to them. [ ... I [11is] indicatcs a dcgrce or 
confusion that would appear to undcrminc the focus or the organisation" (pp. 22-23). 
This is in line with what was found in the case or the police rorcc and the Rcvclltlc and 
Benefits service at LBBD. In the fon-ncr, too many indicators arc linkcd to a fraction or 
targets; in the lattcr, too much importance is givcn to a small sub-sct or Ills. 
6.7 Strategy and 'joilled lip' government 
An important aspect to emerge from the interviews, although not initially included in 
the protocol, is the connection between strategy and Phi. and the possibility to have n 
'joined up' provision of local public services. In the case of the firc authority, the Chief 
Fire Officer and Deputy CFO argued that currently performance targets and indicators 
arc set following a process which is too ccntraliscd and fragmented. Central government 
was criticised as utilising targets in place of n real strategy for public service delivery. 
Moreover, although a ccntmliscd approach to Phi could help single organisations to 
become more performance focused, it could also be an obstacle to the achievement of 
higher quality of service for the community. The pilot interviews showed how 
inconsistent measurement across local public sector orgnnisations could be a 
considerable obstacle to collaborations and effective 'joined up' delivery. 
Intcrestingly, this contrasts with one of the very masons for introducing the Best Value 
regime, which was "to stimulate two major changes in stratcgy contcnt - innovation and 
partncrship" (Boyne, Martin and Walker, 2004, p. 195). Howcvcr, as several 
interviewecs noticed, better results arc being achicvcd. cs; pccially through the 
introduction of LAAs. Partnerships betwccn local organisations arc particularly 
important, because, as Boyne (2003) claimed, cffcctivc improvement in public scrviccs 
"is usually conccmed with the performance of multi-organisational nctworks rather than 
the achievements of single organisations" (p. 214). 
6.8 Performance culture 
Bovaird and Gregory (1996) noted, "performance measurement has undoubtedly had a 
major effect on the language of public service in Britain ( ... ) [and) performance 
management systems have become essential elements in demonstrating accountability 
to stakeholders. However, the extent to which the culture of the public sector has been 
aitcrcd is much more difficult to dctennine" (p. 270). The findings of this research 
support this argument and show how 'performance culture' is now regarded as a key 
issue in the public sector. 
During the pilot interviews and the in-depth case studies, the cxprcssion 'pcrformancc 
culture' recurred several times, although no explicit question focuscd on it. Ilowcvcr, 
the analysis of the responses demonstrates how rcspondcnts uscd this concept in two 
primary ways. Several interviewces related performance culture to pCoplc's 
understanding of where PM sits within the broader "performance managcmcnt picture'. 
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This corresponds to the capability of connecting single Pis and analytical pieces of 
inrormation to the organisation's objectives and comprehending how tile use of 
pcrfon, nance targets and indicators could contribute to their achievement. Other 
respondents referred more to focus of staff on PM, their ability to measure performance 
and, ultimately, to contribute to the achievement of high scores in the assessments 
undertaken by the auditors. 
Although the two perspectives may appear similar, there is a fundamental difference 
from an epistemological point of view. The fon-ncr perspective, which could be called 
'culture of performance managcnient', relates to the strategic use of performance 
inron-nation. In (his case, information acquired through the collection and analysis of 
data is considered as a means to ask relevant questions and, eventually, to attain the 
organisation's main objectives. From this perspective the links between targets and 
indicators and the flows of information that connect different organisational levels (and, 
in complex organisations, scorecards) are essential. 
The latter point of view, which could be referred to as 'culture of performance 
measurcmcnt', focuses on the achievement of performance targets and scoring highly in 
the national rankings. Smith (1995b) defines this problem 'measure fixation' - "an 
emphasis on measures of success rather than the underlying objective" (p. 290). This 
issue cmcrgcd especially during the interviews that involved people working nearer the 
actual delivery of services rather than at top management levels. Interestingly, the issue 
of 'measure fixation' also emerged in the context of the auditing process. According to 
a few intcrvicwccs, auditors sometimes interpret performance results in isolation; this 
has led to macroscopic mistakes (cf. remarks by assistant performance manager at 
LBBD) caused by excessive reliance on the figures and insufficient understanding of the 
real phenomena taking place. Thus, the current performance measurement regime was 
accused of having a negative impact on the creation of a 'culture of performance 
management' and, as previously remarked, also on the provision of integrated services 
to the citizenship. Moreover, although interviewees agreed that progress has been made 
in recent years, the imposition of performance targets and indicators and a 'culture of 
blame' emerged as barriers to the achievement of a performance culture within 
organisations. 
Therefore, it is possible to say that a top-down approach, on both national and local 
scalcs, seems to be a necessary, but not sufficient condition to foster a culture of 
performance management. Nationally, there appears to be excessive reliance on targets, 
rather than a cohesive and explicit strategy. Locally, leadership has proven to be 
essential in both SFRA and LBBD to promote the understanding and use of PM. Indeed, 
lack of leadership and management commitment have been indicated as the most severe 
problems in implementing PM systems (Neely and Bourne, 2000; de Waal, Radnor and 
Akhmetova, 2006). However, performance management has to be embedded also from 
the middle management level down, and, as often indicated during the interviews, 
greater inclusion and participation could help achieve this goal. 
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6.9 The drivers and purposes of perforinnitce measurement 
I'lic review of the literature and the exploratory Cascs; show that empirical studies are 
needed to gain a deeper understanding of the reasons why pcdonnancc is nicasurcd in 
the public sector (cf. section 4.4). The influcticc cxcrtcd by a nurnbcr of cxtcnial 
stakeholders on local public sector organisations and the autonomous dcvclopnIcnt of 
local Pis can result in a PM system that is too dispcrscd, difficult to manage and does 
not provide direction (Adams and Nfichch, 2005). Nforcovcr, the co. cxistcncc or 
competing performance measurement regimes and lack of clarity about priorities arc 
responsible for confusion and duplications locally. Finally, building oil tile reftclions 
made on measurement theory in chapter 3, the results of the mcasurcnicnt proccss have 
to be assigned according to the goals for which the mcasurcincnt is pcrfornied. 
Therefore, clarity on the purposes of PNI is not just important, but fundamcrital, as it is 
part of the measurement itself Ilicrcforc, through the pilot intcrvicws and in-dcpIh case 
studies the researcher aimed at answering tile following rcscarch question- 
IMat arc the roles ofperformance measurement in local public sector organisations 
in England? 
In both the fire service and local authority, similarly to what emerged in the cases of the 
police force and, healthcare trust, the identification of the role of the mcasurcmcnt 
system emerged as a primary concern. 111c following sections discuss the main roles of 
PM derived from the comparison between the literature and the analysis of the data. 
Subsequently, reflections on the drivers and purposes of performance indicators are 
presented. 
6.9.1 Central control 
As a good share of the public sector performance measurement literature suggests, it is 
possible to argue that national P? vI regimes (e. g. Best Value, PSA ctc. ) arc designed to 
control local delivery. As several intcrvicwccs remarked, sometimes ccntralisation 
seems to be the main reason for implementing a PNIS, rather than performance 
improvement. However, the majority of intcrvicwces agreed that the quality of services 
has to improve through PM, and that it is essential to havc institutional pressures to 
achieve improvement locally. 
Therefore, it seems appropriate to differentiate between two types of 'central control'. 
In a broad sense, 'central control' corresponds to central government's influence on 
how performance is measured locally. In a more strict sense, it rcfcrs to performance 
targets and indicators introduced by central government with the specific aim of 
monitoring performance at the local level. From the discussion of the organisational 
responses to institutional pressures (cf section 6.3) it is clear that the two connotations 
substantially differ. 
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If the first dcrinition is adopted, then it is evident that performance targets and 
indicators, both national and local, are primarily there in order to ensure central control. 
In fact, the ccntralisation of the system, the importance of national PIs and the 
development of local indicators on the bases of the national ones arc key characteristics 
of the current PM regime. 
If central control is considered in a more narrow sense, then the two in-depth case 
studies show that only a limited number of indicators arc introduced solely to monitor 
local performance. This is the case with PIs related to levels of expenditure or number 
of people employed in certain jobs. These indicators are relevant at central level, 
because they provide information on expenditure and allocation of resources, but they 
are rarely useful for internal purposes. This is why the performance analysts interviewed 
were particularly critical of these kinds of national PIs. 
Therefore, it is possible to conclude that all empirical phases confirm the absolute 
importance of government departments and auditing bodies in the development of 
performance targets and indicators. However, through a closer examination of their use 
at the local level, the national indicators rarely appeared to be there with the sole 
purpose of sustaining 'the myth of control' (Butterfield et al., 2004). Rather, they were 
oflcn found useful and essential in fostering a culture of performance management. 
6.9.2 Accountability 
During the empirical phases of this research, accountability was often mentioned among 
the primary reasons for measuring performance. Indeed, because of the considerable 
impact that public sector organisations have on people's lives (Pollitt, 1996), there is 
particular emphasis for these types of organisations to be accountable to a number of 
stakeholders (Wall and Martin, 2003). 
Broadly speaking, accountability is "the process via which a person, or group of people, 
can be held to account for their conduct. It is a concept which is contingent on the 
context which gives rise to the accountability relationship" (Glynn and Murphy, 1996, 
p. 127). At national level, central government has to demonstrate the appropriate and 
efficient use of public funds on behalf of the population. Therefore, it monitors the 
perfon-nance of local organisations and demonstrates to the electorate that national 
resources have been allocated on the basis of past and expected performance. In local 
authorities, for example, the Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) 
undertaken by the Audit Commission focuses on an organisation's "performance 
against other councils" and "direction of travel against other councils". Similarly, at 
local level, public sector organisations have to be responsive to public needs and show 
that taxpayers' money is being used appropriately. 
The analysis of the data gathered in all empirical phases shows that central government 
considers PM a fundamental means of ensuring accountability. In this context, the 
publication and availability of performance data is (also) aimed at informing citizens on 
the quality of public services (Royal Statistical Society, 2005). The very concept of 
'golden thread' implies that public sector organisations have to measure and report their 
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performance to demonstrate improvement in the services dclivcrC(l. As GI), nn and 
Murphy (1996) noticed, "accountability is demonstrated by ensuring that there are 
systems in place which provide infornintion about a dcrincd entity sufficicnt to enable 
informed judgments and decisions leading to an optimal allocation of resources and the 
accomplishment of objectives" (p. 129). According to Wall and Martin (2003), "public 
management change initiatives ( ... ) have occasioned n fundamental rethink of the role or 
public sector organisations and how they communicate with, and provide accountability 
to, their stakeholders. At the level of service provision, monitoring systems that rcvicw 
pcrfon-nancc arc seen as enhancing accountability to users and stakeholders of public 
bodies through the dissemination and regular reporting of KPIs. This is nchicvcd 
primarily through the medium of the annual report, which is commonly used as an 
cffcctive channel for the communication of perforniancc inronnation" (p. 506). 
It is interesting to notice how the findings of this rcscarch partly challenge the existence 
of the link between disclosure of infortnation and cffectivc public accountability (cf. 
Pollitt, 2006). Although the intcrvicwccs agreed on the importance of PNI and its role in 
fostering accountability, a number of them claimed that the public is actually interested 
in the services provided, rather than in information related to targets and indicators. 
Moreover, it was remarked that there is no evidence regarding citizens' use of 
performance information. 11crcforc, it was argued that, because of excessive reliance 
on data, there is a real danger of creating a disconnection between performance 
assessments and people's perceptions of local services. Furthermore, the interviews 
carried out in this rcscarch show that disclosure of data in the form of annual reports and 
league tables is not considered sufficient to promote public accountability. Rather, 
citizens" participation, co-production of services and the implementation of a diverse set 
of communication channels could make a greater contribution in this sense (Bovaird 
and Loeffler, 2003). 
Finally, from a more conceptual point of view, excessive reliance on the results of 
performance measurement could be seen as an example of the 'transcendental fallacy' 
(Ferraris, 2005), since performance is reduced to what is possible to measure of 
performance. Indeed, being accountable to the public means improving aspects of 
organisational performance, but also understanding what citizens most value and how 
the organisation can change their perceptions, also through their involvement in the 
design and delivery of the services themselves. 
6.93 Comparing performance 
A third important aspect related to PM is the opportunity to compare performance 
between and within organisations. From the analysis, three primary uses of comparativc 
data could be identified. First of all, a number of intcrvicwccs remarked that it could 
lead to the identification of good practices developed in other organisations or in a unit 
within the organisation itself, and, thus, to organisational learning and pcrfon-nancc 
improvement. 
Second, benchmarking in the public sector is usually pcrfonncd on the basis of national 
Pis. In this sense, organisations are encouraged to "get into the top quartilc in the 
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indicators that are considered to be the key ones" (Performance analyst at SFRA). As 
noted in the cases considered, relative performance is very important especially when a 
financial rcward is linked to national targets or 'stretched targets'. This argument is 
especially relevant from a resource dependence perspective. 
Third, the interviews carried out show that elected members and top managers are 
particularly sensitive to rankings and comparisons with other authorities. Thercfore, 
they tend to take action on the basis of such kinds of information, so much so that, as 
the Director of resources at LBBD stated, comparative data could be regarded as one of 
the main 'engines' for change at the local level. 
However, several issues were also raised. During both pilot interviews and in-depth 
case studies, respondents critiqued the use of league tables in the public sector in 
England. Lack of accurate and unambiguous guidelines on how to calculate and report 
on national indicators and incoherence in the auditing process recurred as relevant 
problems. Moreover, these concerns echo the criticisms made by a number of 
academics, who also claimed that comparisons between public sector organisations 
oflen have dysfunctional effects and that differences between authorities are rarely 
statistically significant (e. g. Adab, Rouse, Mohammed and Marshall, 2002; Goldstein 
and Spicgclhalter, 1996; Wiggins and Tymms, 2002). 
Building on the documents analysed in the exploratory phase of the research and, more 
generally, on central government's rhetoric, it could be argued that league tables were 
introduced mainly to enhance accountability and public choice. However, in contrast 
with this point of view, it is interesting to notice that respondents rarely focused on 
these aspects. Rather, they pointed out the impact of league tables on the organisation's 
resources and reputation and, consequently, the possibility for it to be perceived as an 
employer of choice. 
Another debated issue around league tables and national rankings regards the inclusion 
of contextual factors. Through the use of coefficients it would be possible to discount 
tile effect that local socio-economic characteristics have on service quality. Surprisingly, 
although the two in-depth case studies were carried out in organisations that operate in 
disadvantaged areas, intervicwees expressed disagreement regarding the inclusion of 
contextual factors, since this could lead to complacency and under-performance. 
Finally, following Bowerman et al. 's (2002) analysis of benchmarking in the public 
sector (cf section 4.4), 'compulsory benchmarking' could be found in a high number of 
instances, and was highly valued by the interviewees and given prominence in the 
documents analysed. Organisations also mentioned examples of voluntary 
benchmarking, which, however, were considered less important than the former, since 
they could only be undertaken on a smaller scale (e. g. comparisons between London 
Boroughs rather than among all English local authorities). Finally, no clear examples of 
defensive benchmarking could be identified. 
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6.9.4 Nlanagcrial use 
The fourth main role of pcrforniancc: nicasurcnicrit, which rclIccts most of the private 
sector literature, is to influence behaviour and action in ordcr to improve scrvicc 
delivery. In the two in-dcptli case studies, respondents oflcn dcscribcd the cfficicnt 
allocation of resources as an important condition to achieving improvcnicrit in scrvices. 
SFRA's mediumAong-tcnn improvements strategy docunictit, for example, states that 
PM "will ensure that the most appropriate resources arc located to best protcct the 
community" (originally in bold). From the intcrvicws carricd out in a number of 
organisations it was possible to conclude that pcrformancc rcports arc also uscd as 
supporting evidence to assist management in making dccisions. Moreover, the use of 
pcrformance information could also help to idctitify training nccds at individual lcvcl 
and opportunities for building capabilities within the organisation. Finally, top 
managers and board mcmbcrs remarked on the importance of Phi in the rormulation, 
development and refreshment of strategy (cf. chapter 5). 
In conclusion, it is possible to state that the principal clcmcnts idcntiricd in the litcraturc 
in relation to 'managerial use' - stratcgic dircction-, ticcision-making; resource 
allocation; and organisational Icaming (cf. section 4.4 ror more dctail) - have n1so 
emerged from the analysis of documcnts and interviews. 
6.9.5 Conclusions 
This research explicitly investigated the roles of performance measurement in the public 
sector from both theoretical and empirical points of view. Although interesting 
contributions could be found, two principal issues emerged from the review of tile 
literature. First of all, the articles written on this topic arc seldom cmpirically grounded. 
Second, authors tend adopt different foci. A number of scholars looked at the reasons 
for measuring performance in a general sense, i. e. ranging fmm control to 
accountability to performance improvement (Smith, 1995b; Kopcz)mski and Lombardo, 
1999). Others concentrated on the intcmal/managcrial uses of PNI (c. g. Bovaint and 
Gregory, 1996; Bchn, 2003; Pidd, 2005). Finally, a thini group focused almost 
exclusively on central control (Power, 1997; Townley, 2002; Butterfield ct al., 2004). 
Therefore, the researcher's purpose was to reconcile the different perspectives present in 
the literature and compare them with the data gathered. The initial aim was also to 
develop a taxonomy of the roles of PM in the public sector. The goal was not only to 
dcfine categories that are independent and could cxhaustivcly capture the drivers and 
purposes of PIs in the public sector, but also to classify every PI in use in the 
organisations considered. 
However, while undertaking the two in-depth case studies, the researcher rcaliscd that 
the boundaries between the categories defined in the literature can of1cn be blurred and 
very difficult to define. More importantly, the interviews demonstrated that it is 
virtually impossible to define a system of independent and hierarchically related 
categories in which each PI could be univocally 'labelled', since every indicator is 
usually used for more than one purpose. In other words, a PI could be utilised to 
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enhance accountability, but at tile same time to improve operational performance. 
Indeed, one of the main findings of this research is that, as all interviewees remarked, 
data relative to national indicators is collected and analysed not only to report to 
auditors and government departments, but also for internal purposes. 
It is interesting to note that this is in opposition to a considerable body of academic 
literature and media reports, which emphasise the coercive nature of the current 
performance measurement regime, without really investigating how the same type of 
information could be, and actually is, used within organisations. Although central 
government certainly uses PM to monitor performance and exert control over local 
organisations, there is evidence that a good proportion of national targets and indicators 
arc considered appropriate and useful to promote change and improve performance 
locally. 
Therefore, the previous analysis of the roles of PM is not aimed at specifying which 
driver and purpose any indicator should have or prescribe the role it should fulfil. 
Rather, it is to investigate and provide greater clarity on the main reasons for 
introducing and utilising performance indicators. Indeed, what both the theory and the 
data suggest is that it would be incorrect to assume that all indicators have similar 
purposes and to consider them as equal. 
However, the cases considered show that during both the design and use of Pis, it is 
clarity about those roles that is often missing. In particular, since the demands of the 
different stakeholders are several and sometimes conflicting, it would be important to 
specify the 'drivers' of each indicator, i. e. the stakeholder group(s) that determine which 
aspects of performance are measured. Secondly, the objects that the indicator would 
contribute to reach or accomplish (i. e. its 'purposes') should also be made explicit. 
Through the specification of the drivers and purposes of each indicator, it is believed 
that substantial progress in the use and acceptance of PM could be attained. 
Finally, it is interesting to note how the issue of the drivers and purposes of PM is 
linked to the relationship between legitimacy and efficiency. As previously discussed, in 
tile literature there is a tendency not only to think of a scale that extends from legitimacy 
to cfficicncy, but also to consider which roles of PM contribute to the enhancement of 
either one or the other. However, this research shows that these concepts are often 
intertwined in a dialectical relationship. In other words, since in the relationship 
between legitimacy and efficiency both attributes of responsiveness and distinctiveness 
are present, it is possible to argue the two concepts are loosely coupled (Weick, 1976; 
Orton and Weick, 1990). Thus, each role of PM could contribute to the achievement of 
efficiency gains and, at the same time, to legitimise the organisation in the eyes of its 
key stakeholders. Therefore, the definition of each performance indicator could include 
not only the specification of its drivers and purposes, but also the indication of its 
expected effects on both rational and symbolic aspects of performance (Scott and 
Meyer, 1983). 
1 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS 
The research reported in this thesis focuses on the interactions between local public 
sector organisations and institutions (e. g. rovcmiiicnt departments and audit bodics. ) in 
the development of pcrfbrrnancc measurement targets and indicators. Contributions 
from a number of different fields were reviewed in order to ground the research in the 
literature. Two organisation theories - new institutional theory and rcsourcc dependence 
theory - were utilised to framc the theoretical research questions and intcrprct. the 
empirical findings. The literature depicts the relationships between local public sector 
organisations and institutions as of1cn problematic and conflicting. Thcrcrorc, attention 
was paid especially to the conflicts between organisations and the strategic responses 
enacted by local public sector organisations as a result of the pressures exerted on them 
by institutions. This led to the following conceptual research questions: 
" Mat are the relationships benvecit local public sector organisations and 
institutions in the development ofpcrforinance targets and indicators? 
" What are the strategic responses. conflicts, tensions and behariours that arise? 
From an empirical point of view, the English public sector is a very interesting context, 
since performance measurement (PNI) initiatives have been introduced frorn the late 
1960s and the current PNI system is particularly ccntraliscd. In recent years, government 
departments and the Audit Commission have used the metaphor of the 'golden thread' 
to express the consistency between objectives, targets and performance indicators 
throughout the different levels of the public sector from central government to service 
delivery. Through greater consistency, it is argued, it is possible to enhance 
transparency, accountability and, ultimately, service performance. Since this issue has 
rarely been empirically studied, two exploratory case studies were carried out in public 
sector organisations in England -a police force and a healthcare trust - to answer the 
following research question: 
Does the metaphorofthe 'golden threadcorrccilyreprescrit the waypcrfonnance 
targets and indicators are developed in public sector organisations in England? 
The case studies enabled the researcher to gain a better understanding of the issues 
associated with the process of cascading performance targets and indicators along the 
hierarchy that constitutes the public sector in England. Furthermore, they showed that 
the use of the 'golden thread' metaphor may be inappropriate, since the national and 
local PM systems considered arc not as aligned as might be expected. Finally, the roles 
fulfilled by PM in the public sector emerged as a primary concern at both theoretical 
and practical levels. 
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The first cmpirical phase, although very important, has limitations due to its almost 
exclusive reliance on publicly available documents. Therefore, in order to evaluate the 
possible breadth and depth of the final empirical stage of the research, pilot interviews 
wcre pcrfon-ned in nine organisations from different areas of the public sector in 
England. These interviews showed that there is considerable commonality of issues 
across the public sector. Moreover, several themes emerged from the analysis of the 
data and similarities were found between the organisations considered. In line with 
Carter ct al. 's (1992) work, the main factors that seemed to differentiate the ways in 
which pcrrortnancc is mcasurcd at the local level were the heterogeneity and complexity 
of the organisation. Multi-scrvice organisations such as local authorities and healthcare 
trusts use PM systems that arc much more articulated than those being adopted by less 
complex organisations such as police forces and fire authorities. In Carter et al. 's (1992) 
tcn-ns, the fon-ncr arc more heterogeneous and complex organisations, since they have to 
mobilise a numbcr of different skills in order to deliver a wide range of services. 
Building on the literature and previous findings, the last empirical phase of the research 
addressed the following research questions: 
Witch responses do local public sector organisations enact as a result of the 
instilutionalpressures toward conformity that are exerted on them? 
What are the roles ofperformance measurement in localpublic sector organisations 
in England? 
To answer these questions two in-depth significant case studies (a fairly simple fire 
service and a more complex local authority) were chosen on the basis of a theoretical 
replication logic (Yin, 1994). The former case is holistic, whereas the second is 
embedded, since the researcher considered the corporate level and three services within 
the authority, which were theoretically sampled (Eisenhardt, 1989). The data 
triangulation of interviews and documents, and comparisons across units of analysis led 
to the identification of a number of themes and to the refinement of previous findings. 
From a methodological point of view, the qualitative approach chosen meant that the 
phases of data collection and data analysis were often interlinked. Furthermore, the 
preliminary results obtained at each stage were presented at academic and practitioner 
conferences and seminars. This iterative process and the decision to have three 
empirical phases contributed to strengthening both the rigour and the relevance of the 
research. This process also enabled the researcher to modify the constructs and structure 
of the research on the bases of the development of his thinking (Voss et al., 2002). In 
particular, the framing and analysis of the two in-depth case studies were not only 
influenced by the previous literature review and empirical insights, but also from 
conversations the researcher had had with a number of scholars operating in several 
disciplines, and from his review of the epistemology of measurement. In this sense, it 
was very helpful to have kept a record of how ideas evolved during the course of the 
research (cf. Suddaby, 2006). 
The choice of conducting a qualitative piece of research led to the identification of a 
considerable number of themes, which were either derived from the theory or emerging 
from the data. One of the most significant findings of this research is that, in contrast to 
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prcvious studics; in this arca, local public scctor organisations wcrc found to bc 
mcasuring pcrfonnance for a numbcr of diff4mit. mmsons. Although nradmics nnd 
journalists alikc havc oftcn dcpictcd English local public scctor organisations as having 
to continuously mcasure and rcport tlicir perfortnance to gownimcnt t1cpartinctits and 
audit bodics, 'ccntral control' cmcrgcd as only onc of the roIcs fulfillcd by IINI. 
Furthcnnorc, not only are the rcasons for nicasuring pcrfoniiancc quitc divcrsc, but it is 
oflcn the casc that a singic pcrromiancc indicator could bc utiliscd for diffmnt 
purposcs. 
The analysis of the data shows that the dcrinition of the drivers and purposes of 
performance indicators has important implications for the design and implementation or 
an organisation's PM system. However, at present there seems to be insufficicrit clarity 
with regard to this. On one side, this is due to the ways in which targets and indirmtors 
arc designed at a national level. Lack of a clear and cohesive strategy, and insufficicilt 
collaboration between govcnimcnt departments were signalled as determinant causes or 
the fragmentation of the local PM systems considered. Moreover, n1though the current 
pM regime certainly favours centmlisation, a number of organisations and stakeholders, 
besides government departments and auditors, influence the design or tile pcrfon1lancc 
indicators (Pls) being used at the local level. 11iis causes duplications, confusion nild 
frustrations locally. On tile other side, a plethora of indicators is ollcii developed by 
local organisations themselves and this can make PNI systems costly and difficult to 
manage. Therefore, insufficicnt clarity regarding the drivers and purposes of PM could 
lead to confused messages and countcr-productivc approaches to performance 
measurement and management. 
Considering the stakeholder groups that determine which aspects of performance arc 
measured (the 'drivers' of PM), government departments and audit bodies exert 
considerable pressures on local organisations through national targets and indicators. 
Local organisations are statutorily required to report on national Pis and depend heavily 
on them for resources, operational freedom and reputation. I-lowcvcr, it was also found 
that local organisations introduce their own performance indicators, sometimes in great 
numbers. Therefore, although national Pis are considered as most important, local 
indicators could be present in greater quantities than the national ones. As opposed to 
what is often maintained in the literature, in all of the organisations considered tile 
majority of national indicators were deemed appropriate and licipful. In other words, 
even if local organisations can influence the design of the most relevant Pis only to a 
limited extent, this does not necessarily mean that the Pis in use do not reflect the 
organisations' main characteristics. Moreover, during the interviews, institutional 
pressures were oflcn depicted as necessary conditions for promoting change at the local 
level and achieving service improvement. 
However, a particular lack of clarity was found in relation to the purposes of PNI. In tile 
case of the police force, a large number of Pis coupled %vith insufficient prioritisation 
led to the development of a PNI system that is confusing and difficult to manage. In the 
local authority considered, although the Balanced Scorccard was consistently cascaded 
at service level and strategy maps adopted, people in charge of gathering and analysing 
the data were sometimes puzzled regarding the reasons why certain aspects of 
per-formance were being measured. 1"his was particularly the case of PIs related to 
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expenditure and head counts, since they are designed by central government to monitor 
local performance, but not to directly improve the quality of local services. 
The two in-depth case studies confin-ncd what previously had been found in terms of 
similarities across the public sector, and that differences in organisational heterogeneity 
and complexity strongly influence the design of local PM systems. Another 
fundamental issue to emerge from this empirical phase regards the level of experience 
acquired in the measurement of performance. In particular, leadership was pointed out 
as a crucial element for the promotion and development of PM systems at the local 
level, at both SFRA and LBBD, whereas greater pro-activity in the design of local Pls 
was found within the services in which PM had been in place for longer. 
The development of a performance culture emerged as a priority in all the organisations 
considered, even though no explicit questions focused on this issue. However, the very 
concept of 'performance culture' was utiliscd with different connotations. This reflects 
differences in the perceptions of PM existing within organisations. For people working 
at corporate level, performance culture means understanding how PM could contribute 
to better performance management and service improvement. Nearer the frontline 
service delivery, the focus is more on the achievement of performance targets and 
reaching a good position in the national rankings. This research shows that efforts 
aimed at improving local service delivery should be directed to the creation of a 'culture 
of performance management' (the former), rather than a 'culture of performance 
measurement' (the latter). 
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7.1 Implications 
The researcher bclicvcs that, by creating knowledge that is finnly grounded in theory 
and relevant to practice, it is possible to improve our understanding or pcrrorniancc 
mcasurcmcnt and managcinctit in the public sector. Ilic objective of this research is to 
advance the theory and practice of PNI, to impact on policy-miking and to improve the 
ways in which targets and pcrfomiancc indicators arc set and used, licticc having n 
positive cffcct on the services delivered. 
The following sections describe the main implications this research has at a number of 
levels. From a theoretical viewpoint, contributions tire made to the ficid of I'M and to 
the empirical use of organisation theory. In 1cruis of methodology and method, the 
researcher found that the itcrativc comparison of theory and data was csscntial to 
investigate issues that are relevant to both theory and practice. Morcovcr, the use of case 
studies and the data triangulation of interviews and documents lcd to the iftntificatioli 
of several 'rich' themes. Finally, this research also has important implications for policy 
makers and for the design and use of performance targets and indicators in the public 
sector. In sections 7.2 and 7.3 the limitations of the research arc presented and a number 
of areas that rcquire further research arc examined. 
7.1.1 Implications for theory 
This research considers several issues, such as the drivers and purposes of PNI, the 
influence of conflicting demands and pressures from institutions on local organisations, 
and the existence of 'golden threads' in the public sector in England. From a theoretical 
point of view, concepts from new institutional theory and resource dependence theory 
are related to the literature on PNI in the public sector. This contributes to bridging the 
gap bctwcen applied and theoretical approaches (Covalcski ct aL, 1996; Nicrcditli and 
Samson, 2002). In particular, the interconnections between legitimacy and cfficicncy 
arc addressed both theoretically and empirically (Carruthers, 1995; Mizruchi and Fein, 
1999). 
Comparing the theory with the empirical results obtained, it is possible to observe how 
the research findings challenge several theoretical and practical arguments advanced by 
diverse groups of academics. First of all, legitimacy and efficiency and, more broadly 
speaking, rational and symbolic aspects of performance were found to be loosely 
coupled (Weick, 1976), rather than in opposition, as argued by early new 
institutional ists (cf Mcycr and Rowan, 1977; DiNtaggio and Powell, 1983). Indeed, 
individual performance indicators could be used for different purposes, contributing to 
the improvement of services delivercd and, at the same time, to the establishment of the 
organisation"s reputation. In this sense, the acquisition of legitimacy and improvement 
in organisational efficiency should be conccptualised as a process, rather than a state, as 
has been the case of previous studies (cf Dccpbousc, 1996). 
Second, the adoption of these 'theoretical lenses' enabled the investigation of 
phenomena taking place in both intcr- and intm-organisational contexts. In particular, it 
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was possible to consider aspects related to strategic choice, power relationships and 
resource dependence. These could then be linked to more technical issues, such as: 
design of targets and indicators, reporting and use of performance information, and 
perceptions of the auditing process. The empirical analysis shows that in all the 
organisations considered PM was strongly linked to the concepts of power and resource 
dependence (Collicr, 2001; Townley, Cooper and Oakes, 2003). This was evident while 
cxnmining not only the relationships between local organisations and government 
dcpartmcnts and auditors (e. g. use of league tables and 'stretched targets'); but also the 
links between the central department and area commands in a fire service (e. g. detailing 
of national indicators) and between corporate and service levels in a more complex local 
authority (e. g. use of Scorccard packs). Therefore, similarly to what has been previously 
stated regarding the link between legitimacy and efficiency, concepts drawn from both 
applied and theoretical bodies of literature should be taken into account if we want to 
gain a deeper understanding of PM in the public sector. 
Thirdly, external drivers for PM were found to not always have detrimental effects, as 
often maintained by the critics of New Public Management (e. g. De Bruijn, 2001; 
Townley, 2002). Rather, the role of institutions, although sometimes described as too 
invasivc, was often found to be beneficial in promoting the implementation and use of 
PM systems in local public sector organisations. Moreover, the recent introduction of 
Local Area Agreements and a more co-operative approach to auditing were widely 
acknowledged as positive developments in the relationships between central and local 
levels. 
Analysis of the data also shows that several stakeholders, besides government 
departments and auditors, influence the design and use of performance indicators being 
used locally. In various instances, local organisations themselves were found to develop 
a considerable number of PIs. Moreover, indicators could be used for several purposes 
and not just to control the delivery of services. Although this research covers a number 
of aspects related to PM, further empirical studies are required to gain a deeper 
understanding of the roles fulfilled by PM in the public sector (cf. section 7.3). 
Another implication for research in this field is the consideration of the public sector as 
a whole and not of specific parts of it. The majority of studies carried out in the public 
sector tend to look at just one area (e. g. local goveniment, healthcare, police etc. ) 
drawing conclusions mostly relative to that sector alone. However, as previously shown, 
although local organisations substantially differ in the services they provide, because of 
the common PM regime, many similarities exist in the ways in which perfon-nance is 
measured and managed. 
Finally, although it could be argued that the philosophy of science is very relevant to the 
development of a field such as PM, very little attention has been paid to its ontological 
and epistemological bases. Chapter 3 discusses the implications of adopting an 
objective ontological and subjective epistemological perspective, integrating the 
formulation of a realist ontology of social objects (cf. Ferraris, 2003) with reflections 
based on the foundations of measurement in physical science (cf. Mari, 2007). In 
particular, the introduction of concepts like objectivity, empiricity, specificity and trust, 
as developed in the 'relativistic perspective' in physical science, could contribute to the 
advancement of PM as a field in social science. 
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7.1.2 Implications for methodology and inethod 
The decision to complement the initial review of the literature with three ia C11111 fie, I 
phases (i. e. exploratory case studies, pilot interviews, in-depth Case studies) cnablcd tile 
identification and examination of issues that arc rclcvant to both theory and practicc. 
*11iis was achieved through a process in which theory and data wcrc continuously 
compared and concepts rcrincd. Ilic iterative combination or dcductivc and inductive 
approaches led to results which "fit tile data, because theory building and data collection 
arc closely intcrlinkcd" (Gill and Johnson, 2002, p. 152), but which also support or 
challenge existing theories. Morcom, close engagement with tile ficid led to tile 
attainment of "rich descriptions of organisational practice" (Alirctis and Dcnt, 1998, p. 
3). 
Grounding the research in both the acadcrnic literature and current practice not only 
suits the characteristics and interests of the rx: scarclicr (cf. section 3.3.5), but it could 
also have implications from an cvidence-bascd management point of view (cf. 
Rousseau, 2006). While quality dimensions, such as rcplicability, reliability, construct 
validity, and internal and external validity were taken into account, credibility and 
practical relevance were considered as fundamental criteria. 
The choice of undertaking a qualitative piece of rcscarch led to the investigation of a 
wide range of issues, either derived from theory or idcntiricd through the analysis of tile 
data. Furthermore, it enabled the researcher to examine new relationships and new 
dynamics, and be 'surprised' by the preliminary empirical findings. Conducting case- 
based research also meant that the research questions could evolve over time and tile 
constructs be developed during the course of the research (Voss ct al., 2002). 
In this sense, the researcher agrees with Dycr and Wilkins (1991) regarding the 
importance of selecting cases that could lead to the idcntirication of new theoretical 
relationships and the questioning of old ones. 11irough the use of case studies it was 
also possible to analyse the interactions bct%%, ccn different organisations as well as to 
consider aspects related to intra-organisational dynamics, thereby challenging new 
institutional theorists' emphasis on organisational field level studies (DiNtaggio and 
Powell, 1983). 
In terms of data elicitation methods, the availability of documents on PNI in the public 
sector in England was certainly useful in order to explore the concept of the 'golden 
thread'. However, the pilot interviews followed by the structured intcrvicws, 
triangulated with a wide range of documents which enabled the study of a number of 
issues that would not have emerged if the research had relied solely on tile analysis of 
available documents. This is in contrast to previous studies carried out in this area 
which based their conclusions almost entirely on publicly available documents such as 
annual reports (cf Wall and Martin, 2003; Johnsen, 2005). Finally, the 'within-case 
analysis' for SFRA and LBBD helped the researcher to become familiar with the 
patterns of the single cases, before looking at patterns across cases (Eisenhardt, 19S9). 
Moreover, the selection of respondents from different hierarchical levels led to the 
identification of quite different perceptions of Phi within organisations. 
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711crcforc, this research hopes to contribute to a wider use of case study as a research 
strategy in the field of PM. Using either a different method, e. g. survey, or data sources, 
e. g. limiting them to publicly available documents, would not have provided the 
richness of issues and characteristics it was possible to be exposed to through the use of 
case studies and interviews. 
7.1.3 Implications for policy and practice 
"[T]ruth is not the only goal of science. We want something more than the basic truth: 
we are looking for the interesting Inith, the truth that is difficult to achieve. ( ... ) Basic 
truth is not enough: we look for answers to our problems" (Popper, 1969, p. 184 - 
researcher's emphasis). Although the idea of 'truth" has particular connotations in 
Popper's critical rationalism, which makes it different from 'truth' as intended in the 
rcalist paradigm (cf. chapter 3), the researcher fully agrees with the emphasis Popper 
puts on the practical relevance of science. 
Interestingly, studies in both public administration (Streib and Roch, 2005) and new 
institutional theory have been accused of being too theoretical and having "a hard time 
in providing practical recommendations" (Farashahi, Hafsi and Molz, 2005, p. 15). But, 
this researcher wants his work to contribute to the practice of PM in the public sector. 
Therefore, while carrying out the fieldwork, the researcher adopted a critical perspective 
on the government's actual performance measurement and management strategy. 
Systems and processes being used at different levels of government to measure and 
manage performance were considered. The appropriateness of the 'golden thread' 
metaphor was critically assessed and the responses deployed by local organisations to 
institutional pressures were examined. 
One of the main implications for policy makers stems from the analysis of the purposes 
and drivers of PM. It is believed that the reflections presented in this dissertation could 
foster a fruitful debate on the ways in which targets and indicators are currently set in 
the public sector in England. As Behn (2003) argues, "the leaders of public agencies can 
use performance measures to achieve a number of very different purposes, and they 
need to carefully and explicitly choose their purposes. Only then can they identify or 
create specific measures that are appropriate for each individual purpose" (p. 588). In 
this research, however, little clarity was found with regard to this at either national or 
local levels. As previously stated, this is due to a number of reasons. 
First of all, a clearer national strategy that is shared by government departments could 
foster the creation of a more 'joined up' approach to service delivery. Despite the 
ccntralised nature of the current PM regime, weak co-ordination between central 
departments appears to cause lack of integration at the local level. Second, more 
delegation of powers to local public sector organisations, as is happening through Local 
Area Agreements, could lead to more effective ways of setting priorities and allocating 
funds to satisfy citizens' wants and needs. Thirdly, the complexity of the links existing 
between national and local levels should not be underestimated. In particular, central 
government, audit bodies and any other organisations which influence the design and 
use of local targets and indicators must be better co-ordinated. In the case of the Primary 
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Care Trust, for instance, the Department of Health anti thc 11calthcarc Commission 
required the organisation to measure and report on similar issues, but with divcr5c 
frequency, using different datascts and calculating the indicators in dissimilar ways. 
Furtlicn-norc, as remarked regarding the cases of the firc authority anti policc force, 
older and more recent PNI frameworks should not be n1lowcd to co-cxist, since this 
contributes to create confusion locally. 
Accountability is another issue examined in this research that is highly relevant ror 
policy-makcrs. The British Government has oflcn behaved as if providing the c1coorate 
with infon-nation was inherently valuable and pcrfoniiancc information could help 
citizens make more effective choices. I lowcvcr, the majority of intcrvicwccs argual thnt 
the public is generally uninterested in performance indicators and league tables; n, 111cr, 
they arc more concerned about the quality of a limited set or services. Therefore, 
building on further research in this area, the Government might rc-think its 
communication strategy and the mechanisms through which nccountability is currently 
guaranteed in the public sector (Pollitt, 2006) (cf. section 6.9.2). 
Comparisons of performance bctwccn and within organisations emerged as a very 
relevant topic. However, it seems that league tables, rather than bcnchmarking, are the 
primary focus of attention, despite concerns expressed by a number of distinguished 
practitioners and academics (cf. Royal Statistical Society, 2005). As discussed in 
section 6.9.3, not only can the use of league tables have significant unintended 
consequences, but also their validity is at best questionable. This is partly related to the 
consistency of the audit proccss. Indeed, a number of intcrvicwccs argued that greater 
and more positive influence on local services could be achieved by having more 
prepared auditors and ensuring that communications to local organisations is as timely 
and unambiguous as possible. However, regarding the relationships bctwccn national 
and local levels, it should be pointed out here that the more collaborative and 
participative approach demonstrated by the auditors in the Comprehensive Pcrfonnancc 
Assessment was greatly valued locally. 
From the point of view of a local public sector organisation, the main challenges with 
the current performance measurement regime were effectively summarised by the 
Corporate Director of Customer Services at LBBD: "Getting it to be consistent, not 
overlapping, not duplicating, getting the focus in the right areas and getting the 
management of performance to follow the measurement of performance properly". 'Me 
analysis of the data shows that a number of factors should be taken into account during 
the introduction of a PM system in a local public sector organisation. Several themes, 
such as the competence of auditors and performance analysts, and the consistency of 
comparisons between organisations have been described in previous sections of this 
dissertation (cf 6.8). But, more importantly, involvement and collaboration were 
regarded as essential elements for the successful implementation of a PNI system. 
Participation was mentioned in relation to three types of relationships: between 
organisations along the 'golden thread"; within organisations (e. g. between employees 
working at different levels); and between local organisations and the public (cf LBBD's 
'community priorities'). Leadership was also considered very important; as Bovaird and 
Loeffler (2003) state, "in order to solve 'wicked" problems successfully it is important 
to identify the most relevant stakeholders - and to decide how best to cngagc with them, 
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to mobilisc tlicir cfforts and to reconcile conflicts between them. This is the key role of 
public Icadcrship" (p. 170). 
In tcnns of culture of pcrfon-nance management, local organisations seem to struggle to 
cffcctivcly explain to people working in the front line that collecting and reporting 
information is an activity that, although time consuming, has an important, albeit often 
indirect, impact on service delivery. This could be achieved through greater staff 
involvement in the design and use of Pls, but also by making infonnation flows clearer 
and showing how the elements of the PM system (and the organisation) arc connected. 
If this does not happen, organisations incur the risk of creating a highly fragmented 
system, in which "performance measurement tends to generate only single-loop 
Icarning. What is easier to measure gets measured, without reflection on policy 
assumptions or institutional designs" (Yang and Holzer, 2006). 
Furtlicn-nore, in cases where an excessive number of Pls is present, "what gets measured 
just gets measured" (Corporate Director of Resources at LBBD). Rather, an efficient 
and effective approach to PM presupposes the understanding that, "because of their 
usually tentative nature, performance indicators should be seen as 'screening devices' 
and not ovcr-intcrprcted" (Royal Statistical Society, 2005, p. 1). Indeed, "no 
performance infon-nation is other than partial, imperfect, and indicative" (Bovaird, 
1996, p. 147). 
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7.2 Limitations 
ilia limitations of this rcscarch arc dctcniiincd by tile choices madc on thcorctical and 
methodological levels and by the personal characteristics of the author. Front n 
theoretical point of view, the conjoint use of resource dcpcndcticc thcory and new 
institutional theory influenced the conclusions that could be drawn in this study. 
However, it could be argued that the adoption of any theoretical lens would dctcniiiiic 
which aspects to cqnsidcr, and give prominence to specific concepts and attributes. 
Therefore, it would be interesting to investigate similar topics utilising other theories 
and perspectives (cf. section 7.3). 
From a methodological point of view, given the lack of empirical studies that look at 
how the relationships between institutions and local public sector organisations 
influence the ways in which performance is measured locally, this mscarch is of a 
predominantly exploratory and descriptive nature. 11is is also determined by the choice 
of an objectivist ontology and a subjective epistemology, for which rclcvancc and 
understanding, and not prediction, arc regarded as the ultimate goals of research. 'I'lic 
cases considered provided the researcher with sufficient data to expand tile cxisting 
theories, but other cases carried out in different settings would contribute to tile gaining 
of a deeper comprehension of the issues examined. 
The reviews of the literature and tile empirical analysis show that there is substantial 
commonality of issues across the public sector in England in ilia ways in which 
performance is measured and managed. Given the importance or tile structure or tile 
public sector, the diversity of approaches to (new) public managcilictit, and ilia variety 
of ways in which services are supplied to tile public in different countries, the findings 
of this research mostly regard local public sector organisations in England. However, 
the conclusions might be of interest to public sector organisations operating in other 
countries in which similar issues am present, eg. tensions and conflicts; between and 
within organisations; fragmentation of performance measurement systems; difficulty to 
provide 'joined up' services at the local level, ctc. 
In terms of personal characteristics, the review of the literature, although systematic and 
extensive, was influenced by the researcher's subjective structuration of tile process and 
identification of the main thcmes. Similar reflections could be made regarding tile 
analysis of the material gathered in the empirical phases. In this sense, it could be 
argued that the previous knowledge possessed and philosophical perspective adopted by 
the researcher played a very important role in this study (cf. section 3.3.5). Ilicrcfom, it 
would be interesting to have other research projects carried out on similar topics by 
academics with different backgrounds and adopting divergent perspectives. 
Following these remarks, promising avenues for further research are examined in tile 
following sections. 
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7.3 Further research 
Review of literature and analysis of the data have led to the identification of a number 
of areas that require further research. From a theoretical point of view, the scarce 
utilisation of organisation theory in the field of performance measurement was 
identified as a major issue. Similarly, several gaps were also identified through the 
review of the pcrfon-nance measurement and public management literatures (cf. chapter 
2 for more detail). Moreover, further research is nceded to examine in greater depth the 
implications of measurement theory for the theory and practice of PM (cf. chapter 3). 
I'lic empirical analysis contributed to gaining a deeper understanding of a number of 
aspects, some of which have been discussed in the previous sections. Furthermore, it 
showcd how, by appropriately accounting for a number of differentiating factors, 
studies in the area of PM could consider the public sector as a whole without necessarily 
focusing on separate areas witMn it. However, future research is needed to investigate 
the drivers and purposes of performance measurement in the public sector and to further 
the cmpirical examination of key concepts such as legitimacy, efficiency and 
accountability. 
Building on these rcflcctions, this section presents a selected number of avenues for 
further research. The inclusion of other categories of respondents and the consideration 
of different units of analysis and perspectives could enrich and complement the findings 
of the research. Moreover, future studies could investigate both rational and symbolic 
aspects of PM in greater depth. Finally, other theories and perspectives could be used to 
look at the issues discussed in Us research through different 'lenses'. 
7.3.1 Categories of respondents 
In the two in-depth case studies, the researcher decided to ask questions on fairly 
specific aspects of PM and, therefore, to interview people who are particularly involved 
in the measurement of performance. However, this could prevent certain aspects, such 
as cultural resistance and expression of different identities within organisations, to 
emerge. Therefore, future studies could focus on other categories of respondents, whose 
perceptions of PM have been investigated almost solely in an indirect way in this 
research: 
,D professionals and front-line workers 
e local politicians 
o cnd-uscrs. 
In some organisations such as healthcare, the role of professionals (Jespersen, Nielsen 
and Sognstrup, 2002) and professional power (Cheung, 2002) should not be 
underestimated. A number of studies have been carried out to examine the involvement 
of professionals and front-line staff in the design of PIs (e. g. Rayburn and Rayburn, 
1997) and the very possibility of having management control within organisations that 
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havc strong tcclinical foundations (Sclicid-Cook, 1990). I'licrcrorc, it would be 
intcrcsting to complcmcnt the data gathcrcd in this rcscarch with intcrvicws with social 
workcrs, gcncral practitioncrs, policc officas, firc fightcrs, ctc. 
During the course of the research, intcrcsting rcmarks were made rcgarding the lack of 
involvement of locally c1cacd mcmbcrs in the dcsign and use of pcrfonnancc 
indicators. On the one hand, they were pictured as rarcly using pcrfonnancc data in Ilicir 
spccches, and communication; on the other hand, they wcrc said to be quite rcactive 
particularly to comparisons of performance with ncighbouring organisations. INS was 
confirmed by the clcctcd mcmbcr intcrvicwcd at LBBD. Ilicrcforc. future studies could 
focus on local politicians and their use and influcncc on the PXI systcm. 
Ilis research concentrated on the perceptions of people wotking within public sector 
organisations, but did not directly explore the opinions of end users. Comparisons 
between responses obtained from people working in local organisations and citizens 
could also shed light on important issues, such as communication, trust and public 
choice, which were discussed in this research only to n lirnitcd cxtcnt. With the 
inclusion of other categories of respondents, the analysis of the prevalent discourses 
would be strongly advisable, especially to identify the diffCrent priorities and rationales 
existing between the groups under considcration. 
7.3.2 Units of analysis 
Although the exploratory case studies focused on the "golden threads' in healthcare and 
police services, the subsequent pilot interviews and case studies considered local public 
sector organisations as units of analysis. Future studies could also investigate the 
concept of 'golden thread' in greater depth by directly examining the positions and 
perceptions of audit bodies and government departments. 
These studies would provide a 'vertical' perspective of P, %I, since they would consider 
the delivery chain, i. e. how the 'golden thread' is deployed from the ccntrc to the 
periphery. A 'horizontal' perspective could look at tile consistency of targets and 
indicators between different public sector organisations that operate in the same area. 
This topic was only partially investigated in this research, %vlicn issues related to the 
concepts of 'joined up' government, partnerships and Local Level Agreements were 
discussed. Therefore, it would be interesting to undertake a piece of empirical rcscarch 
that focuses on the impact of tile ccntralisation of the system on the links between 
organisations operating at the local level. 
Utilising a micro-level of analysis (perhaps adopting a resource dependence or agency 
perspective) further work could focus on intra-organisational dynamics at an individual 
level, i. e. bargaining processes between actors and interpersonal power relationships 
within and between organisations. 
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7.3.3 Comparativc 1)crspcctivcs 
Although difficult to perform, cross-national comparisons would be very welcome on 
the issues examined in this research. In particular, it would be interesting to carry out a 
longitudinal study to observe the impact of PM on processes, bchaviours and cultures in 
organisations which operate in countries where performance measurement is currently 
being introduced. 
Although comparisons between public and private sector organisations are rarely 
undertaken, this research suggests that techniques developed in one sector could be 
adaptcd to the other (e. g. strategy maps - cf section 4.3.4). Therefore, future studies 
could focus on the possibility of transferring PM tools and techniques to different 
settings. Furthermore, it would be interesting to investigate similar issues in public and 
private sector contexts. Institutional isation (Casile and Davis-Blake, 2002), responses to 
change (Roy and Seguin, 2000) and leadership (Moore, 1995), for example, could be 
considered. Finally, tensions between national and local public sector organisations 
could be compared to those existing between parent companies and subsidiaries in 
multi-national companies or groups of firms (cf Michcli and Agliati, 2007). 
7.3.4 Measurement 
A number of studies have focused on specific measurement issues, such as the 
quantification of outputs and outcomes (cf. Smith, 1996) and the inclusion or exclusion 
of contextual factors in the calculation and presentation of league tables (cf Royal 
Statistical Society, 2005). However, further work is required in these areas and, as 
emerged from the interviews, this could have a very relevant impact on practice. 
Following the reflections presented regarding the 'relativistic perspective' in 
measurement theory, pragmatic aspects, such as costs, benefits, specificity and trust in 
PM should also be studied in greater depth. These issues also reflect the concerns 
expressed by a number of interviewces on the substantial resources involved in the 
measurement of performance. Therefore, it would be very interesting to carry out an 
empirical study of the costs and benefits of the measurement and reporting of 
performance. In practice, different units of analysis could be considered, e. g. 
organisation, service, team and individual, and estimates of cost could be coupled with a 
study of tangible and intangible benefits (Gray, 2005). 
7.3.5 Reconciling applied and theoretical approaches 
Applied studies in the field of PM have often investigated the effects of performance 
measurement on organisational efficiency (e. g. Neely and Bourne, 2000). On the other 
hand, organisation theorists have examined behavioural and socially constructed aspects 
of PM (e. g. Covaleski et al., 1996; Etherington and Richardson, 1994). This research 
shows that 'applied' and 'theoretical' perspectives are complementary, and argues that 
206 
in ordcr to havc a more comprclictisivc picturc of pcrfomiancc mcasurcinctit, IlIcsc 
pcrspcctivcs should bc rcconcilcd (cf. chaptcr 2). 
One way to do this would be to follow the approach adoptcd by Allison nnd Zcliko%v 
(1999) in their work on dccision-making. In the study of rationil nnd symbolic aspcCts 
of PM, research could conccntrntc on two levels of atinlysis - inter. and intra. 
organisational. Moreover, it could considcr two 'modcls': the first is thc rntional 
model', for which the organisation functions on the bases of proccsscs, tools and 
techniques aimed at improving cfficicncy and cffectivcncss. 'Flic sccond - more linkcd 
to dimensions of organisational behaviour - looks at the sense of lcgitiniation, routincs, 
structures and cultures present in organisations. 
Traditionally, the applied literature has mostly adoptcd the fornicr modcl. whcreas the 
theoretical literature has paid attention almost exclusively to the laticr. As shown by 
Allison and Zclikow (1999), the combination of diffcrcnt models could be vcry 
powerful to describe and explain complex plicnomcna. 
7.3.6 Theoretical perspectives 
A number of alternative perspectives could be adopted to study issues similar or related 
to thosc investigated in this research. For example, the interviews undcrtakcn in the firc 
authority and borough council show how the implementation of a PM system has 
profound implications for the ways in which organisations operate. In particular, for the 
successful implementation of a PNIS, not only is a strong leadership clement required, 
but also the organisation has to go through a process of substantial change. 
Therefore, a change management perspective could be adopted. In so doing, it would be 
possible to explicitly consider the temporal dimension or the process of 
institutional isation and study how change takes place not necessarily in a unirorm 
manner. In the two in-depth case studies used in this rcscarch, CEOs and senior 
management embraced PM as a way to manage the organisation, whereas a 
considerablc time lag was (and still is) required for the change to spread fmin middle 
management down. This research shows that differences in the relationships with 
auditors and participation in the development of the PNI system influences the use and 
perceptions in relation to the measurement system. Thus, a change management 
approach could focus on the links between pace of change and interactions with the 
promoters of the change - in the English case, mostly government departments and 
auditors - and the embedding of a PNIS within an organisation. 
From an institutional perspective, a longitudinal study could look at the transition from 
a traditional" approach to auditing and inspecting to a more advisory one. Furthcnnorc, 
empirical research in services such as waste management, which are strongly regulated, 
could investigate the impact of (changes in) laws in PXI and organisational functioning. 
Longitudinal studies could also shed light on the cvolution of the roics of PNI at the 
local level. 
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To conclude, other organisation theories, besides new institutional theory and resource 
dependence theory, could be adopted. Section 2.5 discussed a number of issues and 
opportunities for further research from three perspectives: contingency theory, resource- 
based view of the firm and agency theory. The latter approach would be particularly 
interesting in the context of this research, as concepts drawn from agency theory could 
help to explain the links between organisations along the 'golden thread'. In essence, 
agency theory is based on the premise that agents, although working for principals (the 
owners of the organisation's assets), have their own agenda to pursue and that this 
agenda will not necessarily align with the principals' interests. Hence the need for 
control mechanisms - performance measurement and incentive systems - designed to 
ensure alignment between the priorities of the principals and the activities of the agents 
(Halachmi and Boorsma, 1998; Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991; Ittner, Larcker and 
Rajan, 1997; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
In the public sector it is not immediately clear who the principals arc. From a 
departmental perspective it could be argued that the Treasury is the principal. Yet 
members of the Treasury itself, and particularly elected officials, might argue that the 
electorate is the principal. However, the Treasury's objective is "to raise the rate of 
sustainable growth and achieve rising prosperity and a better quality of life, with 
economic and employment opportunities for all", while one of its ten sub-objectives is 
to "improve the quality tind the cost effectiveness of public services". Hence the 
Treasury implicitly sees itself either as the principal or the principal by proxy. its 
interest is in ensuring that the agents - government departments and agencies - pursue 
courses of action that arc in the principal's best interests. 
Furthermore, the concept of information asymmetry, which is central in agency theory, 
plays a major part in the behaviour of both principals and agents in the design and 
implementation of PMS. Specifically, agents will seek to minimise the extent to which 
PMS require them to provide that performance information, which would allow 
principals to better understand those parts of their activities where they currently have 
the most valuable discretion (i. e. discretion which allows them to meet their own 
objectives, at the expense of the principals'). For example, PCTs are likely to resist, 
both explicitly and covertly, new measurement procedures, which would reveal in more 
dctail how they contribute to alleviating health inequalities locally. This is either 
because it is an area where they perform poorly or because local health professionals 
resist the idea that they should be distorting their resource allocations to achieve social, 
rather than health, policy purposes. 
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7.4 Dissemination and communication 
During the course of the research, provisional results have bccn communicatcd and 
discusscd with both academics and practitioners. Since the study of pcrfonll. 'Incc 
measurement and managcmcnt is by dcrinition multi-disci pl i nary, the rcscarchcr has 
tried to reach, and receive the fccdback from, diffcrcnt audicticcs. llicrcforc. 
presentations have bccn made at coiifcrcnccs attcnded by scholars with diffcrctit 
backgrounds and working in areas as divcrse as: managcnicnt accounting, public 
administration, operations, organisational bchaviour anti stratcgy. Ili= articles have 
already been published in pccr-revicwcd journals (in the ficid of opcrations) anti one is 
currently under review (in a public administration journal). In the months subscqucnt to 
the completion of the thesis, the rcscarchcr is planning to submit four papcrs to journals 
in the fields of managcmcnt accounting, public managcincrit, strategy and opcrations. 
Presentations before practitioner audiences have been made at a numbcr of confcrcnccs 
and workshops. As remarked in section 3.4, the rcscarchcr has bccn co-ordinating the 
Centre for Business Performance's Public Sector Performance Roundtable for somc 
time. This has represented a key opportunity not only to gain access to data, but also to 
discuss findings and explore their implications with managers intcrcstcd in the 
measurement of performance in the public scr%iccs. In 2006 the researcher has also co- 
ordinated the organisation of, and presented at, the successful confcrencc Wanaging 
performance in the public sector', which was held at IN Treasury in London, UK. 
Finally, the researcher has already published in a number of practitioners" magazines 
and newsletters. 
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Number of 
"rinds" In the Key targcts BSC Indicators Itchition/Slitillarity 
document 
A&E (8) Patients waiting No finds No rclition 
for four hours or 
less in A&E 
Access (29) Access to GP Access to dctitistry; Access to scrviccs 
and to PCP access to services in Inight clicomIxIss 111C 
general (patient access to GP and PCP, 
survey); access to but the way the survey 
services for early is structurcd is not 
unintended pregnancy. reported. I lowcvcr, tile 
data sources arc not 
the same. 
Antibacterial No finds Prescribing rates of No relation 
drugs (2) antibacterial drugs_ 
Appraisal (9) No finds GP and staff nppmisnis No rchition 
Canccr(8) Briefly about Cervical screening; No relation 
smoking quitters mortality rates 
Cervical No finds Number of screening No relation 
screening (3) performed 
_ Child and No finds Audited needs and No relation 
Adolescent investment 
Mental Health 
Services 
(CAMHS)-(10) 
CHD (3) No finds CHD register No relation 
Child protection No finds Compliance to child No relation 
(3) protection systems and 
procedures 
Circulatory (6) No finds Circulatory diseases No relation 
_ community (4) No rinds Community equipment No relation 
and community-bascd 
care 
Dentistry (6) No rinds MIS dentistry No relation 
_ Diabetic (4) No finds Diabetic Rctinopathy No relation 
Screening 
Equity (8) No finds Health Equity udit No relation 
Ethnic (6) No finds Data quality on ethnic No relation 
groups race cquali! y) 
Flu (4) No finds Flu vaccinations No relation 
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GP (35) Access to GP GP practices related to Little relation 
Coronary Heart 
Disease (Cf ID) and to 
drug misuscrs; GP ý 
appraisal; Access to GP 
out-of-hours care 
Human Resource No finds Human resource No relation 
.Q 
management 
Immunisation (2) No finds MMR vaccine No relation 
Infant (3) No finds Infant health No relation 
Infon-nation (11) No finds Better information: No relation 
more choice 
Inpatient (14) Inpatients Inpatients waiting Strong relation, 
waiting longer although different 
than standard sources of data arc 
considered 
Mental (11) No finds Child and adult mental No relation 
health; drug 
prescription 
Outpatient (7) Outpatients No finds No relation 
waiting 
Pregnancy (11) No finds Teenage pregnancy; No relation 
sexual health; infant 
health 
Primary Care Access to a No finds No relation 
Professional (or Primary Care 
PCP) (9) Professional 
Race (4) No finds Race equality No relation 
_ Safety (5) No finds Staff opinion survey:, No relation 
health, safety and 
incidents 
Sexual (3) No finds Sexual health No relation 
_ Smok* (21) Four-wccks Advices on CHD No relation 
smoking quitters treatments; Infant 
health 
Staff (37) Staff working Sufficient number of Staff opinion surveys 
lives staff to ensure service; and the plan to 
Staff opinion surveys improve staff working 
lives have common 
features, but the 
sources of data are 
different 
_Suicide 
(10) No finds Suicide audit No relation 
Survey (39) Primary Care Patient surveys; staff Different sources of 
Access Survey opinion surveys information 
(source of 
information) 
Teenage (10) No finds Teenage pregnanc No relation 
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Tclcplione (4) No finds Single tclcplionc acccss No relition 
Transfcr (6) A&E waiting Dclaycd tr. insfcrs of No mlation 
timcs c 141 rc 
Waiting (27) Inpaticnts and Paticnts waiting, Strong relation. 
outpaticrits; Inpaticnts waiting n1though diffcrctit 
waiting sourccs ordit., nre 
I considcml 
Working livcs (3) Improving I N finds 1 No rclation 
working li cs 
ý 
1! 
Tabic 1: 1 lealthcare Commission - Intcrnal consisicncy 
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Number of 
" Department of Healthcare Commission "rinds III tI IC Health (Doll) (11C) Relation/Similarity document 
A&E (2,8) Patients waiting Patients waiting for four Very similar, although 
no more than hours or less in A&E the second part of the 
four hours, or DOH one is not 
no more than present in the HC 
one hour in document 
A&E 
Access (2,29) Access to GP Access to GP and to Partly similar 
and to PCP; PCP; access to dentistry; 
access to crisis access to services in 
and CAMFIS general (patient survey); 
services. access to services for 
early unintended 
pregnancy. 
Accountability Enhance No finds No relation 
(2,0) accountability to 
patients - Antibacterial No finds Prescribing rates of No relation 
drugs (0,2) antibacterial drugs 
Appraisal (0,9) No rinds GP and staff appraisals No relation 
Cancer (2,8) Mortality rates Cervical screening; Partly similar 
mortality rates; smoking 
quitters 
Cervical No finds Number of screening No relation 
screening (0,3) performed 
Child and Access and Audited needs and Very similar, the HC 
Adolescent increase in investment for CAMHS indicator is more 
Mental Health CAMHS detailed 
Services services 
(CAM11S) 
(2,10) 
CHD (0,3) No finds CHD register No relation 
Child protection No fffids Compliance to child No relation 
(0,3) protection systems and 
procedures 
Circulatory No finds Circulatory diseases No relation 
(0,6) 
. Community No finds Community equipment No relation 
(0,4) and community-based 
care 
1 N. D.: Since the I lealthcare Commission's document is more detailed, the dissimilarity in the numbers of 
rinds also depends on the different document size. flowcvcr, the comparison of the two documents is 
based on the areas they cover and the type of indicators, rather than a mcre comparison of quantities. 
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Dentistry (0,6) No finds NI IS dentistry No mlation 
Diabetic (0,4) No rinds Diabetic Rctinopithy No relation 
I 
-Screening _ Drug (4,29) Drug misuscrs Drug rnisuscrs and Similar areas, but 
and treatment -treatment; shaml 
care difTercrit indicators 
Education (4,1) Education of Teenage pregnancy No relation 
children 
Effectiveness Service No finds No relation 
(3,0) cffcctivcncss; 
service 
cffcctivcness 
indicator for 
NIIS and PSS 
Eff icicncy (2,0) Cost cf'ricicncy No finds No relation 
and cost 
cfficicncy 
indicator 
Equity (0,8) No finds 11calth-Equity Audit No relation 
Ethnic (0,6) No finds Data quality on ethnic No relation 
groups (race equality) 
Financial (0,43) No finds Financial managemcnt No mlation 
(planned, support ctc. ) 
Flu (0, No finds Flu vaccinations No relation 
GP (2,35) Access to GP, Access to GP; GP Partly related 
patients choice practices related to 
Coronary Heart Disease 
(CHD) and to drug 
misuscrs; GP appraisal; 
Access to GP out-of- 
hours care 
Human No finds Human resource No relation 
Rcsource_(0,3) management 
immunisation No finds MMR vaccine No relation 
(0,2) 
_ Infant (2,3) Infant mortality Infant health The indicators are not 
rates related 
Information No finds Better information: more No relation 
(0110- 
- 
choice 
Inpatient (4,14) Inpatients Inpatients %%-aiting One indicator is in 
waiting common, another 
(11C)_is nt 
Life expectancy Reduce Health equity audit Same issues, but 
(3,1) inequalities different performance 
I measures 
Mental (1,11) Child mental Child and adult mental Just partly related I 
health health; drug prescription 
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Older people Quality of life Transfers of care and Same areas, but 
(1,3) and community equipment different performance 
independence of measures 
older people 
(support at 
home) 
Outpatient (3,7) Outpatient Outpatients waiting Same issues, but 
waiting different indicators 
Pregnancy No finds Teenage pregnancy; No relation 
(0,11) sexual health; infant 
. 
health 
Primary Care Access to a Access to a Primary Care One indicator is in 
Professional (or Primary Care Professional common; more 
PCP) (1,9) Professional specific ones are 
introduced by the HC 
_Race 
(0,4) No finds Race equality_ No relation 
Safcty (0,5) No finds Staff opinion survey: No relation 
health, safety and 
incidents 
Service (13,58) Service Service improvement The word is widely 
improvement used in a generic 
sense in both 
documents 
_Sexual 
(0,3) No finds Sexual health No relation 
Smok* (0,21) No finds Four-weeks smoking No relation 
quitters; Advices on 
CIID treatments; Infant 
health 
Staff (0,37) No finds Staff working lives; No relation 
Sufficient number of 
staff to ensure service; 
Staff opinion surveys 
Suicide (2,10) Reduce death Suicide audit Same issue, but 
rate from different ways of 
suicide measuring it 
Survey (1,39) Patient surveys Primary Care Access Just patient surveys 
Survey; Patient surveys; are present in both 
staff opinion surveys documents 
Teenage (0,10) No finds Teenage pregnancy No relation 
_Telephone 
(0,4) No finds Single telephone access No relation 
Transfer (1,6) A&E waiting A&E waiting times; Just ME waiting 
times Delayed transfers of care times are in common 
Value for PSA objective No finds No relation 
Money (2,0) 
Waiting (7,27) Inpatients and Inpatients and outpatients Very similar, except 
outpatients waiting for patient surveys 
waiting (named just in the HC 
document) 
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Working livcs No finds Improving working livcs I No relation 
J2 J3 
Table 2: Consistency bctwccn Dcpartment of I Icalth and I Icalthcarc Comminion 
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Appendix BI: Interview protocol 
What arc the objectives of your organisation? 
2. What do you considcr as succcss for your organisation? 
3. What perfomance indicators do you havc in placc? 
4. Why do you mcasurc pcrformancc in your organ isation? 
5. Do your pcrformancc indicators licip you nchicvc succcss? 
6. Are you satisficd with your pcrfonnancc targcts and indicators? 
7. What use do you make of the information gatlicrcd dirough dic mcasurcmcnt or 
performance? 
8. What are the main problems you are experiencing in relation to performance 
management? 
9. How do the relations with highcr-lcvcl organisations affcct the dcsign of 
performance indicators and rclatcd rcporting of inrormation? 
10. What tensions, conflicts and bchaviours are generated as a result of these 
relations? 
1. What are the organisational responses to pressures coming from institutions? 
12. Are there particular factors that influence the nature of these responses (e. g. 
economic gain, level of resource dependence)? 
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Appendix 112: Map of' the indicators - Matrix 
Ii indicator-- 
cI ric/ 1, () 1-11111 1 
3 Target lc%, cl 
4 I: [-C(Itlcllcy of' illei 
and rcporling 
51 Source of data 
6ý Reasons l'or intro 
neasure CXpCct 
71 Use of the inforiv 
81 Ovcrlal) with othi 
Local lcvcl II lghcr Icvcl 
surcinent 
flicilig the 
-. 
d I)CIlclits 
MIMI 
r measures 
Tablc 1: Map of* the indicators -Matrix 
The questions asked in relation to the matrix are the following: 
I- What is the name and type of indicator? 
2- What is the formula used to calculate it? 
3- What is tile target level" Who sets it" Is the level an aspiration or is it 
achievable? 
4- llowol ten is it measured? How often is it reported" Are there different time 
scales depending, on wholil it is reported to? 
5- Where does the data come from? 
6- Wily and when was the measure introduced" What are the expected beriefits" 
Are there discrepancies between reasons for collecting data and actual use of the 
itil'ormation gathered" 
7- Wilitt is tile role offlus indicator (or group of indicators)? What action is taken 
on the basis of the information gathered'? 
8- Are there significant overlaps with other indicators" If there are conflicting 
deniands, what are their implications on the development of performance 
indicators'? Would the indicator/target be different if it was not mandated? 
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I- Policy and Revicii Officer at 1,11111) 
Researcher "I I'haf art, Me main reasons fiw it -hit -h vtou 1, -, -- 
hitcrvicwcc: "Well, clearly for any organisation it's a way of showing succem and 
progress, if you*ve set yoursell'a goal or an olýjcctive or a target at the beginning of' a 
service planning cycle. the indicators are there primarily it) tell you ifyou'vc dclivcrcd 
on it or not. Obviously it dcpcndN on \\ hat kind ohnthcatoi-N ýou'ic c1ling , nd %%. Ilclllcr 
they are then sinart and all that. But also I think Performance ill , in organisation. because 
we are no\%, much inore. the culture wHilln locill gmernment is no%% atxmi perl'onnaricc. 
you know wherc you fit in that league I-ible. what's your CIIA raiing. but there is a lot in 
terms of reputation, attracting a good work force. retaining the work force- raising 
aspirations in the community, having a confident community. is all aNlut having .1 
good. well perflorming organisation at the heart of it and if* Barking and Dagenham 
became a three star authority out otAbur stars. that is a good mcs'sagl: out there that tills 
council is run well, that people can have confidence in its management. it% structures. 
it just says well there ain't really a lot there for you. So there's a number of factors there 
in terills of reputation, in terins of attracting people to the area. to the workform 
retaining good people, it',, \ ci crý crucial 101 111, IIIkI ý 111, ý k: ý ou 
Ilic., C III-OCCSSCS. \OLI go into other places and you ask tile Narne questions: "what rating 
are you? " So you become much more int'Onned atx)ut it locally as well. 
Key: 
Monitor progress 
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2- Deptily Chief Fire Officer at SFIZ., k 
Rc. scarchcr " What typcs of illdictltor, ý do. voll have ill p/acc') " 
hilcrý Icwcc. "We have to ()n the suite ol'13VPls, which we do; now at the end of' 
tile day, the relevance ()I* cach ()I' those indicators varics, so clearly the best value 
11CI-1,01-111,111ce Indicator In relation to 111-C death and IIIJUI-Y is a key indicator fOr us, tile 
indicatm- mi how long it takes us tO adnliniStCl- tile PI-OdUCtion ol'a fire ccrtificate is less 
relevant In relation to... I'm I1()t saying It"s Irrelevant but It"s less I-cloant in relation to 
(hat hI. (); 1dcI- ()I-ams"Ithmial fi-allic. s() MICII I, ()[- example we report to tile fire authority. 
we what NN'C believe to lie dic key Indicators. I don't know Il'you've got a copy of' 
the chiel's I)CI. I()(lic I-cp()I-t that lie takes to cvcry fire authority which will give you in 
Indication ()I, what lie reports and what is essentially fire deaths and Injuries, that'. ", tile 
1111111her of' primary fires, the 1111111her of' secondary fires and that's rather than go 
thrmigh tile 1,1111 raft of' BVPI *S. - 
Rescarcher: So whal is the maiii rcason ivhYYOll McIdStire po-IM-mance. " 
liitcr% icwccý "We measure performance to ensure that the resources that we've got are 
being used to achieve what the authority effectively is key priorities in temis of 
outcomes. So. a, -min, what %N'C I-CI)OI-t to tile Mltl`101'1tý' IS VCIA' 111101 
I'OCLJSCd Oil OLItCO111CS" 
its part ol*tlic management process, there's also a need to measure inputs and outputs, so 
fundamentally 1f the outcollic isn't its we would want it to be, we then look at tile inputs 
and OLItj)UtS to See Wilit have we've done as a result ofthat particular result and we can 
then Change I nican the outcomes are what the outcomes are, we don't have an 
influence directly, what we (10 have is a direct influence on the inputs and outputs, so if 
we change inputs and outputs, then tile OLItCOMCS Would ... 
" 
Key: 
National Pls 
FIxternal I-cliol-till" 
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Discourse 
111telp'll-Mcd Risk 14-111 ORNIP) - 2004 Olmard% (1111tictimcd III 111C 
cxcctitl%, C S1111111IM-0: "SMITOld"111re "IRNIP" has recogill"Ctl 111C %, gill 1-1calit Illovc 
towards modanisation -. sIncc the collipictioll 01'all extensive licst Vallic RcvIcw of, 
Community Protection carried out in 2000. The Authority will colitlillic 14, (Jellvcr 11lis 
through our strategic anns. focused oil ensuring that our comillutillics tic "S. 11'c I'tom 
fire" and "Sat'er In Emergencies". 
Integrated Risk Nianagement I'Ll" 01011 2004 Om%ard% Oinderimed) "In P, P., 
Decciiilicr2OO3ýiiiiii(icpcii(ictitýiiitill., ', Illlc, l,,,,! 11Y tile Impio\ementand Devc1opment 
Agency, concluded that "tile Scl-Vice has clearly made pnigress in rcsIxill(Illig Io tilc 
modenisation agenda. " ( ... 
) Further. tile ODPNI Verification Audit found solid c-Odencc 
to corroborate the Service's niodenusation pro-1gress. " 
Best Value Performance Plan 2005-2006: "Efficiencies: The Authority has set a 
budget for 22005 00 and pro1mcd budget plans for the folloxvi ing 1,. %-o years dim include 
coillillitillents to efficlency Savings III line With Government expectations. These 
efficiencies aini to release resources to contribute to the conlill till I Iv safetv 
modernisation activities. " 
Chief Fire Officer: 
Productivity' is a NN ord Liscd noN%. but ilo%% -; N c, 11 
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Information flows 
CPA Pilot Test Report - October 2004: 
"Communication of pcrformance is not systematic at present, although this has been 
identified and is being addressed. " 
Deputy Chief Fire Officer: 
'The chiefs periodic report, that he takes to every fire authority, will give you an 
indication of what lie reports and what is essentially fire deaths and injuries, that's the 
number of Primary fires, the number of secondary fires and that's - rather than go 
through the full raft of BVPls. " 
Performance and Quality Manager: 
"Obviously, we have national indicators - arson is one, and death and injuries is 
another. They came out of the national framework of government recently. So, 
obviously, we have to commcnd to that national framework of govenu-nent. We have to 
send an annual return to the ODPM about our own performance. So quarterly we have 
to look at our performance. " 
"(The Chief Fire Officer) doesn't see ... he sees what we all see, but he doesn't drill down as far as we do. He can see the overall picture ... policy and reporting. We see more 
of it in the Policy Advisory Groups. " 
Principal Service Analyst: 
"There would be league tables with all the BV's produced and you can get them off the 
ODPM website and anyone I assume can access that information if they so wished, we 
would then obviously publish around best value performance plan which is published 
and should be available to the public of Staffordshire or anyone else I guess if they 
requested it. ( ... ) It would be published on the internet, I believe that they are sent out to 
the libraries, they wouldn't be sent out to individual homes. " 
"We also have performance reports that go out to our policy and advisory group on a 
monthly basis, that's local to the area command although they are standardised across 
the nine area commands but they would be reported on. Now, they wouldn't specifically 
be Best Value Performance Indicators, they would be the supporting evidence. " 
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-So they have these rcports that are published on a monthly basis and flult's to assist 
them in their management ultimately for best value pcrfornumcc indicators, so it's jult 
supporting evidence, supporting data. " 
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Institutional pressures 
Chlef Fire Officer: 
"nicre's discrepancy between policy makers and deliverers - strategy and policy 
development is different from delivery. " 
"Policy makers can changc the allocation of resources, but not improve performance. " 
"Fire nationally has suffered a neglect by central government. Fire deaths and arson 
have risen, but they have not hit the political agenda. " 
"CPA for the first time also looked at joined up services, management culture, etc. " 
"Relationships with government have to be formative. " 
Deputy Chief Fire Officer: 
I think in the past it was very much directed and it was one way, ODPM, fire services 
Inspectorate or whoever determine what the BVPI's would be and basically told us 
that's what was going to happen. Certainly over the last two or three years they have 
been far more keen to engage with individual authorities on a consultation basis. " 
"We've gone from that to a far more respective and inclusive arrangement or 
relationship with ODPM inspectorate. I think certainly our experience with the 
comprehensive performance assessment was that the reviewers were kccn to engage 
with us and listen to us and share their views with us and were prepared to be 
challenged. " 
"Certainly the CPA assessment team that we had, I don't know whether that's the same 
for all, because we just had one team, but their view was very much that this is a process 
to achieve improvement, so we want to identify the areas where you need to develop to 
improve, to ensure that you have an improvement plan over the next three years, 
addresses those and the issues that need addressing rather than just come in and just 
look at the performance nature. " 
'The approach of certainly the Audit Commission in terms of CPA was to look into 
taking a more holistic view of the performance of the organisation, identify the relative 
relevance of each indicator and then being prepared to listen to our explanation as to 
why we let performance in some areas of the organisation to drop, so I certainly think 
that our experience with CPA is very much about a collaborative partnership approach 
to achieving improvement rather the almost oppressive inspectorate regime finding 
fault. " 
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Performance and Quality Nlanagcr: 
IINVejust set our lcvcls to achicvc. If them is a BVPI, which Itasn"t got n mational target, 
wc set onc. And wc set it through our strategic planning process. " 
"I don't havc any strong vicws about the rclationship, othcr tlmn wc know that tllcy 
[ODPM] are our mastcrs, if you want. Wc just try and achicvc thcy sct (Scnd? ) us. 
Bcar in mind that obviously [our CFO] and othcr Chicf Firc Officcrs lmvc an innucticc 
on ODPM programmcs. So if thcy make a targct dcsign thcrc is n chance that the toll 
lcvc1 gcts involvcd. I'm sure this docs happcn. " 
Qucstion: "So you don't think that thcre"s much friction... " 
Answcr "No no no. " 
Head of Planning and Performance: 
"The ODPM sent the proposcd new indicators to Staffs and other organizations asking 
for feedback about definition of measures, rclc%-ancc etc. " 
(About Her Majesty Inspcctomte): "they are very authoritarian and not wotking well. 
( ... ) It is not able to 
become more than an organization that ndviscs and does not 
inspect. " 
"ODPM and I-IMI have provided slow and bad guidclincs, but relationships will 
improve through the CPAs. ( ... ) ODPNI should fostcr an improvcnicnt cyc1c. " 
"CPA is much more on management practices, than on service dclivctcd and it is all 
evidence based. " 
-it is vital to have pressure coming CPA and othcr institutions. If you are forccd to 
modcrnize and measure you can achieve improvements in the scrvicc. " 
Principal Service Analyst: 
"CPA is pro effectiveness of management of the service, but did not look at scrvicc 
delivery. " 
"Her Majesty Inspectorate is moving away from inspection to assessment and with 
reduced power. ( ... ) The trend is towards less inspection and more assessment. CPA is 
very good: things about improvement arc coming out. " 
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Leadership 
CIIA Pilot Test Report - October 2004 (Executive Summary): "Staffordshire Fire and 
Rescue Service demonstrates clear strengths in all of the themes assessed as part of this 
Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA) pilot. There is effective organisational 
and political leadership of both the authority and fire service and this is making a 
noticeable and bcneficial impact. " 
Head of Planning and Performance: 
"Pcrfonnancc management is getting ingrained in the Fire Authority. The CFO is 
dragging the pcoplc at all levels through this process of change. " 
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Organisational objectives 
Chief Fire Officer: 
-Me key objective is to contribute to the public scrvioc agcnda: s. 1rcr and Ixticr 
Staffordshire. " 
"'Mis is an objective that goes beyond the firc scrvicc. A bronder vision- 
sustainable Staffordshire; regcncration of the cnviranniclit; ruml cconoiny... " 
"Fire at Govcmmcnt level is about Fire deaths, but this is one layer down. " 
Deputy Chief Fire Officer: 
'The overarching objective of our organisation is to cmitc sarcr communities. Our 
primary role is to reduce the impact or fircs, so reducing them in number and the 
consequences of those fires but also were now moving into broader community sarely 
agenda, including road safety and safety within the community in gcnctnl. " 
"Another objective or the organisation, which is probably a longer term Objective. is 
also to contribute to the broader social inclusion, community Cohesion bcing pursued by 
other agencies. So I think that is the overarching plan but I think in some ways we have 
been contributing to that sort of agenda just by doing what we were doing tvlating to 
fire deaths. I think we're now broadening our scope to say: well we can make a 
contribution not just by making people safer from fire, which will have a knock on 
effect to general communities but by engaging with user groups for cxaniplc, we can 
actually encourage them to go to school so tlicy improve their cducational talent and 
reduce truancy, we can reduce anti-social behaviour, so there's less graffiti. so 
communities feel better about themselves, so we can have a dircct impact on those other 
issues, whereas perhaps in the past we didn't do it. " 
"But I do recognise that part of the contribution to%vards the success that we want to 
achieve is in a longer term, goal, so in- the longer term wc would want to see more 
prosperous communities, we want to see more engaged conununitics and them making a 
contribution to the local economy, less strain on the police resources, less strain on the 
health service resources, less disruption to education and all that sort of thing as a longer 
term goal. " 
"The overarching objective of our organisation is to create safer communities. Our 
primary role is to reduce the impact of fires, so reducing them in number and the 
consequences of those fires but also were now moving into broader community safety 
agenda, including road safety and safety within the community in general. " 
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"in the public service agrccmcnt, now that was a key objective to reduce fire, death and 
injurics, so the consequences of accidental fires and the level of reduction would be 
achieved. " 
Performance and Quality Manager: 
'17he objectives of the organisation, I mean ... we have a strategic planning process. We have the Community Protection, Performance Management, Human Resources... mmm. 
... Out of those we have several objectives. ( ... ) We have several objectives within each 
of the areas ... and they're based on the National BVPIs. " 
'Ilic objective of the fire service is to provide a good service. And we want to be the 
best service in the country. " 
"The fire service is therc to provide citizens with more knowledge, to secure a safer 
place, not just dealing with fires... " 
"Now, why I consider performance management to be so important is that it is the only 
way, to a degree, that we can support our objectives. You need some sort of 
measurement of how you arc doing. Ok, there are still perceptions, which are difficult to 
change either way, but if you've got evidence that we are best fire service in the 
country, or that we deliver value for money... our CPA report confirms it. " 
246 
APPENDIX APPUNDIX 1) 
Pcrforinancc culture 
CPA Report 
'7hcrc is a cultural change throughout the organisation towards improved perronmince 
management. " 
"The culture of managing performance as opposed to monitoring pctronnance is 
demonstrable. " 
"Pcrfonnancc management is now a routine part of the Authority's Govcmancc, 
Exccutivc and Senior hlanagcmcnt nrmngcmcnts. 77he mults of CPA nctivity have 
confinned the structure and approach of the planning and pcrfonnancc mani8cmcnt 
process. flowevcr, this now nccds to be dcvclopcd and impicnicntcd to include widcr 
general management and individunI pcrformancc to cnsure it bcconics fully cinbcdcled. "' 
Deputy Chief Fire Officer 
I-rhe main problem internally is that not all of our managers fully understand thc 
concept of performance management and I think there's a perception that performance 
management is a punitive arrangement. So, the targets and if you don't meet them, 
you're in trouble, rather than being seen as a management tool, as a means to insure that 
resources are being used in the most appropriatc way; so that's a key barrier at the 
moment in relation to embedding performance management into the organisation. " 
"I think we've got it down to at least the area commander level, they understand what 
wc9re trying to do. I think we need to take that next step to encourage people to engage 
in the process and importantly to insure that they rccognisc that they arc being held 
responsible and accountable for the achievement of key targets and outcomes. " 
Performance and Quality Manager 112 
"I think the main problem which we had in the past, and not so much now, is gating 
everybody to rccognise performance managcmcnt. I'm not so sure that cvcrybody k-ncw 
what perforrnance management is. " 
-A performance management culture has grown in this organisation in the last four 
years, to the point now where the only thing that could make it really b-cttcr to me is just 
to upgrade the mechanisms - have some more sophisticated statistics in place. " 
Principal Service Analyst 
"The CPA spotted two main weaknesses: cmbcdding performance management below 
middle management, and new mcmbers should be more involved. " 
"Performance management is getting ingraincd in the Fire Authority. I'lic CFO is 
dragging the people at all levels through this proccss of change. " 
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11crfornianec indicators 
Best Value Performance Plait 2004/05 (about LP12): "Although CFS activity 
continues to increase, quality checks during the year show that there are inconsistencies 
in the methods used to record details of hours spent on specific tasks. As a result the 
figures cannot be used for the purpose intended and this measure is to be reviewed. " 
CPA Rcport: "The culture of managing performance as opposed to monitoring 
performance is demonstrable. ( ... ) However the outcomes are almost exclusively based 
on national performance indicators (PIs). This is a good measure of how it is performing 
in relation to other authorities but could be enhanced by the inclusion of more locally 
based targets. " 
Chief Fire Officer: 
"Local indicators should be developed in order to better reflect local issues. " 
"Performance Measurement is very different from Performance Management. We need 
an integrated approach to create a performance culture. " 
'The achievement of corporate goals connected with Community and Strategy 
objectives. " 
"Local organizations should be more pro higher performance and not just whingeing! 
"BVPIs are centralized indicators, most of which are relevant, although prevalently 
past-focused. " 
"Pls are important generally speaking; Best Value is statutory, almost only performance 
indicators. CPA is increasingly driving improvements much more than BV; CPA is 
about performance environment and not just PIs. ( ... )A more holistic approach is 
needed. CPA refers to Best Value and there are not many discrepancies; CPA is more 
pro partnerships. " 
"For changes of BVPls every authority can have a consultation phase. " 
Deputy Chief Fire Officer: 
"We have to report on the suite of BVPls, which we do; now at the end of the day, the 
relevance of each of those indicators varies, so clearly the best value performance 
indicator in relation to fire death and injury is a key indicator for us, the indicator on 
how long it takes us to administer the production of a fire certificate is less relevant. " 
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"We measure performance to ensure that the resources that wc"vc got are being used to 
achieve what the authority cffectivcly is key priorities in terms of outcomes. so again 
what we report to the authority is very much focused on outcomes. " 
"it was a conscious decision by this organisation because, whilst them is n national 
target, 20% reduction by 2010, we decided that we could do better than thal and in fact 
we'd set in our best value performancc plan n target of 33%, reduction. " 
"I think in the past it was very much directed and it was one way, ODIINI, rim services 
Inspcctoratc or whoever determine what the BVPI's would be and basically told us 
that's what was going to happen. Certainly over the last two or thtec years they have 
been far more keen to engage with individual authorities on a consul tation Imsis. " 
,, We've gone from that to a far more respective and inclusive arrangcmcnt or 
relationship with ODPNI inspcctoratc. I think certainly our cxpcricnce with the 
comprehensive performance assessment was that the rcvicwcm wcm kccn to cngage 
with us and listen to us and share their views with us and were prepared to be 
challenged. " 
Performance and Quality Manager: ft 
"As part of our strategic plan here come the BVPls or our local indicators. And then you 
might have another local one at an arca of command. " 
"Local indicators are developed if there is something missing in the national Pis, like 
sickness of part-time fire f ightcrs. " 
"Local area managers have to provide the information, although this is not so easy, 
sincc they don't want to be responsible. Different information is reccivcd depending on 
who provided it. " 
"They're mainly BVPIs, which arc reported nationally. Now, within those BVPls. each 
area of command has a sub-BVPI. " 
-At an area of command I can monitor that. I nccd an objective and an cnd target to 
achieve it. So I can have a local indicator. which is not ncccssarily written in that 
format. The information it gives is, look this is what I'm trying to achieve, and this is 
what I achieved. " 
-Most of them [Pis] you have to monitor them differently. " 
"Going back to about 10 years ago, before BVPls wcrc in placc for the fire authorities, 
[the current CFO], who was my divisional officcr, he was my boss in Stoke at die time. 
we devised some local indicators and tried in the brigades. I'vc always thought wc"ve 
always been ahead of the game. Wc are a vcry pro-activc brigade in Community 
Protection. " 
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'The local indicators were set, but they're not as important as the BVPIs. The ones 
which fccd in the BVPIs arc obviously very important. The ones which the brigade sets 
- local ones - are very important. The ones that the Areas of Command set, aren't 
perhaps as important to the brigade. They are important in their locality. " 
"We have a meeting with the Authority Advisory Group and we've got a planning 
process... what are we going to do next year? And out of that process comes out an 
indicator. Everybody's got an opportunity to comment whether we think it's not 
enough, or whether we think it's too hard a target to achieve. And we try to stretch it if 
necessary. If you take the recent LPSA, we stretched the target and achieved very good 
results... It has taken three years of hard work, you know, going to the community. " 
'They're mainly BVPls, which are reported nationally. Now, within those BVPls, each 
area of command has a sub-BVPI. 
"Thcre arc several main reasons. Obviously, we have national indicators - arson is one, 
and death and injuries is another. They came out of the national framework of 
government recently. So, obviously, we have to commend to that national framework of 
government. We have to send an annual return to the ODPM about our own 
performance. So quarterly we have to look at our performance. " 
(About national Pls): "I don't think it's a problem, really. 
"As part of the management process, there's also a need to measure inputs and outputs, 
so fundamentally if the outcome isn't as we -would want it to be, we then look at the 
inputs and outputs to see what have we've done as a result of that particular result and 
we can then change -I mean the outcomes arc what the outcomes are, we don't have an 
influence directly, what we do have is a direct influence on the inputs and outputs. " 
"We need to rccognise the linkages between inputs, outputs and outcomes far better 
than we do currently, which is the process we're going through at the moment. " 
"We then changed focus more to the outcomes, so then the quality of the service that 
was being provided in each household increased and we then saw, not only the 
consequences of the fire because the smoke detector was being fitted but also the 
number of fires because our staff were starting to spend time with people explaining 
what practices could lead to - of which I actually see as performance management in 
action, is that you look at the outcomes that are being achieved, you then refer back to 
the inputs, outputs and you make a change. " 
Ilead of Planning and Performance: 0 
"Pls are related to it; new indicators by ODPM (new BVPIs) are more supportive. " 
"New national indicators have been set and we have developed our own. " 
"Local indicators from BVPP and committee meetings: need to have standardized 
reports. " 
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"Some indicators arc vcry useful, othcrs not SO Much: tllcrc"S the possibility to chinge 
them or put tilcm togctlicr. " 
Principal Service Analyst: 
"Area commanders might develop their own with ProiccUlshort-tcrni things. " 
"We record it here in Staffordshire, what other brigades have chosen to do is tip to then). 
we don't have to report it anymore, it's no longer a legal requirement. We found it 
a useful tool, so we've continued to use it. 01 
"So what they did was group them together and say this is how many times people were 
casualties of fire and we didn't naturally concentrate on who had died nnd who hid beef) 
injured it was just injuries and that way it's easy to control because obviously four 
people died in the fire in the home accidentally, it's absolutely thrown your target out 
completely because you were looking at such small numbers that you couldn't control 
it, whereas if you looked at all injuries, you could control it and see that it was still very 
down. 9' 
"The Government decided these changes and they were slightly piloted - there was influence by local organisations, but they were not that great' 
"There arc a few problems with the new Pls; the Govcmnicnt cannot see what's 
happening. It 
"Some Pls are ambiguous, it is not clear what thcy arc dicre to achicvc. " 
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11crformance management 
Best Value Performance Plait 2005-2006: "Performance management is now a routine 
part of the Authority's Governance, Executive and Senior Management arrangements. 
The results of CPA activity have confirmed the structure and approach of the planning 
and performance management process. However, this now needs to be developed and 
implemented to include wider general management and individual performance to 
ensure it becomes fully embedded. " 
CPA Pilot Test Report - October 2004: "The fire authority is aware of the need to 
manage performance and not just measure performance. " 
Chief Fire Officer: 
"Me quality of the service has to improve through performance management. " 
"A performance environment is crucial. " 
"Performance management is far more prominent in how we manage corporate 
governance and service management. " 
"Performance measurement is very different from performance management. " 
Deputy Chief Fire Officer: 
'The main problem internally is that not all of our managers fully understand the 
concept of performance management and I think there's a perception that performance 
management is a punitive arrangement. " 
Performance and Quality Manager: 
"Performance management is a standing itcm on our agenda [Policy Advisory Group]. " 
"Now, why I consider performance management to be so important is that it is the only 
way, to a degree, that we can support our objectives. You need some sort of 
measurement of how you are doing. Ok, there are still perceptions, which are difficult to 
change either way, but if you've got evidence that we are best fire service in the 
country, or that we deliver value for money... our CPA report confirms it. " 
"Without performance indicators how can you measure your success? " 
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"PIs are there to make you undcrstand what you nchicvc and dicy're put in plice to 
enable you to achieve it. " 
Question: "Do your performance indicators licip you achicvc succcss? " 
Answer' "It's essential. It's essential. "' 
"For me, as an individual, I've always helped pc6onuaricc manignient, and I fccl it ns 
personal responsibility. " 
Head of Planning and Performance: 
"Performance management is seen as the key to success". 
"Strategic plan, BVPlan ctc., we must have a dread that goes through all the plans. " 
Principal Service Analyst: 
"Oh yes, [Pls] definitely influence the organisation. " 
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Target setting and 'joined up' government 
Chief Fire Officer: 
"Need to create a performance environment and work together with other local public 
sector organisat ions. " 
"Government must devclopjoincd-up local strategies. " 
"We have debris from previous initiatives. (... ) We have the new LAA, but also the old 
LPSA, Community Strategies Agreements, etc. The Govcnimcnt puts more and 
more initiatives on the top of each other. " 
"About targets and Pis, often the organization goes for targets, although they may not be 
right. ( ... ) Targets fragment strategy. A cohesive strategy is different from a set of 
targets. " 
"We want joined up indicators, although Government are departmentalized. "' 
"Performance management is a strategic issue. " 
'Targets oflcn fostcr centralization and not quality of service improvements. " 
"If you don't achieve targets, this is seen as a failure, rather than which directions 
should be followed. " 
"National targets have been reduced. When targets were difficult to achieve (e. g. 
reducing fires for older population) they got cancelled. 
"It is difficult to have 'joined up" services when there's a lack of strategy at government 
level. " 
"[About Local Public Service Agreement (LPSA)]: Staffordshire stretched it to 50% in 
3 years and it achieved more than 46%. " 
Deputy Chief Fire Officer: 
"It was a conscious decision by this organisation because, whilst there is a national 
target, 20% reduction by 2010, we decided that we could do better than that and in fact 
we'd set in our best value performance plan a target of 33% reduction. " 
"We'd set a target above the national standard already and we then had to stretch that 
further which went to 50%, now I have to say the reason why it was 50% was nothing 
other than that was the number we were able to negotiate, there was no real science 
behind why it should be. " 
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Perforniance. ind Quality Manager: 
"Me target that you set has to be related to you, it's sot to be m1mint, it's got to be ... 
not necessarily achievable ... but strctch the target. stretch it to he Ivin, whcre you 
think you could still do it, and I think that Umdually you can achieve it. " 
I 
Head of Planning and Paformance: 
'7here are scveral ovcrlaps bctwccn Staffs' Pis with other Outhoritics. mostly local 
goverrunent and polim" 
'To gct funding for pcrformance wc nccd to ovcr. pcrfonn. " 
Principal Service Analyst: 
"So what they did was group them together and say this is how many times people %vcre 
casualties of fire and we didn't naturally concentrate an who lind died and who had bccn 
injured it was just injuries and that way it's easy to control because obviously rour 
people died in the fire in the home accidentally, it's absolutely thrown your target out 
completely because you were looking at such small numbers that you couldn't control 
it, whereas if you looked at all injuries, you could control it and see that it was still very 
down. " 
"There are targets but what we have done is actually increase the target to be eligible ror 
this additional funding, because obviously if you were just achieving the national 
expectation why would they want to pay us any extra money for that; that is what we're 
doing with those. " 
"The target we actually set ourselves, you get guidelines rroin the ODPNI that govern us 
and they normally are looking at something like a 10% reduction on your pcrrormancc. " 
(About BVPI 208): "I'm honestly not sure of this indicator. Set the targct %Vc didn't 
know which way to set the target, the guidance I Nt vv-as quite ambiguous on this one. 
I'm not happy with this particular indicator, it tells you something orwhat %-Jluc I don't 
know. t$ 
"The target isn't a level of just brigade target, they do have brcakdo%%Tts on a monthly 
basis based on seasonality, so they know roughly where they should be at any given 
month, moment in time as it were. " 
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Reasons for incastiring performance 
Accountability 
Chief Fire Officer: 
'7he key objective is to contribute to the public service agenda: safer and better 
Staffordshire. " 
Deputy Chief Fire Officer: 
"We need the local managers to rccognise that he can be set a target to achieve in terms 
of reducing sickness absence amongst their work force, we give them the tools to 
actually address that but recognise that they can be held accountable and if they don't 
achieve those targets we'll be asking them questions, again not in the punitive sense, it 
will be more to identify perhaps the individual who hasn't got requisite skills and 
therefore needs some training or hasn't got the appropriate data available to them, so we 
can make that available to them or whatever. " 
I think it's more about the internal culture: this fire service probably along with many 
others was a very hierarchical structure, an organisation in the past and we've been 
working very hard over the last four years to break that down but people's perceptions 
of what the culture is, quite often it lags behind what's actually occurring, so I think it 
might take some time for them to realise that things have actually changed. " 
Ifead of Planning and Performance: 
"BVPP is in favour of local accountability. " 
"I don't have any strong views about the relationship, other than we know that they 
[ODPM] are our masters, if you want. We just try and achieve what they set (send? ) us. 
Bear in mind that obviously [our CFO] and other Chief Fire Officers have an influence 
on ODPM programmes. So if they make a target design there is a chance that the top 
level gets involved. I'm sure this does happen. " 
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Acquisition of resources 
Chlef Fire Officer: 
"[About Local Public Scrvicc Agrccnicnt (LPSA)): Staffordshirc stroclicd it to 504vo ill 
3 ycars and it achicvcd morc than 46%. " 
Deputy Chief Fire Officer: 
"It was a conscious decision by this organisation because. whilst them is a national 
target, 20% reduction by 20 10, we decided that we could do better than that nnd in filct 
we'd set in our best value performance plan a target of 33% reduction. - 
"We'd set a target above the national standard already and %vc thcn had to stroch that 
further which went to 50%, now I have to say the rcason why it was 50% was nothing 
other than that was the number we were able to negotiate, them was no real scicnee 
behind why it should be. " 
Pcrformance and Quality Manager: ft 
"We try and concentrate on the national ones because you can get a prize of money. or 
course, you want to have a good reputation in fire service circles as well. " 
]Principal Service Analyst: 
-If we achieved our targets, we would gct additional funding, we did achieve the targct 
and we did receive the additional funding. " 
'There are targets but what we have done is actually increase the targct to be cligible for 
this additional funding, because obviously if you wcre just achieving the national 
expectation why would they want to pay us any extra money for that; tlmt is what %vc're 
doing with those. " 
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flenchmarkin 
Performanceand Quality Manager: 
`17his is where the bcnchmarking ... obviously we're in a region as well, and we are 
compared against a different group, in which there are several brigades -I think there is 
about 8 or 9,1 can't quite remember. So we do benchmark against those fire authorities 
... nationally as well, and it is quite important that ... and 
if you look at our performance 
plan, it'll show we have in here how we rank against other authorities. Both nationally 
and within the group. " 
"Some of them are nationally driven. The death and injury are nationally driven, and the 
arson are also nationally driven. What we've tried to do is to benchmark; what we have 
actually achieved in a progressive manner to get to the end target of 2010 is to 
bcnclu-nark for arson. " 
"We try and concentrate on the national ones because you can get a prize of money. Of 
course, you want to have a good reputation in fire service circles as well. " 
Deputy Chief Fire Officer: 
"We use it to benchmark to see how we perform against like brigades and organisations 
because if our performance is massively different from another organisation, well there 
maybe some lessons that we can learn from them, to see how we compare with others. " 
Principal Service Analyst: 
"It is the aim of the organisation to get into the top quartile in the indicators that are 
considered to be the key ones that probably are the ones that are reflected in that report 
there except the ones that I mentioned to you that have dropped out, we would 
benchmark and certainly look at it, I think it's becoming more and more important than 
it was previously. " 
I think in the future it will become more important, it is in more of it's embryonic stage 
I would say, the benchmarking at the moment. " 
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Central control 
Chid Fire Officer: 
"Ccntralisation seems to be the main driver, rathcr than improvanca" 
"Thc quality of the servicc has to improvc through pcrfOnnancc manngmicnt. " 
Nead of Planning and Performance: 
"It is vital to have pressure coming CPA and othcr institutions. If you are forccd to 
modcrnize and measure you can achieve improvcnictits in the scrvicc. " 
Pcrformance and Quality Manager 
"I think that if there's any pressure from the ODPNt, it goes to our Chief Fire Officcr, I 
think he gets the pressure and then all he says is: %vc need to do better on that. " 
Principal Service Analyst: 
"Certainly we have indicators that are more political than others I guess you would 
argue, expenditure per head of population is certainly a political indicator that will be 
used to show the public how cost effective, cffcctivcly the organisation is. " 
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Communication and reputallott 
Performance and Quality Manager: 
"We try and concentrate on the national ones because you can get a prize of money. Of 
course, you want to havc a good reputation in fire scrvice circles as well. " 
Principal ServiccAnalyst: 
"But the percentage of citizens satisficd with overall service which is BV3, I've not had 
anything to do with that, I honcstly wouldn't want to advise you on that one, we do have 
n citizen's survey that goes out on a three yearly basis, so I'm assuming that this is one 
that is dealt with by another department, I'm aware of one but I'm not involved in it, the 
value of it I truly don't know what the value would be, if you're not asking the same 
people over and over again whether their perception has gone up or down, I don't know 
what value it would be, it"s certainly an indicator as to how you're perceived and I 
suppose after the bad publicity through the industrial action a few years ago, it certainly 
could have dcntcd the reputation of the organisation to a degree but I'm sure that it 
probably wouldn't have gone back up if there was any dip by now. " 
"Ccrtainly we have indicators that are more political than others I guess you would 
argue, expenditure per head of population is certainly a political indicator that will be 
used to show the public how cost cffective, effectively the organisation is. " 
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Resource n1loention 
Mcdium/Long-term Improvements Strategy (underlined and bold in the originil 
text): "Implement the changes required to meet the local community risk profile (As 
identified through FSEQ, in terms of personnel, pumping appliances and special 
appliances. This will ensure that the most appropriate resources are located to best 
protect the community. " 
Deputy Chief Fire Officer: 
-We mcasurc performance to ensure that the resources that %vc'vc got am bcing uscd to 
achieve what the authority cffcctivcly is key priorities in tcrms of outconics, so again 
what we report to the authority is very much focused on outcomes. " 
"We actually use it to dctcnnine how we should use our resources. " 
-rhc main driver must be to ensure that our resources am in the tight place and that 
we're putting our money whcre it's ncedcd. " 
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Appendix B5: SFIU - Nodes and sub-nodes 
" Discourse 
" General Info 
" Information flows 
" External reporting 
" Within the organisation 
" Joined up services 
" Leadership 
" Local Policy, Politicians 
" Media 
" National policies 
" Objectives 
o Broader Objectives 
o Key Objectives 
Partnerships 
Performance culture 
Performance Indicators 
" Appropriateness of PI 
" Contingent factors 
" Link Pls-Mission-Stratcgy 
" Local indicators 
" National PIs 
" Outcomes, outputs, inputs 
Performance Management 
" Importance of PNIgmt 
" Integration of PM 
" Bleas Vs PNIgmt 
" Problems with PNIgmt 
Reasons for measuring performance 
" Accountability 
" Adding value 
" Bcnehmark-ing 
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0 Devclopincnt of capabilities 
0 Extcmal control 
0 Internal accountability 
0 Intcmal culture 
0 Organisational Icaming 
0 Provide focus 
" Rcputation 
" Rcsourcc allocation 
" Rcsourcc dcpcndcncc 
" Supporting dccisions 
* Rclationships with Ccntrc 
e Targct sctting 
* Usc of Pcrf. Info. 
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Appendix B6: SFRA - Node summary report 
Tree node: Discourse 
Characteristics: 
" Words Codcd: 165 
" Paragraphs Coded: 7 
" Coding References: 4 
" Sources Codcd: 2 
" Cases Coded: I 
Tree node: General Info 
Characteristics: 
* Words Coded: 126 
Paragraphs Coded: 10 
Coding References: 3 
Sources Coded: 2 
Cases Coded: 2 
Tree node: Information flows / External reporting ffs. 
Characteristics: 
" Words Coded: 259 
" Paragraphs Coded: 8 
" Coding References: 4 
" Sources Coded: 3 
" Cases Coded: 3 
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, rrce nodc: Inrormation flows/ Within the organisation 
Cliamctcristics: 
" Words Codcd: 166 
" Paragraphs Codcd: 6 
" Coding Rcrcrcnecs: 5 
" Sourccs Codcd: 3 
" Cascs Codcd: 2 
Tree node: Joluctl up services 
Charactcristics: 
" Words Codcd: 140 
" Paragraphs Codcd: 14 
Coding Rcfcrcnccs: 6 
Sourccs Codcd: 2 
Cascs Codcd: 2 
Tree node: Lcadership 
Charactcristics: 
" Words Codcd: 73 
" Paragraphs Codcd: 4 
" Coding Rcfcrcnccs: 2 
" Sourccs Codcd: 2 
" Cascs Codcd: I 
Trce nodc: Local Policy-Politicians 
Charactcristics: 
0 Words Coded: 46 
0 Paragraphs Coded: 4 
0 Coding References: I 
0 Sources Coded: I 
0 Cases Codcd: I 
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Tree node: Media 
Characteristics: 
" Words Codcd: 92 
" Paragraphs Codcd: 2 
" Coding Rcfcrcnccs: 2 
" Sources Codcd: 2 
" Cascs Codcd: 2 
Tree node: National policies 
Charactcristics: 
" Words Codcd: III 
" Paragraphs Coded: 8 
" Coding Rcfcrcnccs: 3 
" Sources Codcd: I 
" Cascs Codcd: I 
Tree node: Objectives / Broader Objectives 
Characteristics: 
" Words Coded: 337 
" Paragraphs Coded: 5 
" Coding References: 4 
" Sources Coded: 2 
" Cases Coded: 2 
Tree node: Objectives / Key Objectives 
Characteristics: 
" Words Coded: 238 
" Paragraphs Coded: 9 
" Coding Rcfercnccs: 6 
" Sources Coded: 3 
" Cases Coded: 3 
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Trce nodc: Partucrships 
Charnacristics: 
" Words Coded: 9 
" Paragraphs Coded: I 
" Coding References: I 
" Sources Coded: I 
" Cases Coded: I 
Trce nodc: 11crformance culture 
Charactcristics: 
" Words Codcd: 381 
" Paragraphs Codcd: 14 
" Coding Rcrcrcnccs: 9 
" Sourccs Codcd: 4 
" Cascs Codcd: 3 
Tree node: Paformance Indicators / Appropriateness of PI 
Charactcristics: 
" Wonis Codcd: 509 
" Paragraphs Codcd: 19 
" Coding Rcfcrcnccs: 20 
" Sourccs Codcd: 3 
" Cascs Codcd: I 
Tree node: Pcrforniance Indicators / Contingent factors to 
Characteristics: 
Words Codcd: 48 
Paragraphs Codcd: 4 
Coding Rcfcrcnccs: I 
Sources Codcd: I 
Cases Codcd: I 
268 
Tree node: Performance I ndicators/Unk Ills -MIsslon-Strategy 
Charactcristics: 
" Words Codcd: 41 
" Paragraphs Codcd: 2 
" Coding Rcfcrcnccs: 2 
" Sources Codcd: 2 
" Cases Codcd: 2 
Trce node: Pcrformance Indicators / Local Indicators 
Characteristics: 
" Words Coded: 693 
" Paragr-aplis Coded: 29 
" Coding References: 16 
" Soumcs Coded: 5 
" Cases Coded: 4 
Tree node: Puformance Indicators / National Pls 
Charactcri sties: 
" Words Coded: 541 
" Paragraphs Coded: 20 
" Coding References: 14 
" Sources Coded: 5 
" Cases Coded: 5 
Tree node: Performance Indicators / Outcomes, outputs, Inputs 
Characteristics: 
" Words Coded: 261 
" Paragraphs Coded: 3 
" Coding Rcferenccs: 4 
" Sources Coded: I 
" Cases Coded: I 
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I'm nodc: 11crforninnce Manngemait / linportuce of Pi%lglllt 
Chimacristics: 
" Words Coded: 327 
" Pamgrnplis Coded: 21 
" Coding References: 13 
" Sources Coded: 6 
" Cases Coded: 4 
Tree nodc: Performance Management / Integration of PAI 
Charactcristics: 
" Words Codcd: 31 
" Paragraphs Codcd: 3 
" Coding Rcfcrcnccs: 2 
" Sourccs Codcd: 2 
" Cascs Codcd: 2 
Tree node: Performance Management / P51cas Vs PINIgnit ID 
Charactcristics: 
" Words Codcd: 48 
" Paragmphs Codcd: 5 
" Coding References: 3 
" Sources Codcd: 3 
" Cascs Codcd: 2 
Tree node: Performance Alanagentent / Problems with PNlgmt 
Charactcristics: 
" Words Coded: 31 
" Paragraphs Coded: I 
" Coding References: 
" Sources Coded: I 
" Cases Coded: I 
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Tree node: Reasons for measuring performuce 
Charactcristics: 
" Words Codcd: 58 
" Paragraphs Codcd: 3 
" Coding Rcfcrcnccs: I 
" Sourccs Codcd: I 
" Cascs Codcd: I 
Tree node: Reasons for measuring performance / Accountability 
Characteristics: 
" Words Coded: 5 
" Paragraphs Coded: I 
" Coding References: I 
" Sources Coded: I 
" Cases Coded: I 
Tree node: Reasons for measuring pcrforniance / Adding value 
Characteristics: 
" Words Coded: 25 
" Paragraphs Coded: I 
" Coding References: I 
" Sources Coded: I 
" Cases Coded: I 
Tree node: Reasons for measuring performance / Bcrichmarking 1tv 
Characteristics: 
" Words Coded: 301 
" Paragraphs Coded: 6 
" Coding References: 6 
" Sources Coded: 3 
" Cases Coded: 3 
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Tree nodc: Reasons for measuring performance / Development of capabilities 
Chamacristics: 
" Words Codcd: 38 
" Paragmphs Codcd: I 
" Coding References: I 
" Sources Codcd: I 
" Cases Codcd: I 
Tree node: 11casons for measuring performance / External control 
Charactcristics: 
" Words Codcd: 125 
" Paragraphs Codcd: 5 
" Coding References: 5 
" Sources Codcd: 4 
" Cases Codcd: 4 
Tree node: Reasons for measuring performance / Internal accountability 
Cliamctcristics: 
" Words Coded: 99 
" Paragraphs Coded: I 
" Coding References: I 
" Sources Coded: I 
" Cases Coded: I 
Tree node: Reasons for measuring performance / Internal culture 
Characteristics: 
" Words Codcd: 123 
" Paragraphs Codcd: 3 
" Coding Rcfcrcnccs: I 
" Sourccs Codcd: I 
" Cam Codcd: I 
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Trce node: Reasons for measuring perrormance / Orgatilsallonal Icarning 
Charactcristics: 
" Words Codcd: 44 
" Paragraphs Codcd: I 
" Coding Rcfcrcnccs: I 
" Sourccs Codcd: I 
" Cascs Codcd: I 
Tree node: Reasons for measuring pcrfortnance I Provide focus 
Characteristics: 
" Words Coded: 14 
" Paragraphs Coded: I 
" Coding References: I 
" Sources Coded: I 
" Cases Coded: I 
Tree node: Reasons for measuring performance / Reputation 
Characteristics: 
" Words Coded: 235 
" Paragraphs Coded: 3 
" Coding References: 3 
40 Sources Coded: 2 
40 Cases Coded: 2 
Tree node: Reasons for measuring pcrformance / Resource allocation 
Characteristics: 
" Words Coded: 254 
" Paragraphs Coded: 8 
" Coding References: 5 
" Sources Coded: 3 
" Cases Coded: I 
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Tree node: Reasons for mcasuring performance / Resource dependence 
Clulmacristics: 
" Wonis Codcd: 102 
" Ilamgraplis Coded: 3 
" Coding Rcfcrcnccs: 3 
" Sources Codcd: 2 
" Cnscs Codcd: 2 
Tree node: Reasons for measuring performance / Supporting decisions 
Charactcristics: 
" Words Codcd: 33 
" Paragraphs Codcd: I 
" Coding Rcfcrcnccs: I 
" Sourccs Codcd: I 
" Cascs Codcd: I 
Tree nodc: Relationships with centre 
Chamctcristics: 
" Words Codcd: 748 
" Paragraphs Codcd: 35 
" Coding Rcfcrcnccs: 19 
" Sourccs Codcd: 6 
" Cascs Codcd: 5 
Tree nodc: Target setting 
Chamctcristics: 
Wonis Codcd: 723 
Paragmphs Codcd: 25 
Coding Rcfcrcnccs: 20 
Sourccs Codcd: 6 
Cascs Codcd: 5 
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Tree nodc: Use or Ilerr info 
Chamctcristics: 
0 Words Codcd: 224 
0 Pamgmphs Codcd: 7 
* Coding Rcfcrcnccs: 8 
0 Sourccs Codcd: 3 
0 Cascs Codcd: 3 
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Appendix B7: LBBD - Main quotes 
Audits and inspections 
Political member responsible for pcrformance managemcni: 
"In terms of the tensions, there can be tensions in rclation to inspections, you can 
sometimes have questions regarding the varying quality of the personnel conducting the 
inspections. " 
"Whilst the inspection itself maybe brief, the amount of documentation is absolutely 
mountains of stuff, it takes a lot of time to do it, perhaps they should be doing many 
other things and I'm not too sure about the burden of inspection, whcthcr it's now too 
much or about right. " 
"In rclation to the audit commission and in relation to auditors and the job that they do, 
I'll say without hesitation, the audit commission is too big for its boots, we are over. 
audited. PriceNVaterhouseCoopers get paid for this council 820 thousand pounds a year, 
that's approximately 2% on the council tax. " 
"Our internal system in terms of anti fraud, risk management ctc. arc sound, then look at 
books are sound and I think we should be getting less audits, not more. " 
"And we fclt sometimes that inspectors have come in with preconceived notions of what 
Barking and Dagenham is like, what the council's like. So how do you control that 
consistency in the human element of inspections? " 
Policy and Review Officer at corporate strategy department (person responsible 
for corporate performance indicators) 
"We have issues with the timing in which stuff comes out. There arc problems with data 
quality from what the Audit Commission requires. ( There's insufficient guidance on 
what to do. " 
Corporate Director of Customer Services: 
"I think somctimes wc havc a bit of a struggic with the Audit Commission about what a 
CPA indicator is trying to achicvc. " 
"Wc also have, discussions with the ALG about things that arc in the CPA baskct, what 
should be in it and what shouldn't be in it. " 
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"I think thcrc is a real danger that you get a disconnect between CPA assessment and 
what people think of local services. " 
I think you can use the Audit Commission's guidance differently, you can't get away 
from compulsory looking, having to look at the PI's. Maybe we should... " 
Croup Manager of rents and bencrits: 
"And I also think that when the Audit Commission give us advice about how to 
calculate the indicators, they're not clear enough. " 
"If they're going to document it line by line by line what you do, don't change the goal 
posts when you come to audit it. And don't give us until very late on the notes that they 
are going to give the auditors, so the auditors get their audit notes March, right at the 
end of the year when we've been calculating this all the way through the year and things 
like that come out of the wash when they come in and that then reflects badly on us. " 
"One of the other things that happens and I've seen it so many times is because it is not 
I 10% clear on a lot of the indicators how you calculate it, I can sit here in this authority 
and calculate this indicator and then I can go and I get a set of auditors who come in and 
audit me and they can say right I agree with your calculation and I can have a set of 
people in another authority who get auditcd by a different set of auditors and have done 
a calculation completely differently and there's no continuity. " 
Performance Monitoring and Service Development Manager for the revenues and 
benefits department: 
"So the [national Pis] arc quite crude and they are in talks with local authorities because 
they rccognisc that these are really crude and they're trying to get new ways of 
measuring it, to be fair to the audit commission, they are looking into authorities more 
than they've cvcr done before. " 
Assistant Manager for housing benefits and council tax benefit claims: 
"It's a little bit cynical but I think that the government or the managing bodies need to 
make clearer definitions and a better audit of actually what goes on. " 
I think they just get the problcm where DNVP is such a large department, someone will 
chase things and not tell them, so they're just doing the analysis work, collecting the 
data, they're not really experts in benefits as such but no they are always very helpful 
I've found. " 
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Capabilities 
Performance Analyst of Saftuarding and Rights: 
"Unfortunately there's a national shortage of social workcrs for the whole country, 
everyone's in the same position and we have to rely quite licavily on agency social 
workers, so we just monitor that. ( ... ) It's more cxpcnsivc, it'3 not offcfing continuity 
for the childrcn, thcy might not stick around, it's quite difficult to invcst in staff whcn 
it's agcncy staff because you could balance up do I invest in training because you want 
them to give good service but Own if I train thcin up, thcy*rc going to go sonicwhere 
else. " 
Corporate Director of Children's Services: 
it's notjust a number crunching capacity, it's an intelligence, it's people with sufficicnt 
intelligence and confidence to come and say oy havc you noticed that thcrc is - that sort 
of capacity not just you know, that is the main problem actually in getting the analysis 
and getting that intellect. 
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Coninitinicaflon and use of information: 
Political member responsible for performance management: 
"We can produce good performance indicators that show all the right things, but if Joe 
and Janet Public and their 2.4 children, are they experiencing, are they perceiving an 
improvement, sometimes the public can perceive that things get worse but they're 
actually getting better and sometimes that adds situations where the public have been 
satisficd with this service and we said it's actually very poor. " 
"Fourth, there's always the problem of making sure that the good numbers that you 
might see in the trend of performance indicators are actually matched by people's 
experiences. " 
"It is more than just performance indicators, that information and asking for the right 
information, getting the right information and making use of the right information. " 
"Getting back to a cultural thing, there's information there for me to get hold of, I'm 
sure it's there, but we haven't got the culture of obtaining this information. " 
Assistant Chief Executive for performance and delivery: 
'There's a bit of an issue about whether we say things in public or not and of course it's 
healthy that we do. On the other hand if we really want members to explore a challenge, 
do they want to do that with the Press there, so we want to make sure there's an 
opportunity that can clearly present these in public so that the public can see what's 
going on, but we're also looking at ways that don't give us a hard time with the press 
being there. " 
Corporate Director of Resources: 
"[Elected members do not use performance information] very much, I think this is the 
challenge for us making it feel relevant politically, in terms of providing good services. " 
"What's important to people on the doorstep, is a range of: clean streets, 'a sense of 
safety and whether they can get a house or not on the waiting list. " 
Corporate Scorecard Project Manager: 
"So, by doing that, there is an intense focus on particular services as well, there's an 
overview focus as well on the agenda overall and then of course within departments 
themselves you will have services monitoring their score card with service plans, at 
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CMT you're on one to one with their corporate directors, that kind of approach and then 
of course the team plan will be informed by this as well, so there's all sorts or use for 
this information at different levels. " 
Corporate Director of Customer Services: 
I think incidentally that the public don't give a toss about pcrfonnancc indicators, I 
think they judge us by three things really, how clean the streets are and what it's like to 
live round here; whether they think that the council is listening to them and consulting 
them; and what happens when they ring up and want a service. Their real I ifc cxpcricnce 
is what they judge us on ... because I think if that wasn't true, you wouldn't scc three 
star, excellent authorities like Camden changing hands politically, bccausc pcopic 
would be enraptured by the performance of the majority party wouldn't they? Why 
would they sling them out? And I think there is a real dangcr that you get a discoilncct 
between CPA assessment and what people think of local scrviccs. " 
"So I think we do need strange people's opinions of the council, we nccd really good 
propaganda, we need to tell people what we're doing but we also nccd to listcn to thcm 
and we need to respond well when they get in touch. " 
Head of Revenues and Bencrits: 
"Because some indicators for central govenuncnt and I think they've got it fairly well 
cracked in benefits where you can see that the performance measure which is an 
element of CPA for benefits is the same thing as a BVPI and is the same thing as the 
management information, so that is very good, so the same thing but it uses a diffcrcnt 
context. " 
"A lot of people use that information [from Pis) and that's why the focus is on what 
matters to stakeholders. " 
Group Manager of rcnts and bencrits: 
Question: "Do you think that the information that you have is helping you? " 
Answer- "It helps us to achieve the PIs, yes. " 
"So I think one of my issues is about, it's not just reflecting what the council docs, it 
reflects on something like that what the customer does, but because it's not clear when 
it's published and I really wouldn't expect the customer to understand all this and how 
it's calculated, it then reflects poorly on the local authority. " 
281 
Corporate Director of Children's Services: 
Micy are obviously open performance targets to abuse and to manipulation but even 
given all of that nnd nil the other stuff, I am very satisfied with the broad regime of 
pcrfoniiancc targets and indicators, they represent an important substitute in the 
educational world or the social services world for profit as a bottom line measure. I 
know there's always stuff about the audit society and all the rest of it and the producer 
always comes out and says blah, blah and the unions ... so that's that. " 
'That's the kind of use I'm looking for, the unexpected, the unanticipated, the hidden 
relationships that are contained in the data as you get just by producing the data, that's 
very important the analysis, crucially important. " 
"(Our main problems in relation to PM are] the scale of the data and the capacity or 
incapacity properly and fully to exploit it. ( ... ) [The scale is] just the huge amount of it 
that's actually available to us and whether we're maximising the potential of it and the 
scale and the analysis of it. " 
"Reporting to this higher level or different part of the organisation or corporate part of 
the organisation affccts very much the reporting of information because it concentrates 
particularly on bottom quartile performance by design. It's good that, I like that because 
I think that's the driver to get us up -I don't know if there arc any tensions, I find in 
education, we've been doing this for so long now since 1988 in this country and so 
intensely, intensively that I think we've all got so used to it that it's not a source of 
tension and conflict, except it is amongst certain providers like those schools in needy 
suburbs who don't like things being revealed about them, that's where the tensions lie, I 
don't think that they are unrepresentative or have particularly inaccurate summary of the 
position in our schools. " 
'They are obviously open performance targets to abuse and to manipulation but even 
given all of that and all the other stuff, I am very satisfied with the broad regime of 
performance, targets and indicators, they represent an important substitute in the 
educational world or the social services world for profit as a bottom line measure. I 
know there's always stuff about the audit society and all the rest of it and the producer 
always comes out and says blah, blah and the unions... " 
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Cost of PINI 
Political mcniber responsible for performance munageniclit: 
"In rclation to the audit commission and in rclation to auditors and the job that thcy do, 
I'll say without hesitation, the audit commission is too big for its boots, we ore ovcr. 
audited. PriccNVatcrhouscCoopcrs get paid for this council 820 thousand pounds n ycar, 
that's approximately 2% on the council tax. "' 
Corporate Performance Manager: 
Main problems with PM: "It is time consuming to collect and process all tile data, and 
substantial resources arc rcquircd. " 
Corporate Dircctor of Childrcn's Scrvices: 
"So there's a tension there really about the amount of work that goes into the balanced 
score card and whether it's productive and cost cffcctivc and provides value for money 
in terms of providing the organisation. " 
"Yes of course, I would be very interested to see some kind of analysis of the amount of 
time and effort devoted to it as against flic outcomes from it, in favour of some simplcr 
you know. " 
Divisional Director of Safeguarding and Rights: elp to 
"I think that numbers and the stats and the Pls arc real lives and real people, so although 
I understand that it's time consuming, frustrating and a lot of work. I think they serve a 
very good purpose and moving myself in a position of being a member of the public, I 
would like to know what local govcnuncnt actually does, so I haven't got a problem 
with that framework, what I've got a problem with is some of the duplication of how the 
performance indicators are recorded, how they arc collated and the frequency, the 
amount of time it takes to get that organised. 
"Well, the main issues arc: it's bureaucratic, it's very time consuming and a lot of paper, 
the other one of course is to do with social workers being compliant and recording. " 
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Data quality 
Policy and Partnership Division Officer (person responsible for Local Service 
Partnerships): 
"The other aspect in terms of government I guess would be the quality of some of the 
statistical information that's available either it doesn't exist and there's an expectation 
on local authority and local authority areas to develop it to which there's no reason. " 
"( ... ) in terms of long term planning, very unscientific and not particularly reliable. " 
"It takes so long for the update to come out that you're always playing catch up really. " 
"I think it's a quantitative and a qualitative thing; lots of the indicators are very specific 
targets that we have - that's a quantitative, that's f me. I think there's also a qualitative 
clcmcnt that people have to feel, have to recognisc the services you're providing and 
actually feel good about them. " 
Policy and Review Officer at corporate strategy department (person responsible 
for corporate performance indicators): 
"nicy (people within the organisation) value more quantitative information, as it is less 
about interpretation and provides more focus. " 
Head of Revenues and Benefits: 
"Some of them [Pls] we produce quarterly and you'd want to produce them more 
frequently to rind out that they are more useful. " 
I think also there arc issues sometimes the quality or the accuracy of the data, being 
able to be reassured about that. " 
"You get more value from the analysis that you do and the action that you take (... )in 
some cases when you have manual systems you spend more time collecting and 
gathering the data and you have little or no time to analyse because by then things have 
moved on. " 
Group Manager of rents and bencrits: 
"One of the other things that happens and I've seen it so many times is because it is not 
I 10% clear on a lot of the indicators how you calculate it, I can sit here in this authority 
and calculate this indicator and then I can go and I get a set of auditors who come in and 
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audit me and they can say right I agrcc with your calculation and I can have n sct of 
people in anothcr authority who get auditcd by a diffcrcrit sct or nuditors and have done 
a calculation compictely diffcrcntly and there's no continuity. "' 
Performance Monitoring and Service Development Manager ror the revenues and 
bucrits department: 
"Even the statistics themselves arc open to interpretation and we're not that everyone is 
being made to play on a level playing field really. " 
"Yes, you would know the score, but you wouldn't know - is it an nfllucnt area unless 
you wcnt and researched, you wouldn't know if it's got a lot of hostels, if it's an 
affluent area, if they've got areas of dcprivation. " 
Assistant Alanagcr for housing bencrits and council tax bencrit claims: 
-You see that's the thing your figures arc just displayed in a league table, there's no 
background. I've asked for it before, why can't they show what systems people use 
because they collect that data, at least you could then compare like for like, but even for 
types it makes a big difference if you've got a large private caseload because these large 
processors have a lot more work involved, so although the league tables arc quite uscrul, 
they are quite distorted because you can't compare like with like. " 
'7herc arc more kind of technical things - weve got our mainframe system, wMch is 
going to be replaced, the one we actually use to calculate bencrits is antiquated, that 
causes us problems. Technology is the main problem; where I worked Worc, you could 
download reports electronically and manipulate them, you can then call off reports so 
that you can target work, which made things a lot easier, you can't do it here. " 
Children's services safeguarding and rights - Performance Datasct Monitoring 
Tool - Data Quality: 
"Data quality has shown evidence of notable improvement over recent months, however 
there are still areas of weakness that will need to be addressed. " 
Children's services safeguarding and rights - Performance assessment framework ft t, ft 
(RAF) monitoring tool -June 2006: 
"Indicators, however, only indicate. Before drawing conclusions about performance 
they must be considered with othcr sources of information about pcrfonnancc, including 
contextual data, and inspection reports. " 
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Corporate Director of Children's Services: 
"[PM is] the key driver for improvement, it is the key driver for improvement and it's 
not just pcrfon-nancc as quantified in figures, it's performance qualitatively and 
tlicrcforc we've spent a lot of time and attention on the observation of classroom 
practice, tile quality of the interaction between teacher and pupil and pupil and pupil, so 
wc'vc built up quantitative performance measures of course determined and driven 
largcly by the govcnuncnt's performance indicator, the regime but also qualitative 
obscrvational bank of evidence around performance, the two taken together are 
fundamcntal I think. " 
Divisional Director or Safeguarding and Rights: 
"A member of staff will not record that that job has been done, so you print out your 
latest position and you don't get the full picture because people haven't recorded it 
accurately. We arc much better than we were a few years ago but we still have quite a 
bit of work to do. " 
Performance Analyst of Safeguarding and Rights: k1o 15 
"nicy'll basically start doing some of this today and they've got about a week to get 
both these data sets done and that's collating all the information that they pull off the 
system, getting information from here and everywhere. This also helps in increasing our 
recording practice: social workers have a cultural thing about recording things, things 
like I didn't become a social worker to use the computer things like that and [out 
manager) since he started has a very strong outlook on this that if it isn't on Swiftý our 
computer system, it didn't happen, you need to evidence your work and having this on a 
monthly basis has helped us focus on areas that we've not been doing well at 
evidencing. " 
Head of Lcisure, Arts and Olympics: 
"The effectiveness of performance management, gathering information and values ( ... ) 
particularly in the cultural quarter, because some of it is non tangible and some of it is 
extremely difficult to capture, for example: how do you capture an experience of 
tourism or art and drama programs? What added value did that give to the community 
and it's the feel good factor ... how 
do we calculate that feel good factor? So there"s 
this debate going on. " 
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Corporite Dircctor of Childrat's Scrvices: 
"[PM is] the key driver for improvement, it is the key driver for improvement and it's 
not just performance as quantified in figures, it's performance qualitativcly and 
therefore weve spent a lot of time and attention on the observation of classroom 
practice, the quality of the interaction bct, %vccn teacher and pupil and pupil and pupil, so 
we've built up quantitative perforniancc measures of course dcIcnnined and driven 
largely by the govcnuncnt's performancc indicator, the regime but also qualitativc 
observational bank of evidence around performance, the two taken together arc 
fundamental I think. " 
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Impact of PINI 
Corporate Director of Children's Services: 
"But without the performance indicators, without the international pressure, the pressure 
from those indicators to go and look we would never have noticed there was another 
way of doing it and thcrcforc the performance indicators had a direct impact on practice 
and intcrnational practice for that mattcr. " 
Performance Monitoring and Service Development Manager for the revenues and 
benefits department: 
"Exactly, the bcncrit in that (of having so many Pls) is that we're so driven by them 
because a few years ago they bought in all these indicators and benefits and it's so 
diffcrcnt to cvcry othcr department but it does mean that we're now a lot further 
forward than other departmcnts in measuring things and using them to develop the 
scrvicc, wlicthcr we're drowning in thcrn and that is taking away from what we want to 
do, then that's an argument as well. " 
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'Joined tip' government: 
Corporate Scorecard Project Manager: 
The LAA ( ... ) has actually allowed all the key agencies to agree on measures and 
targets for the community because they know Oiat the resource has bccn brought 
together to deliver it. " 
"What certainly the LAA has done and we'll sce if it works or not is put lots or money 
in one pot and now everybody is now working togctlicr fmm their diITcrcnt vicw point 
to deliver a common outcome. " 
'7here is a lot of partnerships that the council is now involvcd in with the police ror 
example around community safety, so there's a lot of common indicators there, the 
health authority is the same, so there's a lot of commonality now betwccn the major 
agencies because actually national govcnuncnt has forced us to do it as wcll and 
partnerships are now much more about trusting each other and rcalising that it can't be 
done on our own, the police can't do their job on their own, we can't do ours on our 
own, we need to be working together, so I don't think it's a huge problcrn now but thcrc 
will always be places where you have debates about what's the appropriate nction. " 
Policy and Partnership Division Officer (person responsible for Local Service 
Partnerships) 
"You can't improve service delivery against key deprivation indicators purely on a 
single authority basis, you really need to do it in partnership and as the LSP is seen as 
overarching into strategic partnerships, the LSP's were idcntiried as a way of doing 
that. " 
'The local area agreement obviously is with efficiency really in mcrging or giving the 
local authority or local areas the opportunity to decrease bureaucracy by mcrging lots or 
different government funded streams and the pull in those assets and focus on the 
priorities both nationally for the governmcnt and any local priorities. " 
Performance Analyst for Safeguarding and Rights: lep to ft 
"And because the Met don't collect their statistics in a borough by borough area, you 
can't do a fair comparison like we can't compare our looked after kids in Barking and 
Dagenham with every kid in Barking and Dagenham because that information is not 
available, so our looked after kids compared to the ratio for the whole of the Met area. "' 
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Locally elected members 
Corporate Director of Resources: 
"I think that's the point about mcmbcrs: they tcnd to have slightly poor focus to 
undcrstand the principics. " 
Former Corporate Pcrforniance Manager: b 
Question: "Do councillors havc an influence on performance management? " 
Answer "In terms of monitoring it, yes; in tcn-ns of the local drivers for performance 
indicators - yes; and also in terms of their strength of feeling, if they clearly disagree 
with somcthing, although we have a statutory duty to report on statutory indicators, the 
interest that they show in it will be varied. It also depends on the capability and interest 
of the members concerned and how they act on that, because it's ok monitoring it's 
what you do with the infonnation, does it drive policies, does it drive financially the 
rcdircction of funding in terms of budget setting, that's going to varying degrees in all 
councils, if you go to Essex you'll see one style and if you come to us you'll see a 
different style. " 
"Yes because they are directly elected with portfolios and it's even more prevalent in 
areas where you have hung councils or opposition parties, we do not really have an 
opposition party here and therefore challenging decisions and the scrutiny of funding a 
performance and direction of travel for the council doesn't always get the interest that it 
does in other councils. We have regular performance monitoring systems here and the 
level of engagement is varied. " 
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Objectives 
Political member responsible for performance management: 
"I bclicve succcss is mcasurable and I want to mcasure it, so thcre's a whole b. 11tcry of 
pcrformancc indicators and it changcs from ycar to yvar, the cinpliasis changcs from 
ycar to ycar, the status of thcrn changcs from ycar to ycar. " 
Corporate Director of Resources: 
"One of the challenges for us is that we have such broad ranging objectives, on tile one 
hand there arc lots of scrviccs we have to deliver, on the othcr we've got widcr 
rcsponsibilitics, to promote the economic and cnvironnicnt and social wcllbcing of tile 
arca, to make life bcttcr in the area. So weve capturcd that very high level sct, or 
objectives with our seven community priorities. " 
Corporate Pcrformance Manager: ft 
"Improving scrviccs for the community is our main objectivc. CPA targcts and 
inspcctions are sccondary" 
Corporate Scorecard Project Alanagcr: 
"Well I think the main objective is obviously to deliver excellent services to our local 
community, that's what we're aiming to do, in terms of CPA, become four stars really 
and obviously CPA is about improving those services to a level at which people 
benefit. " 
"Of course we have what we call the seven community priorities and those am the key 
drivers for us having consulted with our community on those, those arc the drivers for 
the organisation. " 
"I think things like delivering value for money services, delivering excellent customer - 
putting customers at the heart of our service obviously is a crucial one, having high 
quality performing services is important to us as well and I think on reflection recently 
cohesion and promotion of equality and diversity within the right way is a very 
important area that we need to give a lot of importance to certainly. " 
I think a lot of the life chance opportunities and social and cconomic rcgcncration 
opportunities are going to rest very much on this massive program that we arc involved 
in and I think yes there are particular things for this community in terms better ccntrcs, 
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better Icaming opportunities, life skills for people through education right through 
adulthood. " 
"So I think also getting new communities in who actually make a very important 
contribution to the community economically is going to be a measure of our success and 
that is one of the key things around regeneration for the borough that we want to attract 
both a mix of pcople. " 
"Rcgcncration is ccntral to us now in many rcspccts and evcrything kind of hangs off 
that almost now. " 
"nicn these areas, these arc sort of almost like corporate priorities say that these are the 
key things that we need to get right in order to deliver this agenda and the way that we 
mcasurc whether we're doing the right things here is we have a set of targets, PI's and 
projccts which havc been identified at senior level which we will monitor and look at as 
a measure of our success. " 
Policy and Partnership Division Officer (person responsible for Local Service 
Partnerships): 
'The simple objective is to provide excellent high quality services for our community 
that our community have identified that priorities for them. now that's kind of embodied 
in B&D the adopted seven between three priorities, they were adopted some time ago 
now, probably been around for about seven or eight years and they are embodied in the 
community strategy. " 
"Those: seven community priorities were quite widely consulted, they were set about 
eight years ago, we've had them for some time and they kind of provide the strategic 
focus where all our services should actually be. Since then, we had those already, 
they've: kind of been embodied within the community strategy, transforming lives and 
that I think is the objective of our organisation is to deliver better community strategy. " 
"I think the success for our organisation, there are two levels really, there's the kind of 
harsh level if you like obviously we were looking to be regarded as an excellent 
authority, look at the general measures within terms of the CPA and also in terms of the 
partnership again they use the traffic light assessment, so we're looking to be rated as a 
green authority in terms of our partnership work. Success again for us really I think is 
in the community itself, rcalising, one from our point of view being able to evidence 
and prove: that we've actually delivered against the community strategy and most of 
those community priorities and I think the second is to understand and recognise that 
Dagenham is a better place to live and work in and apply based on that delivery of those 
strategies. " 
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Corporate Director of Customer Services: 
"It's really about dclivcry the seven community priorities which we have agreed and 
idcntiricd with local people. " 
Head of Revenues and Bencrits: 
I think a successful organisation is first of all in terms of customer vitisfaction, 
reflecting in that we have a customer focused service. " 
"So being successful is that we're top quartile in those indicators, allowing for things 
like regional deprivation or deprivation but we're still top quartile. Successful is that 
we're top quartile in terms of our customer service. " 
"Success is also in having highly motivated staff and staff that arc developing in line of 
change. " 
Group Manager of rents and bencrits: 
"So our ob . ective for this year is to achieve a4 on the best value inspectoratc, but in J 
order to achieve the 4, one's got to achieve certain targets on the PI's. So the overall 
objective is to get a4 on the CPA. And then for fraud, fraud has four performance 
indicators and they too fced in to the CPA assessment, so again it is to achieve a target 
on those four PI's that will make us achieve the four on the CPA. " 
"[Being successful] is meeting those targets but it's getting the four at the CPA at the 
end of the year. " 
Performance Monitoring and Service Development Manager for the revenues and 
benefits department: 
"[Local Pls] are more local our ambitions; a lot of them will fccd in to help the 13VPI 
but they are what we're trying to achieve bccausc obviously you're not just lead by tile 
BVPI's, we lead by having an exccllcnt customcr scrvicc, mccting local nccds, things 
like that, so these arc our service plan, what we're doing this year. " 
Assistant Afanager for housing bencrits and council tax bcncfit claims: 
"It's really to try and process claims and change of circumstances as quickly and 
accurately as possible. " 
"[We achieve success), I would say, if we exceed the targets. " 
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Corporate Director of Children's Services: 
"Minimising bottom quartile performance indicators, reducing them, not only getting 
into quartile range but going above the average within the inter-quartile range and 
thirdly maximise your number in the top quartile. " 
"They have cnormously helped towards our success, they are central and until national 
performance indicators in education for example were published nobody new the 
objective position of the children down here relative to national outputs and national 
outcomes. And it was a huge driver to really raising issues of equity and equality and 
access and participation and without that data or without that data nationally published 
and brought that onto the surface, we would never have had the generation of the kind 
of angcr at disadvantage and the quizzical why the hell are these children in that 
pcrformancc position compared to those children and we would never have had the 
capacity to drive forward? " 
Pcrformance Analyst for Sareguarding and Rights: rm 
"Although we've been talking about percentage and things like that, it's very much the 
child behind die numbers anyway. It's difficult to see the connection because you 
actually see it as a load of statistics, but it's helping them get the bridge between the two 
things. " 
Head of Leisure, Arts and Olympics: 
"We are hcre to transform the lives of the community back in Barking and Dagenham 
and in doing so make their lives simpler. " 
"What we're really up here for is to make sure the Barking and Dagcnham, quality of 
life aspects is transfonned and ... it's quite focused, so the objectives of the organisation 
are really translated into that. " 
294 
APPFNDIX APPFNDIX 1) 
Partnerships 
Corporate Pcrformance Managm 
"There is a lot of partncrships that the council is now involved in with the police for 
example around community safety, so there"s a lot or common indicators there, the 
health authority is the same, so thcrc's a lot of commonality now between the miljor 
agencies because actually national government has forced us to do it as well and 
partnerships arc now much more about trusting each other and rcalising that it can't be 
done on our own, the police can't do their job on their own, we can't do ours on our 
own, we need to be working togcthcr. so I don't think it"s a huge problem now but there 
will always be places wlicrc you have dcbatcs about what's the appropriate action. " 
Policy and Partncrship Division Officcr (person rcsponsible for Local ScrvIce 
Partnerships): 
"in terms of the partnership role, obviously since 2001, wcvc had a local strategic 
partnership which is called Barking and Dagcnham Partnership, and with that we 
rcccivcd funding at the same time and having an LSP was one of the prcrcquisi(cs of 
receiving funds. " 
"You can't improve service delivery against key deprivation indicators purely on a 
single authority basis, you really need to do it in partnership and as die LSP is seen as 
overarching into strategic partnerships, the LSP's wcrc identified as a way of doing 
tlmt. 91- 
"We've restructured certainly twice if not thrcc times, I'd be happy to go to the cnd of 
each of those, we've actually got a stronger partnership as a result of that and it's partly 
in response to external measures and changes in government policy but also partly 
because we see that the way that we were structured. " 
Policy and Review Officer at corporate strategy dcpartnicnt (person responsible 
for corporate performance indicators): 
"NVhcn partnerships are involved gathering information becomes difficult - often there 
is a I-month delay to get the information. In some cases, like cnvironmcnt and road 
safety, they had up to 14-month delays. " 
Ilead of Leisure, Arts and Olympics: 
"When you're working with partncrs that increases the complexity diffcrcnces right 
across the piece, when you've got PCTs, whcn you've got a voluntary scctor, whcn 
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you've got the police, fire brigadc, all doing a necessary job of gathering the 
pcrformance manager information, but again it's about realigning all of them as 
well. " 
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Performance culture 
Political mcinbcr responsible for performance management: 
'The question I've askcd before is to drive up your pctformancc indicators do you nccd 
more rcsourccs or is it a cultural change that you nccd to drive through within your 
rcsponsibility? So far I would suggcst the answcrs that sceni to come back is it n cultural 
thing and that's partly the drive to achicvc cflicicncies. " 
"Geting back to a cultural thing, thcrc's inronnation thcrc ror me to gct hold of, I'm 
sure it's there but we haven't got the culture of obtaining this information. " 
"Thc performance indicators that we've got, I wondcr whahcr on bchnif or all clected 
mcmbcrs and all mcmbcrs of the cxccutivc, flicre is indccd owncrship ror performance 
indicators they're rcsponsibic for. " 
"I wonder whether the importance of pcrfonnancc indicators has pertncatcd the whole 
organisation. " 
Corporate Director of Resources 
"I don't want to get too hung up on the current framework. It is the proccss, it is pcoplc 
having discussions about thesc things, what is it that's important for us, how do we 
know whcn wc're getting there, the thing's successful I think, that's what wc'vc got to 
rctain, their not technical issues, thcy'rc basic issues. "' 
Policy and Review Officcr at corporate strategy department (pcrson responsible 
for corporate performance indicators): 
'vrhe culture within local govcnuncnt is now about performance, you know whcre you 
fit in that league table, what's your CPA rating. " 
"People like myself and more senior people can talk quite well about how this all works 
and how it should. The test for us is how people on the ground understand it and I think 
there is a big drive in the organisation to get that understanding up. " 
'The [people on the ground] don't need to understand how we put the balanced score 
card together or what the strategies of the service is but they need to understand how 
they fit into it. " 
"People will say- "my day job is to provide clinical services or to provide homc care. " 
These add on things arc really not something that I think people like, but, as I said, 
because we are in a performance culture now it's important as well. So there is a bit of 
tension and conflict and I think to say there isn't would really be naive anyway-, and I 
think you'll find that if you speak to performance people who deal with indicators and a 
collection of them and the monitoring, this quarter and that quarter, you'll hear lots or 
frustrated comments because the whole thing around performance is that it's evidence 
based now, it can be proven, the source can be idcntificd. It's not just here's the figure 
that's it, like it was years ago; it's all audited, has to be evidenced and thcrc's a real 
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drive and industry in itself now. So there arc frustrations, but senior managers recognise 
that it has to be done, so tlicy do. " 
Policy and Partnership Division Officer (person responsible for Local Service 
Partnerships): 
"Intcmally it does take quite a long time for that continuity, that message about what 
you're trying to achicvc, to work its way to all levels of the organisation. Now, 
obviously there's training in place internally through things like the Balanced 
Scorccard, what the corporate objectives are in terms of priorities. Any kind of major 
staff gathcring that will be on the agenda, in terms of, actually, at a group manager or a 
heads of service level, using infonnation in that way. It's the cultural change that takes 
tile time. " 
"I'd say from the Lyons review - the government white paper on local conduct of 
govcnu-ncnt -, thcre is a kind of commitment in our direction of travel to improve these 
relationships; but I think it's very slight. I think there are huge cultural changes to take 
place, but, quite understandably, it will be a slow process. " 
Ifead of Revenues and Benefits 
"... then you move it onwards into the servicing and that's around having a sustained 
performance culture with people. Here we try and have a very clear thread where people 
understand how they impact upon the big picture, so the team knows that if I make sure 
that everybody *** and make that payment then they indirectly impact on the collection 
rate for council tax. " 
"You nccd to constantly make connections with the big picture. " 
Performance Analyst for Safeguarding and Rights 95 01 
"Social workers have a cultural thing about recording things; things like: "I didn't 
become a social worker to use the computerý', things like that and [the Divisional 
Director] since he started has a very strong outlook on this that, if it isn't on Swifý our 
computer system, it didn't happen. You need to evidence your work and having this on 
a monthly basis has helped us focus on areas that we've not been doing well at 
evidencing. " 
`17he whole performance culture has helped us to increase our recording practices. " 
"[PM] is not just a stick to beat people with, it's a congratulations thing as well. " 
"I think the national [Pls] are fine, this helps a lot. I think we've got a really strong 
performance culture here anyway, all the managers buy into it, a lot of the work goes 
right into it and it does help us track our performance, where we're doing good and 
where we need to do better. " 
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Pcrformancc indicators 
Political mcinber rcsponsible for performance managemcnt: 
"So I'm very plcascd that the govcmmcnt arc saying: look at the pcrfonnancc 
indicators, look at the targets, look at what you do in factual tcrms and don't get 
distracted by somcthing more woolly conccpts like morn1c. " 
"A third problcm of perrormancc indicators: we had to be constantly aware or the 
unintended cirects orconccntrating on performance indicators. "' 
"I think the more consistency, less change in this, you can actually gcnuincly compare 
year on year or possibly a two or thrcc year period going back. " 
Corporate Performance Manager: 
"Local needs arc reflected in the local indicators, such as the Balanced Scorccard ones". 
"Most indicators arc useful, but there arc too many BVPls and local indicators provide 
more information. After a while some indicators might become redundant. " 
'There's more consultation going on with Government. ( ... ) I'lle development of new 
BVPls before was more top-down, now it is more linked to improving services and 
achieved through more collaboration. " 
Corporate Scorecard Project Manager: k 
"And then we produce this which is the actual balanced score card, which is what is die 
objective, what is the indicator, what's the target, that's what we put on the intcnial 
intranct, so that everybody can see what the service pfiofities arc, what the targets arc 
and what they're measuring, that kind of thing and then below that each scrvicc 
produces an implementation plan, strategic level so it highlights how each of these 
corresponding objectives are going to be nctioned by the head or service. " 
Former Corporate Performance Manager: elp 
"nat's the danger of local indicators, thcy'rc not audited, they're unusable generally, 
they're not helpful or is it that and thcy"rc only often output measures, they're not 
outcome focused, a lot of what we do here, the indicator and setting an indicator 
becomes the industry, the cffcct of that is lost and perhaps we ought to be delivering 
targets not indicators, there is an argument about that. " 
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Corporate Director of Customer Services: 
I think the relationship between us and the ccntre of the organisation has moved on and 
improved enormously over the last year or so. I think (the current CEO] has changed the 
regime, weve got diffcrcnt people, we've got a much more collaborative approach, a 
much more collegiate approach, I would have said that a year ago the centre on 
performance was monitoring our failures if you like and marking our homework and 
today we're working together, I think there's no question about that. " 
I laving said that, some of the LPSA critical have been less than helpful. " 
I think broadly speaking the CPA indicators are ok, there are some specifics and some 
approaches that I disagree with. " 
"Mostly look at the CPA critical 20 or just slightly more than that in the dcpartment, but 
we do at some point and at some level look at all of them. " 
I think if there were more PI requirements to demonstrate how you understand the 
customers and what they want. " 
"And we need to get better and better at that over the next couple of years, there'll still 
be pockets of negativity in the organisation but I think at the top end of the organisation 
we've moved on a long way and I think we're having a much more confident 
relationship with the Audit Commission now than we were a year ago. " 
Head of Revenues and Bencrits: 
"it is very difficult because when you arc dealing with people and location, geography 
and stuff like that, because those are moving, they will always and vary in the national 
schemes. So you need to allow for that kind of variation and that sometimes is very 
difficult to cover sometimes, so that is the main caveat with those kind of league tables. 
But I'm not discounting them completely because they still tell me a valid picture and 
you can still make allowances for those variations, you've got to make allowances for 
deprivation, even regionally, the audit commission has worked with core family groups 
and those work, within our benchmarking groups, we have family groups, they work, so 
nobody is so distinct that they don't have anybody that can be comparative with them. " 
"So whatever objective they have as well, they can link it to the divisional objective, we 
then link to the corporate objective, so they have a very clear approach, that helps to see 
the similarities between their individual target plans, so that's a very useful tool, but for 
some other areas it might not be as straight forward, it depends on the context of that 
might be. " 
"It would be helpful if there was something that one could rely on nationally in terms 
of, certainly value for money and efficiency which is becoming more of an issue, so you 
could actually say hand on heart this is the true cost of providing this service and this is 
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how I compared with that, at the moment Im having to rely on bcnchinirking clubs 
where you arc part of a family group, which is not bad. If we had n BVIII, that would 
have been great. " 
"What local government does do and they do very well is consult on PI's. they consult 
on performance indicators about whether it"s meaningful, are they useful nnd therefore 
we have a chance to influence them. " 
Group Manager of rents and bencrits: 
"I don't think counting input base really gives you something tangible, what you should 
be looking for is output. " 
"Well the balanced scorccard is drawn up each year, but nil the indicators within the 
balanced scorccard are there to fecd into achieving the targets on the PI's to achicvc the 
four. So yes, [we use them] but they're like the next level down. ) 
"Certain things we would measure still without the CPA, certain things I personally 
wouldn't measure or I would measure in a different way because thcrc arc some of them 
in my opinion that mean absolutely nothing. " 
"NVbat happens is, every time they change them, they consult via the local government 
association and the association of London government and they ask for our cornmcnts. 
Comments arc put in every time by the practitioners, sometimes they arc listened to, I'd 
say the majority it generally doesn't change anything. " 
"We all respond because we want to respond and we want to make the DWP aware of 
the issues, but we don't respond in thinking that they're going to take money off of one 
board. " 
Performance Monitoring and Service Development I%Iana, -,, cr for the revenues and 
benefits department: 
"It's a very crude indicator, the way they do it and it doesn't, as with all of these, it 
doesn't take into account local differences, because they're the same across every single 
council and obviously each council is very different in location and the borough that 
they are in. " 
"I'm not quite sure how it will work but you could group people in the same 
demographic make up and things like that. " 
"So literally just because of loads of hostcls in one but a big private tenancy market in 
the other, this effccted their BVPI, they weren't doing anything different within the 
department, so that's how hugely they can be affected by - which is why they're calling 
to say: we need local issues, local make up to come in to the equation. " 
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"We have customer care ones that fccd up into corporate because obviously that's a key 
focus to mcct customcrs. " 
"We weren't ever measured so really these were the first crude things to come in to 
measure us, so they have worked in a way in that they've focused us on what we are 
trying to achieve but they arc so crude and broad bruslistrokcs that in some ways they 
can be not helping the customer. " 
"[If you don't achieve] CPA level 4, you won't get excellent. So there's two things, not 
only do you have to aim for top quartilc, you have to obviously if you get these two 
levels you're going to be pretty near top quartile, but it's not guaranteed because as 
everyone's trying to get these two targets, the top quartilc is moving up and up. " 
"So they're quite crude and they arc in talks with local authorities because they 
rccognise that these arc really crude and they're trying to get new ways of measuring it, 
to be fair to the Audit Commission, they are looking into authorities more than they've 
ever done before. " 
"But is the overall strategic goal and then we obviously in our plans have to feed into 
this and the BVPls, so we have to do both, if we just concentrated on BVPIs, we 
wouldn't meet any of the targets that the council sets themselves overall. " 
Assistant Manager for housing bencrits and council tax benerit claims: 
"It's trying to manage individuals performances and obviously the knock on effect is, if 
you're getting that right then your CPA and the BVPIs are going to come up a bit better 
because you're managing the actual resource better. " 
"I can remember when I first started in benefits, it was a nightmare, it would take ages, 
like months for claims to be processed and things like that. Personally the CPA and 
BVPI are very good, I know a lot of people say no they're not but I think it forces 
councils to concentrate on the business process and try and work out how to do things in 
the quickest possible way. " 
"So on the whole it's fair but the 14-day should just go now, I don't think its relevance 
is lost. " 
'Technically you have got the input into those figures through local government 
organisations who normally write out more to a senior level or have you got any 
comments and things like that and yes it does get fed down to you. " 
Children's services safeguarding and rights - Performance assessment framework 15 ft AD 
(PAF) monitoring tool - June 2006 
"Perfortnance indicators (PI's) are a tool that managers and councillors can use to 
identify areas of good pcrfonnancc and areas of concern. " 
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Corporate Director or Children's Services: 
"[Involvement? ] Not any at all in any way, none. [Pls] are imposcd in our incrcasingly 
ccntrnlised socicty by the govcmmcn% you've bccn licre for some time obviously? " 
'There was a hcll of a lot of trouble ten or liflccn years ago. What I'm saying is they're 
not negotiable ( ... ). So for example they're going to introducc at thc moment ns you 
know the headline figurc for GCSE performance is five A- C's well they are going to 
require Maths and English to be part of those five as from next year, well there's no 
negotiation or discussion about those, thcyjust change the nature of the indicator at will, 
I don't know if there was any consultation about that, as long as they do things that 
people perceive as reasonable, then that does not cause tensions. "' 
"So the international pcrformancc indicators have bccn uscd hcrc probably more than 
almost any%vhcrc else in the country bccausc national pcrformancc indicators havc a 
limited value in the end. " 
"But without the perfonnance indicators, without the international pressure, (lie pressure 
from those indicators to go and look we would never have noticed thcrc was another 
way of doing it and therefore the performance indicators had a dircct impact on practice 
and intcmational practice for that mattcr. " 
"I personally have always been very wary of contcxtualisation, or using social nnd 
economic variables to give a context of performance because you can easily start 
excusing objectively low outcomes by way of well not bad in the cnvironmcnt that 
you've got. " 
"No not at all, I can truthfully say, thcrc's no tension about the focus on bottom quartile 
performance indicators, there is tcnsion but not with the chief cxccutivc, but with the 
producers of the balanced scorccard, which you said you wcrc crigaged with the 
balanced scorccard? " 
Divisional Director of Safeguarding and Rights: ft ft ft 
"Measuring along the way how many of them have a personal educational plan is the 
indicator behind the national indicator that makes it succeed. " 
"The local indicators are the ones that are the back bone to the national oncs bccausc if 
it wasn't for achieving some of the local indicators we wouldn't be able to do as wcll as 
we do on the national ones, so I think they arc cxccptionally important. " 
Performance Analyst for Safeguarding and Rights: 
"Yes, every [national indicator is good] so far - yes, there's a couple in here that I will 
come to that's a bit of an awkward one. " 
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"A funny issue around this one is it could be deemed that the child has done really well 
in their education and they've got a job and they don't want to be in touch with you 
because that's part of their past and they want to ***, that effects our performance 
indicator, so although it's a good outcome for the child, it's not a good outcome in that 
indicator. " 
"Through tile multi strcam we can see that we've really got to go out to get the target 
and we will, if we weren't monitoring it on a monthly basis, we wouldn't have that. 
That's a uscful indicator. " 
"Fhat's, somcthing that we nccd to do on a statutory basis so it's a good indicator to 
mcasure it. " 
"We had some duplications in there like we had rc-registered in there but then thinking 
about it looking how we can get it from a one figure in one of these boxes, so there's no 
point in having it, so we"re gradually cutting it down but it's very much done very 
closely in and there are things in here that will end up as PAF indicators, things like 
core assessments is now a PAF indicator and looked after reviews in timescale is a new 
PAF indicator and we've been measuring that previously. " 
Ilead of Leisure, Arts and Olympics: 
I think with the work we've done about those indicators within the balanced scorccard, 
the corporate scorccard and the priorities, you can clearly see and you can clearly 
demonstrate it contributes to that overall success of the organisation. I think there still 
needs to be more refinement, there's one question are you satisfied with the 
performance targets. I think that within the cultural block there still needs to be 
refinement. " 
"For example a few years ago how would we measure the quality of life in Barking and 
Dagenham, would it be by the fatality rates or would it be or by the income or by some 
other means and there was a substantial debate of how you'd define that and it all went 
down to what would be the necessary requirement of gathering information in a robust 
fashion that would feed into and inform that Pl. " 
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Performance measurement Vs. Performance managcnicia 
Corporate Director or Customer Services: 
"So for me actually a smaller, more critical number of indicators on which we arc sccn 
to act to support the council's key priorities would be a bit more useful; so the short 
answer to your question is that the focus on performance measurement is to get a facus 
on performance management. " 
"If you look at the council's priorities, weve got seven community priorities, then 
we've got corporate priorities for action, then we've got balanced scom=rd priorities 
and actually you can start to say, well actually the council's got 27 priorities and 27 is 
none at all isift it? " 
"I'd rather spend and certainly we're going to spend a lot more time looking nt self 
asscssment, responding to tile requirements of improvement ( ... ) for when we have our 
next CPA inspection next year. PIs arc important but they're not die beginning and tile 
end of the story arc they? " 
"I think it's easy to gct scrvicc Pls up, it's not so casy to gct corporatc asscssmcnt up, I 
think that's what I'm trying to say and it"s the quality of corporatc asscssmcnt I think 
that wc nccd to improvc on most, corporatc pcrformancc. " 
Performance Monitoring and Service Development Nlana-cr for the revenues and 49, benefits department: 
"I think the focus is lost. There arc two things I don't think were probably being as 
customer oricntated as we could be because we arc having to be lead by the BVPI's, so 
that's the problem of the CWP really, they need to address that and they arc addressing 
that, but also I think especially with our score card, we have so many indicators that we 
do spend a lot of time measuring them sort of thing and maybe it would be better to 
have core ones. " 
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90 11clationships bctivecii national and local (indicators) 
Political member responsible for performance management: 
"So tile govcnunent have got to respect in that sense - all being in the context of the 
national agenda - they have to respcct local differences and if you want to respond to 
your community out there. " 
"So I think we arc as an organisation capable of saying: well that's the government's 
agenda, were clear on what our agenda is we can deliver both, I don't envisage two 
agendas would be that dissimilar but who knows. " 
Assistant Chicf Executive for performance and delivery: 
"Simply populating your scorecard isn't best value for performance indicators, we're 
saying decide what's important for you, decide what an appropriate measure is, the best 
performance indicator that provides that measure is great. " 
"If people have not incorporated all of that to value performance indicators which they 
probably won't have done because some of them don't feel central to what we're doing 
other than we've got to do them, then they separately have to have a separate list of ***. 
You've got to keep an eye on these because you just have, so that's how we try to 
approach them, yes you can't ignore them, you need to make sure you're performing on 
them but if they're not the core of your scorecard that is fine. " 
"I think you probably do have to decide what the bottom lines are around certain areas 
of performance ( ... ). But beyond that you've got to think about how you can encourage 
the periphery, if that's what it is to take responsibility for it ( ... ). So in local government 
we've been developing Local Area Agreements - you probably know that. " 
"In principle that seems to be the right approach, a sense of taking our own 
responsibility and that doesn't prevent central government giving quite a strong steer to 
that. " 
Corporate Director of Resources: 
"It's also a basic principle of management, you've tried to set the broad objectives, 
you've set the broad direction and then say you know your service better than I do, Us 
is what we want you to achieve and this what you're going to get. And then we'll come 
to see whether you've achieved it. " 
"So it's that - on the one hand if they're saying we think some of the these things are 
really important to know about - fine, but then for it to suddenly become hugely 
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important, it just fccls... hold on %vc'rc trying to sct our direction wc nccd your support, 
not to havc somcdiing new that bccomcs niorc important. " 
"Because these arc done in blocks, as you say tcn areas, if in a particular area you don't 
do so well, then that area is of course low. So nctually of these various blocks we havc, 
you know children and adults, culture, housing, environment if we get a score of one in 
any of them it's because wc"rc not pcrforming well on a bunch of Ills, thcn Oult would 
mean that we would be a weak authority. Even if we got 100% in n1l the othcrs. so Micn 
you've got a rulc based system it does mean that in the cxtrcme one indicator can have n 
profound effect and it does mean that you get this rather distorted vicw. " 
"Clcarly Ccntral Govcmmcnt, tlIcY'vC got a roic to play to sct dircclions and dccidc On 
funding. But if wc could work on thosc things 1"Orc closcly togctlicr, it'd be bcItcr. " 
Corporate Performance Manager: ft 
"After a while some indicators might become redundant. ( ... ) We have to rcport the 
same information to different organisations and this generates confusion. I lowcvcr, now 
it's better than before. " 
Corporate Scorecard Project Nlana, -,, cr: t5 
"Within the pack that we provide services, there is the need for them to then say what 
drives their services, so the national agendas, the targets, things that you're talking 
about. Those then naturally have to be built into the service plan because it"s the way 
that we scrvicc plan and we prioritisc, you would expect to see those things influencing 
those plans, if they're not then there's something wrong somcwhcre. " 
"So there are things that locally we need to be much more focused on than perhaps 
nationally there isn't the drive, the cornmitmcnt initially but because of other factors 
then the national agenda changes as well and sometimes we can influence the national 
agenda locally because we pick up trends and patterns which might make national 
government say: there's an issue there, we really need to start thinking about and 
planning for. " 
"Well. certainly in terms of best value indicators, we don't have a lot of choice because 
they're statutory, they are the measure that the government sets so that it can mcasurc 
across local authority, how everybody's doing and the thrcsholds therefore include by 
how everybody is performing against them, so there's not a lot of interest there, there is 
consultation that obviously happens. " 
-There's always a debate around what measures are right and wrong, some of them arc 
best value indicators which arc statutorily set for us by government and as you know 
annually the govcnuncnt also reviews which indicators it uses because they arc not 
always the right ones, so I think locally and nationally we arc always struggling or 
debating, should I say, what is the best measure, what"s the best way for us as a public 
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body to provc that the public money that we spend is delivering that's always a 
chalIcngc for us here. " 
I think the juggling act for us is to say well yes we will deliver those priorities because 
actually yes those arc also our priorities but then you can also influence the way that 
you deliver it to match local needs and priorities. " 
"It's a factor of life that nationally there will be things that we have to do, yes it can be a 
pain because there are always resource implications, you have to create teams, you have 
to find new money to deliver these agendas, you have to employ people or consultants 
to come in, there arc all sorts of things that then impact on local government and 
national government perhaps are not always very keen on giving the money for us to do 
things, flicy can come up with all the initiatives in the world but they're not always very 
good on giving us the money to do it, so that is a problem and I think with respect to 
Labour and not to make a political comment, they've come up with lots and lots of 
initiatives and there's a joke about it's every week, what's the new initiative for this 
week... " 
Policy and Partnership Division Officer (person responsible for Local Service 
Partnerships) 
"So that's the national picture, the local picture then obviously it reflects some of the 
national targets, we've got our BVPI targets that are our balanced score card targets that 
obviously you've had a conversation with (... ); they deal with those issues, those areas 
and it's really in terms of what we're trying to do, in terms of the LAA is putting 
together balance of what we require to do for the government in terms of national 
targets and most of those I have to admit, most of those we'd be putting them in place 
anyway, they are issues for this area as well but there are also some localised issues. It's 
a kind of balance and the partnership, you see from a local authority perspective they 
deal with the balanced score card and surveys and the day to day collects and they 
report back. " 
"[National indicators] don't always align immediately and I think you can only deal 
with those tensions in a partnership framework. " 
"in tcnns of the whole agenda ( ... ), it's about devolving responsibility for government down to the local level. Now we welcome that from our side and we obviously want to 
move things along quicker than they're able to at central government position if you 
like. The other issue of course for them and this is very understandable is that are there 
issues in terms of loss of jobs and stailing in central government level if the devolution 
takes place. There are lots of control issues and it's a question of trust which I think it 
is. $$ 
'The other aspect in terms of government I guess would be the quality of some of the 
statistical information that's available either it doesn't exist and there's an expectation 
on local authority and local authority areas to develop it to which there's no reason. " 
308 
APPFNDIX APPINDIX B 
I think we'vc got to how can I say - our relationship from my cxpcricncc with the 
major government organisation, wc dcal with the Government office for London. In 
terms of partnership working over the last four ycars, it's been very good, it's been 
excellent, there's a rcgular ongoing dialogue with them, ccrminly officers that wc deal 
with there's a very real understanding of the problems locally and the difficultics 
between local government organisations and central government organisations, it's the 
cultures and the stylc that they operate and I think there's a understanding of that, there 
is a commitment to try and improve that relationship and that's been working very 
well. " 
"Thc cxpericnce wc had in tenns of dcvcloping the local arca agrccnicnt is vcry 
positivc, flic difficulty camc wlicn it was thcn widcncd to the ovcmll various 
govcmmcnt dcpartmcnts. Now that was an issuc as much for flic intcr-rclationship 
bct%vccn govcmmcnt dcpartmcnts rathcr than for the rclationship local and ccntml. " 
"Now that's not a bad thing, but it does mean that you're in a perpetual state of change 
really and if they slightly alter the definitions or the nature of thc target they're looking 
for then you'd be certain that you're actually collecting the right things, so it"s just the 
continuity would be licipful for central government as well in tcnns of if they really 
want meaningful comparators then they won't be stuck with one definition of what they 
wanted. " 
'7he experience we had in terms of developing the local area ngrccmcnt is very 
positive, the difficulty came when it was then widened to the ovcr. ill various 
government departments. Now that was an issue as much for the intcr-rclationship 
between government departments rather than for tile relationship local and central. Now 
there is again in terms of strategic policies that arc coming out of the government I'd 
say firom the Lyons review the government white paper on local conduct of govcnuncnt, 
there is a kind of commitment in our direction of travel to improve these relationships 
but I think it's very slight, I think there arc huge cultural changes to take place, but quite 
understandably it will be a slow process. " 
Policy and Review Officer at corporate strategy department (person responsible 
for corporate performance indicators): 
'Therc's b"n incrcascd influcnce on national Pls rcccntly, as a conscquence of a morc 
opcn rclationship. National targas and standards are morc towards what customcrs 
want. " 
Former Corporate Performance Nlanagcr: 
"In some cases [national and local indicators] overlap, in some cases they arc the same 
and in other cases they're different, that should be the key items for the council of 
which clearly there is a central driver but that's a varied dcgrcc. " 
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"[Service scorccards are consistent] in some ways but not all; yes, because it will be a 
driver for it but then there arc other local drivers, political drivers that will also inform 
those scorccards as well. As a head of service I will look at all this, I will work out what 
my priorities arc for the year, I'll consider where I hit against this because I have a 
delivery aspect of this, but I have a delivery aspect statutorily which may not be in here, 
for example if we look under performance, high quality services, it doesn't say we'll 
deliver all the best value performance indicators or statutory but probably the most, the 
highest level one means targets set out in the local area agreement, our service plans, so 
it's very different, a much more focused approach to performance management, it's 
using the information. " 
"Well the plan in the department will be because they have planning standards and 
therefore a particular response, the same thing for the waste because they have recycling 
targets set by central government so it's very directional, then you have others that 
really don't have any at all like legal, so we're having to source local ones because one 
thing we haven't discussed is the balance between local indicators. " 
"Each year when we have a consultation document except they rolled it out for three 
years last time, this comes from the ODPM and it sets the statutory best value indicators 
that are top tier level that an authority has to provide and they had what they called a 
sounding board which they wanted various practitioners from a mix of authorities and 
we were one of them and on the basis of that they put out guidance and reshaped the 
document but it was also the vision of having inserts that moved in and out quite 
quickly as downloadablc changes because the actual process of producing a) 
establishing which indicators b) setting the definition c) giving the practitioners 
guidance, was quite lengthy and duplicated, quite problematic and resulted in people 
interpreting things differently and it attempts to standardise that, they had this sounding 
board and the last consultation document and subsequent set of indicators that came out 
were done by the group. " 
"For example if you're conservative you may not think of best value as being your 
primary driver, influenced by labour rather than conservative because conservative is 
CCT you know they all have their own slant on this. " 
Corporate Director of Customer Services: 
"I do have to say as well that CPA basket changes almost without notice and sometimes 
quite illogically, so that I mean for example the CPA critical PIs for this year have not 
been confirmed and it's already July, we really needed to know what they were last 
December didn't we but the commission are still faffing around. " 
Main issues with the PMS: "Getting it to be consistentý not overlapping, not duplicating, 
getting the focus in the right areas and getting the management performance to follow 
the measurement of performance properly. " 
"At the moment we do tend to focus mostly or we have been focussing mostly on the 
ones that arc CPA critical because the council wants to move from fair to good and then 
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to excclicnt, so thm's bccn a lot of cmpliasis on CPA critical and LPSA critical, 
because of the rcward grants and just the status thit Socs with achieving stretch targas 
as opposcd to not achicving, so those I think have bccn quite uscful in focussing us on 
CPA type improvement. "' 
Ilead of Revcnues and Bencrits: 
"I'licy somctimcs ovcrlap, for cxamplc the BVPI's also double up as hlanagcInclit 
information stats and dcfinitcly our performance nicasurcs but also double up as MIS, 
so that's why the colour thread and these are all the kinds or things. " 
Group Manager of rents and baiefits: 
"But they still put all these indicators in because they're trying to force us to collect 
more, yet their direct services am losing billions more than we are. But we're then 
concentrating on say recovering an ovcrpaymcnt when we should really be 
concentrating somewhere else bccause thcy*vc got this agenda that they need to 
achieve. " 
Assistant Manager for housing bcnefits and council tax bencrit claims: b0 
"It just amazed me how detached, how no one saw, no one even considered that 
someone might actually mistypc in a date and I thought that was a bit naTvc, I think their 
heart was in the right place, they thought they were helping us out but I don't think they 
actually thought of the practicalitics of it. " 
Corporate Director of Children's Services: 
"Loads of performance indicators, government central performance indicators all over 
the place ... as you see it's got targets and indicators and also underneath thatý not only 
are we subjected to targets and indicators at government level, we're also subjected to 
inspection criteria and inspection regime by Ofstcd and by CSCI with permission for 
social care inspection, so my word, performance indicators arc all over the place, we arc 
absolutely infected, infused, whatever word you like by them. " 
"Yes, it's self evident, there's nothing much to be challenged about that [government 
policy], there's nothing we can do to challenge it any,. %My, you play the hand you're 
dealt, don't you? And broadly speaking they arc challenging everybody to get the 
maximum number of children to the national expected attainment and I'm perfectly 
happy with that. " 
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'The first and principal objective is set for us by the government because the 
government has determined that there will be five key outcomes for children and young 
people and families" 
"rhcrc"s a slight capacity issue but by and large they are consistent with our aims and 
objectives for this population with these people, this community, so I don't want to 
make too much of an issue of it. I do want national data to be published, I do want their 
position to be revealed against national norms and I do want an atmosphere to be 
created in which they seek and are helped to achieve the same norms. " 
Divisional Director of Safeguarding and Rights: 
"Well it's a different way of measuring, with the PAF you measure - in the 12 months 
of the financial year every single month you measure your performance against the PAF 
indicator, at the end of the year you can see how you compare to others, with other 
authorities and then once a quarter you compare your performance against the best 
value indicators, so you've two frameworks measuring the same thing. " 
I think in vcry simple terms having a performance assessment framework is a great 
idea, being measured on performance indicators is absolutely appropriate, it's the right 
thing to do, I want to know, the people I work with want to know but it has become very 
bureaucratic if you know what I mean, you've got far too many different frameworks, 
scrutinising performance. " 
"I haven't got a problem with the performance framework at all, the problems I've got 
as I said is the duplication of reporting and the overlap between the APA, the BVPIs 
and PAF. " 
"For safeguarding and rights because it's statutory work, we're measured on a number 
of things, we've got a set of performance indicators against the performance assessment 
framework, so you've got about twcnty-something PIs that are driven by central 
govcnuncnt. But in order to succeed in any of those Pls, you've got to have a number of 
other local performance indicators that we don't have to report nationally but are 
important in terms of our success. " 
Performance Analyst for Safeguarding and Ri-lits: III k3l 
I think national [Pls] are fine, this helps a lot, I think we've got a really strong 
performance culture here anyway, all the managers buy into it, a lot of the work goes 
right into it and it does help us track our performance, where we're doing good and 
where we need to do better. " 
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Ilcid of Lcisurc, Arts and Olympics: 
"There's a whole new set of indicators, there arc five new indicators, I don't know if 
you're aware of them ( ... ). Another set that's coining in next year. " 
"Ycs it's definitely a complement, you've got the raft of mition., 11 ones We want 
consistency and they want reliability, because sometimes we have a general approach 
because it needs to get up to direct consistency, so what you Can then do is set within it, 
the local funding gives it that local fccl. now ok you inight not be nble to bcriclumtk. " 
I think it actually starts to inronn them on the local circumstances and n1so, wotking 
with them to influence what comes out of central government, it's not pcrrcct, I don't 
think it will ever be because we've got quite a large organisation with local authorities. " 
"There is always tension towards the things that arc done within central government 
with the best will in the world, there arc things that havc to be addressed ( ... ). But 
there's always going to be that because there"s a limited part of msourcc in financc and 
there's always going to be a priority list of how that's delivered ( ... ). I think the way 
that can be resolved is actually how I explained previously by working closely together 
and for the govcnuncnt and local authorities to understand and have common ground or 
how that's resolved. " 
313 
Resource dependence 
Political mcniber rcsponsible for performance management: 
"We've looked at the major performance indicators, the ones that are causing us too 
many problems, the ones that arc not public service agreements, but that means serious 
money to us, three million odd I believe if we achieve those LPSA targets in the last 
quarter, I read, we were achieving them and on target to get the 3.7 million, we take 
very seriously the performance indicators that count towards our CPA. " 
"One area that I'm involved in, in chasing particularly at the momcnt which is very 
important to our CPA score is the whole value for money, using resources area. " 
Corporate Director of Customer Services: 
'The difference between bottom and top quartilc performance on council tax collection 
could be five or six million pounds a year and that makes an awful lot of difference to 
the services we can provide. " 
"And then there's a cause for celebration whcn we achieve them, particularly the LPSA 
because it brings money and no one enjoys spending money more than we do, on 
improving services of course. It's good to achieve the targets and you get rewards so 
you can do some more, that's the idea isn't it? " 
Head of Rcvenues and Bencrits: 
"[We are resource dependent], because our area is high volume, very transactional, so 
you have to be dependent on making sure that you've got bums on seats and the right 
number of people to meet those targets. " 
Group Manager of rents and bcncrits: 
"And also it depends on some of the PIs will force you down a particular route or have 
funding attached to them which forces you down a particular route. " 
"It fccds in, the score that I get on the BFI, feeds in to the corporate at CPA and then if 
you've got a high score on the corporate CPA, you are less stringently examined by the 
audit commission and everyone else, which means that you can use your resources in a 
more liberal way, does that make sense? " 
"None of the money comes to the Audit Commission; they just come in and say whether 
or not you're counting your PIs correctly. " 
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Performancc Monitoring and Scrvice Developincut 51anagcr for the mallics nild 
bencrits department: 
"Now bcncrits, because it's sccn as so important, has its own CPA that fccds into the 
corporate one, so education has one, social scrviccs have one and we have one. Now, 
dcpcndant on our scores, can hugely affect the overall CPA orthc council. " 
Assistant Manager for housing, bencrits and council tax henclit clahns: 
"Benefits was always a bit of a Cinderella department because the c1Tcct in CPA now 
and because of the fact that it is a difficult area, the pmrilc I think of bcncrits has bccn 
raised a lot higher. I'm not saying just here but in most local authorities I think it's true 
to say it was the forgotten dcpartincrit, now because it's a key factor in performance in 
the CPA, managers and even members arc forced to take more notice of it, it makes it 
easier to get resources and obviously there's more pressure put on if a department is 
failing. I think a lot of that is purely down to the CPA and the BVPI, it's raised the 
awarcncss. 19 
Corporate Director of Children's Services: 
"They're not affected at all, there's no linkage bctwccn die funding of schools and die 
performance of schools in this country. " 
"Oh yes, extraordinarily powerful; only 7% of the population go to [Oxford or 
Cambridge], a tiny proportion of the population but they exert cnonnous power and they 
distort the whole system and they always have done and apparcntly they always will do, 
but there arc those of us that resist. 
Divisional Director of Safeguarding; and Rights: ft ft 
'7here's a target called the local public service agreement target and ror instance it's a 
stretched target. We'll say that 701V6 of our looked after kids will leave care with one A- 
C GCSE, if we stretch ourselves and say in addition to that another 14 will Icavc with 
five A-C GCSE's, then the government will say ok if you cxcccd that, we'll give you 
500,000 quid. So there is a reward clement which is quite important and of course for 
somc of the service areas, the council itself might say %vc want to invcst more money 
into this particular area. " 
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Target setting 
Corporate Director of Customer Services: 
"We've got targets there like cleaner streets in London, highest recycling rates in 
London, that sort of thing and we have very ambitious targets across the board. " 
Group Manager of rents and bencrits: 
"When we got the last set of consultation documents out, they had a number of changes, 
so for cxample one of them was where the target was last year to do new claims in 36 
days, the targct then reduced to 29 days, but like I just said to you a customer has 28 
days to respond to any queries. " 
Performance Monitoring and Service Development Manager for the revenues and 
bencrits department: 
"We've got an aim to be in top quartile, but because of historical problems and 
deprivation in the borough, we're not going to get there next year, so we've got local 
targets to build us up to what is currently top quartile over the next two or three years, 
so our local targets are - we're aiming to achieve that. " 
"rhcse are more local our ambitions, a lot of them will feed in to help the BVPI but 
they are what we're trying to achieve because obviously you're not just lead by the 
BVPls, we lead by having an excellent customer service, meeting local needs, things 
like that, so these are our service plan, what we're doing this year. " 
Assistant Manager for housing benefits and council tax benefit claims: 
"So, based on the workload you've got coming in and your current starting level, try 
and set reasonable targets for an officer to achieve and then monitor those levels so that 
you can monitor the performance of each individual officer, give them feedback 
obviously where it's failing, where it's good, give them praise, but what we're trying to 
do is bring everyone's level up so that you can more or less guarantee that you're 
clearing the work. " 
Performance Analyst for Safeguarding and lZights: 119, ft ft 
"All the targets are set by [the manager] and his operational management team and they 
feed into our balanced score card and are children and people's plans. " 
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"Ilic opcrational managcr and the scrvicc tilanagcrs sct the largc1s. ( ... ) National indicators, ycs, but wc havc largcts, thm's n binding. cach indicator has its owl) 
banding, so that's sct by CSCI, the Commission for Social Carc InsivCtion, so evcry 
indicator his a banding which varics slightly year on ycar obviously dcpending on how 
evcrybody's perfonnancc is donc on onc ycar, so for cach indicator wc havc a target tind 
the nim would bc to givc a top band to cvcryonc, rcalistically you might not be - 
dcpcnding on what it is. " 
"This one we monitor closely, it's a bit more prcilictabic bccausc we know who will be 
leaving care at 18 and we know if they've already got a ME or not. so the soling or 
the target on this one is a bit more predictable, not as much a stab in the dark ns Some of 
them could be. " 
"There's no banding for this one bccausc it's a new indicator, so thcy won't give its a 
banding until they've seen cvcrybody's pcrformancc this ycar. " 
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Roles of performance incastirement 
Accountability 
Political member rcsponsible for performance management: 
"We have to demonstrate to the public out there that we are using their resources well; 
we do afIcr all set a council tax and we say as councillors we're going to dip our hands 
in your walicts and Like your money from you. " 
"Demonstrate as we tax the local population that we are producing, improving services 
that we consider good services and we can demonstrate that when we take money from 
you, we are using it well by searching out efficiencies, the whole Gershon agenda, 
which I welcome. " 
Assistant Chlef Executive for performance and delivery: 
"[Through PM), we can demonstrate focus on value for money. " 
"Simply populating your scorccard isn't best value for performance indicators, were 
saying decide what's important for you, decide what an appropriate measure is, the best 
performance indicator that provides that measure is great. " 
Corporate Scorecard Project Manager: 
"That's the best way for us as a public body to prove that the public money that we 
spend is delivering? That's always a challenge for us here. " 
Corporate Director of Customer Services: 
I think incidentally that the public don't give a toss about performance indicators, I 
think they judge us by three things really, how clean the streets are and what it's like to 
live round here; whether they think that the council is listening to them and consulting 
them; and what happens when they ring up and want a service. Their real life experience 
is what they judge us on ... because I think if that wasn't true, you wouldn't see three 
star, excellent authorities like Camden changing hands politically, because people 
would be enraptured by the performance of the majority party wouldn't they? Why 
would they sling them out? And I think there is a real danger that you get a disconnect 
between CPA assessment and what people think of local services. " 
318 
APPENDIX 
- 
AI'Pt-'-Nt)IX tj 
Ilead of Revenues anti Bencrits: 
"[PM] allows us to also embed accountability across the organisation in Icnns of - 
behind all of these arc individual targets and individual pcrfornianccs that we introduce, 
they have a sense of accountability and ownership of their service areas. " 
Group Manager of rents and bencrits: 
"rhe BVPI's arc published but the customer doesn't undcrstand flicin, they're quite 
complex quite oftcn. " 
"So I think one of my issues is about, it's not just rcflccting what the council does, it 
rcflccts on something like that what the customer does, but because it's not clear whcn 
it's published and I really wouldn't expect the customer to understand all this and how 
it's calculated, it then reflects poorly on the local authority. " 
Performance Monitoring and Scrvice Development Manager for the revallics and tlp bcnerits dcpartnient: 
I think there will always be a top few, you kind of need them in order to compare 
authorities but they have to be taken as what they arc, just n broad brush stroke and it's 
the local authorities underneath that, that will give a better indication and what we're 
trying to do is for the public to be able to see where their council is at, now if they have 
a raft of local indicators that arc relevant to them, it's going to mcan morc to them than 
a national one, people don't vastly care. " 
Divisional Director of Safeguarding, and Rights: 
'7hcre's something about making sure fliat we spend our money well and that we're 
cfficient and cffcctivc. " 
Childrcn's scrvices safeparding and rights - Pcrforrnance Dataset Monitoring ft ft 
Tool - Introduction: "We %%-ant to cnsure that the good work being done at the front- 
line of the service is reflected within. " 
Head of Leisure, Arts and Olympics: 
"You must have a good robust evidence trail, and if you have done that, then you show 
that your action plans have all you needed". 
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Acatilsition or resources 
I lead or Leisure, Arts and Olympics: 
"And also you have no basis to say what your priorities are because for example if 
you're looking to empower a certain service, where does the money get spent? Unless 
you get that information, unless you get a measurable performance against those PIs that 
have been set up, you have no idea whatsoever as to how you prioritise how the money 
gets spent. It was a clear message and I think ( ... ) central government drove it around a 
substantial amount of funding opportunities and there had been for quite a few years to 
actually increase your spend within the borough and it had to be based on the evidence 
of data provided and by performance. " 
"But because my area traditionally has been very much based on national performance 
indicators, thcrc isn't that much attention [within LBBD]. " 
Political member responsible for performance management: 31 
"We've looked at the major performance indicators, the ones that are causing us too 
many problems, the ones that are not public service agreements, but that means serious 
money to us, dime million odd I believe if we achieve those LPSA targets in the last 
quarter, I read, we were achieving them and on target to get the 3.7 million, we take 
very seriously the performance indicators that count towards our CPA. " 
"One of the areas that we are trying to investigate and to link up is the amount of 
resources we commit to a service and its effect on performance indicators. " 
"Demonstrate as we tax the local population that we are producing, improving services 
that we consider good services and we can demonstrate that when we take money from 
you, we are using it well by searching out efficiencies, the whole Gershon agenda, 
which I welcome" 
Assistant Manager for housing bencrits and council tax benefit claims: b0 
"Benefits was always a bit of a Cinderella department because the effect in CPA now 
and because of the fact that it is a difficult area, the profile I think of benefits has been 
raised a lot higher. I'm not saying just here but in most local authorities I think it's true 
to say it was the forgotten department, now because it's a key factor in performance in 
the CPA, managers and even members are forced to take more notice of it, it makes it 
easier to get resources and obviously there's more pressure put on if a department is 
failing. I think a lot of that is purely down to the CPA and the BVPI, it's raised the 
awareness. " 
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"the fact that you are measuring pcrforniancc and the fact that managers, scnior 
managers and members arc awarc of it, means that if you arc failing and you ran show 
that it is due to lack of resources, then thcy'vc got the option or thc choice to put in 
resources. " 
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Comparim! perforninnee 
Political member responsible for performance management: 
"What takes you from being good to that bit extra that makes you excellent and we are 
looking at various aspects. " 
"I think very strongly comparisons with neighbouring authorities and national London 
trends, I think that's important to comparc ourselves with outside, to look at what goes 
on in other authorities. " 
Policy and Review Officer at corporate strateg department (person responsible 11y for corporate performance Indicators): 
"It's valuable to have national comparisons and visits to understand good practices. On 
the basis of bcnchmarking members tend to take more action. " 
"nicre needs to be something nationally, like bcnchmarking. " 
Former Corporate Performance Manager: b. 
"One thing I would say is local indicators and benchmarking need to be better directed 
and supported in local government in order to cnable comparison, because even if you 
do have them can you bench mark them? " 
"Generally bcnclunarking is poor across authorities, statutory ones do enable you to 
actually compare nationally and locally on levels at local, so perhaps I'll turn the point 
round and say perhaps the government should actually set what's considered more 
indicative service indicators that are useful, that more consultation and involvement 
with practitioners, because you always get the one about the statutory indicators are fine 
but they don't give us the key aspects of the service. " 
Ilead of Revenues and Bencrits: 
"We know that this is going to be better than us in the same area of business with the 
same kind of clientele, same variance like deprivation or whatever it might be, then I'm 
going to find out what it is that they do and how can we learn from that, so we can learn 
and share best practice and I think it also helps us challenge, it helps us to raise our 
aspirations, it helps us to improve standards because then before you know where you 
are, it's ok you've done this for the past year. " 
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"it would be licipful if there was something that one could rely on nationally in terms 
of, certainly value for money and efficiency which is becoming more of an issue, so you 
could actually say hand on heart this is the true cost of providing this service and this is 
how I compared with that, at the nioincnt I'm having to rely on bctichinitking clubs 
whcrc you are part of a family group, which is not 1xid. If we had a BVIII. that would 
have been great. " 
"It is very difficult because when you arc dealing with people and location, geography 
and stuff likc that, because those arc moving, they will always and vary in the national 
schcmcs. So you need to allow for that kind of variation and that sometimes is very 
difficult to cover sometimes, so that is the main cavcat with those kind or league tables. 
But I'm not discounting them completely bccausc they still tell me a valid picture nnd 
you can still makc allowances for thosc variations, you've got to make allowances for 
deprivation, cvcn regionally, the audit commission has workcd with corc family groups 
and thosc work, within our bcnclimarking groups, wc have family groups, they work, so 
nobody is so distinct that they don't havc anybody that can be comparative with thcm. " 
Group Manager of rents and bencrits: 
"one of the other things that happens and I've seen it so many times is because it is not 
110% clear on a lot of the indicators how you calculate it, 1 can sit here in this authority 
and calculate this indicator and then I can go and I get a set of auditors who come in and 
audit me and they can say right I agree with your calculation and I can have a set of 
people in another authority who get audited by a diffcrcnt sct or auditors and have done 
a calculation completely differently and there's no continuity. " 
Performance Monitoring and Service Development Manager for the revenues and p bcncrits department: 
"I think there will always be a top few, you kind of need them in order to Compare 
authorities but they have to bc taken as what they are, just a broad brush stroke. " 
The Personal Social Scrvices (PSS) Performance Assessmcnt Framework (PAF) 
indicators provide a statistical overview of ChildrcWs Scrvices, Sareguarding & RighVs 
performance allowing comparisons bct%vccn councils over time. 
Corporate Director of Children's Services: 
'7hcre's many of them: PISA is the main one, now revealed that Switzerland is the best 
in terms of basic subjects Maths and English for example or maths and language, the 
best performing internationally, so we went and did a lot of work based on those 
performance indicators, around what was going on in those schools in those 
classrooms. " 
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"National good practice isn't enough, international good practice is much widcr and of 
crucial importance. " 
Divisional Director of Safeguarding and Rights: 
"Of course I do [appreciate bcnclunarking], it's not always accurate though, not in the 
sense of numbers and stats, I don't think it gives you an accurate picture. " 
Performance Analyst for Safeguarding and Rights: 
"Quite frequently we ask our performance team to phone around and get bits of 
information, sometimes they can come back with information because the authorities 
are measuring it, sometimes they don't. Ours is quite extensive, it's more extensive than 
the last authority I worked in and it's more extensive than that of comparators, but it 
works. " 
Ilead of Leisure, Arts and Olympics: 
"It's about say ok what can we extract that we can practice ( ... ) because when we start 
any project or any process and when we're looking at any service delivery we have this 
simple process to say: this is best practice, this is the best way to go about engaging. I 
think we're at the point where as an organisation we rccognisc that if we practice, I 
think it's about being systematic in that process, but it's about making sure that we 
don't reinvent the whccl every time we initiate a matter. " 
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Centril control 
Political mcnibcr responsible for pcrrormaticc manngcment: 
"Anothcr major arca to look for succcss, indications or succcss arc good inslvction 
rcports, I'm actually quitc a fan of inspcction becausc it tclis us as Occting mcmbcrs, 
it's an outsidc rcality clicck. " 
Corporate Scorccard Projcct Manager: 
I think because of the nature of the business, govcmmcnt will alway's have things thit 
locally we nccd to implcment and it's how we apply that locally. 11crc is always going 
to be a trade off betNvecn what mattcrs nationally and what mattcrs I=ally bccausc for 
each borough there arc difTcrent issues. " 
Policy and Partnership Division Officer (person responsible for Local Service 
Partnerships): 
"I think everyone is aware of thcm, in terms of our relationship with the governmcnt 
office for London, we're both very awarc of the tcnsions, %vc live with thcm if you like. 
In terms of the whole agenda ( ... ), it's about devolving rcsponsibility 
for govcmnicnt 
down to the local level. Now we welcome that from our side and wc obviously want to 
move things along quicker than they're able to at ccntral govcrnmcnt position if you 
like. The other issue of course for them and this is vcry undcrstandable is that arc thcre 
issues in terms of loss of jobs and stafling, in central govcrnmcnt level if the devolution 
takes place. There are lots of control issues and it's a question of trust which I think it 
is. " 
Head of Revenues and Bencrits: 
"How compliant are we, arc we central govcnimcnt rcquircmcnt or central govcnuncnt 
requirements, as well as customer expectations? " 
"It's also used to report progress of performance to the stakcholders, so like the 
corporate management team, the chief exec mcmbcrs, the DWP, the ODPNI or the 
departmcnt for communities and the local govcmmcnt DCLG. " 
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Group Manager of rents and buicrits: 
"So if you take for example one of the PI's I've got to do is the number of fraud 
investigators cmploycd per thousand of the case loads. Now I could have 50 fraud 
investigators but not do any investigations, or I could have two who actually do real big 
investigations and gct results. Why am I counting and reporting nationally the number 
of fraud investigators I've got? " 
"So it all fccds in to achieving the scores that go in to the BFI inspection which feed 
into the CPA. " 
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Decislon-ninkim! 
Corporate Director of Customer Services: 
"%Vhcn you have four hundred indicators it's tough to do that, whcri you've got a core 
basket of a dozen or twenty, you can do it, we only really focus on the. top twenty in the 
department at any one time for real managcmcnt nction. " 
Former Corporate Performance Managm 
"it will be considcrcd by a board, the stratcgic planning board, we have a service nnd 
financial planning board that will gathcr all the scrviccablc cards in and as a group it's 
sat on by a director with licads of scrvicc to cnsurc a cross pcrspccIivc and a high lcvcl 
perspective and they will look at say 28 score cards that have bccn subinittcd and they 
will just confirm that in tlicir vicw that's part of the route inap or the goldcn thread. " 
Assistant Manager for housing bencrits and council tax bcnefit claims: b. es. 
"So it's trying to make those decisions quickly and I think that's bccn good because 
before that I can remember when I first started it would dmg on for ages and that was 
really cmphasised to die staff and to managers that try and remove the obstacles and try 
and get things processed quickly. " 
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Individual perforninnee nud reputntion 
Political member responsible for performance management: 
"Should we show improvement to move from a two to a three, from a fair to a good 
council, which wC want to do. And the benefit in that would be enormous in terms of 
reputation of the council and the borough and should make everybody feel good. " 
Corporate Performance Managm 
"CPA results are important also for reputation and credibility. " 
Corporate Scorecard Projcct Manager 
"[PM is important for] attracting a good work force, rctaining the work forcc. " 
"If you're aspiring to progress in your career, it's a good place to come. " 
"Raising aspirations in the community, having a confident community, is all about 
having a good, well performing organisation at the heart of it and if Barking and 
Dagenham became a three star authority out of four stars, that is a good message out 
there that this council is run well, that people can have confidence in its management, 
its structures. " 
"There is a lot in terms of reputation. " 
Group Manager of rents and bencrits: ft 
"Well people are more focused because they know that if their performance is low 
they'll be spoken to about it and if their accuracy is low, they'll be spoken to about it, 
plus it gives us a complete audit trail of everything that's happened, so if we do get to a 
situation where we have to look at their capability, we've got good evidence for that. " 
"If you're a high performing authority, you're going to be someone who's going to be in 
the papers, you're going to be getting people from other authorities, you're raising your 
profile, you're putting yourself in a better position. " 
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Assistant Nlana-cr for housing bcnefits and council tax benefit chims: 
"No, the other side of [CPA] is obviously rcally to stop you gctting into a backlog and 
to make sure the staff arc pcrfonning. " 
Divisional Dircctor of Safeguarding and Rights: 
"So not only do tlicy monitor perfonnancc, but tlicy n1so monitor paformancc of 
off iccrs - do you undcrstand? -, so it's n tool to makc surc that pcopic dcliver what tilcy 
say that thcy dcliver in tlicir day to day work. " 
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Ilerforninnee mmiltorim! nnd improvement 
Corporate Director of Resources: 
Mic basic thing is do you want to know if you're doing a good job. Yes, of course I do! 
Well, we'll give you some measures then, yes well how are you going to measure that, 
ok once you've got the right measure 'you should be clambering for data on that 
mcasurc. " 
"[PM) enables us to decide whether we're making progress towards our objectives, it 
gives us a basis for then taking any action if we're not. " 
Corporate Scorecard Project Manager: ft 
"Well, clearly for any organisation [PM] is a way of showing success and progress, if 
you've set yourself a goal or an objective or a target at the beginning of a service 
planning cycle, the indicators are there primarily to tell you if you've delivered on it or 
not. " 
Policy and Partnership Division Officer (person responsible for Local Service 
Partnerships): 
"So we've done quite a lot of mapping with that information over the last 12 months in 
starting to map out the real hot spots and various issues in certain areas where the 
children are particularly underperforming and you have to have a fairly broad brush 
view of things. " 
'The performance monitoring form that we're developing for local area agreement has 
statistical information, I'll let you have a copy and underneath there'd be a graph 
showing the actual projection of our performance against government and national 
trajectories and on the other side of it there'll be we're trying to map and get some kind 
of mapping actually showing what areas, now that's the intention, it's more useful in 
some issues and some things than others. " 
Corporate Director of Customer Services: 
"So I think sometimes you do need to drill down and ask hard questions about 
performance and circumstances and challenge what the managers and the people doing 
the job want to say. And I don't think that's what we've been good enough at, getting 
down to the real nuts and bolts and specifics of each indicator. " 
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Ilead of Revenues and Bencrits: 
"We need to know that in tcmis of whcrc we're heading to, wlictlicr we nrc dclivaing 
that. " 
Group Manager of rcnts and Uncrits: 
"Well people are more focused because they know that if their perronnancc is low 
they'll be spoken to about it and if their accuracy is low. they'll be spokcn to about it, 
plus it gives us a complete audit trail of everything that's happened, so if we CIO gct to a 
situation where we have to took at their capability, weve got good cvidcncc for that. "' 
Assistant ISlanagcr for housing boidits and council tax bencrit clalms: 
"So, no I think die performance over the last few years and the way it's worked in 
benefits, I think it's been of great help, it's been a good focus on what we actually do. " 
"The main thing really is to manage your workflow. The pcrfonnancc nicasurcs all go 
out to their targets but the day to day business is managing the throughput of work and 
managing staff performance, so the data is not just coliccted for thcm, the data is 
collected to manage the dcpartmcnt on a day to day basis. So, no it's not that wc just 
produce figures for them, we're actually having to use those figures to work from. " 
Childrcn's services safeguarding and rights - Performance assessment framework ft ft (PAF) monitoring tool - June 2006: ft 
"Perfonnance indicators (PI's) arc a tool that managers and councillors can use to 
identify areas of good pcrfonnance and areas of conccm. " 
Corporate Director of Children's Services: 
"[PNI) is the key driver for improvement, it is the key drivcr for improvcmcnt and it's 
not just performance as quantified in figures, it's performance qualitativcly and 
therefore we've spent a lot of time and attention on the obscrvation of classroom 
practice, the quality of the intcraction bct%vccn teacher and pupil and pupil and pupil, so 
we've built up quantitative performance measures of course dctcrmincd and drivcn 
largely by the government's performance indicator, the regime but also qualitative 
observational bank of evidence around performance, the two takcn togetlicr arc 
fundamental I think. " 
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Divisional Director of Safeguarding and Rights: 
"Not only do they monitor performance but they also monitor performance of officers, 
do you understand, so it's a tool to make sure that people deliver what they say that they 
deliver in their day to day work. " 
Performance Analyst for Safeguarding and Rights: 
"We're a lot more conridcnt this year with the team having seen the poor performance 
they went through last year, I think being a lot more proactivc and making sure they 
stay in touch with pcopic and making sure that the young people would want to stay in 
touch with the team. " 
"'We wcrc the poorest performers in the country two years ago, we've got the latchy 
team established that invested money in that over the past two years and we've seen an 
increased performance and we can see that we're doing good for our looked after 
children now, where we weren't before, there's loads of measures around that. " 
"I think national [PIs) are fine, this helps a lot, I think we've got a really strong 
performance culture here anyway, all the managers buy into it, a lot of the work goes 
right into it and it does help us track our performance, where we're doing good and 
where we need to do better. " 
Ilead of Leisure, Arts and Olympics: 
"There arc three main reasons for measuring performance: (1) Robust case to improve 
income; (2) Demonstrate performance; (3) Improvement of performance building on 
actual performance. " 
"You have to get performance indicators that arc consistent, but also add value and then 
measure against that how cffcctivc that is and if you can't prove quite categorically that 
that million pounds that's invested in your service has actually delivered those outcomes 
and outputs and life quality, then there is no ground or evidence to say that you 
have performed. " 
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Appendix 118: LBBD - Nodes and sub-nodes 
" Capabilitics 
" Cost of Phi 
" Data 
" Data collection and quality 
" Quantitative - Qualitative 
" General Info 
" Complexity of the organization 
" Corporate scorccards 
" Impact of PM 
" Information and communication 
" Information flows 
" Perceptions and communication 
" Use of info 
" Introductory information 
" Joined up govcnuncnt 
" Local political members 
National - Local 
" Auditing and inspections 
" Confusion and duplication 
" Relationships with the ccntrc 
National policies 
Objectives 
Objectives and Indicators 
Partnerships 
Performance culture 
Performance Indicators 
Design of indicators 
How measurement is performed 
Local indicators 
National indicators 
Participation 
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* I'Mcas Vs. PMgmt 
* Resou rce dependence 
* Roles of PM 
" Accountability 
" Bcnchmarking 
" Dccision-making 
" Drivers of PM 
" External control 
" Good workforce 
" Impact on community 
" Improve eflicicncy 
" Internal bcnchmarking 
" Internal decisions 
" Learning 
" Monitor current performance 
" Monitor Progress 
" Motivation 
" Performance improvement 
" Reputation 
" Resource allocation 
Target setting 
334 
APPENDIX APPLNTIIX 1) 
Appendix B9: LBBD - Node summary rcl)ort 
Tree node: Capabilities 
Charactcristics: 
" Words Codcd: 149 
" Paragraphs Coded: 6 
" Coding References: 2 
" Sources Coded: 2 
" Cascs Coded: 2 
Trce node: Cost of PINI 
Characteristics: 
" Words Coded: 300 
" Paragraphs Coded: 14 
" Coding References: 7 
" Sources Coded: 5 
" Cases Coded: 4 
Tree node: Data / data collection and quality 
Characteristics: 
" Words Coded: 1.0 IS 
" Paragraphs Coded: 19 
" Coding References: 18 
" Sources Coded: 9 
" Cases Coded: 8 
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Trce node: Data / Quantitative - Qualitative 
Charactcristics: 
" Words Codcd: 320 
" Paragraphs Codcd: 12 
" Coding Rcfcrcnccs: 7 
" Sourccs Codcd: 6 
" Cascs Codcd: 4 
Tree nodc: General info 
Characteristics: 
" Words Coded: 624 
" Paragraphs Coded: 22 
" Coding References: 7 
" Sources Coded: 2 
" Cases Coded: 2 
Tree node: General info / Complexity of the organisation 
Characteristics: 
" Words Coded: 104 
" Paragraphs Coded: I 
" Coding References: I 
" Sources Coded: I 
" Cases Coded: I 
Tree node: General info / Corporate scorecards 
Characteristics: 
" Words Coded: 373 
" Paragraphs Coded: 7 
Coding References: 7 
Sources Coded: 5 
Cases Coded: 4 
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Tree node: Impact or PAI 
Chamctcristics: 
" Words Codcd: 141 
" Paragraphs Coded: 2 
" Coding References: 2 
" Sources Coded: 2 
" Cases Coded: 2 
Tree node: Information and communication / Information flows 
Characteristics: 
" Words Coded: 1.062 
" Paragraphs Codcd: 31 
" Coding References: 17 
" Sources Coded: 10 
" Cases Codcd: 10 
Tree node: Information and communication / Perceptions and communication 
Characteristics: 
" Words Coded: 316 
" Paragraphs Coded: 6 
" Coding References: 5 
" Sources Coded: 3 
" Cases Coded: 2 
Tree node: Information and communication / use or inro 
Characteristics: 
" Words Coded: 1.285 
" Paragraphs Coded: 40 
" Coding References: 22 
" Sources Coded: 13 
" Cases CcAed: 9 
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Tree node: Introductory information 
Characteristics: 
" Words Codcd: 399 
" Pamgraplis Codcd: 24 
" Coding References: 13 
" Sources Codcd: 4 
" Cases Codcd: I 
Tree notle: Joined tip government 
Characteristics: 
" Words Coded: 476 
" Paragraphs Coded: 7 
" Coding References: 7 
" Sources Coded: 4 
" Cases Coded: 3 
Tree node: Local political members 
Characteristics: 
" Words Coded: 371 
" Paragraphs Coded: 7 
" Coding References: 5 
Sources Coded: 4 
Cases Coded: 3 
Trce node: National - local 
Characteristics: 
" Words Coded: 1.536 
" Paragraphs Coded: 30 
" Coding References: 20 
" Sources Coded: 9 
" Cases Coded: 8 
338 
lk 
Tree nodc: National - local / Auditing nnd Inspectlons 
Characteristics: 
0 Words Coded: 735 
0 Paragraphs Coded: 20 
9 Coding References: 19 
0 Sources Coded: 8 
0 Cases Coded: 6 
Trce node: National - local / Conrusion and duplication 
Charactcristics: 
" Words Codcd: 320 
" Paragraphs Codcd. - 12 
" Coding Rcfcrenccs: 7 
" Sourccs Codcd: 4 
" Cascs Codcd: 4 
Tree node: National - local / Relationships with the ccntre 
Characteristics: 
" Words Coded: 1.668 
" Paragraphs Coded: 32 
" Coding References: 26 
40 Sources Coded: 16 
0 Cases Coded: 14 
Tree node: National policies 
Characteristics: 
" Words Coded: 430 
" Paragraphs Coded: 5 
" Coding Rcferenccs: 6 
" Sources Coded: 4 
" Cases Coded: 4 
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Tree nodc: Objectives 
Characteristics: 
" Words Codcd: 965 
" Paragraphs Codcd: 19 
" Coding References: 22 
" Sources Codcd: 10 
" Cases Codcd: 10 
Tree node: Objectives and indicators 
Characteristics: 
" Words Coded: 1.084 
" Paragraphs Coded: 27 
" Coding References: 17 
" Sources Coded: 12 
" Cases Coded: II 
Tree node: Partnerships 
Characteristics: 
" Words Coded: 522 
" Paragraphs Coded: 9 
" Coding References: 8 
" Sources Coded: 5 
" Cases Coded: 4 
Tree node: Performance culture 
Characteristics: 
" Words Coded: 1.368 
" Paragraphs Coded: 28 
" Coding References: 24 
" Sources Coded: 10 
" Cases Coded: 7 
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Tree node: Performance indicators 
Charactcristics: 
" Words Codcd: 818 
" Paragrnphs Codcd: 10 
" Coding Rcfcrcnccs: 8 
" Sourccs Codcd: 4 
" Cascs Codcd: 3 
Tree node: Design of Indicators 
Charactcristics: 
" Words Codcd: 714 
" Paragraphs Codcd: 17 
" Coding Rcfcrcnces: 14 
" Sourccs Codcd: 6 
" Cascs Codcd: 5 
Tree node: How measurement is performed 
Characteristics: 
" Words Coded: 35 
" Paragraphs Coded: I 
" Coding References: I 
" Sources Coded: I 
" Cases Coded: I 
Tree node: Local indicators 
Characteristics: 
" Words Coded: 750 
" Paragraphs Coded: 40 
" Coding References: 15 
" Sources Coded: 8 
" Cases Coded: S 
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Trcc nodc: National Indicators 
Cham. cteristics: 
" Words Codcd: 1.023 
" Paragraphs Codcd: 29 
" Coding References: 23 
" Sources Codcd: 10 
" Cases Codcd: 7 
Tree notle: Participation 
Characteristics: 
" Words Codcd: 867 
" Paragraphs Coded: 25 
" Coding References: 16 
" Sources Coded: 12 
" Cases Coded: 10 
Tree node: Pmeas Vs. PINIgnit 
Characteristics: 
0 Words Coded: 612 
0 Paragraphs Coded: 16 
0 Coding References: 12 
0 Sources Coded: 6 
0 Cases Coded: 3 
Tree node: Resource dependence 
Characteristics: 
0 Words Coded: 1.002 
0 Paragraphs Coded: 30 
0 Coding References: 18 
0 Sources Coded: 9 
0 Cases Coded: 9 
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Tree node: Roles of PINI 
Charactcristics: 
" Words Codcd: 149 
" Paragraphs Coded: 6 
" Coding Rcfcrcnccs: 2 
" Sourccs Codcd: 2 
" Cascs Codcd: I 
Tree node: Roles of PINI / Accountability 
Characteristics: 
" Words Coded: 1.027 
" Paragraphs Coded: 21 
" Coding Rcfcrcnccs: 20 
" Sources Coded: 12 
" Cases Coded: 9 
Tree node: RoIcs of PAI / Benchmark-Ing 
Characteristics: 
" Words Coded: 987 
" Paragraphs Coded: 21 
" Coding References: 17 
" Sources Codcd: 12 
" Cases Coded: 9 
Tree node: Roles of PINI / Mcision-mak-ing k1p 
Characteristics: 
" Words Coded: 99 
" Paragraphs Coded: 2 
" Coding References: 2 
" Sources Coded: 2 
" Cases Coded: 2 
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Tree nodc: Roles of PAI / Drivers of PAI 
Cham, ctcristics: 
" Words Codcd: 122 
" Paragraphs Codcd: 4 
" Coding Rcfcrcnces: 4 
" Sourccs Codcd: 3 
40 Cases Codcd: I 
Tree node: Roles of PAI I External control 
Characteristics: 
" Words Codcd: 396 
" Paragraphs Coded: 8 
" Coding References: 8 
" Sourccs Coded: 6 
" Cases Coded: 6 
Tree node: Roles of PAI / Good workforce 
Characteristics: 
0 Words Coded: 217 
Paragraphs Coded: 8 
Coding References: 6 
Sources Coded: 4 
Cases Coded: 4 
Tree node: Roles of PAT / Impact on community 
Characteristics: 
" Words Coded: 61 
" Paragraphs Coded: 2 
" Coding References: I 
" Sources Coded: I 
" Cases Coded: I 
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Tree node: Roles of PAI / Improve efficiency 
Characteristics: 
" Words Coded: 62 
" Paragraphs Coded: 2 
" Coding References: 2 
" Sources Coded: 2 
" Cases Coded: 2 
Tree node: Roles of PAI / Internal benchmarking 
Characteristics: 
" Words Coded: 9S 
" Paragraphs Coded: I 
" Coding References: I 
" Sources Coded: I 
" Cases Coded: I 
0 
Tree node: Roles of PAI / Internal decisions 
Characteristics: 
" Words Coded: 84 
" Paragraphs Coded: I 
" Coding References: I 
" Sources Coded: I 
" Cases Coded: I 
Tree node: Roles of PAI / Learning 
Characteristics: 
" Words Coded: 18 
" Paragraphs Coded: I 
" Coding References: I 
" Sources Coded: I 
" Cases Coded: I 
345 
Tree nodc: Holes of PINI / Monitor current performance 
Charactcristics: 
" Words Codcd: 706 
" Paragraphs Codcd: 17 
" Coding Rcfcrcnccs: 14 
" Sourccs Codcd: 10 
" Cascs Codcd: 8 
Tree node: Roics or Phi / Monitor progress 
Charactcristics: 
" Words Codcd: 152 
" Paragraphs Codcd: 6 
" Coding Rcfcrcnccs: 3 
" Sourccs Codcd: 3 
" Cascs Codcd: 3 
Tree node: Roles of PINI / Motivation 
Characteristics: 
" Words Coded: 10 1 
" Paragraphs Coded: I 
" Coding References: I 
" Sources Coded: I 
" Cases Coded: I 
Tree node: RoIcs of PAI / Performance improvement 
Characteristics: 
" Words Coded: 407 
" Paragraphs Coded: 12 
" Coding References: 7 
" Sources Coded: 5 
" Cases Coded: 4 
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Tree node: Roles of PAI / Reputation 
Characteristics: 
" Words Coded: 105 
" Paragraphs Coded: 5 
" Coding References: 4 
" Sources Coded: 4 
" Cases Coded: 4 
Tree node: Roles or Pm / Resource allocation 
Characteristics: 
" Words Coded: 572 
" Paragraphs Coded: 16 
" Coding References: II 
" Sources Coded: 6 
" Cases Coded: 5 
Tree node: Target setting 
Characteristics: 
" Words Coded: 783 
" Paragraphs Coded: 30 
" Coding References: 15 
" Sources Coded: 8 
" Cases Coded: 5 
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